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1ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
The object of the thesis is to enquire into various 
aspects of the doctrine of 'tainted' debts in Hindu law, 
as found in the dhurmasastras, and in the light of their 
interpretations by the commentators, digest-writers 
(nibandhaKab as> ana modern scholars; and to explain its 
present position as obtained at the hands of the modern 
courts of law, with an c-:ye on remedies, if any, to rectify 
the ambiguity which presently surrounds the doctrine.
The first chapter begins with a brief survey of the 
sources of our information. Then, it explains the institution 
of the Mltaksara joint family, the father-son relationship, 
the function of the Pious Obligation, and ends with the
introduction of the doctrine of 'tainted' debts.
The first part of the thesis -- chapters two to four - 
enquires into the nature, scope and possible reasons for the 
exclusion of these debts, except the surety debts, from the 
son's liability mainly from the point of view of the sastras
as expounded by the commentators, digest-writers and modern
scholars. In view of their peculiar nature as compared to 
rest of the enumerated debts, as well as their exceptional 
treatment in the sastras, the surety debts are discussed 
separately in Appendix I.
In the second part, the fifth chapter is devoted to 
explaining certain similar but foreign legal concepts alrcdy A < 
known to the British judges, which seem to have influenced 
the judical opinion significantly while administering justice 
in respect of the doctrine of 'tainted' debts. Having this 
information as a background, the sixth chapter proceeds with 
the enquiry concerning the case-law on the subject, as 
developed by the modern courts of law. This, in turn, leads 
us to the question of 'notice of taint'. The significance 
of t-he doctrine of 'notice of taint' , and its place in the 
modern Hindu law of debts is, therefore, discussed in the 
seventh chapter.
The final chapter contains the concluding remarks in 
respect of the future of the 'Pious Obligation' and the 
doctrine of 'tainted' debts in modern Hindu law.
Throughout the thesis an attempt is made to throw further 
light on the controversial points of lav; on the subject.
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7CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The sources of our information
fc
1.2 The nature of the Mitaksara joint family
1.3. The Father-Son relationship
1.4. The function of the Pious Obligation
The doctrine of 'tainted' debts is an exception to the 
general rule under which a Hindu son is held liable to pay 
his father's 'just debts' (for further details see below p.41). 
Although a small pert of the whole body of Hindu law, it has 
been instrumental in improportionateiy greater volume of 
litigation amongst the whole of the case-law accumulated so 
far under modern Hindu law. And vet, doubts persist with' 
regard no its exact purport and applicability. It cannot be 
claimed 'However that no one has so far written about this 
doctrine; but, at the same time, it is true that no one has 
exhaustively dealt with all the aspects of law on the subject; 
hence this attempt.
1.1. THE SOURCES OF OUR INFORMATION
%
This doctrine is found in both the dharmasaTstra and
arthasastra. The term "dharmasastra means 'the teaching (or
science) of righteousness';" and is generally considered as
2synonymous with the smrti-texts - 'revelations remembered'.
The arthasastra is mainly a body of secular knowledge, and is
generally regarded as a secondary authority only to that of
/ 3the dharmasastra.
4 ~
The smrti-texts are numerous: Manusmrti, Yajnavalikya-
smrti e t c ..
1. J .D .M . Derrett, Dharmasastra and Judicial Literature, 
(Wiesbaden, 1973), p.2. On the meaning of the term dharma, 
see P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, vol.I, (Poona,
193o), pp.1-4; K.V.R. Aiyangar, Rajadharma, (Adyar, 1941), 
p.26; R. Lingat, The Classical Law of India, (Berkeley,
Los Angeles, London, 1973), pp.3-4, (vide here the trans. 
by J.D.M. Derrett).
2. H. Chatterjee, The Law of Debt in Ancjent India, (Calcutta, 
1971), Prefatory note, p.XV; also see P.V. Kane, op. cit., 
pp. 131-132; N.C. Sen-Gupta, Evolution of Ancient Indian L a w , 
(London/ Calcutta, 1953), p.6 .
3. K.V.R. Aiyangar, op. cit., prefatory note, p.VIII. However* J 
in view of its scope and the knowledge contained in the artha 
^astra, he says that 1 VijnanesVara brings Arthasastra on this 
among other grounds, under Dharmasastra"; Ibid., p.26.
4. P.V. Kane, op.cit., pp.131-135.
9"These texts .represent a mixture of morality, religion, 
and lav/,. They do not confine themselves to the 
enunciation of juristic rules for guidance of human 
conduct. The ceremonial rules, moral and religious 
injunctions and legal precepts are noticed in 
juxtaposition and no demarcation between them is 
> uniformly maintained. The ethico-religious obligations 
are tressed here more in comparison with the legal 
(obligations. The authors see even secular questions 
with an eye to the moral as well as social consequences 
of the rules. The composers of the dharmasastras 
however did not arrogate to themselves the position 
of law-maKers, but they claimed to be exponents of the 
divine precepts cf law^and compilers of tradition 
handed down to them."
/ 2 Apparently, the dharmasastras dealt with life as a whole,
and therefore even the legal precepts contained in them have
to be viewed in a wider context in order to evaluate their
significance.
The commentaries, such as, for example,^Medhatithi's Manu- 
bhasya, Vijnanesvara's Mitaksara on Yajnavalkya-smrt i , and the 
digests (Nibandhas) such as the Vyavahara-Mayukha, the 
Smrticandrika, the Vivada-Ratnakara etc. have done the job 
mainly of interpretation and reconciliation of the smrtis
3
wherever they found apparent conflicts and contradictions, 
jr* However, like the commentaries, the digests did not confine 
themselves to a particular smrti. On the other hand, both of 
them have made use of various smrtis and other literature in 
order to expound the rules with v/hich they were concerned.
The digests have discussed the views not only of different 
commentators,- but also of earlier n ibandhakaras, e.g.,
Jagannatha‘s Vlvadabhahgarna v a .
1. H. Chatterjee, op.cit., pp.XV-XVI. Also see j.D.M. Derrett, 
op.cit., p.3; R.Lingat, op.cit., p.9ff, N .C .Sen-Gupta, op. 
cit. p.336.
2. K.V.R. Aiyangar, op.cit., p.34.
3. H. Chatterjee, op.cit., p.XVII; also see N.C. Sen-Gupta, 
op.cit., p. 18 where he says, "The task of commentators was 
like that of the Roman Jurisconsults to reconcile the 
numerous texts and to adapt them to the existing conditions 
of society."
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“They developed the law not only with reference to the ' 
sacred traditions but aioO with equal regard to the 
practical needs of the society of the time. This 
becomes very prom.inent in the commentaries from 
Vis'varupa and Vijnanesvara down to authors like 
1 Candesvara of Mithila and Nilakantha, who were 
practical lawyers.and who tried to expound the law 
as much with reference to sastras as to the practical 
needs of the society. It wj.ll appear from a study 
of these commentaries that it is by reference to the 
social usages and the needs of the society that each 
of the commentaries has been developed.111
In view of their superior scholarship and sound judgement/
some of the commentaries are considered as authorities. The
Mitaksara of Vijnanesvara is a remarkable example of this, for,
though a commentary on the Yajnavalkya-smrti, it has been
treated as a final authority throughout most of India. On the
other hand, certain digests too have been followed by the
modern courts as an authority in a particular part of the
2
country, e.g. the Vyavahara-Mayukha in western India ,i.e. 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. The composition and compilation of 
nibandha-texts continued upto the end of the 18th century,
and a few of them were written even under British patronage
3 _ _
in India , e.g. the Vivadabhangarnava by Jagannatha Tarkapanca-
nana in c. 1792 A.D., which was translated by H.T. Colebrooke 
in,three volumes between 1796-97 under the title of 'A digest 
of Hindu law on contracts and succession1. It may not be out 
of place to mention that Colebrcoke's rendering of the sastric 
precepts concerned, particularly that of the term gyyavaharika 
used by' Vyasa and Usanas, has considerably influenced the 
doctrine of 'tainted1 debts as developed by the modern courts 
of lav;.
1. N.C. Sen-Gupta, op.cit., p . 18.
2. For further information, see H. Chatterjee, op.cit., p.XVIII, 
f.n.2 .
3. For further details, see J.D.M. Derrett, R . L .S .I ., (London, 
1968), pp.225-273; also see K .Chatterjee, op.cit., p.XIX. f • 
The literate public's interest in the s'astric literature 
still continues, see J.D.M. Derrett, Dharmasastra and 
Judicial Literature, op.cit., pp.6-7; K.V.R. Aiyangar,
op.cit., p .2o
Amongst other sources of our information, mention must ; 
be made of the efforts of all the editors and translators 
of the sastric works , the text-book writers, and the authors 
of independent dissertations, critiques and articles, both 
native and foreign, many of whom have thrown further light 
on various aspects of the sastras as well, as modern Hindu law 
by way of their learned interpretations, critical comments 
and rationalization of legal principles in view not only of 
the sastras but also of comparative international jurisprudence.
All the works referred to or cited throughout this study 
have been indicated and properly acknowledged at the appropriate 
places as well as in the bibliography which accompanies the 
thesis.
In addition, a major source of information is the Law- 
Reports: English as well as Indian. These include the decisions 
made by various higher courts of law such as the Sadar Diwani 
Adalats, High Courts, the Federal Court, the Privy Council and 
the Supreme Court of India.
1
However, as J.D.M. Derrett says,
"The courts frequently had difficulty in ascertaining 
and applying the sastric rule, a misfortune springing 
from a literature which has largely been misunderstood.
But the method adopted by the British since 1772 .....
produced a uniformity and certainty which would have 
been impossible if that misunderstanding had not 
occurred."
Admittedly the case-law has achieved a degree of uniformity 
and certainty; but on the other hand it will be found, particu­
larly in respect of the doctrine of 'tainted' debts, that in
spite of the judiciary's claim that it silll applies the sastri c
2
law, its decisions have produced a result according to which
1. Dharmasastra and Judicial Literature, op.cit., p.9.
2. The decision in the case of Luhar v. Doshi, A.I.R. 196o S.C. 
964, in effect amounts to this. For the facts and detailed- 
discussion see below pp. 248-249, 448 ff.
1 2
the son would have to pay, in certain circumstances, even
proved tainted debts of his father. Besides, certain
liabilities of the father, such as for example compensation
arising out of his criminal acts, which the saseras did not
include in the category of 'tainted' debts, and for which the
1
Orthodox Hindu Court did in fact hold the son .Liable, have 
been brought under the doctrine by the modern, courts of justice. 
Thus, the case".lav; has not fully succeeded in determining 
either the correct import or scope of the doctrine under 
consideration. An effort is therefore made to clarify the 
existing situation which is apparently far from certain so far 
as this doctrine is concerned.
Modern Hindu law, which in fact amounts to Anglo-Hindu 
law, is partly based on the sastras, partly judge-made and 
partly enacted by the Legislature. Apart fAxn these sources, 
the subject matter of this thesis has reference to international 
jurisprudence too. For, as mentioned above, the British 
scholars and judges made the mistake of taking sastric precepts 
for legal principles:
"Now to mistake precepts for principles is to risk 
misjudging the system. It is clear that the British 
(mistaking the sastra for a system akin to Canon Law 
as they knew it) made this mistake; and their contri­
butions to Indian legal literature must be viewed 
against this background. They had no inward knowledge 
of the civilization they undertook to protect, and 
thus could not have applied the precepts even if they 
had recognised them as such. The vast discretion of 
»the Hindu judge of the pre-British times could not 
figure in Anglo-Indian jurisprudence after about 1800, 
when the loose system of referring cases to arbitrators
1. See Met ha jar by B.V.B. at (1913) 15 Bom. L.R., Journal, p. 97 
at pp. 1oo-1o1; for further details see below p. 47 ; also 
see G. Smith and J.D.M. Derrett, 'Hindu Judicial Admini­
stration in Pre-British Times and Its Lesson for Today', 
at 95 (3) Journal of the American Oriental Society, (July/ 
Sept. 1975), 417, at p.422.
i
2\ See J.D.M. Derrett, C .M . H .L ., (Bombay, 1970) p . 15, sec.22.
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ceased to prevail, "
As a result of this certain concepts of English law, such 
as, 'for example, the doctrine of 'illegal’ or 'immoral' debts, 
which, as will be shown (see below chcipter 5) , were taken 
origina].lv from Roman law, entered modern Hindu law and have 
significantly influenced the doctrine of 'tainted' debts.
In order to explain such concepts of forc-.ign origin, therefore, 
recourse had to bemade to a number of books dealing with Canon 
law, Roman law and the Law-Reports involving relevant cases 
on the subject.
Apart from the above-mentioned sources, I have made use of 
a few inscriptions, and have utilized, perhaps for the first 
time, the information derived from a couple of Maharjars 
(a written statement of a suit or case, and of the award upon
2 h *it) which throw further light on how far the^ sastric precepts 
on the subject were applied in actual litigation by the Orthodox 
Hindu Court.
The method of research followed in the present thesis is 
broadly historical. Its first part deals mainly with the 
sastric position in respect of the 'tainted' debts. Its second 
s* part is concerned with the doctrine as developed through the 
case-law. Generally the sastrakaras' views are followed by 
the views of the commentators or digest-writers. But the 
method could not be strictly adhered to because in certain 
cases it. was necessary to utilj.se the commentaries before other 
sastric-texts in order to clarify the meaning of a particular
1. J.D.M. Derrett, Dharmasastra and Judicial Literature, op.cit. 
p.4, "It was an error on the part of eighteenth-century 
foreign students of the few sastric-texts then available
to them to expect to find a complete code of law, ready-made, 
on European lines." Ibid., also see, N.C. Sen-Gupta, op.cit., 
p . 336.
2. J.T. Molesworth, A Dictionary of Marathi and English, 2nd 
edn., (Bombay, 1857), p.636.
I 4
1
text concerned. As tar as the case-law is concerned the 
method is strictly pursued with the hope that it may help us 
to understand the evolution of ideas or legal principles 
involved. The discussion of the dharmasastra is generally 
followed by that of the arthasastra on each of the topics 
discussed; and in each case a conclusion has been drawn in 
the light of the discussion made, and also attempts have been 
made often to suggest possible explanation for the provisions 
of the sastras . The same principle is followed in the rest 
of the thesis while explaining the related doctrines, and 
throughout our critical examination of the case-law concerning 
the doctrine of 'tainted' debts.
Any investigation or discussion of the doctrine of tainted
debts could hardly be possible unless we have a certain prior
— 2knowledge of the nature of the Mitaksara joi'nt family, for
it is a basic concern of our study. We need to go into the
3 4basis and the development of the father -son relationship 
as it has been envisaged by the sastrakaras, the commentators 
and other jurists. We, then, have to ask ourselves: What were
the legal consequences of this relationship, particularly in
1. In order to understand not only the difficulty but also
* futility in discussing the smrti-texts in their strict
chronological order reference may be made to N.C. Sen-Gupta, 
op.cit., p. 20ff. At p.20, he observes, "The chronology 
of the texts relied upon for constructing the history is 
as yet little more than a mass of guesses."
Ajlso see H. Chatterjee, op.cit., p.XX, where he says,
"To construct, historically the original meaning of the smrtis 
is often a speculative task."
2. In what we say in this chapter, it should be understood 
that we have in mind the Mitaksara joint family, and not 
the Dayabhaga family. For the explanation of the difference 
between these two families, see K.K. Bhattacharya, The Law 
relating to joint Hindu Family, (Cal., 1885), pp.54, 158-59; 
P.Sen, The General principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, (Cal. 
1918), p. 161; J.D.M. Derrett, I.M.H.L., (Bom., 1963), pp.345- 
349; R.L.S.I ., op.cit., p.413ff, 431 n.3; C .M .H .L ., op.cit.
p . 55.
3. The term 'father' includes the father's father, and the 
father's father's father.
4. The term 'son' includes the son's son and the son's son's 
son.
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respect of the repayment of the father's debt? How, if any, • 
and to what extent does the pious obligation of the son come 
into play in connection with the debts of the father? It is 
only after answering these questions that we may be in a 
position, to investigate and discuss the doctrine of the 
tainted debts. Let us start with a very brief account of 
the nature of the Mitaksara joint family.
1.2 THE NATURE OF THE MITAKSARA JOINT TAMIL?
The Mitaksara joint family - named after the Mitaksara,
a commentary on the. Ya jnavalkya-smrti (loo A.D. - 3oo A.D.),
written by Vijhanesvara (1125 A.D.) is, perhaps, of recent
origin, in a seiise, relatively to the joint or undivided Hindu
family , the origin of which may go back into remote antiquity.
Though useful, it is beyond ‘the scope of this study to go into
2the details of its evolution from the pre-historic period.
We are fortunate, however, in the sense that we may be able 
to benefit from the research that has already taken place in 
this sphere.
As far as it concerns this study, the consensus of opinion
3
 ^^  of these /cholars appears to endorse overwhelmingly the view 
that the family of this age was, generally, of patriarchal 
form. Thus, it is said that
"the Indo-European family is best conceived as 
resembling the Roman familia, i.e. as consisting of 
the women, children and slaves under the potestas of 
; single housemaster.4"
1. For more detailed exposition of the subject reference may 
be had to K.It Bhattacharya, op.cit., pp.1-61; J. Jolly, 
History of the Hindu Law, (Cal., 1885), pp.81-85; J.D.M. 
Derrett, R.L.S .I ., op.cit., pp.4oo-436; The author here 
traces the history of the juridical framework of the joint 
Hindu family with a particular reference to Aryan and non- 
Aryan families in India.
2. For a brief survey, see J.C.Ghose, The Principles of Hindu 
L a w , I , (Cal., 19o6), pp.363-366; N .C .Sen-Gupta, op.cit., 
p p .159-6o.
3. Such as Dr. Schrader and Rudolph von Ihering etc. ref. to 
by J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.365,n.
4. ibid. p .363.
There is clear reference to the despotic power of the
head of the family or house-holder (i.e. the living eldest
ascendant) over his wives and children. Apparently, the
blood-relationship (mainly on the male side) was highly
regarded, and the family property, it seems, belonged to uhom
in common. For, "the notion of private property in land and
soil was quite unknown to the Aryan: he recognized only common
2
property." The statement is admittedly conjecture, but, as
3the researches of Walter Ruben confirm, private property m  
land made little, sense in an age of migrations. This might 
help us as regards the remoter background before we begin to 
discuss the joint Hindu family.
Jointness was the normal condition of the Hindu family
4
in ancient times, which grew on patrilineal lines, and 
consisted of persons descended from a common fpale ancestor
5
exclusively through males but this does not mean that a male
adopted or the famales married into the family were excluded.
Besides, the original idea regarding property, especially,
immovable property, namely, that it belonged to the family,
and was intended for its support, and hence no member of the
family had any right to dispose of it as he or she liked,
except for family and religious purposes, seems to have been
6the- law of the ancient Indians.
It may be worth noting here, however, as observed by
7
K .K .Bhattacharya, that it is not the family which is ordinarily 
spoken qf as joint or undivided, in the original texts, but
1. ibid. p. 364 ; There appear similar ref. in the Dharmasastra,
see "A wife, a son, a slave   may be beaten with a rope or
a split bamboo." Manu VIII. 299 , vide G.Biihler, trans. ,
The Laws of Manu, S.B.E.25, (Oxf., 1886), p.3o6; also see, 
N.R. Raghavachariar, Hindu L a w , 6th edn., (Mad., 197o), p.262
2. J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.366.
3. W.Ruben, Gesellschaftliche Entwicklung Indiens.
4. J.C. Ghose, op.cit., p.366.
5. N .C .Sen-Gupta, op.cit., p.16o; for similar views reference may 
. made to West & Biihier, Hindu Law, 4th edn., (Lon., 1919),
p .6o4.
6 . J.C.Ghose, op.cit., pp.366-67; also see J.D.M.Derrett,
R .L .S .I ., op.cit., pp.411-12.
7. op.cit., pp.53-54, 61.
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it is the members composing the family who are said to be
separated or unseparated. Thus, the jointness of the Hindu
family could only he deduced from what the sastrakaras have
said in various context. For example, Manu refers to
'divided'^ kinsmen, in the context of repayment of a debt,
contracted for the purpose of the family^', and states that
the members of the family, though they may have separated
afterwards, must pay the debt. It is well known, too, that
undivided agnates could not act as sureties for each other.
Likewise, it is through such legal maxims that the rights, the
liabilities, the statuses, the obligations and the duties of 
3
the members of a joint family have been gathered together.
In this connection, the Mitaksara of Vijnanesvara has been 
generally accepted as the leading authority in India, and 
the joint family which is governed by this law is called the 
Mitaksara joint family.
The most distinctive feature of the Mitaksara law is 
its doctrine of the son's birthright. Thus, Vijnanesvara 
says "that property in the paternal or ancestral estate is
5
by birth." In support of this proposition, he not only cites
1. Manu VIII.166, G.Buhler, trans, op.cit., p.283; also see 
Yajn.II.45, vide J.R.Gharpure, trans., Vol.II, p t .3, (Bom., 
1938), p.783; "Separated kinsmen as those who are unseparated, 
are equal in respect of immovables." Mit.I.1.3o, vide H.T. 
Colebrooke, Two Treatises on the Hindu Law of Inheritance, 
(Cal., 181o ), p.257.
2. Nand'ana means by the term 'the- family' 'a united family', 
vide G.Buhler, op.cit., p,283, n.166.
3. For more detailed information regarding membership of the 
Mit. Joint family reference may be had to T.Strange, Hindu 
Law, I, (Lond., 183o ), pp.198-199; Mayne's Treatise on 
Hindu Law and Usage, 11th edn., (Mad,, 195o), pp.324-325;
West & Biihler, Hindu L a w , op.cit., pp.6o4-6o5; N.R.Raghava- 
chariar,. o p . c i t . , pp.262-263; J.D.M.Derrett, I . M . PI. L . ,
op.cit., pp.244-45, sec. 398.
4. For similar views see K .K .Bhattacharya, op.cit., p.54;
J.D.M.Derrett, C.M.H.L., op.cit., p.54; I.M.H.L., op.cit., 
p.345.
5. H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit., p.256, (Mit. 1.1.27).
Gautama but also popular recognition.' This may be interpreted"
as indicating thai the rule existed already and was not a
new,invention. Mitra Misra (17th cent. A.D.) seems to support
2
this interpretation. Besides, the ownership of the father
_ ~ 3
and son is said to be alike. Thus, according to Yajnavalkya , 
"The ownership of the father and son is the same in land which 
was acquired by the grandfather, or in a corrody, or in
4
chattels;" and as such, it would appear that neither is 
generally in a position to alienate it without tihe consent 
of others, except in the case of movables, wherein the father 
has an independent power of disposal for the purposes prescribed
5
by dharma , i.e. religious benefit, in which, ex hypothesi, 
all members of the family, past, present and future, would 
participate. On the other hand, "during a season of distress, 
for the sake of the family, and especially for pious purposes" 
any member of the family may conclude a valicl alienation even 
of immovable property. This is so particularly when the sons
7
and grandsons are minors and incapable of giving their consent.
1. "It has been shown that the property is a matter of popular 
recognition; and the right of sons and the rest, by birth
is most familiar to the world, as cannot be denied. --- for
the text of Gautama expresses, 'Let ownership of wealth be 
taken by birth; as the venerable teachers direct." Mit.I.1.23 
ibid., p .255.
2. Prayana vyavahara-smrtlnam loka siddharthanuvadakatvam 
iti sakala-nibandhrbhir abhidhanat /
Vir. 1.37, vide G.Sarkar Sastri, ed.& trans., The Vlrami- 
trodaya of Mitra Mis'ra, (Cal., : 8 7 9) , p..1o, for trans. see 
pp.1y - 2o; also K .K .Bhattacharya, op.cit., pp.161-162.
3. Bhur ya pitamahopatta nibandho dravyam eva va/ 
tatra syat sadrsam svamyam pituh putrasya cobhayoh//
Yajfu 121, L.S. Joshi, Dharmakos'a, vol.I, pt.2, (Wai, 1 938), 
p.' 1175.
4. H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit. (Mit.I.V.3), pp.277-278.
5. ibid., pp.256-257.
6 . Mit.I.1.28, ibid., p.257; for a better translation see 
J .D .M.Derrett, I .M . H .L ., op.cit., p.266.
7. Mit. 1.1,29, vide H . T . Colebrooke , op.cit., p.257. * *
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Thus, in the eyes of the sastras, as interpreted by the 
Mitaksara, both the father and the son have equal right in 
the ^ .ancestral and the joint family property; and its alienation, 
except for sastrically approved causes,, might be* objected to 
by the son.
There is, however, an exception to this general rule.
 ^ -J
According to the sastras, the son is said to be liable for
2 3his father's personal and untaintcd~'debts, incurred while
he is joint with him, and the reason for this liability seems
4
to be no other than his being the son of his father. Thus,
1. 'When the father has -—  his debt should be paid by the sons
and grandsons ---.' Yajn.II.5o, vide J.R.Gharpure, trans.,
Yajnavalkya Smrt i , vol.II, pt.3, (Bom., 1938), p.792;
"If he who contracted debts should die --- that debt shall
be discharged by his sons grandsons." Vis.VI.27, vide 
J.Jolly, trans., Institute of Visnu, S.B.E.7, (Oxf., 188o), 
p.44; Narada 1.4, vide, J.Jolly, trans., Narada, S.B.E.33, 
(Oxf., 1889), p.42; Katya. 55o, 554-55, vide P.V.Kane, 
ed.& tr., Katyanasmrt i , (Poona, 19 39), pp.227-28; also have 
similar provisions, and it may be correct to say that ail 
these sastrakaras, who have laid down the rule (see below 
f.n.3 ) to the effect that the son need not pay 'tainted 
debts' of the father, by implication, accepted this position.
2. 'Personal' because the debts for the purpose of the family 
etc. were to be paid by all the coparceners besides the sons; 
see Yajn.. 11.45, vide J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.783; Manu
VIII.166, vide G.Buhler, op.cit., p.283; Katya 542-43,
'vide P.V.Kane, op.cit., pp.225-26.
3. 'Untainted', for 'tainted debts' are excepted by the 
sastrakaras; see, Gautama XII.41, vide G.Buhler, trans.,
S.B.E.2, (Oxf., 1879), p.241; Vaeistha XVI.31, vide G.Buhler, 
trans., S.B.E.14, (Oxf., 1882), p.32; Manu VIII.159, vide
G.Buhler, op.cit., p.282; Kautilya 3.16.9, vide R.P.Kangle, 
trans . , Kautiliya Arthasastra , pt. .II, (B o m ., 1963), p . 281 ; 
Narada I.1o, vide J.Jolly, trans., op.cit., p.45; Katya, 
554-55, vide P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.228; Yajn.II.47, vide 
J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.786; Brhaspati XI.51, vide J.Jolly, 
trans., S.B.E.33, op.cit., p.329. Also, see P.V.Kane,
H .D h ., vol.Ill, (Poona, 1946), pp.446-47, notes 752-754.
4. "If the father --- be dead or --- , then the debt incurred
by him --- (should be paid) by the son or the grandson;
and even when there exists no property of the father, in their 
capacity as son and grandson." Mit. on Yajn. II.5o, vide 
1 J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.792. (My emphasis).
2o
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it would appear that though the son acquires ar inheres equal 
to his father's in ail ancestral and joint family property, 
by birth alone he is liable to lose this to pay his father’s 
debts, as mentioned above. Is this a gocd enough reason?
Let us examine the father-son relationship.
1.3 THE FATHER-SON RELATIONSHIP
To faci litate better understanding of the; father-son 
relationship, it is proposed to begin with a. brief account of 
the background of Hindu life, as it is visualised in the 
sastras. It is a characteristic sastric theory that a man 
is born with three (or according to ether authorities, four) 
debts, a concept of great antiquity as it is elaborated in the 
Satapatha-brahmana amongst other texts much older than any of 
our smrtis. These debts are envisaged as existing towards gods> 
human beings, and ancestors. Naturally, there is no conveivable 
limit to the debt to ancestors to whom ones' being is due.
K .V.Rangaswami Aiyangar, in his introduction to the 
Grhastha-kanda of the Krtyakalpataru of Laksmidhara Bhatta 
sums up,
"The background of Hindu Life presents two features. 
Firstly, existence is conceived as continuous, 
stretching from the immemorial past into the future, 
life after life, through the force of Karma. Secondly, 
it is held that a debt which is contracted can be 
liquidated only by full discharge. So lang as one is 
in debt he is unfree. The obligation stretches beyond 
. life, into as many lives as witness the unredemption 
of the debt. Release (moksa) is possible 
only for the debtless, (anrni) . Short of full repayment, 
there is no way out."
These two features, in view of this statement, may be
explained as follows: Karma means action. Every action is
2
subject to the law of consequences which is universal, and it
1. K .V.Rangaswami Aiyangar, ed., The Krtyakalpataru, vol.II, 
(Baroda, 1944) p. 123.
2. K.V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, Aspects of the Social and Political 
System of Manusmrt i , (Lucknow, 1949), p.69.
is through the force of the interactions of karma and its
consequences that life continues. The word debt is, in
Sanskrit, termed 'rnam', which means, besides debt, duty or 
1obligation. Unless it is fully paid, there is no release 
from the 'obligation, i.e. no moks a .
Both these features, action and debt, are further explained
in the sense that they are two expressions or aspects of dharma-
Accordingly, "In external terms, dharma is the action which,
provided it is conformable to the order of things, permits
man to realise his destiny to the full, sustains him in tnis
life, and assures his well-being after death. By its own
virtue that act produces a spiritual benefit for him who nas
performed it, which will necessarily bear fruit in the other 
2
world." Thus, one who behaves according to dharma, is said
to be the receiver of spiritual happiness orfcbliss, and even
3
a little righteousness will save one from the great fear.
Conversely, an act contrary to dharma, it would appear, presents
4 5one with adverse effects, either in this life or in the next.
1 . H .T .Colebrooke, (see below f.n. 3 , p.56); also, see
W.J.Bryne, A Dictionary of English Law, (London, 1923),
p .624 .
2. R.Lingat, op.cit., pp.3-4.
3.> Nehabhikrama-nasosti pratyavayo na vidyate / 
svalpam apy asya dharmasya trayate mahato bhayat //
B g . Gita, I I .4 o , vide A .Roy, e d ., The Message of the Gita, 
(London, 1938), p.35.
4. " ~~~ an unrighteousness., once committed, never fails to 
bring its consequences to the perpetrator", Manu IV.173, 
vide here G.Jha, trans., Manusmrt i , vol.II, p t . 2, (Calcutta, 
1921), p.436; for the text 1na tveva ---- nisphalah'/
see, G.Jha, ed., Manusmrt i , v o l .I , (Calcutta, 1 932), p.387 .
5. "Intense sin and super-virtue may manifest their effects
even in this life. But in Hindu belief the main effect
is on the future births." vide K .V.Rangaswami Aiyangar,
"The Background of Manusmrt i , op.cit., p.73. Also see 
"Destroyed, Dharma destroys; protected, he protects."
(Manu VIII.15), quoted in R.Lingat, op.cit., p.4.
22
On the other hand/
"In internal terms, dharma signifies the obligation.
* binding upon every man who desires that his actions 
should bear fruit, to' submit himself to the laws 
which govern the universe and to direct his life 
.in consequence - That obligation constitutes his , 
duty: and that is the further sense of the wor d .""
It may be correct to say that, in a sense, the obligati.cn 
to submit to the laws of the universe, in those days, appeared 
similar in modern terms, to the principle of respect for the 
rule of law; and the sastras seem, therefore, to have favoured 
rule of law in a wider sense. The gist of the matter is that 
man has been expected to lead a moral life as understood by
o
the sastras. The source of his rise or fall is his action.'"
In order to pay his debts fully, it is believed, he is subject
3
to transmigration , until he has reached the final stage of 
_____________________________________________________fc____________________
1. Ibid.
2. It may be noted here that many writers have found defects 
and loopholes in this theory of karma; some have modified 
it and introduced the concept of Idvara. Thus,
Isvarah karanam purusa karmaphalya-darsanat // 19 
na purusa-karmabhave phala-nispatteh // 2o 
tat-karitatvad ahetuh // 21
Gautama-nyayasiitra, IV. 1.19-21, vide G.Jha, ed . , (Poona,
- 1 939), pp. 25o-251; also, see F.Max Muller, The Six Systems 
of Indian Philosophy, (London/ Bombay, 1899), p.556.
For further critical information, see E.W.Hopkins, 
'Modifications of the Karma Doctrine', Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 19o6, pp.581-593; cf. V.S.R., Maharajah 
of Bahhili, ibid. (19o7), pp.397-4o1; and again E.W.Hopkins, 
ibid., pp.665-672; A.B.Keith, The Religion and the Philo­
sophy of the Vedas & Upanishadas, (Oxford, 1925), p p .6 3 5-36; 
(for further references see below p.36 ff,where the subject 
of transfer of merit etc. is discussed in more detail}.
3. K .V.Rangaswami Aiyangar, op.cit., p.74; q. Manu XII., 17-18,
Tenanubhuya ta --- tavevobhaumahaujasau //
Sa jlvo vltakalmasah / tanyeva pancabhutani --- bhagasah //
Manu XII.22, i.e. "when body dies, the self first undergoes 
its appointed purgation by suffering for its lapses, and 
then re-enters the five elements composing the material 
body in new form." It may be noted, here, that the 
materialists did not believe in the existence of an 
antecedent life; see U.Mishra, History of Indian Philosophy, 
vol.I, (Allahabad, 1957), p.216.
23
life, i.e. moksa or ‘heavenly bliss'.
If one examines this morality closely» it would appear that
"Its foundation and its sanction are religious, but it is 
essentially social in the sense that, in a social order 
visualised as one with the natural order, the individual 
who obeys its precepts performs a duty which is as much 
social as religious"^
Thus, looked at from this point of view, the realisation 
of dharma is necessary, and unless men put their duties, as 
envisaged by dharma, into effect, (i.e. fully meet their 
obligations), no realisation of dharma is possible. With this 
information in the background, we may, now, turn to our main 
enquiry into the father-son relationship.
Manu says that "One shall turn his mind towards liberation
"3only after having paid off the three debts  ^ What were those 
three debts? According to the Veda, a man is born burdened 
with three debts. He owes the study of the Vedas to the 
Rsis (sages), sacrifices to the Gods, and a son to the manes; 
and by studenthood (brahmacarya) , by performing yajnas 
(sacrifices), and by procreating sons he frees himself from
1. Regarding moksa see Manu VI.33, in f.n,3 below. Apastamba, 
in regard to 'heavenly bliss' states, "The revealed texts
declare ---  a reward without end, which is designated by
the term 'heavenly bliss'." Apas.I I .9.2 3.11, vide G.Buhler,
S.B.E.2, cp.cit., p . 157; also see J .R .Ghurpure, Teaching
of Dharmasastra, (Lucknow, 1956), pp.36-39; R, Lingat, 
op.cit., p.4, f.n.5.
2. Ibid, p.4
3. Manu VI.35, vide G.Jha, op.cit., vol.Ill, pt.I, p.219; 
also, see Manu VI.36-37, ibid, pp.22o-22.
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those three debts respectively. ! Thus, procreation of a sou
2is one of man's three debts or obligations, which he has
to pay to his ancestors. The purpose of begetting the sen
has been very succinctly stated in the Ait, Br.33.1.
It is stated there "A debt he payeth in him, and immortality
he attaineth, that father who seeth the face of a son born 
3
living." Thus, the purposes served by a son are payment ci
1. Jayamano vai brdhmanastribhirrnava jayate brahmacaryena 
rsibhyo yajnena aevebhyah prajaya pitrbhya esa va anrno 
yah putrT yajva brahmacarivasi /
Tai. Samhita Vl.3.1c.5, vide A.S.Dhupkar, ed., (Aundh,
1945), p.316; see also, P.V.Kane, H . D h . , Vol.II, p t . I ,
(Poona, 1941), p.56o, f.n.13o2; M.L.Sandal, trans., Purva 
M rmamsa, Jaiminisutra, (Allahabad, 1923), p.325; 
Aitareyabrahmana, 33.1, vide A.S.S. No. 32, (Poona, 1896), 
p.835; A.B.Keith, trans., Rgveda Brahmana s , (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 192o), p.2'99; W.D.Whitney, ^ trans . , Atharva- 
Veda Samhita, pt.1, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 19o5), 
p. 367; Sat.Brahmana, 1 .7.2. 1 , (and n. 1 )J♦Eggling, trans.,
S.B.E.12, (Oxford, 1882), p.19o; Vasistha XI.48, vide 
G.Buhler, trans., S.B.E.14 (Oxford, 1882), p.56; Manu VI.36,
& Medha. on this verse quoting Satapathabr'ahmana , I. 7. 2.1, 
vide G.Jha, op.cit., p.22o; Baudhayana II. 9.16.7, vide 
G.Buhler, trans., S.B.E.14, op.cit., p.271; also, these 
debts are referred to at Manu V.257, VI.94, XI.6 6 , vide
G.Buhler, trans., op.cit., pp.169, 215 and 443 respectively; 
j Visnu 37.29, vide J.Jolly, trans., S.B.E.7, (Oxford, 188o), 
p . 137; J.Jolly, Hindu Law and Custom, (trans. by B.Ghosh),
- cited above, p p .211 -12; Mayne's Treatise on Hindu Law and 
Usage, 11th e d n ., op.cit., p.1o5; These debts are alsc 
referred to in The Buddha-Karita of Asvaghosh, trans., by 
E.B.Cowell, S.B.E.49, p t .I , (Oxford, 1894), p.1oo-
It may be noted that a life-long student or safn.nyasin was, 
it seems, excluded from the payment of debt (of procreating 
son e t c .), see Vedanta-sutra, III. 4 .17 , vide G .Thibaut, trans
S.B.E.38, pt.II, (Oxford, 1896), p.295.
2. For these duties are essential and obligatory and are not 
left to choice; see,
Brahmanasya tu somavidyaprajamrnavakyena samyogat /
Jaiminisutra, VI.2.31, vide M.L. Sandal, op.cit., p.325, 
also see P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.56o.
3. vide A.B.Keith, op.cit., p.299; also see,
Rnam asmin samnayaty amrtatvam ca gacchati /
pita putrasya jatasya pasyec cej-jivato mukham, iti //
vide A.S.S. No.32, op.cit., p.835.
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debt to the ancestors and the securing of
immortally1 and hcaver. Moreover, it appears that as long 
as the process of procreation (of sons) continues, it is believed 
that it increases the contribution to the fame and heavenly 
bliss of departed ancestors. This seems to happen through 
the continuity of performance, according to the sastras, of 
the religious rites.*
One is, however, likely to wonder at the credibility of such 
ideas, and there is no denying that it is impossible to prove 
whether the pit re really reap any fruit from the rites wh.ich 
their sons have performed for them. The explanation may lie 
in the natural parent-child relationship. It may therefore 
be argued that if looked at from a different point of view, 
this dilemma might be better understood. The existence of such 
an idea might have been the product of both faith and some real 
experience, subjective, of course, on the part of the performer.
It is due to faith, in the sense that one believes and follows 
certain things because he is taught to do so; and one could 
hardly come across a faith which has not any practical foundation 
or use. In this case, the practical side of it (which is 
susceptible of proof by experience) might be assimilated with 
the resultant satisfaction of the son. This might be explained 
thus: generally, children are loved, cared for and brought up 
by"their parents. Their kindness and affection might generate 
a feeling of gratefulness, and, as a result, the children feel
1. This; idea of achieving immortality seems to have been voiced
in the Rgveda. ,f  and may I be immortal by my children."
Rg.V.4.1o, vide R .T .H .Griffith, trans., vol.II, (Benaras, 
189o), p . 193; even in the later age of the smrtis like
Manu IX.1o7, where in a slightly different context, the same 
idea is laid down. "That son alone to whom the man transfers 
his debt and through whom he attains immortality, is the 
'duty-born son'; " vide G.Jha, op.cit., vol.V., p. 87; also,
"He (the father) throws his debt on him (the son); and the 
father obtains immortality." Vis.XV.45, vide J.Jolly, op.cit., 
p . 65.
2. "These (sons) ... increase the fame and the heavenly bliss 
... of the preceding ones." Apa s .I I .9.24.3-4, G.Buhler,
o p .c i t ., p .158.
a kind of obligation. Because they owe so much to thei.r
parents, their gratitude is generally reflected in their
caring for the parents during their old age. This filial
gratitude- in return, satisfies the parents, which might be
construed as the sign of their contentment in the last days
of their lives. In other words, such a stage of peace and
happiness is possiole only when a man has fulfilled his duties.
Thus, in a circular way, every generation seems to have incurred
-)
this obligation towards its parents (and ancestors) , the 
basis of which seems to lie in the interactions of the natural 
parent-child relationship. In this sense, it would appear that 
the rna- (obligation or debt) principle, as envisaged by the 
sastras, evidences the consciousness of moral obligation. 
Further, it may be pointed out that, the fact that the develop­
ment and maintenance of one's career is owed^to ones parents 
or ancestors instils a sense of duty impelling continuance 
of the same treatment to one's progeny. Thus, the sense of a 
moral duty is itself the dharma: a source of obligation or rna.
Thus, to continue our theme, i.e. continuity of performance
of religious rites and the consequent spiritual benefit of
the departed ancestors, it may be pointed out here that 'the
son's close connection with the offering of pindas to the ancestors
is not much emphasized in the oldest works.' Its prominence
3is visible in the sutra and the smrti literature , (see Manu
IX.136). If this is true, then, why should those earliest
1. For, even the pitrs were expected to aid. "May the most
glorious fathers aid us, --- rescue us from all distress."
Rg.I.1o6.3, vide R .T .H .Griffith, op.cit., vol.I, (Benares, 
1889), p. 181, n.3 explains the term fathers (pitarah)are 
the manes or spirits of departed ancestors. Also see,
"we may support children, and children's sons."
Rg.I.92.13, ibid.p.156.
2. P.V.Kane, H .D h ., vol.III. (Poona, 1946), p.642.
3. In this connection reference may be had to Jagannatha, 
vide H.T.Colebrooke, trans., Digest, vol.Ill, (Calcutta/ * ' 
London, 18o1), pp.293-297, (verses 3o2 to 313).
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scriptures impose this mandatory duty (see above f.n.2, p.24) 
of procreating a son on every man? In fact, the Satapatha- 
brahmana repeats again and again that the benefits to the 
ancestors accruing from the individual's Vedic study and 
other religious duties return to him oy way of benefits con­
ferred by the ancestors themselves.
Now, as has been stated, the debt to the manes is simply
that of begetting a son; and accordingly, the matter should
end there. Against this, the idea that the son enables the
father to pay off the debt he owes his ancestors (see pp.22-23
above), appears somewhat strange, for it seems merely self-
help. Perhaps it is the process and the happy (?) coincidence
that begets the son, and not the sen as such, that appears to
be instrumental here in enabling the father to pay the debt.
But even this interpretation seems to be absurd, especially
1
in view of the universal yearning for a son in the Veda.
Why should the son be wanted so badly?
One suspects that there should have been something more to 
it than what is apparent just from the literal meaning of the 
term. Perhaps, the wider construction given to it, in the 
Ait.Br.33.1 (see above pp.22-23) confirms this. Let us enquire 
whether this construction has any foundation.
o
We come across a verse in the Rgveda** which clearly 
indicates that the son is 'canceller of debts'. The debt 
referred to here is one which his father owed to his progenitors.
1. "To us be born a son, and spreading off spring. Agn i , be this thy 
gracious will to us-ward." Rg.III.1.23, vide R.T.H.Griffith, 
op.cit., vol.I, p.4o9;
"O' Dawn, enriched with holy rites   we may support
children, and children's sons." Rg.I.92.13, Ibid, p . 156.
"To him who worships soma --- a glory to his father."
Rg.I.91.2o, Ibid., p . 153
In ^g.I.162.22, it appears to have implied that the sacrificer 
in return for his performing this sacrifice, expects both 
spiritual and temporal benefit including 'manly offspring V 
as well as freedom from sin. Ibid., p.28o.
2. Iyamadadadrabhasamrnacyutam das'use /
Rg.VI.61.1, vide, P.V.Kane, H .D h ., op.cit., vol.Ill, P.415, 
n.674; also see R.T.H.Griffith, vol.I, op.cit., p.4o9.
3. Ibid., n .1
1
Further, vu notice in the Atharva-veda a raterence to debts
owed in :;his world. Does this mean that it refers to a secular
debt? It would seem so-/ for the word indicating the debts
owed in this world is lokah ,in place of the term rsl s .
Moreover in this context, it has been clearly pointed out
that the term (dnrna) "has, here, both a sacred and a profane
meaning, applying to what one owes to his fellow-men, and what
3
duties bo the gods." This leaves hardly any doubt that secular 
debts were meant here.
4
So, from what has been laid down in the A i t „B r .(33.3),
i.e. ’bv means of a son, one gets over o n e ’s obligations or 
5
worries (tarnah )'; it appears that the son has been looked 
at as the reliever of his father’s worries and obligation - 
and in view of what is meant by obligations in Atharva-veda 
(VI.117.3) above, it seems.almost certain that secular debts 
of the father would fall under this category. Thus, in view 
of this discussion, the wider construction given to the term
1. Anrna asminn anrnah parasmin trtiye loke anrnah syama / 
ye devayanah pitrayanasca lokah --- ksiyema //
Ath.veda V I .117.3, vide V.Bandhu, e d . , Atharvaveda, pt.II, 
(Hoshiarpur, 1961), p.826.
2. Kesava (cn Kausikasutra, 46.36) quotes the three hymns 
-.(i.e. Ath.Veda VI. 117.1-3, as accompanying the satisfaction
of a debt after the death of a creditor, by payment to his 
son cr otherwise. vide W.D.Whitney, op.cit., p.366.
3. Ibid., p.367. It may be pointed out here that though 
Whitney renders anrna as guiltless, in the context, here, 
’free front debt or obligation’ is an appropriate meaning.
4. A.B.Keith, op.cit., pp„29 9-3oo;
Sasvatputrena pitro’tyayanbahulam tamah / 
atma hi --- sa iravatyatitarini,iti /
A i t .B r .33.3, vide A.S.S. No. 32, op.cit,, p.836.
5. It may be pointed out here that the term tamah in this 
context seems to mean ’obligation’ or ’worries’ than 
’darkness’ as translated by Keith. Also, see L.R.Vaidya, 
The Standard Sanskrit-English Dictionary, cit. above,
* p. 3o4.
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'debt to ancestors' in A i t .B r .(33.1) appeals to be justifiable; , 
and we may not be wrong in stating that the son,, by then, was 
considered pliable for his father's secular debts. In addition, 
to support this conclusion, it may further be stated, in view 
of what we have discussed above {see pp.16-1? ) in respect
of the ancient families, as well as in respect of the concept 
of debt (pp.2o-22) that the closeknif family-ties, jointness 
of ownership, and absence of separate property might have 
brought about this result.
Let us examine this aspect, (i.e. the son was liable for 
the father's secular debts,) of the father-son relationship 
from a different point of view, as advanced by the sastras.
The s'asfric view is that the son is nothing but his father
i
re-born. It hardly matters whether this view has its origin 
in the desire to perpetuate one's own or one'^s family's name, 
or the desire to secure spiritual benefit.
What really matters, however, is that its acceptance, despite
2
the fact that some- evidence is presented in its favour, would
1. A i t .B r .33.3,6 , vide A.B.Keith, op.cit., pp.299-3oo; Also 
see, A.S,S.No.32, op.cit., pp.836-837; 'Therefore they say 
that he who begets a son produces even his own self; and
it is declared in the Veda, "thou art self, called a son".' 
"See, n.11 on Baudh# II. 9.16.11, vide G.Buhler, op.cit., 
p . 2 7 ? ;
‘In thy offspring thou art born again, that, mortal, is thy 
immortality ' , Apas . I I . 9 . 2 4 .1 , T>ride G.Buhler, op.cit., p. 158;
'Bythemere birth of --- son, a man becomes ‘with son* ",
Manu,I X . 10 6 , G.Jha, op.cit., voi.V, p.87; even the material­
ists "hold that their son is their very self" (and support 
it with a sruti, i.e. Kausitaki Upanisada. I.ii; Sabarabhasya
IV.iii.38); vide U.Mishra, op.cit., p.218; P.V.Kane, H .D h ., 
vol.III., op.cit., pp. 641-642.
2. "Nov/ it can also be perceived by the senses that the (father) 
has been reproduced separately (in the son); for the likeness 
(of a father and of a son) is even visible; only (their) bodies 
are different."Apas.II.9.24.2; vide G.Buhler, op.cit., p . 158; 
also see, U.Mishra, op.cit., p.218.
Regarding sonship reference may be had to J .R.Gharpure,
. Hindu law, 4th edn., (Mad., Bom., 1931), p.98 ff.
3o
lead to seme conflicting results.Thus, it would support the 
view that the son is liable to pay all debts of his father, 
in the sense thcit the father himself would have done so; but, 
it seems to cancel the whole idea of the doctrine of the 
'Pious Obligation1, which will presently be discussed belov;
(see pp. 36-45 ). For, how could one's own act done for the 
benefit of the same person be construed as a pious obligation 
of the son? Then again, we come across the maxim of Jatesti. 
Though in a different context, it clearly implies that the father
and the son are two different selves in the sense that the
/ _  1 fruit of Vaisvar.ara sacrifice accrues to the son (and not to
the father.) It would appear, therefore, that there is hardly
any unanimity among the sastras as to this theory of the father
and the son being one and the same. What in fact is meant by
this theory might well be their oneness in tjje representative
sense.
To sum up this discussion before we turn to the smrtikaras,
it may be conjectural that by the payment of three debts,
originally, the sacred triple debts only might have been
contemplated. But, as time passed on, as we have seen above
2
(see pp.26-27), secular debts were gradually added to this
1 .*Although the author acknowledges the existence of another 
Vedic text 'Atma vai putrah', 'A son is one's own self'; 
the fruit goes to the son by virtue of their being no 
relationship of a part to its whole. Vide M. I.. Sandal, trans. , 
The MImamsa. .Sutra of Jaimini, (Allahabad, 1 923), pp. 233- 239 .
2. Actually the original list of three debts seems to have been 
amended so as to include new entries. See,
Rnais' catuibhlh -- / pitr-deva rsi-manuja-deyaih 
i^atasahastrasah //
M. Bh. 1.111 .12, vide V . S .Sukthanakar, e d . , B.O.R.I., vol.I, 
part II, (Poona, 1933), p.493;
Rnam unmucya devanamrslnam --- /
pitrnam atha vipranamatithlnam ca pancamam //
M.Bh. XIII.37.18, R.N.Dandekar, e d . , B.O.R.I., vol.XVII, 
pt. I, (Poona, 1966), p.25o. Cf. P.V.Kane, H.Dh., vol. Ill, 
op.cit., pp.415-416, f.n. 675. Also see, Satapatha B r . f .
I.7.2.1, op.cit., p.19o; Prajapati q. in A p .II .9.24.7-8, 
op.cit., p . 158; Baudhayana II.6 .11.34, vide G.Buhler, crans.,
S.B.E.14, (Oxford, 1882), p.262. For similar obligation, see 
also, Gaut.V.3, vide S.B.E.2, op.cit., p . 198; Manu III.69-72 , 
vide G.Buhler, S.B.E.25, op.cit., pp.87-88; IV.19-21, at 
pp.131-132.
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j*1*
list and the son was expected to pay such debts of his father.
When we come to consider the views of the sutras and the 
smrtis, we enter into an obscure situation. Obscure because, 
on the one hand, the sutrakaras and the earlier smrtikaras like
Gautama, Vasistha, Manu, as against the later smrtikaras like
~ 1 '" 2 3
Yajnavalkya, Narada, ' Katvayana, seem not to have positively
4
attributed this liability to the son; but on the other hand, 
all of them lay down in very clear language, that certain 
secular debts of the father need not be paid by the son, and 
on this point, both the dharmasastra and the arthasastra are 
in agreement.^
g
Now, this situation has led certain writers to conclude 
that in view of the earlier sastrakaras, the son is not liable 
to pay his father's secular debts, because of the absence of 
any positive rule to that effect. According to them, his 
liability extends only to the religious debts. These arguments
1. Pitari prosite prete --- va / putra pautrairrnam deyam — /
Yajn. II.5o, vide Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.684; J .R.Gharpure, 
trans., op.cit., p.792.
2. Na putrarnam pita dadyaddadyatputrastu paitrkam /
Nar. IV.8 , vide Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.695; also see J.Jolly 
trans., S.B.E.33, (Oxford, 1889), p.45 (verse 1o) .
3. Vidyamanepi --- va / vimsatsamvatsaraddeyam rnam
pitrkrtam sutaih //
Katya. 548, vide P.V.Kane, ed.& trans., cit.above, p.69; 
trans., p. 227 . (Also see Katya. 549, 55o) .
Also, "If he who --- that debt shall be discharged by sons
or grandsons," Vis.VI.27, vide J.Jolly, trans., op.cit., 
p.44; also see Br.XI.49.
4. R.K.Ranade, (195o) 52 Bom.L.R.,J . , p.1. The writer argues 
that these writers of B.C. period do not saddle son etc. 
with the pious obligation in this respect.
5. Reference may be had to Gaut.XII.38, vide Dharmakosa, cp 
cit., p.677; Vasistha XVI.26, Ibid., p.678; Kautilya 111.16, 
Ibid., p.68o; (or according to R.P.Kangle, Kaut.Ill.16.9, 
see his trans., pt.II, (Bombay, 1963), p.281); Manu VIII.159 
Ibid., p.663; Yajn. 11.47, Ibid., p.685; Brhaspati quoted
at p.7o8, Ibid; Narada IV.1o, Ibid., p.695; Vrdahaharita 
7.24 9, Ibid., p.715.
6 . R.K.Ranade, op.cit., p.1; also in (1953) 55 Bom.L.R., J . ,
94, at pp.96-97; also see an anonymous article in AIR 1 923 , 
Journal & P.C., J., pp.71-8o at p.79.
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are, however, apparently of doubtful validity. For, in the
first place, according to Manu VIII.1 do, "the heirs should
pay 'the surety-morey if the father had stood surety for payment;"
and the surety-money is undoubtedly a secular debt. According
to the arthasastra, too, "sons snail pay the debt with interest
2
of a deceased person, or heirs inheriting the property."
Secondly, what does the presence oi express denial of the son's 
liability, in respect of certain .secular debts of the father, 
indicate? Does it serve any purpose in the absence of any 
positive rule to the contrary?
It is respectfully suggested that the presence of this
3
injunction itself indicates the existence of the rule that 
the sons were, in the first place, liable, even in the view 
of the earlier writers, to pay the secular debts of their 
father; and the later sastrakaras seem to ha>ve merely confirmed 
this rule, already in existence.
If that is so, then, the son appears to be liable, generally, 
for the father's debts, irrespective of their nature; sacred 
or secular. Thus, there is hardly any doubt that in view of 
all the sastrakaras, this rule has been applicable to the son.
Now, let us deal with an interesting but apparently discounted 
point of view. According to this view, the liability is attached 
to sons, it seems, "because they are sons, that is, because
4
they are assets of the deceased," ..... This view appears to
1. Vide G.Jha, Hindu Law in its Sources, I, (Allahabad, 193o), p.2o7.
2. Kaut. III.11.14, vide R.P.Kangle, p t . II, op.cit., p.26 2;
C f .* Kaut. III. 11.17-18, Ibid., p.263.
3. Also see Ait.Br.33.3, Atharvaveda V I .117.3 (cited above at 
PP*28“ 29)/ where the secular debt of the father has been 
referred to, and that proves its existence.
4(. An anonymous article 'The doctrine of Antecedent debt', f 
op.cit., at p. 78; also see K.S.Mathur, 'The doctrine of 
Antecedent debt in Hindu Law', AIR 1937 Journal & P.C., 49.
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1rest on misinterpretation of certain sastric texts. True,
it has been stated that the son (among others) might be given,
2sold or abondoned; but this might well he the position in the
3cases of extreme necessity; for, at tne same time, we come 
across rules to the effect that the right of gift or of sale
A
of one's own child was not recognised.*1 Again, if this theory 
is accepted, why should a liquor-seller etc. be deprived of 
his dues from such a slave-owner: the father? Further,
suffice it to say therefore, that in the view of the sastras 
this idea had hardly any place, and hence has never been accepted 
by the modern jurists or the Courts.
At this stage, it would be appropriate to determine the 
basis of this liability of the son. Now, from what we have 
discussed so far, it would appear that it lies in religious 
faith as well as in one's own moral duty. l£ lies in religious 
faith because a Hindu believes (as we have seen above pp.2o-22) 
that a man qualifies for heavenly bliss only after he has freed 
himself from all his obligations; both sacred and profane.
If a man dies indebted, it is believed that his son would
5
relieve him of the spiritual burden by paying his debts, 
thus adding to the spiritual benefit of the father. It lies 
in moral duty, for the son acquires, simply by birth, a right 
in the ancestral and the joint family property (see above p.18). 
Besides, the kind treatment etc. received from the parents 
creates a kind of moral obligation to the effect that it appears 
just and proper that the son souid repay such debts.
1. J.Jolly, History of the Hindu Law, op.cit., pp.81-82; here, 
Jolly clearly states that that the father can sell his son 
at wi l l . Especially, his interpretation of Manu VIII.416 is 
misleading. Cf.Medha. on Manu VIII.416, vide G.Jha, op.cit., 
vol.IV.pt.2, pp.434-35.
2. Vas.XV.2, "(Therefore) the father --- have power to give,
to sell and to abondon their (son)," but, this should be
read with Vas.XV.3-4, - "But let him not ---- the ancestors".
Vide G.Buhler, op.cit., p.75.
3. J.Jolly, op.cit., p.83; J .D .M.Derrett,'Indica pietas:a current 
rule derived from remote antiquity,' at Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stif tung Rechtsgeschichte , Rom.Abt., vol 86, (1969)37, p. 47.
4. "The gift --- and the right to sell -- not recognised." Ep-
as . II .6.13.11, vide G.Buhler, op.cit., p. 131.
5. 'Fathers wish to have sons he will release me from all obligations
towards superior and inferior beings'. Nar.1.5, vide J.Jolly, op.cit., 
p.42; also see, Vyavastha-candrika, of S.C.Sarkar, vol.II, (Calcutta,
188o), p.2.
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This brings us to the views of the commentators. Here
1 ~again, we find no one opinion. Thus Visvarupa (on Yajn.II.51) 
says that, "the son of one who has left no property shall not
be liable, ----  for debt follows assets,"^ But, according
to the Mitaksara (on Yajh.I I .5o), it shall be paid "even when
there exists no property of the father, in their capacity as
3 4son and grandson." Devanna-bhatta, quoting Katyayana, appears
r 5to agree with the view of Visvarupa, while Nilkantha-bhatta,
quoting another verse of Katyayana, says that 'even in the 
absence of paternal wealth the son is liable to pay his father's 
debt.' It may be pointed out here that in fact Devanna-bhatta
g
refers to both the verses of Katyayana which seem to be
contradictory. Actually, the contexts in which these should
7
be applied differ. Apararka (on Yajn.II.51), glosses that
rktha-graha (one who has received the estate) does not apply
~ * 8
to the son, 'hence, he seems to support Vijnanesvara; so does
Mitra Misra. According to him, "the son must pay with interest
whether he takes the estate or not; in the absence of a son
the grandson must pay with interest if he takes the estate,
but the capital only if he does not; the great-grandson need
9not pay even the capital if he does not take the estate."
** This is how the commentators s'ee the problem.
1 . Na tvadravyasyaiva putro dadyat / rnasya dravyanusaritvadi- 
tyetat prageva jhapitam / 
vide Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.6 8 6 ,
2. Vide K .P .Jayaswal, Manu and Ydjnaxalkya, (Calcutta, 193c), 
p. 193; also see, R.K.Ranade, op.uic., p.2.
3. Ibid., also see, J .R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.792.
4. Vide J .R.Gharpure, trans., The Smrtlcandrika, V y a .Kand a , 
pt. II, (Bombay, 195o), p.319.
5. Vide V.N.Mandlik, trans., Vyavahara-Mayukha, (Bombay, 188o), 
p. 112; Borradaile, trans., V y a .-Mayukha, (Madras, 1 879),
p . 116; P.V.Kane, trans., V y a .-Mayukha, (Bombay, 1 333), p.216.
6 . Vide J .R .Gharpure, op.cit., pp.318-319.
7. Vide P.V.Kane, ed.& trans., cit. above, pp. 7o and 229.
8 . Vide K.P.Jayaswal, op.cit., pp.192-193, also see Dharmakosa,
op.cit., p .6 8 8 .
9,. J.D.M.Derrett, ' Indica pietas', op.cit., pp. 37-66 , at
p .46, n .2 2 .
Putrena rikthagrahanagrahana yoh --- prapautrena tu
rikthagrahane mulamapi na deyam /
Vide V . P .Bhandari, ed., Viramitrodaya, V y a .prakasa , vol.VII.
(Benares, 1932), p.264; also see, P.V.Kane, H.Dh., vol.Ill, 
op.cit., p.445  ^ f.n. 749. ------
From the pornt. of view of our study, the view of the ?
Mitaksara is very important in the sense that it is his {i.e.
Vi jnanesvara’s) interpretation (of Yajn.II.5o) which is at
the root, or so it appears., of what is known, these days, as 
the doctrine of the Pious Obligation; though, the germs of 
this idea have, it would appear from the above discussion 
(see p .22 ff) , in a sense, been iri existence throughout tne
period since the notion of rnam, and the devices by which it
1 , 2 could be paid, developed. In Vijnanesvara's view, 'a son
who has attained the age of majority, leaving aside his personal
interests, should free his father from debts by (all) efforts, 
so that he may not (have to) go to hell .1 Thus, the purpose 
for which VijnanesVara wants the son to pay his father's debt 
by all means at his command, is to save him from going into 
hell due to his indebtedness; and this the §on should do with­
out any selfishness. In a sense, this purpose seems to be more 
of a socio-religious nature, for the repayment saves the family 
from loss of prestige in the society as well as serving the 
religious purpose of saving the father from spiritual punishment 
It is for this reason that it is a son's pious duty to pay his 
father's debt; and he should fulfil it, in the view of the
3
Mitaksar5, even if he receives no property from nis father.
Thus, in view of the sastras, as interpreted by the Mitaksara 
the father-son relationship gives, on the one hand, the son 
a right by birth in the ancestral and joint family property,
1. J.D.M.Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', op.cit., at pp.37-38, ex­
presses the opinion that the P.O. seems to have been in 
existence between 15oo and 9oo B.C..
2. Atah putrena jatena svarthmutsrjya yatnatah / rnatpita 
mocanlyo yatha na narakam vrajediti / putrena vyavahara- 
jffataya jatena nispanneneti vyakhyeyam /
Mit. on Yajn.II.5o, vide B.S.Moghe, e d . , Yajnavalkyasmrt i , 
Vyavaharadyaya (with the) Mitaksa r a , (Bombay, 1879), p.1o5.
3. It may be noted that by the Hindu Heir's Relief Act, (Bombay 
Act VII of 1866) the son's liability is, now, limited to the 
extent of the assets that come to his hand, the same is the 
law laid down in the other parts of India by judicial 
decisions.
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but imposes, on the other hand, a pious duty upon the son to 
pay his father's dharmic or just debts: both sacred and profane.
We shall now turn to the function of the so-called 'Pious 
Obligation 1.
1 .4 THE; FUNCTION OF THE PIOUS OBLIGATION
In the course of above discussion, we have noticed how the 
notion of rna or obligation developed into various religious 
and secular debts. Also, we came across the process by which 
the ancient idea of getting rid of obligations of a religious 
nature, through sons (Rg.VI.61.1 etc.), was later assimilated 
and applied to that of secular liability. The payment of these 
spiritual or secular debts is necessary to avoid the evil
consequences arising from their non-payment; for "the non-
1 2 %
payment of debts" is an offence (sin).  ^ We have also seen
(see p.2 2) above the various methods of repayment of these
debts, devised by the developed sastras. Thus, the doctrine
3
of the Pious Obligations is one of many such devices, the basis 
of which lies in the religious and moral obligation of the son 
to pay his father's debt. But how does it operate and what is 
the scope of this doctrine?
This liability imposed upon the son, under the doctrine of 
the Pious Obligation, would hardly make any sense, unless we 
examine how the father benefits spiritually from the son's 
meritorious deeds. To sustain the Pious Obligation, therefore, 
one has- to inquire into whether merit is transferable.
1. Manu XI.65, vide G.Jha, op. cit., vol.V, p.392; according 
to Medhatithi the term 'debt', here, "refers to the non­
performance of those acts that have been laid down as paying 
off the 'four debts' (to the Gods, the Pitr s , the man and the 
fires).", vide, Ibid, pp.392-393.
2. "To omit to perform the act enjoined brought sin in any 
event, and sin brought misfortune in this life and the 
prospect, if not expiated personally or vicariously, of 
unhappy births hereafter." J .D .M-Derrett, R .L .S .I ., op.cit., 
p.77; also see his 'Indica pietas', op.cit., p.44.
3. Besides the methods already mentioned, the following few may
be added to the list. "By open confession --- a sinner may
be released from his guilt, -- ." Manu q.by Jagannatha, vide
H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit., vol.I, p.319.
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It would appear that there has always been a popular opinion
that both merit and demerit are shared between lather and sons.
Thus,' in Rgve d a we find evidence to the effect that sons would
benefit from their- 'gracious fathers' (Pitrahl, while, on
the other hand, the sons are praying for saving themselves from
2
the sins committed by their fathers. This would not have been 
so, had there not been such a belief as this prevalent in the 
society of the day. Manu appears more explicit. According 
to him,
"If not on himself, then on his sons, if not on his sons, 
then on his grandsons (falls the punishment.) ; an unrighteous 
ness, once committed, never fails to bring j.ts consequences 
to the perpetrator."
He says both dharma and adharma affect the man or his
1. "May the most gracious fathers aid us." Rg.i.1o6.3, vide 
R.T .H .Griffith, op.cit., vol.I,p.181.
2. "Loose us from sins committed by our fathers." Rg.VII.8 6 .5, 
Ibid., vol.Ill, (Bombay, 1891), p.1o6; also see, P.V.Kane, 
op.cit., vol.IV, (Poona, 1953), p.5. Cf. "May Agnee free 
me from the sin which my mother or father committed when
I was a babe unborn." T a i .B r .Ill.7.12.3 q. by R.T.H. 
Griffith, op.cit., vol.II, (Bombay, 189o), p.395, n.7.
^3. Manu IV.173, vide G.Jha, op.cit., vol.II, pt.II, (Calcutta, 
1921), p.436;
aYadi nae.rnani putresu na cetputre.su naptrsu / na tveva tu 
krto dharmah karturbhavati nisphalah //
M.IV.V'3, vide G.Jha, ed., op.cit., vol.I, (Calcutta, 1932), 
p. 387 . In respect of the term Krto- dharmah , Medhatithi says 
"Whether the component words be read as ‘Krtah-dharmah * or
*Krtah-adharmah', the resultant conjunct form would be the same 
Krto-dharme.ii; hence both dharma (righteousness) and adharma 
(unrighteousness) are meant to be spoken of (as not failing in 
bringing up their consequences).
This verse is quoted in the Viramitrodaya , Paribhasa- 
prakasa, which adds Krtodharmah should be construed as 
krtoh adharmah as the context deals with adharmah (adharmah 
iti chedastatprakaranapathat /) vide P.N. Sarma, e d ., the 
Viramitrodaya, Paribhasaprakasa, (Benares, 19o6), p.68.
It may be noted here that the commentator appears to deny 
what Manu says, and thinks that Karma only affects the doer. 
He says the principle of the Vai^vanara sacrifice is not 
applicable here. Vide G.Jha, op.cit., vol.II, pt.II, 
p. 437; also, see G.Jha, Manusmrti., Notes, II, (Calcutta, 
1924), p.318.
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descendants. in fact, this verse is good evidence of the
popular notion, mentioned above, that sin as well as merit,
are vicarious and affect sons and grandsons. Of course, this
belief has not been confined to the father-son relationship
-1
only. We come across examples such as the k i n g 1 sharing both
papa and punya - demerit and merit - with his subjects;
2
a Brahmana's (Agnihotrin) merit going to his creditor, should 
he die without paying his debts. Thus, the cause of transfer 
of merit or demerit has connection with one's failure or 
otherwise of one's own obligation: religious or secular.
Medhatithi, while commenting on Manu IV. 173, (see f.n.3, 
p.37), refers to the principle of the Vai£vanara sacrifice,
and states that it does not apply in this case. In fact, the
3 h
principle involved, according to the maxim of Jatesti nyaya ~
_____________________________________________________ t__________________
1. Baudh., I.1o.1, vide G.Buhler, trans., S.B.E.14, (Oxford, 
1882), p. 199; Manu VIII.3o4-3o8, vide G.Buhler, op.cit., 
pp.3o7-3o8; Yajn. II.335-337, and both the Mit. and the VIr. 
on these verses, vide J. R. Gharpure, trans., op>.cit., vol.II, 
pt.II, (Bombay, 1937), pp.597-6oo; the M.B h .(Santiparva), 
77.4.34; 91.41, vide M.N.Roy, trans., (Calcutta, 19o3),
pp.114-115 and 136. In Poona critical edn. these chapters 
are no.78 and 92 of the 12th parva (i.e. Santiparva), cit. 
above, pp. 36 7 , 371 and 4 39. Cf. Kau t . Ill. 1 6 . 25-27 , there j.s 
no mention of sin; vide R.P.Kangle, op.cit., pt.II, p.283.
‘ Also see, M.Hara, 'Transfer of Merit', Adyar Liabrary Bulletin! 
vol.31-32, 1967-1968, p.382.
2. "If an ascetic --- dies without discharging his debts, the
whole m e r i t  belongs to his creditors." Vyasa q. in t.bo
Vyavahara-Mayukha, vide V.N.Mandlik, trans., (Bombay, !88<'0, 
p. 112; P.V.Kane, H .D h ., vol.Ill, op.cit., pp. 416-17, also 
see f.n.676 on p.417.
3. Vais'vanaram dvadasakapalam nirvapet putre jate /./
Tai. Sam.2.5.3, q. in the Mimamsa-sutra of Jaimini, IV.3.38, 
vide M.L.Sandal, op.cit., p.239; Also it has been referred 
to in the Vfrm., Vya.pra., vide V . P .Bhandari, op.cit., p.253; 
the Dattaka-MImamsa, vide S.Marulkar, e d . , A.S.S. 116, (Poona, 
1954), p . 136; P.V.Kane, H .D h ., op.cit., vol.V, pt.II, p. 1343;
S.N.Naraharayya, trans., Yajnavalkyasmrti with the Mitaksa r a , 
(Allahabad, 1913), p . 178, n.(k).
4-. Vide M.L.Sandal, op.cit., pp.238-39; Mit. on Yajn. 11.56, vide B.S.Mcghe, 
op.cit., p.119; N .P.Paravatiya, ed., Vyavahara-Balambhatti, (Benares,
1914), p.216; Subodhini (on the Mit.), vide J.R.Gharpure, trans., 
Subodhini, (Poona, 193o), p.76; P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.1343; S.N.Naraharayya 
op.cit., p.178, it may be noted here that ref. to Jai.IV.3.36, in n.(k) i 
is, perhaps, a printing mistake, it should read Jai.IV.3.38.
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means that though the performer of the sacrifice is the 
father, the fruit accrues to the son thac is born. Thus, the 
maxim of Jatesti might be taken as an appropriate authority 
for the proposition that the fruit of one man's ritual accrues 
to another.
Now, if one performs a ritual or sacrifice, and the fruit
of it can accrue to another, then, if the payment is analogous
to a ritual, in the sense that Mfmansa would seek for an
-  1 2analogy, payment by B can achieve apurva, £*drsta for A.
Historically, however, not everyone has been a willing 
follower of this ideology. It would appear that, from very 
early times deleterious and unfair aspects of this notion struck 
scholars and mystics, especially under the influence of 
reactions against Carvaka Philosophy: the Materialism.
The Materialism, where one senses an element of caricature 
of the Carvaka position, plainly denounced the authority of 
the Vedas. According to this view, 'while life remains let 
a man live happily, let him feed on ghee (purified butter)
3
even though he runs in debt .' It would appear that this
philosophy believed that one could accumulate debts irresponsibly
4
and since, in its view, there was no antecedent life, and 
hence, no rebirth and no karm a , one could leave one's issue 
to pay each and every debt.
1. Apurva means 'unknown', merit and sin as the cause of future 
happinpss or misery. Vide L.R. Vaid.ya, cit. above, p. 42.
2. Adrsta means 'invisible', 'unforeseen', 'destiny', 'fate' 
etc., Ibid., p . 13. Both these terms are used here in the 
sense that they mean the remote or unforeseen consequences 
of the rite performed (for the benefit of others.)
Also, it might be worthwhile mentioning here the existence 
of another method of gaining spiritual merit for oneself, 
relatives or superiors (involving the same principle of 
transfer of merit) from the Deity; see . G . Sontheime-r, 
'Religious Endowments in India: The Juristic Personality 
of Hindu Deities'; Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Rechtswis- 
senschaft, 67, pt.I, (1 965), pp.45--1oo, at pp.71-72.
3. S .Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol.I, (London, 1923), 
p. 283.
4. U.Mishra, History of Indian Philosophy, vol.I, (Allahabad, 
1957), p.216.
It is co combat this philosophy, perhaps, that the Gastric
view developed that each man is responsible for his own sin.
Of course, even in the Rgveda we come across such ideas as
this: "May we not have to enjoy (i.e. suffer for) the enas
1
(sin) copuiiitced by another". This prayer clearly indicates 
the feeling that men may be relieved of the consequences of
another's sins. In the sutras and the srartis we find some
2 _ 3
conflicting views, but Medhatithi on Manu (X.91), leans in
favour of the view that, "the results of good and bad acts
always accrue to the man who does them." According to
Parasara-smrti, too, this should be so; because in the Kali-
4
age .only the perpetrator himself (is abandoned as patita) .
Thus, in the view of the sastra, the sinner, and no other
person, is responsible for his sin. His merits and good might
be shared, however, (as is the popular view)- but sin was 
5personal. We will return to this point later at an appropriate 
place.
Whatever might .have been the exact position of the sastras 
on this question (which might have depended on every writer's 
own choice of a particular fai.th) , one thing, on which most 
of them appear to agree, is this ancient belief that merit 
and demerit were transferable from one to another; and the 
fact that, even today, this belief strongly exists among the
1. Ma eva uno anyakrtam bhujem ma tatkarma vasavo yaccayadhve / ----.
Rg.VI.S1.7 r vide L .Sarup, ed., Rcjveda-samhita, (Benares, 1955), p .638; 
also see R.T.H.Griffith, trails., op.cit., vol.II, p<395; (and f.n.2, 
on p.37 abcve); P.V.Kane, op.cit., vol. IV, p.6.
2. "Those among these (sons) who commit sin, perish alone, (but not 
their ancestors.) " Ap. II. 9.24.9, vide G .Buhler, cp.cit., p . 158; while
Manu says, "If one does with sesamum , piungcs into the ordure of
dogs, along with his ancestors." Manu X.91, vide G.Jha, op.cit., vol.V, 
p.315.
3. Ibid., pp.315-16. Also see, A.Avalon, trans., Mahanirvana Tantra, 3rd.edn., 
(1953), p.363, wherein it is stated that, "as men go to hell by reason
of their own sins, so they are bound by their individually incurred 
debts and others are not." Note: the authenticity of this work is doubtful ; 
see J.D.M.Derrett, 'A Judicial Fabrication of Early British India',
Z.V.R., 69/2, (1968), pp.138-181.
4. Tyajedade^am krtayuge tretavam gramamutsrjet / 
dvapare kularnekam tu kartaram tu kalau yuge //
Para. 1.25, vide D .Shrivasudeva, ed.& trans., (Hindi), Parasarasmrti, 
(Benares, 1968), p.5; also see P.V.Kane, op.cit., vol. IV, p.26.
f.n. 5 on the next page.
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majority of Hindus, almost compels us to accept it. Of course,
1
this idea has not been foreign to other faiths. So far as we . 
are concerned, however, if we accept the notion that merit 
is transferable from one person to another, then the operation 
of the doctrine of the Pious Obligation may be seen from a 
similar point of view. With this background knowledge about 
the Pious Obligation, we may first turn to our inquiry into its 
scope and implications from the sastric point of view.
It has been already noted above (see p.21) that the 
philosophy of Hindu life is essentially a socio-religious 
morality. Moreover, while discussing the Mitaksara joint 
family, and the father-son relationship, we found that the son 
has, by birth, an equal right in the ancestral and the joint 
family property with his father; and that by birth alone he 
incurs the liability to discharge his father's dharmic or just 
debts, due to his religious and moral obligation to save his 
father from spiritual pains ensuing from his indebtedness.
This faith persisted throughout the period under study and it 
is evident especially among the rural population of the country 
even to this day.
Perhaps, having this situation in mind, it might be true to 
say that generally, "the Pious Obligation, originally, was a 
socio-psychological obligation recognised to bind any son, 
son's son (hereafter called 'grandson') , or son's son's son 
(hereafter called 'great-grandson'), whether legitimately born
or adoptive, to pay the just debts of his deceased male lineal
; 2 
ancestor. It was this, no more and no less." It would appear,
f.n. 5 from the last page: In Adhyatma Ramayana (II. 6 . 42-88)
we find, in respect of Valmik.i , that when Valmiki asked his 
son and wife etc., whether they would share his sin, they 
replied, "This sin is your responsibility. We share only 
the enjoyment of wealth that you make by your (unrighteous 
activities)." Vide Bulcke (Camille), Rama-Katha, (Hindi),
195o, p .39
1t. M.Hara, op.cit., p .411; Also see, "Mosaic law no doubt contemplated that
the sins of the fahters should be visited on the children unto third
or fourth generation, -- ." Vide H.F.Morris and J.B.Read, Indirect Rule
and the Search for Justice, (Oxford, 1972), p.177; also see J.D.M.Derrett, 
'Allegory and the wicked Vinedressers' at The Journal of Theological 
Studies, N.S., vol.XXV, (Oxford, 1974), pp.426-431.
2. J.D.M.Derrett, op.cit., 'Indica pietas', p.43.
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however, that a son who is 'incapable of undertaking his
father's responsibilities due to his incurable physical or
1
mental disability', is not held liable' for his father's debt;
otherwise, of course, he is liable. So far as the grandson is
concerned, the position^is that of the son, but according to 
2
Brhaspafi, the son pays both the capital and the interest, 
while the grandson pays only the capital. Ocher smrtis do not, 
however, seem to contain such a distinction. When we come to 
the great-grandson, we are faced with confusing statements.
In the first place, not a single sastrakara has categorically 
stated that the great-grandson of the debtor is to pay his
3
debt. Brhaspati says that the great-grandson is not liable,
1. Rnam tu dapayet putram yadi syannirupadravah / 
dravinarhasca dhuryasca nanyatha dapayetsutam //
Katya.557, vide P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.7o. According to the 
Smrticandrika, if the sons are incompetent - due to incurable
disease or the like, --- are not liable for the payment of
the father's debt; vide J .R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.318.
Cf. Hemacandra's Arhannlti, according to which sons must pay 
the father's debt, but impotent, blind or deaf-and dumb sons 
need pay only when wealth from their father has reached them 
(i.e.,when they inherit). See M.N.Dosi, trans., (Ahmedabad, 
19o6), p.84, verse 22:
Satsu putresu tenaiva rnam deyam sutena ca / 
yena pitrvasu praptam klrbandhavadhiradisu //
2. Rnamatmiyavat pitram putrair deyam vibhavitam / 
paitamaham samam deyam na deyam tatsutasya tu //
Br.q. in the Vivada-ratnakara, vide P .V.Vidyalankara, op.cit., 
p.49r G.Jha, Hindu Law in its Sources, I , (Allahabad, 193o), 
p.21o; cf. Katya, q. on p.2o8 where he also lays down a 
similar rule. The Vivada-ratnakara, op.cit., is quite clear 
on this point at p.49.
3. Prapaufreirna deyamityarthah, the Vivada-ratnakara on 
Br.;(see f.n. 2 above); also q. in the Mit. on Yajn.II.5o, 
vide J .R.Gharpure, o p .c i t ., p .794.
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1 9 3while Visnu loaves it. to nis option. Narada and Katyayana
appear of the opinion that 'the obligation to return a debt
4
ceaSes from the fourth.' N o w r whether the debtor is to be
included or not in this calcutation is not clear. In the
absence of any positive rule indicating his inclusion, it
would appear, in view of Brhaspati's statement, that he should
not be included, i.e., the great-grandson is thereby excluded
from the liability. This is, however, not so. For, the
Mitaksara (on Yajh II.5o) cites Brhaspati, referred to above,
and glosses that, "The great-grandson is not liable to pay
5
when he has received no property." The Viramitrodaya has
a similar view (see above p.34, f.n.9). Asahaya on Narada
(1.4-6) appears to have arrived at the same conclusion, referring
6
to the principle 'liability follows the assets', and 'conferrinc
1 . Dhanagrahini p r e t e  tatputrapautrairdhanam dayam natah
paramanlpsubhih //
Vis.VI.27-28, G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cit., p.2o9; the Smrticandrika 
vide J .R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.322; J.Jolly, trans., op.cit., 
p p .44-45.
2. Kramadavyahatam -- / taccaturthannivarttate //
Nar. q. in the Vivada-ratnakara, op.cit., p.49; The Smrti­
candrika , vide J .R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.322; G.Jha, H ,L .5.,
* o p .c i t ., p .2o9.
3. Pitryabhave --- yatnatah/ caturthena -- nivarttayet //
Katya, q. in the Vivada-ratnakara, op.cit., p.49;
Katya.56o, vide P.V.Kane, e d . , op.cit., p.7o; also, the 
Smrticandrika, op.cit., p.322.
4. P.V.Kane, H^Dh.. vol. Ill, op.cit., p.443.
5. Vide J .R.Gharpure, trans., op.cit., p.794.
6 . According to Asahaya, the term grandson, here, must be 
taken to mean the grandsons of the debtor's son, i.e., 
the great-grandson. See J.Jolly trans., op.cit., pp.42-44, 
notes 4-6; also, P.V. Kane, H .D h ., vol.Ill, op.cit., pp.443- 
444; J.D.M.Derrett, 'Indica pietas', op.cit., p.46, n.22;
J .R.Gharpure, trans., The Smrticandrika, op.cit., p.322, 
n.2. Also, the actual case cited by Asahaya may be referred 
to in this respect. See P.V.Kane, trans., Katyayana-smrti, 
op.cit., pp.229-232, n.56o; for similar view, see also,
The Vyavahara-Mayukha, V.N.Mandlik, ed.& trans., (Bom.,188o), 
p . 113. Cf. the trans. of the same by P.V.Kane and S.G. 
Patwardhan, (Bom., 1933), p.218.
1
spiritual benefits to upto great-grandfathor1 . The position,
therefore, appears to be this: that if the great-grandson
2receives property, then he is liable. If this is so, then, 
the rule 'is equitable in that it is the holder of the property 
of the deceased person who is in general liable for his 
debts.
There is, however, an exceptional rule laid down by 
A
Vyasa, according to which, so far as the suretyship debts 
are concerned, it is only the son who is liable; but only 
for the capital, and not the interest. Accordingly, the 
grandson and the great-grandson seem to have been exempted 
from this liability..
Thus, it is quite clear that, except for the great-grand­
son, the male issue were considered liable for debts of their 
father or grandfather even if they received $o assets from 
them.'*
When did the liability arise? The sastras have laid
down certain conditions in this respect. Thus, according to
Yajnavalkya, "when the father has gone abroad, is dead or is
immersed in difficulties ---  his debt should be paid by the
6 — 7sons --- ." Narada explains that unless twenty years are
1. Naradc 1.6, vide J.Jolly, op.cit., pp.43-44; P.V.Kane, H.Dh., 
vol.Ill, op.cit., at pp.443-44, discusses this point after 
citing various authorities.
2. P.V.Kane, Katyayanasmrti, op.cit., p.232, n.; J.D.M.Derrett,
' Ind'ica pietas 1 , op.cit., p. 46.
3 . Ibid., p .47.
4. Vyasa q. in the Viramitrodaya, (on Yajn.II.5o), vide
J .R.Gharpure, trans., op.cit., p.795; also see the Smrti­
candrika , vide J .R.Gharpure, trans., op.cit., pp.283, 321; 
Katya.561, vide P.V.Kane, trans., op.cit., pp.232-33; for 
the further discussion reference may be made to J.D.M.Derrett 
op.cit., pp.47-48.
5. The Mit. on Yajn. II.5o, vide J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.792.
6. Ibid. . *
Pitari prosite prete vyasanabhiplute1pi vVputrapautrair rnam deyam -/, 
Yajn.II.5o, vide Dharmakosa, cit.above, p.684.
7. Nar. q. in the Mit. (Yajn.II.5o), vide J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.792; 
also see Katya. 548, vide, P.V.Kane, trans., op.cit., p.227; also 
Visnu. VI.27 (see f.n. 1, p.43 above and f.n. 2, p.45 below).
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lapsed the liability does not arise in such cases. The Mitaksara 
(on Yajn.II,5o) states that, even in the case of death, a son
i
should,not pay before he reaches the age of majority. Apparently
in this case, the liability of the son is merely inchoate which,
when he reaches majority, becomes legally operative. Then again,
the death could be real or civil, in the sense that the father
2
has renounced the world. Besides, Katyayana says that even if 
the father is alive but afflicted with incurable disease or 
incapable due to madness, or old age, or guilty of grave sin etc.,
3
his debts should be paid by sons.
This it seems that only in these circumstances the liability 
to pay arises, and hence the son may be required to pay his 
father's debt under the Pious Obligation. In a case, however, 
where a son is faced with the payment of his own debt, and that 
of his father and grandfather, the order of payment appears to 
be: first, the grandfather's debt and then his father's, and
4
after that his own. This seems to be the rule to be applied 
in such cases. This would seem to have been the position according 
to the sastras.
j**
1. Vide J .R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.752; Katya. 552-3, vide P.V.Kane, 
op.cit.,- pp. 227-28; The Smrticandrika, vide J . R . Gharpure , 
op.cit., p.321; cf. N a r . q. at p,241, vide J .R.Gharpure, trans., 
The Smrticandrika, Vyavahara kanda, pt. I, (Bombay, 1948) ,
p .24 1 .
2. "If he who contracted the debt should die, or become a religious 
ascetic, or remain abroad for twenty years, that debt shall be 
discharged by his sons or grandsons."
Vis.VI.27, vide J.Jolly, trans., op.cit.,pp.44 -45.
3. Katya. 548-5o, vide P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.227.
4. Pitramevagrato deyam pascadatmlyameva ca / 
tayoh paitamaham purvam deyametadrnam sada //
Br.q. in Para.Madha., vide V . S .Islampurkar, op.cit., p.264;
The Vivada-ratnakara, vide P . D . Vidyalankara , op.cit., p.47;
Br. XI.48, vide J.Jolly, trans., op.cit., p.328; P.V.Kane,
H .D h ., vol. Ill, op.cit., p.445, n.748.
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The Pious Obligation under Modern Hindu Law; : The dharmasastra
information on the Pious Obligation v/as not law in the modern
1 / - Western sense. On the other hand the ctharmasastra theory insisted
on a scheme whereby in litigation four sources of law should be
consulted. The sources are described in the smrti texts as the
four "feet" of vyavahara (vyavahara here means "judicial admini- 
2
stration") . The four sources of law are, in order, dharma 
(righteousness), vyavahara (cursus curiae), caritra (actual usage 
in the sense of custom), and raja-^asana (royal decree). Each 
subsequent source overruled previous source.
The Pious Obligation is an excellent example of the contin­
gency that in the forum a proved custom or established course 
of decision will overrule the norm of righteousness according 
to the standard of conformity to the religious jurisprudence 
reached for the time being in that particular fo^rm. It is not 
possible to argue that the dharmic rule was invariably enforced;
nor can one argue that it was never enforced - still less that
3
it was unenforceable.-
1. J.D.M.Derrett, Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu L a w , III, 
(Leiden, 1978), preface.
2. J.D.M.Derrett, R . L .S .I ., cit. above, pp.148-156; cf.R.Lingat,
The Classical Lav; of India, cit.above, part II, chap. 2, p.176ff.
Also see, J.D.M.Derrett, ’A New T:ceatise on the Nature and 
Sources of the Dharmasastra, 1 in Para n a , vol.X, N o .1 (Varanasi, 
Jan.1968), 77, at pp.9o-93; R.C.hazra, 1Dharma - Its early 
meaning and scope* in Our Heritage, vol.VIII, (Cal., 196o),
7 at pp.29-32.
3. For, there is clear evidence showing that in pre-British period 
the son was held liable for his father's obligations during 
both the Hindu and Mohammedan administrations.
For example, in Archaeological Survey, Mysore, Annual Report, 
1911-12, at p.44, para.91 we come across an insciption (A.D. 
1252) referring to a law-suit and its decision by the King.
It states that Naganna and Sovanna, not knowing their father's 
transaction, wanted to take possession of the property concerned 
whereupon the case went up to Narasimha-Devarasa, who told 
them that they were in justice bound to carry out the wishes 
of their father and decided the case in favour of the other 
party. Thereupon Naganna and Sovanna acknowledged the gift 
of the property made by their father Devanna who had purchased 
it from Bhandari Adiyanna.
The inscription - Epigraphica Carnatica, 15,Supplementary 
(continued on the next page)
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Since the British administration of justice, however, the 
doctrine cf Pious Obligation has undergone considerable change, 
and therefore, in order to understand its proper function under
continued from the last page)
Inscriptions, New Inscriptions from Belur Taluk, No.32o - is 
as follows:
Virodhikrtu-samvatsarada pu sudha 15 Adivaraha svasti 
^rl'matu pratSpacakravartti Hoyisana . . . 
vamnnanu Jhandari Adiyannana 3<ayyalu tati.ka.lbcita- 
krayava kcttu korda nivesanavanu tamma arauyata .... 
nerasi kalla naclsi kottaru adan ariyade a-Devanna makkalu 
Naganna Sovamnamgalu Narasimha-devarasara m.unde 1 .... 
vara makkalu parakivu nimma tande inatji dharma-vidhiya 
agadendare hamgadu .. mau prama ....
Translation (by J.D.M.Derrett)
In the year Virodhakrt, the fifteenth of the bright half 
of the month Pusya, Sunday (A.D. 1252)*. Hail! (While) the 
mighty emperor Hoysala (Somesvara (?) was ruling the earth) 
Devanna paid cash into the hands of Treasurer Adiyanna and 
bought at the appropriate time a dwellinghouse and gave it to 
their respected ... and erected a stone.** The sons of Devanna, 
viz. Naganna and Sovanna, who had been unaware of this, went 
before King Narasimha (to dispute) this ... those sons.
"Take care! You are bound not to render void the dharma-dis- 
position (the vidhi, or precept of or for dharma) which has 
been made by your father", he said: (therefore there is) an
authority (?)..***
** Dharma-vidhi is the operative word. It can mean the injunction 
implied in the fahter's action, which the sons must respect, 
or"the performance by the father of the injunction inherent 
in precepts of Dharmasastra : on the whole, the latter seems to 
be more probable.
(I am indebted to Prof.J.D.M.Derrett for the translation 
of the original and his valuable comments; and also to Dr.G.S. 
Gai, for supplying the copies of the original from India.)
Also, see J.D.M.Derrett, R.L.S.I ., op.cit., pp.21o-11. 
Examples of holding the son liable for his father's 
obligation during the later period, appear in later writings: 
see, V .K .Rajwade, e d ., Marathvamchya Itihasachim Sadhane ,vo1.15, 
(Bombay, 1912), p.22ff; for further explanation see, G.Smith 
and J.D.M.Derrett, 'Hindu Judical Administration in Pre-British 
Times and its Lesson for Today'. J .A .0.S ., vol.95, N o .3 (1975) 
417, at 421, f.n.24; M.V.Gujar, ed., Pavar Visvasarao, 
Gharany5cha Aitihasic Kagada-Samgrha, 2nd edn., (Poona, 196o), 
pp.1-2. For the facts and decisions in these cases, see below 
p. 227, f.n.1 and Appendix II. '
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modern Hindu law, we must clarify its position very briefly.
The process would seem to have begun almost as soon as the
British undertook administration of justice in India. They
"sought to find a limitation upon it which might be equitable and
2
consonant with modern ideas of justice." This is evident from
their reluctance to extend the son's liability beyond the assets
3 4he received from his father. The trend continued; and
that the liability under this doctrine is a liability of the
joint estate was stated by the Privy Council in 1936. Later
1. For a succinct account of its present position, reference may 
be had to J.D.M.Derrett,1Indica Pietas', cit.above, p.5off, 
and to his C .M .P .L ., op.cit., p.93ff.
It may be noted here that in order to avoid fruitless 
repetition, I have relied mostly on the above authorities so 
far as this portion is concerned. However, $ have added all 
upto-date authorities, and discussed latest developments 
concerning this doctrine.
The doctrine of Antecedency is fully discussed in the chapter 
dealing with certain foreign concepts, see chapter V, in the 
part II below.
2. J.D.M.Derrett, 1Indica Pietas', op.cit., at p.5o,
3. In Aga Hajee v.Juggut, (1779) Mort. Montr.272, the Court was
^ not prepared to hold the son liable for his father's debt
beyond the assets he had received from his father. Cf.Cole- 
brpoke's remarks at the end of the decision in Timmarah v. 
Veneapah, (18o7); vide T.Strange, H indu L a w , II, 3rd e d n . ,
(Madras, 1859), 456-457. And also, W.Jones' note that "Without
which (i.e., assets) the son and grandson are under a moral 
and religious, not a civil, obligation to pay the debt, if they 
can; but assets may be followed in the hands of any representative 
Vide H .T .Colecrooke, Digest, I, cit. above, p.266.
4. In 1866, The Hindu Heirs Relief Act, Bombay Act VII of 1 866 , 
enacted inter alia that a son or grandson shall not be liable 
to be sued for the debts of his deceased ancestor merely bv 
reason of his being such a son or grandson; the son, grandson 
or other heirs shall be liable only to the extent of the assets 
that come to his hands.
The lead given by this enactment was followed by the Courts 
in other parts of India: see the Judgement (by 3-2) in Ponnappa 
v .Pappuvayyangar, (1881) I.L.R.4 Mad.1, at p.2; also see,
Vencapaiya v . Visvesvaraiya , (1892) 1 5 M y s . L.R.196, at p. 197;, .
P.Venkanna v.Sreenivasa Deekshatulu, (1918) I.L.R.41 Mad.136,
at p . 142; also see, J .D,M.Derrett,'Indica Pietas', op.cit., 
p.5 6 , f.n.48.
5. Sat Narain v.Rai Bahadur, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 384, at p.396.
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the Supreme Court heZd that :'The doctrine of Pious Obligation
is not merely a religious doctrine but has passed into the
realm of law. The doctrine is a necessary and logical corollary
to the docrrine of the right of the son by birth to a share of the
1
ancestral property and both these conceptions are correlated. 11 ' 
Presently, therefore, "The Pious Obligation is confined to the
2
interests of the male issue in Mitaksara joint family property," 
Thus, not only the sai-t.rlc nature of the doctrine but also its 
scope has changed almost beyond recognition.
In view of this development, the immunity given by the 
sastras to the minor son (see above pp. 4 4-45) , the grandson and 
great-grandson, as also the distinction made between the three 
degrees of descendants (see above pp. 4 3-4 4), was abandoned as 
of no value. Consequently, all the three degrees, provided 
they are members of the joint family when the d<gbt was incurred, 
are equally and concurrently liable to the extent of their share
3
in the Joint family property.
Moreover, the conditions laid down by the sastras in 
respect of the time when the son's liability arose (see above
pp.44-45) were also modified. Once the existence of the father's
4 5personal, untainted, pre-partition debt is proved, the son
1. Anthonyswamy v.M.R.Chinaswamy, A.I.R.197o, S.C.223, at p.227, c.1 
This case concerned certain Christians customarily governed
by Hindu law in this regard.
2. J .D .M.Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', op.cit., p.57. Cf. Vyankatesh
v. Kusurn, (1 975) 77 Bom. L.R.671, at p.677. In this case, the
Court refused to extend the doctrine to debts incurred by the 
father under the provisions of a secular statute (Tagai Loans 
Act), on the ground that such extention would discriminate 
between citizens on religious ground. Here the provisions of 
the Act would seem to conflict with the scope of this doctrine. 
However, looked at from the real nature of the Pious Obligation 
as obtained under modern Hindu law, i.e., it is attached to 
assets, and the religion plays hardly any part now, the question 
of discrimination would hardly arise.
3. J.D.M.Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', op.cit., pp.51-52, For the position in respect 
Of surety debts, see below Appendix I.
4. For further explanation see above f.n.2 and 3, at p.19, also see, J.D.M. 
Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', op.cit., p.51. As regards personal debts of the 
father reference may be made to a recent article by B .Sundaramoorthy, 'A Note 
on Sankaranarayanan and Another v. The Official Receiver Tirunelveli and
Others',at (1977) 2 M.L.J., J., p.9, c.2, which advocates that the P.O. 
applies to the father's debt due to new business, if not avyavaharika.
(continued naxt page)
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is held liable for it since its inception, irrespective of the
debtor's being alive and Quite capable of paying the debt out
of his own means. But an obligation' created by the father by
way of an alienation of joint family property has been subjected
to challenge on the ground of overstepping the father's power of
alienation under Hindu law. Whenever such challenge was successful,
the alienee was faced with the prospect of losing at least a part
of his purchase; and unless he proved that the alienation was for
an existing debt of binding nature, he could not recover it from
the son's share. The situation, which w a s 'conducive to fraudulent
actions against alienees of the father, led the Courts to develop
the law so as to protect their interests on the basis of equity
created by the acceptance of their money by the father. Such
equity would bind the family property generally even in the hands
of the son, and if the son's equity proved weaker^ in view of
his pious obligation, the alienee would succeed. However, this
remedy was available when the Courts could impute intention to
the father to sell in order to pay an existing debt. For, unless
the debt existed, the Pious Obligation could not be invoked. The
problem of the non-existence of debts in the strict sense of the
tpxm readily arose particularly where the transaction was a
mortgage. Hence the formula developed that the father could se]i
ancestral property along with his son's share in order to pay his
private, untainted, pre-partition, and antecedent debt. Meanvuiile,
as soon as the existence of a binding debt is established, the
liability under the doctrine of Pious Obligation is attached from
its inception. The rule, as J .D .M.Derrett has shown, "has developed
in order to protect aljenees from fraud, and, indirectly, in order
2
to establish the credit of Hindu fathers." Since the liability 
is now confined to the share in the ancestral property which the
f.n.5 continued) 1Pre-partion' because once the son is separated 
in interest from his father, he is ceased to be co-owner with 
the father and therefore he cannot be made liable for the 
father's subsequent incurred debt. Also see, Hardwarilal v .
Dwarka Prasad, Zi.I.R. 1974 Raj. 1o1, at p.1o2. Regarding 
revived time-barred debts, see below pp. 398-4o3.
1. J.D.M.Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', op.cit., pp.52-53. For fuller discussion of 
the doctrine of Antecedent debts, see below pp. 198-2o8.
2. Ibid., at p.57
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son acquires by birth, it seems not inequitable that the father's
}
juct debts should become his son's liability c.s well immediately 
they are incurred. However, one wonders as to how far this 
obligation of the son could properly be called 'pious' in these 
circumstances.
Suffice it to say, however, for our present purpose, that
the function of the Pious Obligation has been greatly modified,
and accordingly, the son is not liable for moi~e than the assets
which he has acquired. His liability has been extended so as to
be co-extensive with his birthright in the Mitaksara joint family
property, if any. However, doubts in respect of applicability
of this doctrine to debts incurred under a secular Statute have 
1surfaced (see above p.49, f.n.2), while on the other hand, by 
2
abolishing the Mitaksara joint family system, the State of Kerala 
has set in motion a revolutionary trend which, if followed by 
other States in India, would lead to abolition of both the Mitaksara 
birthright and the Pious Obligation. Having regard to the uncert­
ainty that surrounds the doctrine of the Pious Obligation (see 
Luhar v.Doshi, discussed below7 p#248 ft) and the aspirations of 
those who would prefer a unified civil code for the whole of the 
country, the trend would seem to be a welcome step in the right 
direction. How far the ordinary citizens in the rest of . the 
country will respond to this kind of change will ultimately 
determine the success or otherwise of the enterprise. Meanwhile
3
the Pious Obligation has, as stated above, its function to perform.
1. Also see,' J.D.M.Derrett, C.M.H.L., cit. above, p.94.
2. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act* 1975; Act 3o of 1976. 
Vide (1976) K.L.T., J., (Kerala Statutes), pp.97-98. For the background and 
comments reference may be had to J.D.M.Derrett, 'Law Reform in Kerala' at 
(1974) K.L,T., J., pp.2-6; P. Parameswaran Moothath, ' The Kerala Joint Hindu 
Family System (Abolition) Bill, 1973 - A Study; at (1973),K.L.T,, J., pp.91- 
95; P.B.Menon, 'Some Stray Thoughts on the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System 
(Abolition) Act.1975, Act 3o of 1976' at (1977) K.L.T., J., pp.37-38.
It may be noted that the special circumstances (which J.D.M.Derrett 
has mentioned at p.3) which exist in Kerala State do not exist in most of 
the other States in India, and it will be premature to predict their attitude 
in this matter. One would hope, however, that realistic counsels will 
prevail in the interest of all concerned.
* Sec.5 reads: ..."After the commencement of this Act, no court shall, ... 
recognise any right to proceed against a son, ... for the recovery of any 
debt due from his father, ... on the ground of the pious obligation under 
the Hindu law, ... to discharge any such debt."
Udayan Chinubbai v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1978) 111 I.T.R. 584.
We have approached now* the last, and, from our point of 
view, the most important of all the exceptions to this rule under ' 
the doctrine of the Pious Obligation. This exception absolves 
the son from the payment of his father's certain debts which are 
enumerated by the Sastraj^ras *^see f.n.3, p - 19 above), though none 
of them has, (as we shall see in the following chapters), supplied 
us with any explanation. The most comprehensive of the lists 
available, that of Brhaspati, states,
"Sons shall not be made to pay (a debt incurred 
by their father) for spirituous liquor, for losses 
at play, for idle gifts, for promises made under
the influence of love or wrath, or for suretyship,
nor the balance of a fine or toll (liquidated in 
part by their father)." 1
2Although Gautama has used the term van iksulka; and Vyasa'
(or Usana), na vyavaharikam in their respective lists; speaking 
generally this list gives us a broad idea as to ^ vhich debts are 
not, in the view of the sastras, covered by the Pious Obligation.
In a sense, all these debts (regarding van iksulka see below
p.70ff) seem to be avyavaharika or 'tainted'; (which we are going to
investigate). Suffice it to say here that in the view of the
sastras, especially as interpreted in the Mitaksara school of Hindu
^aw, the Pious Obligation is very much a feature of the joint
4
Hindu family law. It is a corollary of the birthright. The 
basic purpose of this doctrine appears to be to aid the departed 
father in fulfilling his primary obligation which, in fact, is 
a socio-religious obligation, the payment of all his debts, whether 
spiritual Or secular; and that the benefits that might follow 
seem incidental. To say that it is for the spiritual benefit of
1. Br.XI.51, vide J.Jolly, op.cit., p.329; 'influence of love' 
in this context may be construed as 'influence of lust'; (for 
the further discussion see below p . 151 ff.
Sauraksikam vrthadanam kamakrodhapratisrutam / 
pratibhavyam dandasulkasesam putranna dapayet //
Br.q. in Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.7o8.
2. ' Pratibhavyavaniks'ulka —  / Gaut.XII.38, Ibid., p. 677.
3. —  yacca na vyavaharikam / both Vyasa and Usana, Ibid., p.714
4. J .D .M.Derrett, 'Indica pietas', op.cit., p.45.
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th3 father is, perhaps, to tell a half-truth. The sastras, 
as we have noticed above, excluded certain debts from this 
liability, apparently for some reason, but we have been told 
nothing about it. Whether the cause lies in the notion that 
in the Kal i-age on.iy the perpetrator: is liable for his sins 
(see above p.4o), or whether it lies in the avyavaharika nature 
of these debts (or something else), is the subject-matter of the 
remaining chapters of this study. We propose, therefore, to 
investigate and examine each and every debt, named in the above-
mentioned lists of 'tainted debts', first, in view of the sastras,
the commentaries on them, and the digests, as understood by the 
modern scholars and jurists; and .also, as they have been inter­
preted by the courts. We shall endeavour to trace realistically, 
as far as possible, the intended motive or motives behind these 
exceptions in view of both the dharmasastra and the arthasastra, 
and see what has become of them today, especial?y in the context 
of the present socio-psychological as well as socio-economic needs 
of the people. We might, then, be in the position to put forward
some practical and desirable legal solutions, with a view to
judicial or legislative reforms.
j*r-
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II.1 GENERAL
Debts which were incurred by Hindu fathers by way of 
unpaid fines and tolls v;ere regarded, according to the sast.ra- 
karas , as debts for the payment of which their sons were not 
liable. It is proposed here to investigate the position of 
these two kinds of debts, in the ]ighf of what has been 
expounded by the various sastric text~writers and commentators 
on the subject.
To begin with the earliest period known, it may be said 
that any act which was then considered as against the accepted 
canons of good behaviour, either religious or moral, was
supposed to result in creating an obligation as well as a sin
2on his part who committed the act."' It was probably a kind
3of moral obligation which he was supposed to fulfil in order 
to relieve himself of the consequences of thl sin. According 
to this theory, it appears that the person may be subjected 
to performing some religious and/ or secular duties to redress 
his misdeeds. For example, if a man committed a murder, during
the Vedic age, he had to pay blood-money as an atonement for
4 5the murder to the relatives of the murdered person.
1. Gautama, XII.41; Vasistha, XVI.31; Manu, VIII.159, Brhaspati XI.51; 
Kautilya, 111.16,9; Yajnyavalkya, 11.47; Vrddha-Harlta, IV. 142; Vyasa 
(according to the Vi.vada-ratnakara) and Osanas (according to the 
Mitaksara), see J.C.Ghose, The Principles of Hindu Law, 3rd edn.,
(Calcutta, 1917), p.546.
2. Medhatlthi on Manu, VIII.1; a similar explanation is advanced there.
Vide G.Jha, trans., Manusmrti, vol..TV, ptnl, (Cal.,1924), pp.1-2.
3. H.T.Coiebrooke defines an obligation thus: ’An obligation is a moral tie, 
by which a person is held to do or to suffer some thing. In this wide 
sense, it is synonymous with duty,1 Treatise on obligations and contracts, 
part I, (London, 1813), p. 1; also, in a sense an obligation is equated 
with the meaning of the word rna. In the Taitt irlyasamhita (VI.3.1o.5) 
where three debts have been referred to, the word rna stands for 
obligation.
4. J.Jolly, Hindu Law and Custom, cit.above, p.284: " traces of a state
of things have been preserved when the atonement for murder and 
slaughter when the blood-money used to be paid." < •
5. "... that in the Vedic age a blood-money was paid to the relations
of a murdered person." Ibid.
Thus it seems that the payment was more in the nature of
compensation than a fine in the modern sense, and the king
*1
did not keep it for himself.
However, the position shows signs of change during the
later period. Both fines and tolls are clearly mentioned in
2
the literature of the period, and the purpose behind the
imposition of fines, it appears, was to punish the wrong-doer.
Moreover, it is evident from the existence r>f administrative
machinery to collect fines, taxes, customs, etc. that by then
the King bad, almost certainly, become the recipient of the
4
amount collected by his officers. At the same time, it may
1. "... Probably the King did not keep these fines for himself, but gave 
them to the family of the murdered person." Ibid.
2. N.K.Waglc, ’Some aspects of Indian Society as depicted in the Pali Canon', 
Thesis No. 396 (London, 1962), pp.281-82, 316-317.
t
3. Ibid., pp.281-82.
While discussing the functions of Nati, Wagle refers to the following 
conversation wherein Roja Malla says to Ananda, "I am not impressed 
by the Buddha, Dhamma or Sarngha, but a rule was m a d e  that whoso­
ever does not go to meet the Buddha will be fined five hundred (coins) .
It is due to fear of punishment from Natis (natinam dandabhayar) that 
I go."
Vinaya Pitaka, I, p.247.
4. Ibid., pp.316-17.
A reference is made to government officials on p.316.
Therein it is said that "Kammika, gamikas and rajabhatas are the 
next important (to the ministers etc,) group since they interfere 
directly by influencing the economic activities. Kammikas act as 
customs' officials. Thus a caravan from Rajagaha going south 
intends to evade the tax. Kammikas come to know of this plan and 
they infest the way, seize the caravan and confiscate it."
Vinaya Pitaka, IV, p.131.
Also, on p.317, 'The tax-collecting centres of the king have been 
referred to as situated in a-mountain pass or at a ford in a river, 
or at the gate of a gama.'
Vinaya Pipaka, III, p.52.
be pointed out here that this period witnessed a change also
in connection with spiritual affairs of mankind and consequently
the.idea that by paying a fine one could achieve purification
1
lost its importance, it seems. However, it is submitted that 
this view, though realistic, is based merely on an inference, 
for the word used therein (see f.n,1) is 1 wealth' and net 'fine'
The dnarmasastras have a different story to tell.
According to them, a fine was not only one of the means of
atonement", it was also an instrument in the hands of the king
3
to punish those who committed crimes, or wronged other people 
4
or the state.
Moreover, a fine was undoubtedly considered by them to be
1. Ibid., p.274. Here, while dealing with the value of gotta 
in spiritual affairs, it is said, "The mortals are purified 
by deeds, knowledge and dhamma, not by gotta or wealth."
Dlgha NIkaya, I, p.99.
'Gotta5 (Skt.gotra)means 'lineage' (family name).
2. Manu, VIII, 318. "Men who having committed crimes, have 
been punished by kings, became freed from guilt and go 
to heaven, ..."
Vide G.Jha, trans., op.cit., vol.IV, pt.II, (Cal., 1926), 
p. 349 .
3. P.V.Kane discusses how and why the ruler and danda was 
created in his History of Dharrnasastra, III, cit.above,
p. 22; and expresses his view that "the conception of danqla 
is, thei.'efore, this that the state's will and coercive power 
keep the individual and nation within the bounds of dharma, 
punish for breaches, and effect the good of the whole."
A.lso, Medhatithi on Manu, VII. I. 2; Vide G.Jha, op.cit., 
vol.Ill, pt. II, pp.274-75.
4. Kautilva, 5.2.15: "For' one selling these (prohibited
goods) without persmission, (the punishment shall be) the 
lowest fine for violence."
Vide R.P. Kangle, trans., II, cit.above, p.344.
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1
a legitimate source of livelihood for the king and a weapon
by which the king could protect his subjects from evil-doers
2
and, maintain law and order in the kingdom. Thus, it appears
3that a 1fine' as one of the four methods of danda - a word
which comes from t^e root 'dam' which means to restrain or
4 d
to deter, and which also denotes punishment as well as fine ,
came to be regarded as an instrument, in the hands of the
king, to protect hns subjects, which the king used primarily
to restrain those who broke the law and to deter potential
law-breakers.^
It may als^ be pointed out here that the use of a fine, 
in the sense of the king's livelihood, became dominant
1. Medhatlthi on Manu, VIII, 318; ... "punishment in the form 
of fines becomes useful to the king." Vide G.Jha, op.cit., 
vol.IV, II, p .35o. %
Also, Medha. on Manu, VIII.1, G.Jha, op.cit., vol.IV, 
pt.I, p.2. But it is submitted that J h a 1s translation seems 
to be wrong. He says, "Then again, in as much as for the
king there is no other lawful means of livelihood except
the fines imposed upon criminals, and the taxes and duties, 
any obstacles in the proper administration and collection 
of these leads the kingdom into trouble."
Here Medhatlthi is explaining why vyavahara is necessary: 
dhana-dandasca rajnah karasulkadi va tadanyadharmi sta- 
jivika na bhavatlti vrtti-pariksayad api rajyavasadah/
that is, 'The kingdom (administration) would be enfeebled 
if the king's income were reduced, for (if there were not. 
legal administration) there would be no (i) fines, (ii) royal 
taxes and tolls, etc. (iii) other lawful means of livelihood
apart from those first two (e.g., mines, treasure-trovc,
customary presents)'. For the text see V . N .Kandalika, e d ., 
M5nava-d.harma-sast.ra, vol. II, cit. below, p. 86 9 , and compare
G.Jha, ed. , Manusmrti, vol.II, cit.below, p.7o
2. Manu, VII.1.2, "The protection of all this shall be done according to 
law, by the Ksattrlya who has received the Vedic training in due form." 
According to Mkihatlthi, 'all this' in this verse means 'all the people 
who pay taxes as well as who are poor and helpless.' Vide G.Jha, op.cit., 
vol. Ill, pt.II, pp.274-275.
3. P.V.Kane, H.Dh., vol.Ill, cit.above, P.39o; Manu, VIII.129; Yajn.I 367; 
Brhaspati (S.B.E.33, p.387, verse 5); and Vrddha-Harita, VII.195 - all 
these speak of four methods of Panda.
4. Ibid., P.V.Kane, p.389; H.T.Colebrooke, Digest, I, cit.above, p.132;
J.Jolly, op.cit., p.28o.
5. R.K.Ranade, (195o) 52 Bom. L.R., J., p.33, at p.35
6. P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.22; Manu, VII.1.2, vide G.Jha, op.cit., vol.Ill, 
pt. II, pp.274-275.
1 2 later , than the use of the term in its original sense.
That is to say, its primary purpose became to raise revenue
for-the king rather than the atonement of the criminal. One
thing is quite clear, however, that basis of a fine has
reference, to seme kind of illegal or immoral act on the part
of the person fined (see below p.75 ff).
We may now proceed to study, in detail, the views of 
various sastrakaras, particularly in respect of the nature 
of the liability which is incurred by way of unpaid fines and 
tolls by a Hindu father.
j II.2 OUR BASIC TEXTS
I
i
Our basic texts, containing all the excepted debts are
as follows:
According to Gautama, XII.41,
Pratibhavya vaniks'ulka^madhya dhyuta danda na 
putranadhyabhaveyuh /
"Money due by a surety, a commercial demand,a toll, 
the price of spirituous liquors, a loss at play, and 
a fine, shall not involve the sons of the debtor."
1. Dubois, Hindu manners, customs and ceremonies, (edited by
H.K. Beauchamp), 3rd edn., (Oxford, 19o6), p.657.
Here, the author refers to criminal jurisprudence in India 
during the period ending 18th century and the beginning of 
the 19th century A.D., and states that "They (the rulers) 
thought it would be less cruel and more advantageous to the 
State to inflict very heavy fines for offences of this 
nature (adultery is meant here)."
2. J.Jolly, p.28o, cit.above, f.n.1, cf. the beautiful ode to 
danda in Mahabharata, 12.63. 20-29. According to these 
verses it appears that danda should be translated by 1 internal 
administration1 and not merely by 'punishment' which was its 
original meaning.
According to the Mahabharata, santiparva, 12.63.28-29, i.e., Majjet trayT
danglanitau hatayam sarve loka rajadharman-pravistah //
vide S.K.Belvalkar, ed., The Mahabharata, vol.13, pc.I, (Poona critical 
ed., 1961), p.295.
In short, these two verses emphasize the importance of preserving the scie­
nce of chastisement or punishment; for, if it disappears, the Vedas, the 
scripture, all duties, including kingly duties, etc. would disappear.
For trans. see M.N.Dutt, The Mahabharata, books 8-18, (Cal.,19o1),p.93; 
P.C.Roy, trans., The Mahabharata, vol.VI-VII,(Cal.,1926), p.147.
3. U.C.Pandey, ed., Gautamadharmasutra, (Varanasi, 1966), p.127; V.Mitra, ed. 
Gautamadharmasutra, (New Delhi, 1969), p.192; cf. P.V.Kane, H.Dh.,111, 
cit.above, p.446, f.n.752.
4. H.T.Colebrooke, trans., Digest, I, cit.above, p.3o5, verse 2o2.
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However, tie term 'vaniksulka1 has been rendered by G.Biihler
i
as "a commercial debt, a fee (due to the parents of the bride)."
Vasistha, XVI.31 says,
Pratibhavva vrthadanamaksika saur.lkarn ca yat / 
dandasulkavasistam ca na putro datumarhati //
"A son need not pay money due by a surety, anything 
idly promised, money due for losses at play or for 
spirituous liquor, nor what remains unpaid for a 
fine or a toll."3
Manu, VIII.159 is identical:
Pratibhavyam vrthadanam-aksikam-saurikamca yat / 
dandasulkavasesam ca na putro datum arhati // ^
"But money due by a surety, or idly promised, or lost 
at play, or due for spirituous liquor, or what remains 
unpaid of a fine and a tax or duty, the son (of the 
party owing it) shall not be obliged to pay."5
The terms danda and sulka have been rendered by G.Jha^
% 7
as 'fines' and'duties' respectively, while J.D.M.Derrett
has rendered the latter as 'toll'.
According to Yajnavalkya, 11.47,
Sura-kama dyuta-krtam danda-sulkavasistakam / g 
vrthadanam tathaiveha putro dadyan na paitrkam //
1. G.Biihler, trans., S.B.E.2, (Oxford, 1879), p.241; J.C.Ghose, 
o p .c i t ., p .532.
2. J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.534.
3. Ibid, also, G.Biihler, trans., S.B.E.14, (Oxford, 1882), p. 82.
4. V . N .Mandalika, e d ., Manava-dharma-sastra, v o l .I I , (Bombay, 
1886), p.975; G.Jha, e d . , Manusmrti, vol.'ll, (Cal., 1939), 
p. 14.9; J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.53o; K. V . R . Aiyangar, ed. , The
Krtyakalpataru, cit.above, p.315; J .D , M .Derrett, e d .,
Bharuci's Commentary on Manusmrti, vol.I, (Wiesbaden, 1975), 
p. 115.
5. G.Biihler, trans., The haws of Man u , S.B.E.25, (Oxford., 1886)
p.282; J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.531, is identical.
6 . G.Jha, trans., Manusmrt i , vol.IV, pt.I, (Cal., 1924), p.2o1.
7. J.D.M.Derrett, trans., Bharuci's Commentary on Manusmrt i , 
vol.II, (Wiesbaden, 1975), p. 144.
8 . S.S.Khedwal, ed., Ya jnavalkya-smrti, (Bombay, 19oo), p. 138;..
H.N.Apte, ed., Yajnavalkya-smrt i , A.S.S.46, (Poona, 19o4), 
p. 64 8 ; N .P .Parvatiya, ed., The Vyavahara-Balambhat t i , 
(Benares, 1914), p . 178; J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.535.
"That which was contracted for the purposes of spirituous 
liquor, lusr, or gambling, or which is due as the balance 
of an unpaid fine or toll, as also a gift v/ithout. any 
consideration, the son should not pay (such) parental 
■ debt ."1
9
According to H .T .Coleorooke/' danda sulkavasistaicam means
3
'what remains unpaid of a fine or toll'. However, J.C.Ghose 
has translated the term as 'a fine, or what remains unpaid of 
a toll'. He seems to have treated danda separately, which, 
in view of its treatment by others, appears to be erroneous. 
Apparently, the term avasistakam refers to both danda as well 
as sulka, and, therefore, the meaning would seem to be 'the 
balance of a fine or toll'.
Brhaspati, XI.51 lays down,
Sauraksikam vrthadanam kamakrodhapratisrutam / ^
pratibhavyam dandasulkasesam putran na dapayet //
"Sons shall not be made to pay (a dSbt incurred by 
their father) for spirituous liquor, for losses at 
play, for idle gifts, for promises made under the 
influence of love or wrath, or for suretyship; nor 
the balance of a fine or toll (liquidated in part 
by their father)."5
However, according to H.T.Colebrooke it means,
"The sons are not compellable to pay sums due by 
their father for spirituous liquors, for losses at 
play, for promises made without any consideration, 
or under the influence of lust or of wrath; or sums 
for which he was a surety, except in the cases before 
mentioned, or a fine, or a toll, or the balance of 
either.’76
1. J .R.Gharpure, trans., Yajnavalkya-smrti, vol.II(3), (Bom., 
1938), p.786;
2. H . T . Colebrooke, trans., Digest, vol. I, op.cit., p. 311, verse*
3. J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.535.
4. Ibid, at p.54o; G.Jha, trans., The Vivadacintaman i , (Baroda, 
1942), p.29; according to the latter the verse is Brhaspati, 
X.118, so also, K.V.R.Aiyangar, ed., The Krtyakalpataru, 
cit.above, p.316.
5. J.Jolly, trans., S.B.E.33, (Oxford, 1889), p.329; J.C.Ghose, 
op.cit., p.54o; Ghose's translation is identical to Jolly's 
except that it has missed, perhaps due to a printing mistake 
the term aksi kam, i.e., 'for losses at play'.
6 . H.T.Colebrooke, trans., Digest, op.cit., p.3o5, verse 2o1.
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The inclusion of the underlined phrase shows that this 
rendering goes beyond the literal sense of the verse, and 
has,reference to ether details on the subject (see Appendix I 
below). Also, the construction of the term dandasulkasesam 
indicates a sindlar tendency on Cclebrooks's part, i.e., here, 
he seems to have the views of Vyasa or Usanas in mind.
Narada, I.1o states,
Na putrarnam pita dadyad dadyat putras tu paitrkam / 
kamakrodha sura dyutapratjbhavya-krtam vina // 1
"A father must not pay the debt of his son, but a son. 
must pay a debt contracted by his father, excepting 
those debts which have been contracted from love,  ^
j anger, for spirituous liquor, games or bailments."
Here, 'lust* would seem to be appropriate meaning of the term 
kama than 'love1. It may also be noted that Narada seems to 
have omitted danda and s'ulka from his list o| excepted debts.
Vrddha-harita, IV.142 says,
Surakamadyutakrtam vrthadanam tathaiva ca / ^
dandasulkavasistam ca putro dadyan na paitrkam //
"Debts incurred for spirituous liquor, lust, gambling, 
what is idly promised as gift, or what remains unpaid 
of a fine or a tax or duty: (these debts) of the
father, the son should not pay."4
Here the translation of the word sulka. as 'a tax' seems to be 
incorrect in view of its rendering by most others as 'a toll 
or duty'.
5 /According to Vyasa or Usanas,
< Dandam va dandas'esam va suikam tacchesam eva va / 
na datavyam tu putrena yac ca na vyavaharikam // 6
1. J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.536; P.V.Kane, H .D h ., III, cit.above, 
p.446, f.n.752 where it is Nar.IV.1o; A.S.S.46, op.cit.,
p.64 8 ; the same verse seems to have been quoted in Sanat- 
kumarasamhita e d ., by V.Krishnamacarya, Adyar Library Series, 
95, (1969), p.3.
2. J.Jolly, trans., S.B.E.33, op.cit., p.45; J.C.Ghose, op.cit., 
p . 538.
3. Ibid., at p.546.
4. Ibid.
5. Vyasa's terms read dando va dandas'eso va and the rest of the 
verse is same as Usanas, see Vyasa quoted in the Krtyakal- 
pataru, op.cit., p. 31 6 . On the other hand, Apararka on Yaj.II.47, 
quotes Usanas in the terms attributed to Vyasa, A.S.S.46, op.cit.,p.648.
6. J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.545.
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"Neither a fine, nor a toll, nor the balance due 
lor either, shall be necessarily paid by the son of 
the debtor; npr any debt for a cause repugnant to 
good morals."*
-  2The term na vyavaharikam has beer, construed by J.C.Ghose
3
a s ’not proper;1, while J.R.Gharpure has rendered it '’not legal 
or capable of being recovered by a suit', {for further 
discussion on this see below). Suffice it to say here that 
Colebrcoke's construction has been generally accepted.
We find a similar rule even in the arthasastra under the 
heading of 'Non-payment of gifts'. Thus, according to Kautilya, 
III.16.2,
Prahibhavyam dandasulkasesamaksikam saurikam 
kamadanam ca nakamah putro dayado va riktha-haro 
dadyat / ^
"The son or heir inheriting the property may not pay, 
if unwilling, obligations of suretyship, balance of 
a fine or dowry, a gambling debt, a debt for drinks 
and a gift of l o v e . "5
It may be pointed out that the term sulka may also mean 'a toll 
or duty1, and the word kama-danam may appropriately be rendered 
'a gift made under the influence of lust', (for further discussior 
see below).
It is clear from the above that in these texts fines 
and tolls appear together: danda-sulka . Only in one text - 
(Gaut. XII.41, see above p.6o), vaniksulka appear. Also 
it appears that the same subject-matter has received different 
treatment at the hands of these sastrakaras. Thus of the nine 
of them referred to above, only one has mentioned both fine
1. H.T.Colebrooke, trans., Digest, I, op.cit., p.3o7, verse 2o3.
2. J.C.Ghose, op.cit., p.546.
3. J.R.Gharpure, trans., Yajnavalkya-smrt i , vol.II(3), cit.above, 
p. 786.
4. R.P.Kangle, ed., The Kautiliya Arthasastra, pt.I, op.cit., 
p . 122; H .Chatterjee, op.cit., p.1o4, f.n.2. , *
5. R.P.Kangle, trans., The Kautiliya Arthasastra, pt.II, 
op.cit., p.2 8 1 .
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and toll; whereas six of them have referred only to the balance 
of a fine or a to.il, and rhe remaining two have stated that 
both fines and tolls as well as the balance of them should not 
involve the sons. We are therefore faced with the problem of 
determining whether the sastrakaras meant to exclude the entire 
amount of unpaid fine and toll of the father from the sons' 
liability, cr only the balance of them, or both. Secondly, 
as stated above, of the nine sastrakaras only Gautama, XII.41, 
speaks of vaniksu l k a . So the question arises: whut is the 
significance of the term vanik in the context of the views of 
the rest of the sastrakaras? Then again, we see that there is 
no difference or opinion among them as regards the meaning of 
the word danda, i.e., fine; but we have to find out why the 
son is exempted from its payment? On the other hand, the word 
sulka has been variously rendered, i.e., bride-price, dowry, 
tolls and duties etc.. Hence, presuming thai* these various 
renderings of the term are correct, we have to investigate 
them and their significance from the point of view of their 
exclusion from the son's liability under the doctrine of Pious 
Obligation. In the process, it may emerge that danda and sulka 
seem similar to a certain extent (see below p.114), and there­
fore they appear together.
Let us turn to our first problem: the controversy regarding
the quantum of fines and tolls.
1 1 •3 THE QUANTUM OF FINES AND TOLLS 
According to Bharuci on Manu, VIII.159/158,
9 4 ,
Sulkavasesam iti vacanat krtsne sulke 'sti putrasya , 
sambandhah, dan^avasesasyapy enam vidhim icchanti kecit.
That is,
"From the phrase 'remainder of a toll' we see that the
son has a connection with the entire toll. Some would   —  —  ^
apply the same rule to the 'remainder of a fine'."
Thus in his opinion it seems that the son is liable when an
■ 1 1   - ■ - ■ ■■ ■ - ■     ■ - ■ ■ .... ---------- ---------- — ■— ■— ■— —  j J
1'. J.D.M.Derrett, ed., Bharuci's Commentary on the Manusmrti, 
vol.I, cit.above, p. 115.
2. Ibid., trans,, vol.II, p . 144.
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entire toll or fire is to be pa.iu. However, this view was
not shared by Medhatlthi on Manu, 7111.159. He says,
Dandasulkayoravasesah/ yatrc. pitra dandamsah sulkamsasca 
kasciddattah paripurnau dangasuikau na dattau tadrs'asya 
pratisedhab / yatkimcitpitra dattam sa taddapyate / ...
1 tatra vikalpah / mahatyaparaahe mahati ca dhane paitrike 
avasesasya pratisedhah / sulke apy evam / svalpe tu 
sarvasya /1
"If the father has paid ?. part cf the fine or a part 
of the duty - but did nor pay the entire amounts, - 
then the balance cannot be realised from the son.
That is he cannot be made to pay what the father did 
not pay. (and after citing Gaut. XII.41, see above, 
he continues) Thus then, there is an option. If the 
crime for which the fine had been inflicted was a
! serious one, or the property inherited from the father
I is a large one, then the balance only of the fine, as of 
I the duties, shall be remitted; but if they have not 
| been serious, then the whole shall be remitted.
i
i
This translation is unsatisfactory. It may mean that if the 
father has paid a part of danda or sulka, dharmic purpose is 
fulfilled and hence his son need not be called upon to pay 
the balance; or it may be that if the father's offence was 
serious, and his estate was also large (he should have paid 
it, and if it was not realised from him) then his son should 
not be asked to pay the balance; (and further) if the offence 
as also the fine were minor or small, the son should not be 
made to pay anything at all.
On the other hand, having regard to the views of these
two commentators, it may be argued that originally (it seems) 
the sons were liable to pay any fine which was totally unpaid;
i
but if payment had been made in part the father was discharged 
of 'sin' and the pious obligation of rhe son was not called 
into play. Later it was felt unnecessary to call upon them 
with reference to any fine. For the texts of Vyasci and Usanas 
(which might be later texts) seem to point towards this trend, 
(see above, p.63).
1. G.Jha, ed., Manusmrt i , vol.II, cit.above, p.15o.
2. G.Jha, trans., Manusmrt i , vol.IV, p t .I , cit.above, p.2o3.
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- 1 Moreover, Sarvainanarayana on Manu,- VIII. V j9 says that
2no emphasis is to be laid on 'remainder'. Both Kulluka and 
_ 3
Raghavunanda seem to agree. Similar views seem to have been
✓ 4 S
taken by Vijnanesvara and Apararka' after citing the text
of Usanas. Vijnanesvara on Yaj.I1.47, (see above, p.61),
says that from the use of the word ‘balance' in the text ...
it should not be supposed that the entire amount is to be
paid. The Vlramitrodaya explains thus; "By the mention of a
fine, comes to be included its balance,- its repetition again,
therefore, is intended to indicate that such should be made
in the case of a very large fine; (even) a small balance,
however, need not at all be paid. According to the Ratnakara
it is deducible that(even) in the case of a small fine even
7
the entirety need not be paid."
I
Also Jagannatha quotes the Vivadaratnakara on Vyasa. 
According to him,
"Since the balance of fine is suggested by the general 
term 'fine', and is nevertheless repeated, the sense 
must be, that if the amercement be great, it must be 
paid, but not the small arrear of such a fine; but 
if the amercement be small, no part of it need be 
paid by the son."®
1.' Avasesamityupalaksanam / sarvamapyadattama deyameva / 
V.N.Mandalika, ed., cit.above, p.975.
2. Dandam yaddeyam dandam sulkam ghattadideyam tadavasesam 
ca pitrsambandhinam pitari mrte putrodatumnarhati /
Ibid.
3 . Dandasulkavas'esam rajadandapanyastrl-ghattadisvikrta- 
sesam ca na putro datumarhatltyanvayah /
Ibid.
4. Yatra dandasulkavasistakam iti avasistagrahanatsarvam 
datavyamiti na mantavyam /
S.S.Khedwal, ed., Yajnavalkya-smrti, cit.above, p . 138.
5. Yacca dandasya sulkasya ca deyamavasistam ... putro na 
dadyat / avasistam-iti-avivaksi.tam/
A.S.S.46, cit.above, p.648.
6 . J.R.Gharpure, trans., Yajnavalkya-smrti, op.cit., p.786. , •
7. Ibid., at p.788; H.T.Colebrooke, trans., Digest, I, 
cit.above, p.3o7.
8 . Ibid. Colebrooke understands that 'fine', in this text signi­
fies an inconsiderable fine; and 'toll', an inconsiderable toll.
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On the contrary the Vivada-ratnakara cn Gautama, XII.41
states that "... a debt ... contracted tor a toll or a fine
1
need no!; be paid by the son of the debtor;’ though while
explaining the same text of Gautama,| Jagannatha argues,
"... a fine originally small, or the balance of a large fine
2
need not do paid by a son after the death of his father."
We have already referred to Medhatlthi's similar vi.ews in the 
context of the same text (see above p.6 6 ). These views are 
apparently confusing and hence they dc not appear to carry 
much weight. On the contrary they strongly suggest that by 
that period the exceptions were not taken very seriously. 
Perhaps the sastrie tendency during the period was to limit 
the scope of the doctrine of avyavaharlka. Jagannatha's 
attempted rationalisation is, it seems, also based on vikalpa - 
but in another sense; Medhatlthi is more intelligent and 
intelligible. Perhaps Jagannatha's views reflect what was 
taking place in practice in his days (see below p.37o ff , on 
earlier cases on 'fines').
Moreover, in view of the above controversy, the determin­
ation of what may be deemed a large or a small fine may be 
disputed, for even a small amount may be a large one from a 
poor man's point of view, while the same amount may be nothing 
in the eyes cf a wealthy man. Then again, if a small fine or 
a part of a large fine need not be paid by the son, why should
he pay a large fine or toll? The commentators give no reason
why this should be so. Further,
; "If a very small part of the greatest fine have 
been paid by the father, it is agreed on all hands 
(smrtikaras) that his son shall not be compelled to 
discharge the remainder: but in another case, he m.ust
discharge the whole fine due by the father, amounting
to somewhat less than the greatest fine; which forms 
a great disparity." 3
1. Ibid., at p .3o5.
2. Ibid., at p .3o6.
3. Ibid., at p.3o8.
The apparent confusion resulting from the various interpretations 
placed upon the o i i g m a l  texts may be attributed to the 
commentators' efforts to bridge the gap between the theory 
ennunciated in the sastric precepts, which were written long 
ago, and the actua] practice prevailing in each of these 
commentators' time *
Perhaps, in order to overcome the uncertainty, Colebrooke's 
opinion on the subject may be accepted. According to him, the. 
import of the expression used by Vyasa (see above p.63), in 
fact, is this: "After the death of the father, a fine, due 
by him need not be paid by his son; surely the balance of a 
fine need not be paid." This may be applied to tolls also, 
so far as the determination of quantum is concerned.
In short, it appears that, generally speaking, earlier 
texts rescue the sons (if they wish) from th$ payment of residue 
of fines and tolls, whereas later texts, as if to explain matters 
but not necessarily so, insist that they be free from all fine 
or toll payments. As mentioned above (see p.6 6 ), it may well 
be that if some payment of fine or toll was made by the father 
the religious effect of the regulation was felt and the sons 
need not make it good. Later it was felt that the distinction 
was not viable, and therefore the sons were exempted from nil 
payments of fines and tolls, (see Vyasa and Usanas above p.63).
In conclusion, therefore, on this issue of quantum cf
fines and tolls, it may be suggested that the verse of Vyasi,
(or Usapas) may be accepted as stating the correct position of
law on the subject; and, hence, "Neither a fine, nor a toll,
nor the balance due for either, shall be necessarily paid by
2
the son of the debtor." This leads us to our next query: 
what is the significance of the term vanik in the context of 
the views of the rest of the sastrakaras?
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., at p.3o7.
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11.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERM VANIK
Haradatta on Gautama, XII.33, has (dissolving the compound 
into a dvandva) treated the term vaniksulka as two separate 
words: vanik and sulka. To him yanik means a ’commercial debt '■ ; 
and sulka means 'bride price’: Accordingly, he has explained 
the terms as follows:
: vanig-vanijyarthamupattam dravyam tadapi na putranabhya- 
bhavati / yada salabhamulam dasydmiti paribhasya kasya- 
i citsakasaddravyam grhitva vanijyaya desantaram gato 
I mriyeta tada tatputrena na tatprati kartavyamiti /
■ tatha sulkam pratisrutya vivaham krtva mrte tatputram 
i na tacchulkamabhyabhavati / 1 
I ‘
fc
Biihler translates these explanations thus:
"If a person has borrowed money from somebody on the 
condition that he is to repay the principal together 
with the gain thereon, and if he dies in a foreign 
country, while travelling in order to trade, then 
that money shall not be repaid by the son.(Likewise) 
if a person has promised a fee (to the parents of a 
woman) and dies after the wedding, then that fee does 
not involve his son, i.e., need not be paid by him." 2
It would appear that here the father's borrowing might have 
been as an agent, not a capitalist, in person. The capitalist 
takes the risk, and as such he could hardly be expected to 
agree to repay the debt along with his profit, i.e., salabhamulam 
If the father were an agent Haradatta's explanation concerning 
the son's exemption from the payment of such debts can be 
understood; but if he were a trader in his own right, then it 
is difficult to understand why such debts should not be paid 
by the son. Perhaps the borrowing contemplated by Haradatta 
was a high risk debt, or a debt incurred in sastrically
1.. H.N.Apte, ed. , Gautamadharmasutra (with the Mitaksara of 
Haradatta), A.S.S.61, (Poona, 191o ), p.98.
2. G.Biihler, trans., S.B.E., vol.II, cited above, p.244 , (or 
according to other edn. p.241), f.n.41., Biihler notes here 
that "the word sulka is, however, ambiguous and may also 
mean 'a tax or toll'.
71
1reprobated trade (see below pp.7 2-73),
2As regards the term vanik, Maskari's comments on Gautama
XIIr. 38 appear to be similar to that of Haradatta. However,
, a
according to him, sulka is 'bride price' paid in the asuraJ
-  4form of marriage. Va^caspati Mis.ra renders vanik as
'commercial debt' and sulka as '(bridal) fee'. His explanation
of vanik, i.e., "'commercial debt' stands for those goods
that have become due from the father on account of commercial
5
transactions," does not throw any light on the kind of 
commercial transactions he had in mind.
On the other hand, Medhatlthi who Has referred to Gautama 
XII.41 while interpreting the term sulka in Manu, VIII.159, 
seems to have taken van iksulka as ore word (tatpurusa compound). 
Thus, Medhatlthi^ on Manu VIII.159, interprets van iksulka
1 •y f
as 'trade dutries'. Colebrooke says vanikstalka is 'a commercial
3
demand or a toll; while to J.C.Ghose it means'a commercial tax 
or toll'. He suggests that the word 'debt1 in Biihler's rendering 
(see above p.63) is wrong. It should be 'toll' and 'a fee due 
to the parents etc.' should be omitted, for sulka here means 
tax or toll; and thus he agrees with Medhatlthi.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the authorities 
are equally divided. If the renderings of Haradatta, Maskari 
and Va^caspati Misra are accepted, i.e., that vanik means 
'commercial debt', it appears that they do not offer any 
convincing explanation why commercial debts of the father 
should -be excluded from the son's pious obligation. However,
1. I am obliged to Prof. J.D.M.Derrett for this suggestion.
2 . vanigvanijyanimittam cetyarthah / yatha mulyam dadamiti 
paribhasya kasyacitsakase dravyam grhitva vanijyakaranartham 
desantaram gatva mriyet putrena tadapraptam ca bhavati 
tatastadrnam putrasyopari na bhavatityabhiprayah /
See V.Mitra, ed., Gautama-dharma-sutra, with Maskari's 
Commentary, cit.above, p . 192.
3. dulkam asuradivivahe sulkam .... na bhavatlti / Ibid.
4. G.Jha, trans., The Vivada-Cintamani, (Baroda,1942), p.28. * *
5. Ibid., pp.28-29.
6. G.Jha, trans., vol. IV, pt.I, cit.above, p.2o3; also see ab., p.66,f.n.2.
7. H.T .Colebrooke, trans., cit.above, p .3o5, verse CCII.
8. J.C.Ghose, cit.above, p.532; also see H.Chatterjee, cit.above, p.1o4
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J.D.Mayne says that
'’When Gautama says that a father's commercial debt 
need net be repaid by the son, ho is certainly not 
referring to the debts incurred m  the usual course 
cf carrying on a business or trade but evidently to 
sums b o n  oTwed for speculative and hazardous ventures, 
involving something like gambling. " 1
Although we have no express authority prohibiting gambling,
2
except Manu IX. 221-228, in view of the concern shown by most 
of the sastrakaras (see below p. 121 ff ), Moyne1s explanation 
seems credible. .Mayne seems to convey that speculative or 
hazardous ventures on the part of a father of the joint Hindu 
family might be considered avyavaharika, and hence such debts 
might not be binding on the son.
The sastras were concerned with preservation of dharma, 
and therefore they dispised gambling, drinking of liquors etc. 
for obvious reasons; namely, their adverse effects on peoples'
3
lives, materially as well as spiritually (see below p .121 ff ) .
Probably realising that complete prohibition of such vices would
be unrealistic, they laid down, it seems, certain selective 
4
restrictions. This clearly shows that they wished to prohibit
i
rather than encourage anything that would promote such vices. 
Hence, in their opinion, trading in liquors or running gambling 
casinos, for example, could hardly be a righteous way of 
earning o n e ’s living. Under the circumstances, therefore, if 
the father were to incur debts in such sast.rically reprobated 
trades like these, the debts might be viewed as avyavah'arika. 
Looked at from this point of view, the theory, that when Haradatta
1 . J . D . Mayne, Treatise on Hindu Law and. Usage, 11 th edn . , cit. 
above, p . 3 9 9 .
2 . "Dyuta and samahvaya should be driven out of the state by the 
king. These two faults of kings are the means for destruction 
of kingdoms." etc.. See N .C .Sen-Gupta, Evolution of Ancient 
Indian Law, cit., above, P.282 ff.
3. Where liquor is sold on credit misery and degradation results: L.Carroll, 
'The Temperance Movement in India: Politics and Social Reforms,'at
‘ Modem Asian Studies, 1o/3 (1976), 417, at p.438.
4. Thus, we find that Brahmins were completely prohibited from drinking while 
selective prohibition was laid down for others. See G.Jah's translation 
of Kumarila Bhatta's Tantravarttika, vol.I, (Cal., 1924), pp.192-2oo;
J.Jolly's Hindu Law and Custom, op.cit., p.251; J.D.M.Derrett, C.M.H.L., 
cit.above, p.1o3.
For restrictions on gambling see N.C.Sen-Gupta, op.cit., pp.281-285.
Maskari and Va^cappati Misra construed vanik as 'commercial 
debts1, sastricaliy reprobated debts might have been meant, 
would seem to make sense. However, no one seems to have ever 
thought of this before.
On the other hand, Medhatlthi and others (see above p.71) 
treat vaniksulka as one word,meaning thereby trade-duties.
Also, it should be remembered that like all other sastraks ras , 
Gautama has used this word in the same context, i.e., while, 
laying down the exceptions to the son's liability to pay his 
father's debts. Now, since the meaning attached to the word 
sulka in all these verses by various commentators is, almost 
unanimously, either a toll or duty, it appears rather strange 
to attribute a completey different meaning to Gautama's use 
of the same word. On the contrary, it may be suggested that 
Gautama, in an attempt to sp‘ecify the correcj. import of the 
word sulka in this context, added the word vanik as an adjective 
thus making one word (tatpurusa compound) van iksulka. In this 
sense it may further be suggested that in comparison with other 
sastrakaras, Gautama has given more definite meaning to the 
word sulka in his verse than theirs, removing the ambiguity 
as to whether it should be considered as a toll or bride price.
And, should this rendering be accepted (that he meant 
a toll by sulka) , it is a significant guide for interpreting 
the same word used by others, in this particular context, 
as a toil and not as a bride price; (for furthei: details of 
these renderings of sulka , see below pp.83-144). In this 
connection we may mention that leading Sanskrit-English 
dictionaries give, among various others, the meaning of the 
word sulka as "A toll, tax, custom, duty; particularly levied 
at ferries, passes, roads etc. (Manu, VIII.159; Yajn., 11.47; 
Gaut., XII.41);"  ^ and "Nuptial gift ..... dower, dowry,
1. V.S.Apte, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, (Poona, 1959 e d n .), ■ 
p . 1562; also see D.C.Sircar, Indian Epigraphical Glossary, 
(Delhi, Varanasi, Patna, 1966), p.423; G.S.Dikshit, Local 
Self-Governemnt in Mediaeval Karnataka, (Dharwar, 1964), 
p . 1 71 .
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Marriage settlement etc. (Manu, 3.51;8.2o4;S .93,98; Visnu, 
XVIII.18; Gaut., XXVIII.25; Raghuvamsa, 11.38)."1 It may 
be notec that the authorities cited by these dictionaries seem 
to strengthen our view (also see J.C.Ghose above p.71).
Moreoverr having regard to rhe following view of Gautama,
2 /
X.4 9 that "The additional (occupations) of a vaisva are,
agriculture, trade, tending cattle, and lending money at
interest;" and in view of the fact that no other sastrakdra
has laid down a rale marking a commercial debt, incurred in
the usual course of carrying on business or trade, a part of
these exceptions, it appears highly speculative to impute
the intention to Gautama that, by van iksulka, he means to
exclude this kind of debt of a Hindu father from his son's
liability to pay. Hence it is more likely that he meant by
it a commercial toll or duty, which a trader is supposed to
pay (see below p.97 ff) . In view of the abovS, therefore, it
appears safer to conclude that the word van iksulka in Gaut.,
XII. 41, not only means a trader's toll or duty, but also,
by implication, the meaning of the word sulka which is used
by others in this context, may be regarded as a toll or duty,
and not as a bride price or dowry.
I I .5 THE BASIS OF THEIR (FINES AND TOLLS ETC.)
EXCLUSION FROM THE SON'S PIOUS OBLIGATION
We may now turn to our next question: why were these debts 
of the father, i.e., fines and tolls, excluded from his sen's
i
liability under the doctrine of Pious Obligation? As we have 
noted above (see p.64), these debts appear together in the 
writings of the sastrakaras, and therefore one suspects some 
analogy between the two (see below p.114) . However, in view 
of their apparent basis, one also detects that the natrue of 
the liability arising out of non-payment of danda and sulka 
could hardly be the same. For it is like suggesting that the
1. M.Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, (Oxford, 1899) 
p .1o 8 4 .
2. R.K.Ranade, cit. above, p.37. Also see G. Biihler, trans., 
cit.above, p. 229.
liability to pay for breaking some traffic rules, for example, 
and that which one is expected to pay as the user of roads, 
is the same, which it is not. We may explain this by Kaut. 
2.21.16, which says "And for goods that have passed beyonci
the foot of the flag without the duty being paid, the fine
' 1 is eight times the duty." It is apparent that the liability
to pay the duty and the fine here is obviously based on differen
grounds.
Apparently the basis of the fine has reference to some 
kind of illegal or immortal act on the part of the person 
fined. But we cannot, say that the same applies to toll from 
its inception. Moreover, we have been told that "Two prero­
gatives are attached to the royal function: the right to tax
2
and the right to punish." Now, in this context, too, these 
two belong to different royal prerogatives: the toll to the
first and the fine to the latter. In view of this, therefore, 
we may treat them separately for our present purpose.
PANDA (Fines)
The sastrakaras say that the son is not liable to pay his 
father's debts due to fines (see above pp.6o-64), and their 
commentators seem to agree with them (see above pp.65-69) but 
none of them tells us why. We have, therefore, detective work 
on our hands. Although not directly on the point in question, 
there is ample information available in respect of the concept 
of danda which might throw some light oh the nature and purpose
1. R.P.Kangle, trans., cit. above, p . 164;
dhavajamulamatikrantanam cakrtasulkanam sulkadastaguno
dandah /
0 • *
Kaut., 2.21.16; R.P.Kangle, e d ., cit.above, pt.I, p.73.
Also we come across similar instances, e.g., Medha. on Manu, 
VIII. 4oo, vide G.Jha, trans., vol.IV,II, p.421; Narada,
III.13, vide S.B.E.33, p . 126; and Visnu, III.31, vide
S.B.E.7, p . 16, Mita. on Yajn., II, 262, vide J.R.Gharpure, 
trans., p .378.
It is clear that the liability to pay the 'duty* and the . 
'fine' referred to in the above quotation is obviously based 
on different grounds. For further discussion of these see 
below p. 97, ff.
2. R.Lingat, cit. above, p.213.
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of 'fines', with the help of which we might be able to answer 
this question.
* According to K.V.R. Aiyangar,
"Dharmasasfra, like religion, dealt v;ith the whole 
> life, not v/ith only a part of it. No one was outside 
its jurisdiction: the individual, the family, the 
corporation.:?, and the king were all under it. It 
upheld the i deal of an indissoluble union between stats 
and society, and king and subject. The welfare of 
the king Was held to be rooted in the well-being of 
the people. Political union was sanctified by 
religious sanction. The King and Danda, the Spirit 
of Punishment (the power of santion)’were both of 
divine creation."^
Apparently, the concept of danda is viewed here in its wider 
sense. P.V.Kane explains the term danda in the words of Gautama,
XI.28, thus:
"That the word danda* is derived by the wise from the 
root 'dam' (to control), that he (thd king) should 
control by means of danda those who observe no restraint; 
and (XI.31) that the instructions of the teacher and 
the power of punishment (wielded by the king) guards 
those who violate the rules of varnas and asramas.""
And, after citing a number of sastric - both the dharmasastra
2
and arthasastra - authorities he states that "The conception
of danda is therefore this that the state's will and coercive
power keep the individual and nation within the bounds of ahurma,
4
punish for breaches and effect the good of the whole.1’ On 
the other hand, while giving more realistic assessment of the 
concept, N .C .Sen-Gupta says,
j "The judicial authority of the king, as we find it 
in the earliest laws, is not founded on any fiction 
of his divine personality but upon positive law and 
had its ultimate historical basis in his function as 
the military chief. As such he would naturally 
concentrate in himself in a growing measure the power 
to coerce people to obedience. The law accordingly 
looks on him as a person whose duty it was to compel 
each person to adhere to the law of the varna to which he 
belongs. He is looked upon as the upholder of social
1. Rajadharma, cit.above, p.34.
2. P.V.Kane, H .D h ., vol.Ill, cit.above, p.21.
3. Ibid., pp.21-22.
4. Ibid., p .22.
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and moral order, though, characteristically for India, 
in conjunction with the learned Brahmana. For the 
purpose of maintaining Pharma he is endowed with the 
power of danda or awarding punishment. The association 
of Danda (Punishment) with the king meets us at the 
very threshc]d of early law and is to be found also in 
the Brahmana s . Panda is looked upon as the weapon to 
enforce obedience to Pharma, and, in a somewhat later 
conceit, is descri.bed as Pharma himself created in 
that shape by Brahmana. DandanTt.i or the laws about punish­
ment is, from very early times conceived as a most 
essential part of the education of a King. But danda 
is to be applied according to established cannons of 
dharma.11 '
One feels inclined to agree with thi s assessment because of 
its realistic approach. However, it is clear from all these 
authorities that the purpose of the concept of danda was 
undoubtedly to uphold and maintain dharma, i.e., righteousness 
as envisaged in the sastras. Apparently, in its wider sense 
danda represents punishment or chastisement $n general, and 
therefore includes all means of punishment. Obviously, danda 
in the sense of .'fine' is one of such means and has reference 
to some 'unrighteous act' on the part of the person fined.
To be more precise, 'unrighteous act' may be anti-social, immoral 
or illegal in the sense of criminal or tortious or avyavaharika 
jr. (see below pp.161-176).
On the other hand, the sastras have put forward the theory
that purification of the criminal or wrong-doer can be achieved
by way of chastisement or punishment. Thus, for example, Manu,
VIII. 318 declares that "Men who, having committed crimes, have
been punished by Kings, become freed from guilt and go to
2heaven, just like well-behaved good men." MedhatTthi has
3
explained this verse at length. If we paraphrase his commentary 
it amounts to this: punishment by the King purifies the punished
offenders, i.e., t.heir sin is set aside. Afterwards, by virtue 
of their meritorious acts, they are entitled to enter heaven.
1. N .C .Sen-Gupta, cit. above, pp.38-39. , .
2. G.Jha, trans., Manusmrt i , vol. IV, p t . II, cit.above, p.349.
Rajabhih Krtadandastu Krtva papani manavah / 
nirmalah swargamayanti santah sukrtinoyatha //
Manu, VIII.318, V.N.Mandalika, ed., vol.II, cit.above, p.1o62.
3. G.Jha, trans., op.cit., pp.349-351.
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In his view, punishment serves a dual purpose - protection of 
the peoplo and purification of the offenders. Punishment in 
the form of fines becomes useful to the king, bei?ig one of 
the' means of his livelihood; and at the same time it causes 
seme suffering to the person fined. But he suggests that 
punishment in the context of this verse means corporal punishment 
and ho]ds that only by corporal punishment do criminals become 
absolved from guilt, not if they are only fined. In his words,
‘‘From all this it follows that the corporeal punishment, 
while tending to 'protection* (of che people), has 
to be regarded as serving the purpose of purifying 
the person punished. It is for this reason that there 
are rules laid down regarding the cutting off of limbs 
and other forms of corporeal punishment. All this 
produces an invisible effect in the persons punished, 
and at the same time serves the purposes of the king 
X in the form of protection). Thus it is established 
that the criminals become absolved from guilt only 
when there is corporeal punishment, §nd not when they 
are only fined."1
Whether Medhatlthi's assessment of the effects on the.
offender of corporal punishment and fines etc. is correct or
not is difficult to tell; but, as stated, his view clearly
discounts any possibility of absolving the offender of his
2
guilt or sin by means of fines.
1. Ibid., p.351. Here, it may be noted that Jha's text (p.2o6)reads in part: 
atasca karanadi chedane niyamah/iiastyadividhisca dandyesva 
evadrstam adhasyati na rajartho bhavisyati/ 
but in Mandalika1 s text, (cit. above, p. 1o63) , there is no na; it reads,
atasca adhasyati rajartho bhavisyatj..
However, Jha has followed Mandalika1 s edition in his translation.
cf. Pharuci on Manu, 'Till, 318/317; he treats punishment in this 
context as penance appropriate to a theft. Fines are not mentioned, 
but he agrees that it serves both parties involved; see J.D.M.Derrett, 
trans., cit. above, pp.186-187.
2. Cf. Jagannatha, who quotes Manu as saying, "By open confession, by
repentance, by devotion and by reading the scriptures, a sinner may be 
released from his guilt; or by alms-giving, by dominion over senses, 
or by a fine to the King (for the word dama admits both senses) ."
See H . T . Colebrooke, tr ans., cit. above, p . 312, verse 2o6. Here Jagannatha 
seems to refer to Manu, XI.227, which reads,
Khyapanenanutapena tapasa-adhyayanena ca/papakrnmucyate papattatha 
danena capadi//
which does not contain the term dama. Perhaps, he has taken it for the 
word dana i.e., gifts or almsgiving. If so, his reference to fine here 
seems to be his own view or a mistake. For the text, see Mandalika's 
edn., vol.II, p.1457, and also see G.Jha, trans., vol.V, p.528 for trans.
The sastras have provided a long list of various moans
by which the offender may expiate guilt. Whether or not any
of these means do expiate guilt, is beyond the scope of this
1study.' But if whai. the sages have said is considered to be. 
true, then it seems that a fine alone lacks the expiatory 
function. Why, then, have the sastrakaras included fines in 
the list? Probably because it is expected either to meet an 
exceptional case wherein the criminal is unable to perform 
any of the other rites for expiation of guilt, or its function 
may simply be considered as a material and not a spiritual one.
Before our inquiry into what happened in practice, we
2 /may briefly mention here that a general survey of the sasbrfc 
provisions in respect of punishment for injury to person or 
property clearly shows that ‘the provisions for compensation, 
fines, etc. appear in the same rules (see below). We 
must therefore be careful in our treatment of these provisions 
not to confuse the nature and purpose of the father's debts 
due to payment of compensation with that of fines.
Thus, for example, according to Manu, VIII. 287, "In the 
case of injury to limbs , ...... . the man should be made to
3
pay the expenses of recovery, or the whole amount as 'fine'."’
That is, says Medhatlthi, "If the man hurt does not accept all
this, then the whole amount is to be totalled up and paid to
a
the kina as 'fine* f 1 1 Further, Manu, VIII.288 says, "When 
a man either intentionally or unintentionally, damages the 
goods of another, he shall give satisfaction to him and pay
5
to the King a fine, equal to it." That is, "value must be 
paid to the owner's satisfaction and equal fine to the king.11G
1 . "All authors (sastrakaras) have directed penance, not the payment 
of amercement, to expiate guilt ". Ibid.
2. For a concise exposition of the provisions on the subject by various 
sastrakaras, reference may be made to N.C.Sen-Gupta, cit.above, chapter 
XII, p.286 ff.; Dandaviveka, cit.below , H.Dh.,. vol.Ill, cit.above,
pp.167-168; J.D.M.Derrett, R.L.S.I., cit.above, pp.213-214.
3. G.Jha, trans., vol.IV, pt.II, cit.above, p.323.
4. Ibid., at p. 324..^
5. Ibid.
6 . N.C.Sen-Gupta, op.cit., p.296.
* 'accept' so Derrett translates Bharuci (see his vol.II, 
p.176) op the same verse. .(VIII, 28.6 ). But 'receive' is
the meaning needed.
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Thus it is ciear that the payment of compensation was 
meant for and generally paid to the victim of rhe crime, while 
the payment of fine was imposed in order to punish the offender 
and'was due to the king, In view of this, though both the 
payments arise out cf the same act, their purpose and nature 
are hardly the same. Compensation is equitable, but the 
fines are of a purely punitive nature. Because of this, it 
seems that the sastras have expressly excluded the payment of 
fines from the son's liability to pay his father's debts.
On the contrary, no such prohibition is laid down by the sastras 
in respect of the father's debts due to compensation or reim­
bursement. Reimbursement may be part of the judicial order
and yet distinct from danda.
I1 / - 
In spite of the sastric injunction, what happened in
practice is not very clear, though it would appear from the
following that the sons were in fact made to fcpay even the
fines of their father. We have already stated above (see p.6 8)
in connection with the commentators' different views on the
subject that probably by that period the exceptions were not
taken seriously. That the fines formed a part of the king's
1
revenue is clear from an inscription of about 1o55 A.D..
2
According to another inscription dated c.1131 A.D. it seems 
that, in practice, the son was made to pay his father's fines. 
However, the inscription is not very clear on this point; for 
it refers to the father, his son and his junior uncle who were 
made to pay both compensation and fine. It might be that all 
of therm were responsible for the murder concerned. Two
1. Epigraphia Indica, vol.XIII, p . 175. The object of the 
inscription is to record a donation oy the king to the god 
Kadambesvara. The grant included certain estate as well as 
the right to all taxes within the specified area. In this 
context, the King's revenue from fines' is listed. In effect, 
the temple was granted the right to collect the king's 
revenue from fines imposed upon criminals in that area.
2. Epigraphia Carnatica, vol.VIII, pt. II, Sorab Taluq, inscrip­
tion N0 .8 0 , at p . 13 in the section containing translations . 
in English. Here, the son and others were made to give "1oo 
gadyana, and paid the fine of 5o ga for killing his son/'
i.e., somebody else's son. '1oo gadyana' seems to be compen­
sation paid probably to the murdered person's relations and
'5o g a ' paid as fine to the king.
1
cases decided by the Orthodox Hindu Court in the seventeenth 
century seen to prove that both compensation and fine arising 
out of the father's criminal act were payable by the son; 
however, rt may be pointed out here that these cases were 
probably decided during Mohammedan rule.
On the other hand, ignoring the actual, practice for the 
sake of argument, if we suppose, as the sastras say, that 
the son was not liable to pay his father's debt due to fines, 
then what about the king's income from this source? Should 
the son be held liable to pay fines of his father merely on 
this ground?
Perhaps not; because that particular source (the fines)
of the king's livelihood would seem to be incidental, and also
it does not appear to be very dependable, as in the first
place it could be expected only if a crime i=> committed and
then proved in the court of law. True, to achieve proper
fulfilment of his state responsibilities, the king must have
a regular and sufficient source of income; but this is why
he has the prerogative to tax his subjects. He might therefore
be expected to assure himself of his income either by increasing
the existing taxes or by imposing new taxes on his subjects.
So, on this ground alone, it would not be justifiable to hold
the son liable. Moreover, we know from inscriptional and
other sources that mediaeval kings used to confiscate the
Property cf whole families and vicarious punishment was
2certainly knov/n.
In view of the foregoing, it may be said that the only 
viable theory in support of the sastric injunction appears 
to be this: criminal liability was firmly attached to the
1. Mahajaras in Jagadale's case, and a case found in Pavar 
Family's historical papers; for facts and other details 
see below, p.227, n.1 ; and Appendix II.
2. J .D .M .Derrett, R . L .S .I ., cit. above, pp.215-16.
•]
individual who committed the ciume. Accordingly, even the 
idea of an expiation by way of the payment of a fine, it 
seems, was dependent on the condition that the criminal or 
the wrong-doer must himself suffer the punishment. For it
has been said that "the results of good ^nd bad acts always
 ^ 2 accrue to the man that does them." This might be the basic
reason for excepting the payment of his father's fine from
the son's liability under the doctrine of Pious Obligation.
Before coiiduding this section, however, it may be 
observed that when Medhatlthi advocates the payment of fines 
by the son (see above p.66), he might be referring to the 
payment of compensation arising out of a tortious act on the
1. Medha, on Manu X.91, vide G.Jha, trans., vol. V, pp.315-16; 
also see Medha. on Manu I.V.173, where he says: "it is not 
right that the consequences of acts done by one person 
should be described as falling on others. As a matter of 
fact, all Vedic acts bring their fruits to the person who 
performs them."
Vide G.Jha, vol. II, pt.II, cit.above, p.437.
Also see, Tra. Arch. Series, vol.Ill, p t . II, pp.191-196. 
Here the inscription No.49 (on p. 196) states this: - 
"Those who transgress .... shall individually* be bound 
to pay a fine ... " (Dated: A.D. Middle of 13th Century.)
*It is explained in the note that the word "Mey" whose 
variant is "Vey", means 'body, person or individual'; 
and hence the term (veyverruvagai) means 'individually 
or separately'.
Also see A.Avalon, The Great Liberation, (i.e. Mahanirvana 
Tantra), cit. above, chapter XII.13, p.363, whereon it is 
said that "As men go to hell by reason of their own
sins, so they are bound by their individually incurred 
debts, and others are not."
However, it may be noted here that this authority has 
been described as "a well-intentioned fraud" .... sec 
J.D.M.Derrett,'A Judicial Fabrication of Early British 
India' in Z.V.R. (1968), pp.137-181, on p.138.
2. Medha. on Manu, X.91, vide G.Jha, trans., vol. V, pp.315-16.
part cf the father, because on the one hand he refers to 
the seriousness of damage and on the other he refers to the 
large property inherited from the father. Whatever it may 
be,'in view of i.-is reference to Gautama, XII. 41 (see above p.56) 
it appears unlikely that he meant fines per s e .
Thus, from the above discussion it appears that, according 
to the sastras , punishment by imposition of a fine applies 
to the person fined only, and not to anybody else; and hence 
it may be concluded that according to the sastras the liabii.ity 
is not transferable. This, therefore, may be the reason to 
absolve the son from his liability to pay his father’s debt, 
due to fines.
/
SULKA: Bride-price, Dower or Tolls
The word sulka is used to denote various apparently 
unconnected things. According to leading Sanskrit-English
i
dictionaries , it means "Price, value, purchase money; the 
prize of a contest; toll, tax, duty, customs (esp. money levied 
at ferries, passes and roads); nuptial gift (originally a price 
given to parents for purchase of a bride, but in later times 
bestowed on the wife as her own property together with the 
profits of the household labour, domestic utensils, ornaments 
etc.), dower, dowry, marriage settlement; wages of prostitution 
... etc." Besides, there are various other meanings cf this 
word when it is used as a compound with other words. However, 
the compilers of these dictionaries have, while explaining 
these meanings of the word sulka, referred to various works 
of authority^which enable us to understand its proper meaning.
It is very important, however, especially in the context 
of the list of debts not exigible from sons, that one should
1. M.Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, cit.above, 
p. 1o84; V.S.Apte, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, cit.above, 
p . 1562.
$ *
2. To explain when sulka means 'toll, tax, dut y 1, V.S.Apte 
ibid., refers, for example, to Manu, VIII.159; Yajn., 11.47, 
but when it means 'purchase-price (of a girl) etc.1, the 
reference is made to Manu, III. 51; Raghuvamsa, 11.38, etc.
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understand, from the legal and moral points of viev/, what 
exactly is the meaning cf the word in a particular context.
For^example, a debt incurred due to non-payment of the pi ice 
of any essential'goods such as food cannot, in a legal or 
moral sense, be t-he same as that for liquor or for a prostitute 
in a society hostile to indulgence in those practices. It 
follows, therefore, that to determine the nature of the 
liability to pay a debt in respect of sulka, we have to make 
inquiry into the contexts in which the word is used, and as 
a result of the same, to determine what is its exact import 
from the point of view of the s'astric authorities.
SULKA AS BRIDE-PRICE: It will be appreciated that the ancient
Indian, like the ancient Jewish and Muslim cultures, knew
marriage by purchase and tha*t, as in modern Africa, a certain
self-consciousness arose as to whether the purchase, as such,
was not derogatory to the bride's or her family's status,
suggesting (as it did) mere subsistence economy on their part.
-1
According to Medhatlthi on Manu, III. 51, 1 (sulka) is what
is received from the bridegroom on stipulation. When there 
is bargaining, carried on in consideration of the good or bad 
qualitites of the bride - it is a case of pure selling."
In other words, all that is received (by the bride's parents
or the like) from the bridegroom for the sake of the bride,
2 / in connection with the asura form of marriage, is termed sulka.
3 4Both Haradatta and Maskari - the commentators on the Gautama- 
d.harmasutra, state that, "sulka means bride-price which is 
given in the unapproved forms of marriage as a consideration
5
for giving the daughter in marriage."
1. Vide G.Jha, vol.II., pt.I, cit.above, p.83,
2. Refers-to basic sastric definition of asura form of marriage; see e.g., 
Apas. 11.5.12,1. Also see Gonda at Lakshman Sarup Comm.Volume,
p.223 ff; L.Stembach, Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law, I, (1965) , 
p.347 ff.
3. Haradatta on Gaut.XII.38, vide H.N.Apte, A.S.S.61, cit.above, p.98. t ,
' Also see S.B.E., vol.II,, cit.above, p.244; and, (195o)52 Bom.L.R.,J.,
p.33.
4. Maskari on Gaut.XII.38, L .Srinivasacharya, ed., (Mysore, 1917), p.2o8; The 
Dharmakos'a, ed. by L.Joshi (Vai, 1938) , vol.I, pt.II, p .678 .
5. P.W.Rege, The law of Stridhana, (Ph.d. Thesis, Univ.of London, 196o), 
p.311; also see Chunilal v.Surajram, (19o9) 33 Bom.433, p.442.
Thus, sulka as bride-price is taken to mean, "a gratuity
1for whicn a girl \s given in marriage."
t It may be pointed out here that there existed an intriguing 
controversy as to what exactly constituted a 'selling1.
According to Vasis'-ha (I. 36', "... when the present of a
2
chariot and a hundred cows is made, it is known as selling,"
3but on the other hand, in the view of Apastamba , such a gift ’ 
to the girl's guardian (as described above) has been prescribed 
V7ith a view to securing a special end and for a righteous 
purpose ... which present joins the couple in wedlock; the 
applying of the term 'selling' to such giving of the girl is 
a mere declaration because the acceptance of the present is for 
a righteous purpose.
1 . According to the Mit.on Yajn.II.144,
Yaddattam sulkam yadgrhitva kanya diyate,
i.e., "The gratuity, for the receipt of which a girl is given in 
marriage." For the text see, S.S.Khedwal, ed., Yajnavalkya-Smrti, 
cit.above, pp.2o6-2o7; and for translation, see H.T.Colebrooke, Two 
Treatises on Hindu law of Inheritance, (Cal., 18o1), p.367; The 
Viramitrodaya, V.1,3, vide, G.Sarkar Sastri, trans., (Cal., 1879),p.223;
D.F.Mulla, Principles of Hindu law, (12th edn., Bombay, 1959), p.219; 
G.Banerjee, The Hindu law of Marriage and Stridhana, (2nd edn., 1896), 
p.272; or (5th edn., 1923), p.324; as well as f.n.3 on p.337;
E.J.Trevelyan, Hindu Law, (3rd edn., 1929), p.475;
It was held (in the context of succession to stridhana) that, "if the 
present is given to the girl or the father of the girl for the primary 
purpose of purchasing a bride or securing the marriage, then it would 
come within the definition of sulka." Sulka is explained here as falling 
under 'some idea of bride price'. - T .Suravya v .Balkrishnayya, A.I.it 1941 
Mad.618, at p.619.
Also;in similar context, it was held that, "presents received by a bride 
from her parents cannot be considered sulka. To attract the application 
of special rules of succession to sulka, it must be distinctly alleged 
and proved by cogent evidence that the property given to a Hindu girl 
was of the character, the gift having been prompted by a desire to 
confer a pecuniary benefit, immediate or ultimate, on the parents who 
have been thereby induced to give her in marriage." - Arunachalam v. 
Sivakami, A.I.R." 1955, N.U.C. (T.C.), 1659.
Also see, J.D.M.Derrett, I.M.H.L., cit.above, p,399.
2. Vasistha (1.36) quoted in the Notes on Manu, by G.Jha, (cited above),
vol.Ill, p.187; also, vide G.Buhler, S.B.E., vol.14, (Oxford, 1882),
p.7, as follows, "The purchase (of a wife) is mentioned in the following 
passage of the Veda, therefore, one hundred (cows) besides a chariot 
should be given to the father of the bride." Also see, Megasthenis' view 
that "They marry .. , giving in exchange a yoke of oxen." vide J.W.
McCrindle, trans., Ancient India, (Lon., 1877), pp.7o-71.
3. Apas., II.6.13.11 q. .Jha, cit.above, vol.III., p.186; correct reference
should read: Apas. 11,6.13.12.
1However, according to the translation of G.Biihler ,it reads 
as, "In reference to those (marriage rites), the word 'sa]e' 
(which occurs in seme smrtis is only used as) a metaphorical
t *
expression, for the unJon (of the husband and wife) is effected 
through the law."
Thus, the difference of opinion between these, two lies, 
not so much in the substance, but in the idea of selling fox 
purchasing) attributed to the nuptial present. The latter 
justifies his view on the ground that it tends to fulfil a 
righteous (dharmlc) end, i.e., uniting the couple in wedlock. 
Provided this takes place, it appears that Apastamba has no 
objection even if the gift is used by the girl's guardian.
But VVasa, through the mouth of Bhisma, offers a different 
opinion.
2
Bhisma says, ^
pracetasasya vacanam kirtayamti puravidah / 
yasyah kimcinnadadate jnvatayo na sa vikrayah // 
arhanam tatkumarinamanrsamsyatamam ca tat / 
sarvam ca pratideyam syatkanyayai tadasesatah //
"People learned in ancient lore, quote words of 
Prachetasa to the effect that in cases where the 
relations do not appropriate anything for themselves, 
it is not selling, it is only a method of honouring 
the girls, and as such,entirely harmless and righteous; 
the whole of the present received should be made 
over to the girl."3
1. Apas.,11.6.13.12, S.B.E.2 (Oxford, 1879), pp.131-132.
2. The Hahabharata, Anusasana-parva, 13.46.1-2, (critical Poona edn,,1366', 
vol. 17, ptTI, p.281;
3. The Mahabharata, 7vnusasana-parva, 13.46.1-2, q. by G.Jha, in his Notes 
(cit. above), p.187;
It may be pointelhere that according to the translation of Mr.P.C.Ray,
The Mahabharata, vol.XIII, (Cal.,19o5),p.114, it means,"However,good treaimer 
and everything else which is agreeable, should all be given to the maiden 
whose hand is taken in marriage." Also, Manu, III.54, "In the case of 
girls whose relations do not appropriate the bride's gift, it is not 
'selling', it is only a means of honouring the maidens and it is entirely 
harmless", seems almost identical to Bhisma's view. Vide G.Jha, ibid., 
vol.II, pt. I, p.85. Cf. V.V.Mirashi, at Indian Antiquary, 3rd series- 
vol.I, (Bom., 1964), pp.174-175. Here, in Ephigraphic Notes - I, he 
suggests that according to an inscription of Samudragupta, the "bride-price 
(sulka) was paid in the form of manliness and valour (by Samudragupta)", 
etc.. Though imaginative, the meaning of sulka here points to that sort of 
payment which will ensure the maiden's own happiness, and not that of her 
parents or guardian.
3?
Thus, it appears that by implication Vyasa suggests that it 
is not a righteous practice of the relatives of the girl to 
appropriate for themselves the presents received in connection 
with her marriage. There is no doubt only this interpretation 
of customary practices arose.
For, Manu had gone further and positively stated that 
such an appropriation, is deplorable and should not be practised. 
According to him,
"The girl's father, if wise, should not accept even 
a small consideration; by accepting a consideration, 
through greed, the man becomes a child-seller." 1
Medhatlthi explains that, "This verse prohibits the receiving
of ’consideration’ in connection with the Asura form of
marriage , ... " (for what he means by 'consideration', see
above p.84). Further, at IX.98, we read:
Adadita na sudro api sulkam duhitar&m dadan / ^
sulkam hi grhnankurute channam duhitr vikrayam //
"Even a sudra should not take a nuptial fee (sulka), when 
he is giving away his daughter; by accepting a fee, what he
3
does is disguised bartering." Perhaps 'concealed sale' would
be a better translation. The prohibition appears to be complete
and total, though Bharuci (7th cent.) in his commentory on this
verse shows it is his view that sudras were still permitted
to conclude marriages with bride-prices. Any act contrary
to Manu's deprecation was regarded as a sinland (by some at
5 _any rate) even a 'crime'. Baudhayana goes to extremes and 
declares that, "a female who has been purchased for money is 
not a wife . ... and quotes Kasyapa (or Kasyapa) as stating
1. Manu, III.51, vide here G.Jha, ibid., p.33; J.D.Mayne, cit.above, (7th edn. 
Madras, 19o6), p.96.
2. Manu, IX.98, by G.Jha, ed., vol.II., cit.above, p.27o.
3. Manu, IX.98, vide G.Jha, trans., vol.V, cited above, p.82; Medhatlthi 
explains this sloka as "the nuptial fee here spoken of is the same as 
what has been deprecated in another text"; (i.e. Manu, III.51) referred 
to above p. 84.
4’. I.e. living on money obtained by 'selling' one's female relatives;
Manu, III.52, vide G.Jha, vol.II, pt.I, cit.above, p. 83, Baudh.,1.11.21
q. by G.Jha, The Notes, cit.above, p.186; also see, G.Biihler, trans.,
S.B.E. 14, cited above, pp.2o7-7.
5. Baudh., 1.11.21,3, op. cit., p.2o8.
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that 'she is a slave* " This view appears to be an erroneous 
one (probably an arthavada, i.e., nlndarthavada? because 
marriage, according to the sasti a s , is a necessary samskara , 
a sacrament, and once performed according to the prescribed
rites is valid - the presence of a financial consideration or
2 * otherwise cannot invalidate it. Why, then, have these sastras
treated the bride-price as immoral and undxharmic? Govindasvaml
in his commentary on Baudhayana clearly says a daughter-seller
obtains a mean rebirth and falls into hell.
It might be inferred from what has been stated above by 
Apastamba (see p.85), that he wants to limit the scope of 
the 'present* to a gift made voluntarily for a righteous end
- and no more. Bhisma wants, in addition, to see that the
' * 3'present* is ultimately made over to the girl. Looked at
I
from this point of view, the use of the present by anyone
other than the girl transforms it into (a) b?ide-price, and
(b) an act not leading to a harmless end, i.e., an immoral
and sinful act. The reason offered by Manu is forthright.
He prohibits taking a bride-price because it amounts to 'child-
sale', which is an immoral act (see above p.87). Hemadri
enumerates various penances considered to be appropriate by
f _ 4
various sastrakaras in the section on puttrivikrayaprayascittam.
5
Baudhayana treats this not only as a child-sale but also as 
selling 'oneself*. This, according to him, amounts to commiting 
a great 'crime', literally 'great stain'.
1. Baudh., 1.11.21,2, ibid., p.2o7; P. W, Pegs, cit.above, gives this 
reference no. as 1.11.21.4-5 on p.41 of his Thesis, because he was 
following the Kashi skt.Series (1934) edn.. of the text.
2. J.D.Mayne, op,cit., 11th edn., p. 134; Venkat v .Laxminarayana, (19o9) ,
32 Mad. 185 (F.B.), It was held there that, "The marriage, once performed 
... is valid."
3. Smrticandrika, IV.1.5; vide S. Setlur, A Complete collection of Hindu 
law Books on Inheritance, vol.I,(Madras, 1911), p.258; TheVrramitrodaya, 
V.I.3, vide, ibid., vol.II., p.44o-41; also, vide C.Sarkar Sastri, cit. 
above, p.223; Medha.on Manu, III.54, 'accepting of a present on behalf 
of the bride is permitted', vide G.Jha, cit.above, vol.II, pt.I, p.85.
4. P.N.Tarkabhusana, ed., Hemadri's Catur^argacintamani, Prayascitta- 
kandam, (Cal., 1911), pp.157-158.
5. Baud., 1.11.21.3, "Those wicked men who ... give away a daughter for a
fee, who thus sell themselves* and commit a great crime ... and destroy 
their family down to the seventh (generation)." Vide G.Biihler, cit. 
above, S.B.E.14, p.2c8 - * according to the trans. of G.Jha, "soul-
sellers", see, the Notes on Manu, cit.above, vol.Ill, p.186.
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According to Vasistha, the matter seems to be even more
serious. He quotes the Caturmasyasf as stating that, "she
(forsooth) who has been bought by her husband fcommits sin , as
afterwards she unites herself with others (strangers) .
It is obvious that if parents sell their daughters they sell
to the highest bidder. Riches did not,, in ancient India, go
with high caste status or unblemished morals, any more than
they do today. In sacramental terms the marriage by purchase
is a merely secular acquisition of the girl. The gods do not
give her to the bridegroom. Vasistha's idea arose perhaps
because the bride came from a blemished family" (due to her
3
father, who took purchase money from her husband). This 
inference, that the daughter also becomes tainted due to the 
father's sin, might be debatable, but in comparison with 
what we have noticed so far, the implications of Vasistha's 
assertion are far more serious; they brand sulka, as the 
emblem of the Asura marriage, as destructive of dharma and 
morality.
Is there anything justifying acceptance of the bride-price 
Apastamba, as we have already seen above (p.85), seems to 
defend it (as a present) on the ground that it is meant for 
a righteous purpose, and thereby it helps, perhaps, to uphold 
dharma. One might be inclined to accept this argument provided 
it is followed not only in the letter but also in spirit.
But from the practical point of view, especially considering 
human weaknesses, one could hardly be sure of its not being 
misused, for the benefit of wicked fathers or the like, for 
there was no machinery to compel fathers of girls to hand over 
the consideration to them.^
1. Vasistha, 1.37, vide G.Buhler, cit.above, S.B.E.14, p.7.
2. Vasistha, 1.38, "Lost learning comes back, when the family is lost all 
is lost; even the horse becomes estimable on account of its pedigree; 
therefore men marry wives descended from an (unblemished) family." Ibid.
3. Baudh., 1.11.21.3, vide, S.B.E.14, op.cit., p.2o8. < *
4. Compare Dowry Prohibition Act, Act 28 of 1961, sec.6, (see J.D.M.Derrett, 
cit.above, I.M.H.L, p.6o9) a dead letter.
/mother argument put forward in defence of the bride’s 
father suggests that a part oi the bride-price went to him 
"as compensation for the patriarchal or family authority which
i
w a s rtransferred to the husband." This might well be so in 
those days, but in view of a Hindu father’s sacred duty to 
give his daughter m  marriage to a suitable husband,^ the 
claim based on this authority seems illusory and contradictory.
Now, considering the above arguments, both in favour cf 
and against bride-price, it appears that the sastrakaras were 
right in treating it as an illegal and immoral (undharmic) 
practice for the reasons given above. They had no objection, 
however, to a gift, given and taken as such, provided it was 
in the interest of dharma and for the benefit of the girl. 
Evidence of the latter would be its finding its way eventually 
into her hands in the shape of jewellery or household furniture.
)
This view appears to have been followed and confirmed 
by the majority of the modern decisions, and, especially, the
1. N .R.Raghavachariar, Hindu Law, cit.above, (4th edn., 196o), 
p. 4 92; Kautilya, IV.12.9, here Kautilya in the context 
of the failure, after betrothal, to give his daughter to 
the bridegroom, states that, "the (latter, i.e., the father) 
forfeits his ownership by (his acts) making her periods 
vain. "
Vide R.P.Kangle, trans., Kaufillya Arthasastra, pt.II, 
cit. above, p.33o.
2. The Full Bench observed in Venkat v.Laxminarayana,
op.cit., at p. 187, "It is clearly opposed to the dictates 
of justice, equity and good conscience to allow a father 
to make a profit out of the fulfilment of the duty imposed 
upon him by Hindu Law of finding a suitable husband for 
his daughter ... "
3. In Keshow Rao v. Naro Junardhun, Borradaile's Reports, 
vol.II, (Bom., 1862), p,215, at p.223,
In this case the sastric injunction was followed and the 
• son was not held liable.
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idea of selling or purchasing of a child (a daughter or a 
2
s o n -) seems to be the basis; the taint of which, in their 
opinion, makes it immoral and opposed to public policy. Also, 
the modern decisions appear to discourage this practice (as
3
observed by the appeal court ) for, "it is obvious that such 
an agreement (claiming a local custom allowing bride-price 
to be enforceable at law) is derogatory to the happiness and 
welfare of the child as it acts as an incentive to the guardian 
to have regard to considerations other than the child's 
happiness in marrying her into another's family. The child 
is given away to the highest bidder without having the least 
regard for her welfare."
Of course, this assertion has its own limitations and 
therefore its application will depend on the facts of eachI
case. It is impossible to generalise in this way because 
not each and every parent or guardian of a chfcld is of the 
same attitude and feelings so as to be always guided by this 
kind of incentive.
In Bhagirathi v. Jokhu Rama, 1 however, it was helf that 
the asura form of marriage was (then) quite common, that the 
purchase of a bride was quite common, and that it could not 
^  be held that the money which was raised was not part of the
expenses of a legal marriage. With respect, it must be pointed
1. T. Surayya v. Balkrishnayya, A.l.R. 1941, Mad.618,619, "But, these same 
classes of gifts if not tainted with the idea of purchase, being simple 
gifts to a prospective bride, would not fall within the definition of 
sulka;" Venkat v. Laxminarayana, op.cit.; In this case the Court said 
on the p.186 (while referring the issue to F.B.) that, "we should have 
no hesitation in holding that such agreements for payment to a father in 
consideration of his giving his daughter in marriage are immoral and 
opposed to public policy whether the question be approached from the 
standpoint of Hindu law or justice, equity and good conscience which we 
are bound to administer." In D.Chetty v. M.Chetty,(1914) 37 Mad.393 at 
pp.395-6; per White C.J., "It is true ... that no money is payable as 
'bride-price' to anybody. ... It is now established ... that a contract to 
make a payment to a father in consideration of his giving his daughter in 
marriage is opposed to public policy within the meaning of section 23 of 
the Contract Act."
2: Dholidas Ishvar v.Fulchand Chhagan, (1897) , 22 Bern. 658. It was held in this 
case that, "a contract which entitles a father to be paid money in 
consideration of giving his son or dauther in marriage is against public 
policy and cannot be enforced in a Court of law"; Cf. Subbaraju v . 
Narayanaraju, (1926) 51 M.L.J. 366.
3. Gulabchand v. Fulbai, (19o9) 33 Bombay, 411 at p.414.
4. (191o) 32 All. 575.
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out here that this appears to be an attempt to ignore the 
illegal and immoral nature of Ssura marriage (due to the
taint of payment of bride-price), against the dictates of
<!
the sastras as well as modern Hindu law, simply because it 
was 'common'. This seems too weak a ground^ to justify the 
deviatiOxi from the majority view based both on the sastras 
.and on sound principles of 'justice, equity arid good conscience.
New, before we turn to examine another meaning of the
word sulka, it may not be out of place to note here that the
inappropriate word 'fee' in English has been used to denote
sulka (both as bride-price and as qratuity ultimately passed
'2
to the bride) by different translators. * However, we need 
not be confused.
1. In comparison, however,, the argument put ^forward by T.Strange 
at p. 167 of his Hindu Law, vol.I (London, 183o), appears 
more justifiable (though in a different context). What he 
meant there by 'nuptials' seems to be 'marriage expenses
in general' rather than the 'bride-price'.
2. a) Visnu XVII.18, the word sulka here has been given the 
following three different interpretations: 1. 'fee, as one 
of the items of Stridhana; 2, fee denotes the price or 
value of a house or other valuable object presented to the 
bride by her father; 3. or it means the fee paid for her 
by the bridegroom (i.e. the bride-price); see, J.Jolly, 
Institutes of Vignu, S.B.E.7, cit.above, p.69;
b) Gautama, XII. 41 quoted in Vivadacintamani, pp.28-29, 
herein according to G.Jha's translation, ^ulka means 'fep' 
(bridal); Haradatta explains it as meaning that which was 
to be paid to the parents of the girl (i.e., bride-price); 
also in G.Biihler's translation of this in S.B.E.2, p. 241; 
Haradatta on Gautama XXVIII.25 is said to have meant by 
sulka therein 'the fee i.e., the money v;hich at an asura 
oi an arsa wedding, the father has taken for giving the 
sister away1; see, G.Biihler, ibid., p.3o3.
— _ ■ k
c) Vyasa quoted 1) by Jimutavahana, Dayabhaga, IV.III.21, 
translation of which is given as 'bribe' (i.e., inducement) 
to bring birde to her husband's family;
Katyayana quoted 2) by Jimutavahana (ibid.) IV.III.2o, 
where sulka is translated as 'bribe' given to a woman to 
send her husband to ... labour;
Katyayana quoted again at IV.III.19, ibid., sulka means‘ 
'price of household goods etc.',
vide here the trans.of H .T .Colebrooke, Two Treatises on Hindu 
Law of Inheritance, cit.above, pp.92-93.
(f.n. continued next page)
SULKA AS DOWER CR DOWRY: We have not-iced above the
deprecation cf bride-price. The sastrakaras appeared to 
agree unanimously on this point. This did not mean, however, 
the end of the bride-price. In spite of the dharmasastra1s
f -j
disapproval, £uJLk_am as a dowry (which in fact appears here
(f.n. continued from the last page)
* According to Colebrooke (f.n.21) 'what is given to bring 
the oride'. Cudamani notices a variation in the reading 
of Vvasa's text - an!tarn for anetam,"what is brought 
while the bride is going to her husband’s house" instead 
of "what (is given) to bring her to her husband's house." 
P.W.Rege (cit.above) seems to agree with this view (p.7o-71) 
In this sense, it may be noted, that sulka. means dowry. 
G.Eanerjee (cit.above), pp.491-92, appears, however, to 
agree with Colebrooke's translation.
Also, Vyasa q. in Jagannatha's Digest, vol.Ill, verse 
471, p.57o; Colebrooke translates ^ulka as bribe to a bride. 
J.D.M.Derrett says, it may be treated 'practically obsolete
I .H .L ., cit.above, at p.4o3. *
"But the Cintamani and the Vivada-ratnakara (p. 525) both 
take the term in an entirely unusual sense; the latter 
remarks 'the sulka is the money that is given to the woman 
by the servants of the house, by way of bribe for keeping 
them in good graces of the Master'. This again is different 
from the explanation of the Cintamani above;" (i.e. sulka 
in the sense of price of household goods etc.) vide G.Jha, 
The Vivadacintamani (f.n. on verse 96o), op.cit..
We find all these ideas meet at a phrase like 'bride's 
perquisites'. It is obvious that not all of them can 
be debts I
1, Kaut, 3.2.7 read with 3.2.11; - "For those two (i .e .parents) 
receive the dowry of the daughter, or one of them in the 
absenc.e of the other", and 3,2.19, which states that on 
the death of her husband she shall receive the remainder 
of t.he dowry (sulkasesam) . In the f.n. 19, Kangle states 
that"the sulka goes to the bride's parents (s.11). It may 
be that parents who receive the sulka hold it in trust 
for the daughter."
Vide R.P.Kangle, trans., op.cit., II, pp.227-28.
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not to vary greatly from bride-price ) has been mentioned
2
in the context of women’s property (stridhana) , as well
as in ihe context of debts (not recoverable from sons or
in 
4
* 3heirs) by Kautilya. But at the same t.ime the references
that the wife in certain circumstances either receives
5
(herself) or has to forfeit the dowry, suggest that during
1, This view is strengthened if we take into account Kaut.4.12; 
especially the following siokas cn the consequences of 
violations cf maidens:
Kaut. 4.12.4, ’’and he (who violates a maiden) shall make 
good the loss to her father";
Kaut. 4.12.7, "if she (the maiden) has been reserved by 
the dowry of another, ..., as well as the 
payment of dowry"
Kaut. 4.12.8, "A bridegroom not receiving the bride after 
betrothal, ... shall have right (to her) ... 
and shall not make good the father's loss";
Kaut. 4. 12.15, "For a (bride) not a virgin at the time of
consummation, the fine . . , and (she) shall 
return the dowry and (marriage) expenses";
(also, the f.n.15 there, on this £loka.)
Kaut. 4, 12,18, "And he (who falsely accuses the bride of 
loss of virginity), "shall lose the dowry 
and the expenses."
Kangle, ibid., pp.33o-331.
2, For a concise exposition, see P.Mukherjee, at Our Heritage, 
'Property Rights of Women as Recorded in Kautiliya Arthasastra 
and Mar.usmrti', - vol.9, (Cal., 1961), 47, pp.52-58.
3, Kaut. 3 „ 16,9 (ibid.) p. 281.
4. Kaut. 3.2.19, which is "When the husband is dead, the 
(widow.1 if desiring of leading a life of piety, shall 
forthwith receive the endowment and the remainder of the 
dowry." Ibid., p.228, See above p.93, f.n.1.
5. Kant. 3.4.15, "If, even on such occasions", (i.e., those 
which are normally allowed to attend without her husband's 
permission), "she conceals herself, she shall forfeit
her woman's property, or the kinsmen concealing (her, 
shall forfeit) the balance of the dowry."
Ibid., p .237,
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this period in question women themselves, either in place of 
or along with their parents, shared the dower. In this 
connection, one wonders whether the practice possibly relates 
to a social custom analogous to Islamic law according to 
which prompt dower was paid at the consummation, and the 
balance was a charge, as it were, on husband's estate.
For, here is the reason why sons were approached to pay 
the balance: sulkasesa m . We have no sa.stric or other proof 
that there was such a custom; but, if this were not true, 
it is difficult, to explain Kautilya’s views on the subject.
What all this seems to indicate, is, probably, the
result of interaction between the sastric ideals and the
materialism (based on practical values of life) of the
arthasastr a . Although Kautilya does not appear openly to
prohibit sulka to be given or taken, he seems to agree with
%the smrtikaras when he allows sons or heirs, if they so wish, 
to refuse payment of debts incurred by the father by way of 
a balance of sulka. This transitional period appears to 
have resulted in converting sulka into something similar to 
a ’dowry'1 properly so called.
"The introduction of dower", however, during the later
period, "denotes that the Aryan society of Visnu’s time was
inclined to be guided by M a n u ’s censure against a father who
received money for his daughter, and instead of preventing
this pracui.ce altogether, thought of converting the bride-price
2into st.cldnana of the bride herself."' If this was realised, 
the result, would have been almost identical to what Bhisma 
(see above p.36) wanted to have, which modern decisions 
generally approve (see above pp.87 and 91, and f.n.1 on p.91)
1. Kaut., 3.16.9, "The son or heir inheriting the property 
may not pay, if unwilling, obligations of suretyship, 
balance of a fine or dowry (sulka) a gambling debt, a debt 
for drinks and a gift of love." (Here it seems to mean 
’of lust’). Cf. Manu, VIII.159; Yajn. 11.47; etc. *
Ibid., p.281; also see R.Shamasastrv, trans., Kautiliya 
Arthasastra, (1915), p.22o.
2. P.W. Rege, op.cit., p.64.
Conclusion: It may be stated in conclusion that
1 . ^bride-price and dowry (as understood by the arthasastra) 
are apparently synonymous terms;
2. the dharmasestras treated such practices as taking a bride- 
price as immoral and undharmic since they amounted to a 
child-sale, which the Sastrakaras deprecated;
3. this view of the sastrakaras seems to have been relied on 
and followed by the modern decisions, for according to 
them,
4. the idea of selling or purchasing of a child forms the 
basis, the taint of which makes it immoral and opposed to 
public policy.
Thus, in connection with marriages, it is the primary
purpose for which the present is given or accepted , which
determines the legality and morality or otherwise of the
present concerned. It is quite clear, then, that any debt
* ,
of a Hindu father, which falls within the definition of sulka 
in the sense of the bride-price, is outside the son's liability 
to pay his father's debts, because such debts are, as we have 
seen above, immoral and illegal debts.
1. Raghavananda on Manu, VIII.369. Sulka means here a present 
to ingratiate oneself. This may arise when the male is 
exceptionally attached to the girl but the girl does not 
reciprocate his affection, or when she is especially 
relied upon (to agree to the match) because of unusual 
proximity: in either case a special penalty is called
f or...... •» sulkam ... visesah (this supposes a society in
which bride-prices as such are repudiated, but the onus 
still lies on the boy's family to get this marriage arranged)
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SULKA AS A TOLL, TAX, CUSTOMS OR DUTY: In the
course of explaining the results cf non-performance by the
i
king of his duty to protect his subjects, Medhatlthi on Manu,
VI.lt.3o7, defines 'tax1 'karo dravyadanam1 as what is paid
in cash, and 'duties' 'sulkam vanikprap/abhagah1 as what the
2 /tradesmen pay* But, to some, sulka denotes lawful taxes 
in general.
According to the Mitaksara on Yajhavalkya, 11.261, sulka 
seems to mean a sales-tax, Yajhavalkya, 11.261 reads:
Ardhapraksepanadvimsam bhagam sulkam nrpo haret /--
raja-gami tat // 3
! "The king shall take as a tax a twentieth share ^
I of the price fixed (by him) «... it belongs to him."
1. Vide G.Jha, vol.IV, pt.II, cit.above, p.34o; for Sanskrit 
terms, see G.Jha, ed., op.cit., p.2o2. '
2. "On account of sutras immediately following, it is, however^ 
more probable that the term is here used as a synonym of 
kara and includes all taxes. 'Lawful taxes are, of course, 
those sanctioned by custom and approved by the smrtis" , 
observed G.Biihler in the translation by him of Apastamba 
Dharmasutras, S.B.E.2, pt.I, (Oxford, 1879), p . 162; f.n. on 
Ap a s .I I .1o .26(9);
According to Kangle's gloss on Kaut.2.6.3, 'Karah appears 
to be a tax paid in cash'; vide his trans., op.cit., p.II, 
p.87, f,n.3 .
In this sense, the above observation of G.Biihler that the 
term sulka is synonym of kara wenId appear incorrect, but 
even Kangle himself appears to be doubtful about his own 
gloss.
3. Yajhavalkya - Smriti, e d , by J.R.Gharpure, (1st edn., 1914), 
pp.142-143; L.Sastri Joshi, Dnaniako s a , Vyavaharakanda, 
vol.’l, pt.II, (Vai, 1938), p.773.
4. Mit. on Yajh., 11.261, see the translation of J.R.Gharpure,
(Bombay, 192o), p.378; also, see Haradatta on Apas, II.1o.26 
(9), ...'sulka is the 1/2oth part of a merchant's gain,' 
referred to here in the trans. of G.Biihler, cit. above, f.n. 2 
above); also for the similar view, see Manu, VIII.398 and 
Gautama, quoted in the Vivadacintaman i , see trans. of G.Jha, 
cit,above, p . 122, but according to the Vivadaratnakara 
(p.3o4), quoted in f.n. thereunder, this refers to 
merchandise bought from foreign lands. Visnu, on the 
contrary, applies this to 'goods sold in another country'; * 
see Visnu, III.3o, see the trans. of J.Jolly, S.B.E.7,
cit.above, pp.15-16.
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However, Visnu says, "Let him take a tenth part of
(the price of) marketable commodities (sold) in his own 
]
country". This, however, is immaterial from our point 
of view.
/ - 2 Vis^arupa, while commenting on Yajn., 11.53, renders
the same word as
sulkam pathi rajabhavyam danam /
i.e., sulka is a payment which is a duty due to the king upon
the road.
The term sulkam in Kautilya,I I .6.2, is rendered as
4'custom-duties*, while the same word in Kaut., 11.12.35 , 
has been translated as 'duty'.
5
Kulluka on Manu, VIII.159, says, 
sulkam ghattadideyam / 
which means what is to be given at the gatefci.e., a toll.
G.Biihler^ renders sulka as payment of a toll at a ferry; 
while B.S.Moghe says that "sulka should be understood as 
jakat, kara, dhara, etc.", which means a toll paid at the 
city-gate or at a ferry.
1. Visnusmrti, III. 29, vide J.Jolly, op.cit., p. 15.
2. Yajhavalkyasmrti with the commentary of Vi^varupa, edn.by
• T.Ganapati Sastri, (Trivendrum, 1922), p.22o; according to
H.H.Apte's edn.(of Apararka on Yajn.),A .S .S.No.46, cit.above, 
p. 648; this verse is enumerated as Yajh*. , 11.47.
Also, see Kaut.2.6.3; the road-cess is mentioned here without 
using tne word ^ulka. R.P.Kangle, p.tl., p.41; and pt.II, 
p . 8 /.
3. Ibid.. pt.I, p.41, and pt.II, p.86.
4. Ibid., pt.II, p . 126; also Kaut. 2. 22 deals exhaustively 
with the tariff of duties and tolls, see pp.166-167.
5. V.N.Mandlik, e d . , Manavadharmasastra,c i t .above, p.975; 
also, Manvartha-Muktavali, quoted by R.K.Ranade at (195o)
52 Bom. L .R .,J ., 33 at p.35. Also see J.Hoshing, e d . , 
Hemacandra's Anekarthasamgraha, (Benares, 1929), p.4,
s'ulkam ghattadidatavyejamatus'capibandhake /
•6. Vasistha, XIX.16.25, S.B.E.14, (Oxford, 1882), p.99.
7. Mitaksara on Yajn. 11.47, vide S.B.Moghe's translation 
in Marathi, called Yajnavalkyasmrt i , Vyavaharadhyaya, 
cit. above, p.1o2.
Thus, even if there is a difference of opinion among
the sastrakaras and the commentators as to the quantum of
amount of tax to be paid, we are left with hardly any doubt
that the word sulka may mean a sales-tax, or a road-tax,
custom-duties, a duty, a toll, £md that these duties were
/
lawful dues owed to the king."Sunka was unquestionably the
consolidated estimate for the customs and excise dues for the
-|  ^
area, and 'our sources indicate that sulka was the most
2
important item of royal income."
But why should the duties be due to the king? And, if 
these were his dues, then why should a debt, incurred by way 
of non-payment of tolls etc. by a Hindu father, be exempted 
from his son's liability to pay it?
According to the sastrakaras, the protection of his
subjects shall be done by the king in accordance with the
provisions of 'law'. 'Law' stands for the scriptures,
especially the scriptures dealing with dharma or duty. The
protection was necessary to guard the weak against the strong,
and to see that they do not transgress righteousness.
"'Protection' means saving from troube; the transgressing of
law brings imperceptible (adrsta/ supernatural) trouble;
so that when people do not transgress it, they become saved
4
from that trouble by the king." How could he do so? He was 
expected to achieve this with the help of punishment: by
punishing culprits who transgressed. Of course, this involved, 
e.g., investigation of the such cases. Again, the king was
1. J .D .M .Derret l , The dynastic History of the Hoyasala K ings, 
Ph.D.Thesis, University of London, (1949), p.549.
Sunka is same as Sanskrit sulka which means tolls; vide 
"D.C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphicai Glossary, c it. above, p. 4 24 . 
Also see G.S.Dikshit, Local Self-Government in Mediaeval Karnataka, 
cit.above, p. 171. Also see, D.N.Jha, Revenue System in Post-Maurya and 
Gupta Times, (Cal.,1967), pp.72-78. At p.76 it is stated in respect of 
£ulka "that it was a tax on commodities realised from traders and 
merchants, and that it may have included taxes on both foreign and 
indigenious articles." Also, B.Bhattacharya, trans., Danjaviveka, 
cit.above, p.5.
2. D.N.Jha, op.cited, p.73.
3. "The protection of all this shall be done according to*law 1 (dharma),by 
the Ksatrlya who has received the Vedic training in due form." - Manu,
VII.2, G.Jha, trans., vol.Ill,pt.II, cit.above, p.274.
4. Medhatithi on Manu, VII.2; G.Jha, ibid., p.275.
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expected to do chis and decide cases in strict accordance
1
with the ordinances of scriptures.
Dandcna nlyate ceyam danqlam nayati capyuta / 
dandanitir iti proktta trimllokan anuvartate //
"And because men are led (to the acquisition of the 
1 .objects of their existence) by chastisement, or, in
other words, chastisement leads or governs everything, 
therefore, v/ill this science be known in three worlds 
as dandanit.i (science of chastisement)." 3
Thus it appears that according to the dharmasastra, it was 
the king's ducy to secure a good administration of justice.
But why? Obviously, tG maintain law and order for the sake 
of peace and prosperity of the people and his realm; (see 
below f.n,1). A modern writer on the subject has stated that 
this royal function of protection covers the whole scope of 
dharma as the smrtis conceived it: acara, prayascitta and
4
vyavahara. In this sense, the royal function is essential 
not only for the benefit of society as a whole but also for 
this reason that the sastrakaras have treated this as the
1 . Medhatithi on Manu, VIII. 1 reads as follows: "Prosperity of the people
i.e. kingdom; King's duty is to protect (removal of trouble) the people; 
and to fulfilling this duty and thus to preserve the kingdom, he must 
investigate the cases of people and.decide in strict accordance with 
ordinances of scriptures"; the trans. of G .Jha, ibid., vol.IV, pt.I,p .2;
2. The Mahabharata,santiparva, 12.59.78; S.K.Belvakar, ed., The Mahabharata, 
vol.13, pt.I, cit.above, p.269.
3. P.C.Roy, trans., The Mahabharata, (of Vyasa) , vol.VI-VII, santiparva, 
(Cal., 1926), p.134; also see, M.N.Dutt, trans., The Mahabharata, 
books 8-18, santiparva, chap.LIX, 78, (Cal., 19o3), p.85.
Cf. The Mahabharata, 12.59.91-92, (see Poona critical 
edition, op.cit,, p.271), which tell us how this science 
was abridged so as to suit decreased life-span of human 
beings (and everything else) in order to benefit all (the 
world).
Also see, P.C.Roy, trans., op.cit., p. 135; M.N.Dutt, 
trans., op.cit., p.85, (here the verses are 85-86).
4. R.Lingat, The Classical Law of India, cit.above, p.223.
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1
highest among all duties of the king; and precisely because
of this royal function of protection they nave conferred
upon him, it seems, the right to collect taxes from his 
2
subjects. "In fact, the right to take revenue is only an 
adjunct to the royal function, intended to give the king 
the means to secure his proper subsistence and to govern 
his r e a l m . T h i s ,  however, does not mean that only those
1. Manu, VII.144, "The highest duty of a ksatriya is to protect 
his subjects, for the king who enjoys the rewards, ...,
is bound to (discharge that) duty." Vide G. Buhler, S.B.E.25, 
cit.above, p.238;
Also, the Virmitrodaya on Yajn., 1.335-36, "With a view to 
point out the protection of subjects as a principal one 
among the duties of a king, the author mentions the highest 
fruit from the protection of subjects." Vide J .R .Gharpure, 
trans., The Collection of Hindu Law Texts, vol.II, pt.II, 
(Bombay, 1937), p.598.
2. Baudh., I.1o.1, "Let the king protect (h:?fe) subjects receiving 
as his pay a sixth part (of their incomes or spiritual merit)'4* 
vide here the trans. of G,Buhler, S.B.E.14, cit.above, p . 199. 
Narada, XVIII.48, reads, "Both the other customary receipts 
of a king and what is called the sixth of produce of the 
soil, form the royal revenue, the reward (of a king) for
the protection of his subjects," Vide here the trans. of 
J,Jolly, S.B.E.33, (Oxford, 1889), p,221; cf. Medha. on 
Manu, VIII.1, cit,above, f,n.1, p.1oo, where he mentions 
taxes, duties as part of his lav/ful means of livelihood; 
see also, Manu, VII.137, at S.B.E.25 , cit.above, p.237;
Manu, VIII.3o4 states, "A king who (duly) protects (his 
subjects) receives from each and all the sixth part their 
spiritual merit; if he does not protect them, the sixth 
part of their demerit also (will fall on him)." Ibid., 
p,3o7; Cf.Manu, VI I I ,3o7,3o8; ibicL , pp.3o7-3o8; Yajh.1.337, 
vide J .R.Gharpure, c i t .above,(see f.n.1 above), pp.599-6oo. 
Medhatithi on Manu, VIII.3o7 says that "the meaning of the 
verse is that - 'for fear of having his life span cut short 
and sinking into hell, the king should receive his dues 
and afford protection to the people'." Vide trans. of 
G.Jha, vol.IV, pt.II, op.cit., p.34o.
3. R.Lingat,c i t . above, p.213;
Also, J.D.M.Derrett, 'A new Treatise on the nature and 
sources of the Dharmasastra' , Puraiia, (Varanasi, 1968), 
pp.77-94, at p.92, says, "The ksatriya has the right to 
take taxation and to punish offenders."
1o2
who pcy taxes are eligible for the protection and not the
1rest. Medhatithi on Manu, VII. 2 , has explained very clearly 
tha.t protection should be extended to all those 'who pay the 
taxes, as well as those who are poor and helpless.1
This brief discussion, in search of an answer to our 
first question, leads us to believe that according to 
dharmasastra the right of the king to tax his subjects is 
justifiable in the interest of welfare of the people in his 
kingdom, as well as on the ground of upholding dharma. Besides, 
in view of the inability of poor and helpless section of the 
society, it appears, by implication, that those who are liable
and able to pay taxes have greater responsibility than what
appears, on the face of it, to be solely necessary for the
survival of the king.
In view of the above, turning to our second question, 
one might be tempted to reply hastily that the avoidance of 
the payment of tolls and taxes by a Hindu father is prima 
facie not only illegal but also immoral and hence (since 
immoral debts are exempt), outside the liability of his son 
to pay it. But is it, in fact, so?
Let us have a closer look at the above statement.
The avoidance of payment of sulka , tolls or duties, appears
to be immoral or illegal, and hence the debt is said to
2
fall outside the liability of a Hindu son. But one detects 
absurdity In this; for the son, who inherits the fruits of 
his father’s ill-gotten fortunes, made (in part) by way of 
non-payment of sulka, is exempted from the liability to pay 
his father's debt which is incurred by way of non-payment of 
sulka, lawfully due to the king. The absurdity latent in 
the statement could easily be illustrated.
1, Medhatithi explains the words 'of all this1 in this verse of Manu as 
meaning (a) 'of all' - who pay taxes, as well as those who are poor and 
helpless; (b) 'this' - this refers to the people living in his kingdom, 
in villages as well as in cities. Vide G.Jha, cit.ab.,(see f.n.4 on
p.99),p.275.
2. Gaut., XII.41; Manu, VIII.159; Yajn., 11.47; Vasistha, XVI.31;
Brhaspati, XI.51; Vriddha-Harita, IV. 14 2; Vyasa, (acc.to the Vivada- 
ratnakara) and Usanas (acc,to the Mitaksara) , see J.C.Ghose, Hindu Law,
3rd.edn., cit.above, p.546.
Suppose there was a clever businessman named F. His 
sole ambition was to accumulate as much wealth as he possibly 
could. He therefore employed, besides hard work, all the 
tricks he knew: clieatjng, fraud, bribes etc. Thus he succeeded 
in making a huge fortune, which was inherited after his death 
by his only son S <. There were, however, a few cases pending, 
regarding certain claims against F, arising out of his evasion 
of the payments of rolls etc..
His son's advocate pleads that even if the claims 
against F were true and would be proved, S could not be held 
liable to pay because of the exemption, granted in favour of
1 2
Hindu sons by the dharmasastra as well as the arthasastra t 
which releases S from this liability.
The court which was required to decide cases in accordance
with the rules of dharmasastra, would appeal to have been left
with no other choice than to agree, perhaps unhappily, with
the advocate and leave S free to enjoy the wealth. And all
this would appear-to have taken place in spite of the fact
that such an act of avoiding tolls, as in this case, might
ultimately endanger the existence of the king, upon whose
strength and survival depends the welfare of the people and
the survival of dharma itself (see above p.1o1). Surely,
the aim of the principles of the dharmasastra could hardly
be expected to lead to the destruction of dharma itself.
3
From the information available, it is apparent that merchants 
employed various tricks to avoid payment of tolls. This 
was and is unrighteous behaviour. Thus, unpaid tolls could 
be a burden on the soul and the whole toll as well as unpaid 
balances (due to fraud etc.) ought in righteousness to be 
paid by the sons, for their own joint family assets benefited 
from the fraud.
1. Ibid.
2. Kaut., III.16.9. . ‘
3. "People will sell goods mostly with false weights and measures and traders 
will be full of many tricks;" vide P.V.Kane, H.Dh., vol.Ill, (Poona,1946), 
p.894; "While ..., smuggling with a view to avoid payment of tolls was
to be punished and doubtless it was also practised." A.Appadorai,
Economic Conditions in S.India, vol.I,(Mad., 1936), p.428; also see the 
following part of this chapter.
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On the other hand, the situation might Le quite different 
from the one described above: the father might squander
all his wealth and leave behind only the liabilities arising 
out of his misdeeds, such as described above, for his son, 
perhaps a completely innocent person, to pay. We must, 
therefore, investigate and try to determine the proper import 
of the above exception in so far as it concerns the liability 
in respect of non-payment of sulk.a, a toll, from the point of 
view of the s'astrakaras. What, in their opinion, was the 
connotation of this liability which made them place it almost 
in the same category as that of danaa, a fine?
The sastric law on this is laid down in several smrtis 
and the commentaties upon them. But before we start the 
discussion of the sastric law, let us attend to a minor point
I
first,1 To begin with we must appreciate variations in degrees
of 'guilt' attributable to the wrong-doer who incurs the
liability. For it is the seriousness or otherwise of the
guilt which in turn would have been likely to be taken into
consideration while deciding the penalty for the act in question
For example, if we understand a sulka-liability to arise out
of unpaid sulka, unpaid tolls, then there are likely to be
various degrees of liabilities depending upon whether the
non-payment is deliberate or circumstantial, innocent or
intentional, first or repeated and so on and so forth. But
we need not involve ourselves in tuese permutations in order
to compute these variations, Whai we really need to know is
the soft of liability - its nature cr character. What sort
of unpaid tolls, then, did the sastras and the commentaries
upon them judge as qualifying for inclusion within the
exceptions in favour of Hindu sons, along with danda? Perhaps
those outstanding by reason of toll-evasion? Thus, Manu says,
/
Sulkasthanam pariharannakale krayavikrayi / ^
mithyavadi ca samkhyane dapyo astagunam atyayam //
1. Manu, VIII.4oo, V.N.Mandlik, ed., Manavadharmasastra, cit.above, p.11o6; 
Manusmrti with Manvarthamuktavali, (Nirnayasagar, edn. Bom., 192o) , 
p.336; Pandit J.Vidyasagar, ed. Manusamhita with comm, of Kulluka 
Bhatta, (Cal., 1874), p.434; Dandaviveka of Vardhamana, G.O.S., vol.52, 
(Baroda, 1931), p.93; L.S.Joshi, Dharmakosa, vol.I, pt.III, (Wai, 1941), 
p.17o6.
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"Fie who avoids a custom-house (or a toll) , he 
who buys or sells at an improper time, or he who 
makes a false statement in enumerating (his goods), 
shall be fined eight times (the amount of duty) 
which he tried to evade." ^
In..short, according to Manu, he who tries to evade the
payment of tolls should be made to pay eight times the amount
2
of duty which he tried to evade. Bharuci on Manu, VIII.4oo, 
says that in these circumstances the customs must be paid 
eight times over, "sulkam asta-aunam dapyam." But according 
to this view the payment does not seem to be regarded as 
quite the same as suggested above, namely danda, a fine.
3It is Kulluka, on this sloka of Manu, who notices that the
word danda is not used by Manu. Instead, the word is atyayam
which, according to him, means dandarupataya, i.e. 'by way of
fine'. Thus, he glosses, • ^
sulkakhandanartha vikreyadravyasyalpam sankhyam vakti / 
rajadeyamapalapitamastagunam dandarupataya dapyah//
He who declares less than the actual amount of sale for
the purpose of reducing the due amount of toll, and thus avades
what is due to the king, should be made to pay eight times
that amount by way of fine.
j**
1.’ G.Buhler, trans., S.B.E.25, cit.above, p.324; Cf.the trans. 
of G.Jha, vol.IV, pt.II, cit.above, p.421; and that of Sir 
W . Jo■:ies , Institutes of Hindu Lav; or the Ordinances of Manu, 
(Cal., 17 94), p .24o,=Manavadharmasastra , (Cal., 1888), p . 134. 
It may be pointed out here that Sir William Jones appears 
to differ from both G.Jha and G.Buhler, when he states, 
'shall bo fined eight times as much as their value (meaning 
the v a Iug of the articles). The other two seem to mean, 'eigh 
times (the amount of duty) which he tried to evade."
The Burne]1-Hopkins translation, Ordinances of Manu (London,
1891), 241, f.n.6: 'Should be fined the eightfold fine'.
So also, A.Loiseleur-Deslongchamps, Louis de Manou (Paris ND, 
183o), 253 (amende, 'fine'). The assumption that atyayam = 
fine (dandam) is understandable but unwarranted, though 
commentators, naturally, authorise it.
As a matter of fact atyayam is ambiguous. It means 'evasion' and also 
'offence1: thus a true translation, bringing out the pun, would read,' 
outwardly, 'should be made to pay eight times his evas.ion-offence1!
See Apararka below.
2. In Bharuci on Manu, this verse is numbered 393; see J.D.M.Derrett, trans. 
cit.above, p.2o7.
3, V.N.Mandlik, cit.above, p.11o6; Pandit G.S.Nene, ed., (Benares, 1935), 
p.283.
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j**
Medhatlthi, 'on the other hand, glosses it (atyayam) 
danda; ' dapyc^stagnnnm atyayam dandafv. According to him, 
however, it seems that the word atyayam has two slightly 
different meanings: a fine, and similar to that of a fine;
because he says that whatever is gained, at the end, in the 
form of eight times (of sulka) money, is by way of (ad yam 
ev^yuktam. atyayasabdohi tatra aamnrijjasah ( i. .e. in conventional 
sense/ fine).
Sarva jna-Narayana'' is quire clear on this verse. To
✓ - ' 
him, sulkam krayavikrayarajagrahycbhagah /. Sulka is the
king's share arising (or due) from buying and selling trans­
actions. And according to him atyayam means wealth earned 
by the king (by way of tolls), atyayam rajnyopacitam sulkam / .
Apparently he does not treat this word atyayam in the sense
!
of a fine, danda, but probably in the sense ^ of a balance due 
to the king because of fraudulent behaviour of the evader 
concerned.
- 3Raghavananda on this verse has made no comment on the
4
problem before us, but Nandana seems to agree, in part,with 
the view of Sarva jna Narayana. Re says, jrh4tamtadatyayamasta- 
gunam dapyah /. Here, atyayam seems to mean either 'excess 
o f ' or 'in multiples o f , (i.e. eight times) of (what was 
concealed).
_ 5
Govindaraja treats this eight-times payment as a fine, 
danda, but Vardhamana, while agreeing with this opinion, seems 
to treat atyayam as meaning a toll due to the king.
But Yajnavalkya has the following to say on the subject: 
mithyavadanparimanam sulkasthane.dapasaran / dapyastvastagunam 
yasca savyajakrayavikrayl // ^
1. V.N.Mandlik, cit.above, p.11o6; G.Jha, cited above, p.421.
2. V.N. Mandlik, cited above, p.11o6,
3. Ibid. , •
'4. Ibid.
5. V.N.Mandlik, ed., The Commentaries of Govindaraja on 
Manavadharmasastra, (Bom., 1886), p . 127,
6. Dandav.iveka, cited above, p. 93.
7. Yajn., 11.262; V.N.Mandlik, e d ., Yajnavalkyasmr t i , (Bom.,1886 
p. 148; J .R .Gharpure, ed., Yajn.smr t i , with Mita., (Bom.,1914) 
p . 142; L.S.Joshi, Dharmakosa, cited above, p.778 .
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"He who falsely declares the quantity (of the articles
of sale), who withdraws himself from the place of (collecting)
a tax, and he who purchases and sells fraudulently, shall
■ 1
be made to pay eight times (the value oi commodity?)" This 
penalty could be more severe than the one Manu or the 
commentators above have prescribed, if our conjecture as to 
the meaning is correct.
For the Mitaksara on Yajn,II.262, appears to explain the
2
matter thus; te sarve panyadastagunam dandanXyah / ...
all these shall be fined eight-times the amount of value of
3 4the commodity. Also, the Viramitrodaya on the same verse
seems to agree with the Mitaksara when it states, panyadasta­
gunam danda dapyah /; which means almost the same thing.
5But Apararka on Yajn.II.262, offers the following
comment which agrees with Manu and the latter's commentators:
\
panyavikrayl panyaparimanam sulkahanaye mithya 
vadansulkagrahanasthanaccapakramanvaniksulkadasta- 
gunam dandyah/
yasca savyajau saulkikaprataranavantau krayavikra- 
yau karoti sauapi s'ulkadastagunam dandyah /
That is, a trader who sells his goods and declares, for the 
purpose of avoiding tolls, a false quantity of goods; or passes 
by the toll-office (without paying tolls), should be fined 
eight-times the amount of the toll. Also, he who sells or 
buys fraudulently and (with the intention of) evading sulka, 
(toll), should be made to pay eight times the amount of sulka 
as a fine.
Moreover, while commenting, in this context, upon Narada 
(below), sulkasthanam ... dapyoastagunamatyayam /, Apararka 
appears to understand by the word atyayam, 'a fine due to the 
transgression'. Thus, atyayo atikramanimitto dandah /
1. Vide V.N.Mandlik, trans., (Bom.,188o), p.239; but vide J.R.Gharpure1s 
trans., it is not clear whether the payment is eight-times the value of 
the commodity or otherwise; see, J.R.Gharpure, Yajnavalkya Smrti with Mita 
kgara, (Bom., 192o), p.378; also G.Jha, the Vivadacintamani, cit.above,
p.12o.
2. J.R.Gharpure, cited above, p.142; N.S.Kiste, ed., YajriavalkyaSmrti, 
(Benares, 193o), p.715;
3. J.R.Gharpure, cited above, p.378;
4. N.S.Kiste, op.cit., p.715.
5. H.N.Apte, ed., Apararka on Yajnavalkya Smrti, A.S.S.46, pt.II, (Poona,19o4 
p.834.
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According to Brhaspati, "Those (companions in trade)
who conspire to cneat the king of the share due to him (of
their profit), shall be compelled to p ay eight times as much,
-|
and shall be punished if they take to flight." Further, 
probably in support of his statement, he gees on to emphasize 
why the payment of tolls is important:
sulkasthanam vanik praptah sulkam dndyadyathocitam / 
na tadvyabhicare-drajnyam balircsa prakirtitah / 2
"A trader, who has approached a to11-office, must pay
due toll. It should not be evaded, because it is said that
the sulka is an offering, bali, due to the king." By
implication, therefore, its evasion is a sin.
But Visnu's remedy in this regard appears to be more 
severe than the others when he says,
/ - _ _ 3
sulkasthanada-pakraman sarvapaharaifiapnuyat/
"Any (seller or buyer) who (fraudulently) avoids a toll-
4
house (situated on his road) shall lose all his goods."
1. J.Jolly, trans., S.B.E.33, cit.above, p.349. According 
to the trans. of H .T .Colebrooke, however, there is no 
mention of 'companions in trade1; see Jagannatha's Digest, 
vol.II, (18o1), p .3o1.
2. K .V.Rangaswami Aiyanghar, reconstruction & ed., Brhaspatismrt.
- (Baroda, 1941), p . 131; Apararka on Yajn.II.262, cit.above,
p. 834. Cf. Narada, IV.12, which is almost similar,
positively state that this means 'it is necessary to pay 
taxes r,o the king, because it (sulka) is (as if an offering 
to th<- God) king's share.' See Dharmakosa , cit.above, vol.I, 
pt.II, g .783; Naradryamanusamhita w ith the Bhasva of 
Bhavaswami, Tri.S.S., No.4 7 (Tri., 1929), p.83. Bhavaswami 
is excellent: the sulka, according to him is the king's
share and therefore, it is a sin to fail to pay it. Also,
J.Jolly, trans., S.B.E.33, p . 126, f.n.12: 'A duty is king's
due and traders must not defraud the king of it.'
3. Visnu, III. 31, vide The Adyar Library Series, vol.No.93, 
Visnusmrti with the Commentary of Nanda Pandita, vo 1.I ,
(Mad., 1964), p.43.
4. Vide the trans. of J.Jolly, S.B.E. vol.7, (Oxford, 188o), 
p . 16. Cf. G.Jha, 'One who evades the custom-house should 
suffer the confiscation of his entire stock'; see his 
trans. of Vivadacintamani, cit.above, p.12o.
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According to the gloss of Nanda-pandita! however, this 
rule seems to apply to goods, dealing in which the king has 
either prohibited or lias reserved for himself. The Vivadacin- 
tamani^ on the other hand, says that this rule applies to 
cases of repeated offence.
Narada seems tc advocate an identical view to that of 
Brhaspati (see above p . 108).
Besides, he says,
sulkasthanam pariharannakale krayavikrayl / ^
mithyoktva ca parimanam dapyoastagunamatyayam //J
"If he evades a toll-house, or if he buys or sells 
at other than the legal hour, or if he does not 
state the value (of his goods) correctly, he shall 
be fined eight times the amount which he tried to 
evade." ^
This view seems to tie up with what we saw above (see pp.1o5-
1o6) in Manu. Bhavasvami^, apparently, treats this penalty
(eight times the amount evaded) as a fine when he glosses,
dapya sulkadastagunam-dandam /. But his gloss on the word
mithyokti is excellent:
adhikavacane na dosah / yadyapyadhikavacanena 
mithyoktih / tathapi rajabhavyasthanapaharat / 
svarthahanesca na chalam grahyam /
What he means is this, 'an over-estimate (of goods) (by itself) 
is no offence, even if it is technically (according to the 
definition of the word mithya) false; because it does not 
affect (diminish) the king's due share. One does not presime 
fraud when the act tends to be actor's personal loss.' This 
explanation greatly helps us to clarify what the sastrakaras 
meant by this rule. In short, the act on the trader's part 
must be deliberate and intended to defraud the king of his 
lawful due or share.-
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; also see Jha's Hindu Law in its Sources, vol.I, (All., 193o),
p.429. His note here reads: 'the penalty here laid down is for repeated 
evasions; and that laid down in the preceding sections (i.e.Yajn.II.262) 
& Manu, VIII.4oo) is for the first offence.
3. Dharmakosa, Vyavahara-kanda, vol.I, pt.2, op.cit., p.784; Narada, IV. 13, 
Naradiyamanusamllita, cit.above, p.87.
4. J.Jolly, cited above, p. 1 26 (also see f.n.2 on p. 108).
5. Naradiyamanusamhita, cit. above, p.87.
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According to the Kautiliya Arthasastra,
dhva j amu1ama t ikrantanam c akr t a s u 1kdnam 
sulkadastaguno dandah / 1
"And, for goods that have passed beyond the foot of the flag 
without the duty being paid, the fine is eight times the duty.’ 
It may be noted here that unlike the smitj s referred to above, 
but like a few commentators upon them, Kautilya regards the 
eight times penalty as a fine, dandah. Again, this rule seems 
to apply to only one offence (or wrong) of by-passing the 
flag-post (toll-point); for, unlike the smrtis again, he 
appears to regard such wrongs as making false declarations 
in order to defraud the customs duty as a crime of theft, 
and prescribes punishment accordingly; while for the trader, 
on the!other hand, who tries to cheat the toll-collectors 
by contealing the real value of his goods, but swears that 
he is telling the truth, the highest fine for violence is 
stated.^
Also, there are certain closely analogous rules which 
throw some light On this subject. For example, Vyasa says,
agopayanto bhandani sulkam dadyusca te adhvani / ^
anyatha dvigunam dapyah sulkasthanadvahih sthitah //
j* "Without concealing the goods, they must pay the due
tolls on the road, otherwise they must pay up double 
the amount as evaders of the toll-house."
(Or, they, those who have gone beyond the toll-office 
should be made to pay doable).^
1. Kaut., 2.21.16; R.P.Kangle, ed., The Kautiliya Arthasastra, 
pt.I, cit.above, p.73.
2. Ibid., trans., pt.II, p. 164
3. Kaut., 2.21.19, ibid.; cf. "Thieves are of two kinds 'open' 
and 'secret1. Among 'open' thieves are traders and others; 
... in this regard Vyasa says, 'traders rob people etc.1; 
see G.Jha, trans., Vivadacintamani, cit.above, p.118. It 
may be noted here that both Kautilya and Vyasa seem to have 
identical views.
4. Kaut., 2.21.21; Ibid.
5. Vyasa, quoted in Dharmakosa, cit.above, p.789. ( ,
6. Cf. the Smrticandrika, trans. by J.R.Gharpure, cit.above, 
p . 351 .
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It appears that this double penalty is restricted to merely 
by-passing the toll-house.
( Vasistha, on the other hand, lays down the rule:
akarah s'rotriyo raja^  / bahubhyamtaran
satagunam dapyah //
After stating those who are exempted from kara .(toll) , he
says, "He who crosses a river with (the help of his) two arms
(swims), should pay a hundred times." G.Buhler would prefer,
however, to understand this as 'he wno swims with his arms
(across a river, in order to escape payment of toll at a ferry)
shall pay one hundred times (the amount due).1 Mahamahopadhyaya
K.K.Smrtitirtha appears to agree with G.Buhler. The principle
underlying the punishment, according to him, is to be sought
2for in; the consequent diminution of the revenue. But, why 
should it be so high only in this context? Unless there are 
some special considerations, it appears to be highly oppressive 
and undharmic; more like a fine for an offence than compensation 
for a wrong.
We know that there is no mention here of the swimmer 
carrying any merchandise or valuable goods across the river.
The basis of the charge or toll, therefore, amounts to no more 
than the privilege of crossing a river, perhaps by a state- 
owned ferry, and hence may mean a fare; but even then the 
hundred times payment, simply because one swims across 'a river'* 
sounds ridiculous.
Perhaps the rule applied net to 'a river1 but to 'a parti­
cular river1, the crossing of which must have had some particular 
importance attached to it, due to which Vasistha thought it 
fit to sanction a hundred times penalty, or it might be a river 
representing a border between two states, where sulka or an 
entry-kara had to be paid for the privilege of crossing the 
river, i.e., entering a particular (or foreign) territory.
1. Vasistha, XIX.16, quoted in the Dharmakosa, cop.cit., p. 1944. 
This verse is numbered XIX.16.25 in the trans. by G.Buhler,
S.B.E.14, cit.above, p.98 or 99 (according to some copies)
2. Vardhamana's Dandaviveka, cit.above, see its introduction, 
p.XXIII.
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In this case swimming across the river might well be a crime 
or something akin to it. In this case ii is a question of 
frontier control.
-  1akale atlrthe ca taratah purvah sahcisndandah /
"For one crossing cut of time or elsewhere than at the crossing,
2(the punishment shall be) the lowest fine for violence."
Moreover, Kautilya, in the same context,- prescribes a 
comparatively heavy penalty (atyaya)^ foi him who crosses
even at the proper time and at the crossing but. without the
4 5
authority; and in the following verse, where he is laying
down exceptions to the rule (of paying tolls), he mentions
'envoy's followers' (sambhavyadutanupatinam /) as one of these
exceptions. Thus, in view of the above, our suggestion that
this rule of Vasistha applies to the crossings of a border-
river appears sensible and may tentative!^ be accepted.
T o  sum up our discussion, it may be stated that
a) none of the smrtis have used the word danda in these verses
on the subject; instead the words atyayam and dapya are used;
b) the arthasastra has, however, used the word danda; and
c) it appears from the interpretations of various commentators 
that they have understood these words atyayam and dapya as 
meaning either a fine or a penalty; thus, there is no one 
opinion cjiiong the commentators on this point. It is quite 
clear, however, that
d) all the sastrakaras seem to agree that the sorts of unpaid 
tolls intended to qualify for the exception are those which
have reference to intentionally fraudulent or dishonest behaviour 
in order to defeat the king's claim to the tolls on the part
1. Kaut., 2.28.15; pt.I, cit.above, p.83.
2. Kaut., 2.28.15; pt.II, cit.above, p . 187.
3. Kangle's gloss on Ka u t .,2.6.1o , ibid., p.88, f.n.lo; here he 
says, "atyayah : - This would ordinarily include danda. But in 
2.12.35, both are separately mentioned. Perhaps, there atyaya 
is restricted to penalty for violation of state regulations,
'while danda is a fine imposed by judges and magistrates only.
4. Kaut.2.28.16, ibid., "For one who crosses without authority even at the 
proper tine and at the crossing, the penalty for crossing is twenty six 
panas and three quarters." This is very specific 1
5. Ibid., pp.187-188 and f.n.17 thereon.
* L.Rocher has given' reasons for thinking that the original 
meaning of sahasa related to fines..'
of the toll-evader concerned; and that
e) there appears to be no clear-cut demarcation., either in
the smrtis or in the artasastra, as to where the civil liability 
ends and the criminal liability begins so far as this subject 
is.concerned; in these cases, civil wrong and crime are 
difficult to distinguish. Lastly,
f) the attitude of the arthasastra towards the wrong-doer,
so far as toll-evasion is concerned, is more severe as compared 
with that of the dharmasastra. This is not surprising as the 
former was written solely from the standpoint of a royal 
administrator.
Thus, the 1sulka1 liability, incurred by reason of toll- 
evasion, has some reference to unrighteous behaviour on the 
part of the evader. Moreover, the liability is one w7hich 
seems to have been provided for by administrative decree, 
and appears to be closely analogous to modern excise rules, 
under which one who attempts to evade customs duty becomes 
liable to pay, on conviction a multiple of the duty. This 
is not a fine, properly so called!
II.6 SUMMARY
There is no doubt but that what is meant is that where 
the king's right to the toll has been defeated by the merchant's 
evading the custom-post, which is in any case a sin, the amount 
payable ieight times, etc.), though analogous to a fine, is 
not precisely a fine and therefore deserves to be mentioned 
separately from fines.
t
Now, one would suppose that unpaid fines and unpaid tolls 
are debts. In the first case they are due to crime and in 
the second they are mostly due to evasion of duty (but in 
some cases they might be due to the combination of both crime 
as well as evasion of duty, as appears in the case of Vasistha's 
rule discussed above, see pp. 111, 112. Such evasion of duty 
is akin to crime, and therefore the soul of the offender would 
be better off if the amounts were paid. But this is, perhaps, 
subsidising the king's income at the son's expense - and each .
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offender musi: pay _for__his own guilt. Therefore these two 
debts are exempted according to 'dharma1,henee are equally 
non-exiqible from sons.t 1
■ The dharmasastra , as we find it, is already in an advanced
stage of,development. We cannot tell which considerations
might have decided, in the remoter past, what policy should be
adopted towards royal rights. The theoretical subordination
of the king and his powers (and this includes his 'income’)
to the rule of dharma V7as already complete before our smrt.is
were compiled in their present form. To the smrtikaras the
king was a necessary expedient, but not more than an expedient.
To claim, as a matter of dharma (as opposed to secular policy),
the payment of fines, and claims analogous to fines, from
persons other than the offender may well have suggested
supersensory pretentions which the sastris were never able,
it seems, fully to comprehend or allow. What happened in
2
practice was that vicarious punishment took place, irregularly 
and de^  facto as an additional deterrent. The dharmasastra 
never countenanced this, and only mentioned it by the way.
We cannot at present confirm that this was indeed the regular 
sequence of thought in remote and undocumented times, but 
this suspicion must at least be noted here.
1. Medhatithi on Manu, X.91; 'the results of good and bad acts 
always accrue to the man who does them'; vide G.Jha, trans,, 
cit.above, vcl.V, pp.315-316.
2. J .D.M.Derrett, R . L .S .I ., cit.above, pp.215-216.
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III.1 GENERAL
Generally, from the point of view of both the dharmasastra 
* * 2and arthasastra, the son's liability to pay his father's 
d<-:bts does not extend to debts which are incurred by him 
(the father) for the purpose cf gambling, spirituous liquor, 
or futile gifts or debts due to last or wrath. Our purpose 
is, therefore, to investigate here why the sastras exclude 
these debts of the father from the liability of his sons to 
pay. For the purpose of clear understanding of the problem, 
we begin with the presentation cf the views of the sastrakaras; 
we shall then illustrate them with the help of their comment­
ators' |and, later, digest-wTriters' , comments and explanations.
Ii
I
I III.2 THE SASTRAKARAS' VIEWS
I
Thus, while laying down the exception th the general
rule in respect of sons' liability to pay their father's debt,
_ 3
Gautama enumerates, madya - dyuta i.e. 'debts contracted
4
for spirituous liquor or in gambling.' Kautilya lists
6
'aksikam - saurikam - kama-danam1' which mean 'gambling debts 
or debts due to liquor or debts due to lust'; the last 
jt* category being in addition to what Gautama has mentioned 
in his list.
7 8Vasistha and Manu, on the ether hand, mention vrthadanam,
1. Gautama, XII.41; Vasistha, XVI.31 r Manu, VIII.159; Yajn.
11.47; Brhaspati, XI.51; Vrdhaharita, VII.249; Narada,
IV.1o, see above pp.6o-63.
2. Kautilya, 3.16.9, see above p.65.
3. Gautama, 12.38; q. the Dharmakosa, cit. above, vol. 1', p t . 2 , 
p. 677.
4. G.Buhler, trans., Gautama, S.B.E.2, cit.above, p. 241, (here 
this verse is numbered XII.41).
5. Kautilya, 3.16.9; R.P.Kangle, ed., cit.above, p t .I , p. 122; 
Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.68o.
6. G.Jha, H .L .S ., cit.above, p t .1, p.2o7 (Jha seems to have 
omitted 'suretyship debts' from his translation); R.P.Kangle, 
trans., op. cit., p t .2, p.281, translates kama-dana as 'gift 
of love'. It may be suggested here that in this context J h a 's 
rendering seems correct.
7. Vasistha,.16.26; the Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.678.
8. Manu,'vill.159*
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aksikam and saurikam i.e. 'anything idly promised, money
2due for losses at play or for spirituous liquor1. They
have introduced, it may be noted, a new category, namely,
* 3
vrthadanam (which may also mean 'a futile gift' ); but at
the same time they have left out kama-danam which appears
in the enumeration of Kautilya. Yajnavalkya's list includes
all the four categories, i.e., sura-kama-dyuta-krtam ...
4
vrthadanam the meaning of which is, 'that which was
contracted for the purposescf spirituous liquor, lust or
5
gambling ... as also a gift without, any consideration' ... .
Vrddha-harita has a similar provision.^ Brhaspati's enumeration 
includes an additional category of debt that the son need not 
pay. According to him, sauraksikam-yrthadanam-kama-krodha- 
pratisrutam / ... putran na dapayet //'^, which, according 
to J.Jolly, means, 'Sons shall not be made to pay (a debt 
incurred by their father) for spirituous liq&or, for losses 
at play, for idle gifts, for promises made under the influence
g
of love or wrath ... '. However, it may be pointed out here
that the correct translation of the term kama in this context
1. Pratibhavyamvrthadanam-aksikam-saurikam ca yat /
j** . . . na putro datumarhati // ibid., vide Manavadharmasastra,
V.N.Mandlik, ed., op.cit., p.975; Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.663; 
P .D .Vidyalankara, e d . , The Vivada-ratnakara, (Calcutta, 1887) 
p. 57.
2. Vasistha, 16.31; G.Buhler, trans., S.B.E.14, cit.above, p.82.
3. Vide G.Jha, trans., Manusmrt i , vol.IV, pt.I, (Calcutta,1924), 
p.2o1;(cf. f.n.5 below).y
4. Yajnavalkya, 11.47; B.S.Moghe, e d . & trans., Yajnavalkya- 
smrt i , Vyavaharadhyaya, cit.above, p,1o2; Dharmakosa, op.cit. 
p . 685.
5. Yajnavalkya, 11.47; vide J .R .Gharpure, trans., Yajnavalkya- 
smrti, cit.above, p.786.
6. Sura-kama-dhyutakrtam vrthadanan --- ca /
danda --- putro dadhyanna paitrkam // Vrddhaharita, 7.24 9;
vide Dharmakos'a, op.cit. , p.715.
7. Brhaspati q. in Dharmakosa, ibid., p.7o8; The Vivada-ratna­
kara , op.cit., p.57.
8. Brhaspati, 11.51; J.Jolly, t3*ans., S.B.E.33, cit.above, p.329 
cf. J .R.Gharpure, trans., The Vlramitrodaya, op.cit., p.787, 
where he translates the same term "a promise made under 
amorous influence, or in wrath".
1
should, it seems, be 'lust' and not ’love'.
Narada^ has all these categories except vrthadana.
Katyayana, though he seems aware of variaus other tainted
3
(sadosam) debts,- has mentioned, by way of explanation,
only two- of the categories mentioned by Brhaspati, i.e.,
4 5kama-krtam and krodha-krtam debts.
1. Even uolly, op.cit., appears to agree with this meaning, 
for he draws our attention (see f.n.51 on p.329) to 
Katyayana's explanation regarding the meaning of this term. 
P.V.Kane, ed.& trans., Katyayanasmrt l , at p.234, translates 
Katyayana's explanation, (verse 564) as “ (what was promised) 
to the wife of another should be known as a debt due to lust." 
Also, J. P., Gharpure, trans., The Smrticandrlka, cit.above,
p. 319; here the term kamakrodhapratisrutam in Br.XI.51, 
is translated as 'for promises made under the influence 
of lust or wrath'. G.Jha, trans., The Vivadacintaman i , 
cit.above, at p. 29 seems to agree with th^Ls. There he 
translates this term, 'gifts promised through lust or anger1
2. Kama-krodha-sura-dhyuta ... krtam vina /
Narada, IV.1o; vide Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.695.
3. Yad ... tu tat /
sadosam vyahatam pitra naiva deyamrnam kvacit //
Katya., 554; vide P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.69. According to 
Kane sadosam means 'tainted'. And in f.n.554 (at p.228) 
he says that a "debt is tainted when it is incurred for 
liquor, lust or gambling .... etc."
4. Likhitam .... pratisrutam / parapurvastriyai yattu ... 
kama-kitam nrnam //
Katya., 56 4, P.V.Kane, ibid., p.71; 
also see f.n.1 above.
t
5. Yatra ... vinas'ya va / Uktam ... vidhyat krodha-krtam ... // 
Katya., 565; P.V.Kane, ibid.
119
It is clear from the above statement chat, of the sastra­
karas referred to, all except Katyayana have mentioned the 
'debts due to spirituous liquor and gambling'. Kautilya, 
Yajnavalkya,- Brhaspati, Narada, Katyayana and Vrddha-harita 
have referred to 'debts due to (or under the influence of) 
lust'. Whereas Vasistha, Manu, Yajnavalkya, Brhaspati and 
Vrddha-harita have listed 'debts due for futile gifts', 
Brhaspati, Narada and Katyayana have mentioned 'the debts 
incurred under the influence of wrath'. Thus, of all the 
five categories of debts under consideration, Gautama refers 
to only two kinds, namely madya and dyuta, which are missing 
from Katyayana's list and vice versa. Only Brhaspati has 
enumerated all the five categories; but the rest, as shown 
above, have laid down various combinations. Evidently, 
therefore, there appears to be no uniformity^amongst the 
sastrakaras so far as the number as well as the kind of debts 
forming the exceptions are concerned. One wonders why?
Does it mean,' for example, that the debts mentioned by
Gautama, i.e. debts due to spirituous liquor or for gambling,
which are not found, by name, in Katyayana's list, were no
longer considered during Katyayana's period as forming part of
the exception? Perhaps not; firstly because, besides the
debts due to lust or anger, Katyayana does refer to sadosa
debts, which, it is suggested, may represent other immoral
or illegal debts (see f.n.3 above). Moreoever, even if we
do not find it in Gautama XII.38 (or 41), the Mitaksara on
1Yajnavalkya, 11.47 does seem to attribute to him (Gautama)
the term kama, meaning thereby that according to Gautama
" (money due from a father on account of) a debt incurred for
spirituous liquor, ..., or in gambling, or for amorous
2
pleasures ... shall not involve a son." Thus, in the absence 
of any positive evidence to the effect that the categories 
of debts which are not found in Katyayana's (or for that 
matter, any other's) list, were not considered as excepted 
from the son's liability to pay, it might be an untenable 
suggestion on our part. This is, however, beside the point.
1 . Gautamenapyuktam / madyasulkadyutakamadandan —  //
vide B.S.Moghe, op.cit., p.1o2; Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.677, f.n.1.
2. J.R.Gharpure, trans., op.cit., pp.786-787.
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What we really want to know is the basis behind the inclusion 
of these debts of the father within the 'illegal or immoral' 
category. We may proceed with this enquiry from now onwards, 
for the sake of convenience, by treating these five debt 
categories, one by one.
[II. 3 Gx^MBLING DEBTS 
1
We are told that gambling is one of the most ancient
vices of men. Undoubtedly, there are numerous references to
7
gambling in the vedas.J We find the most vivid and convincing
'■i
description of a gambler's lament in the Rgveda, X.34.1-1b."
It is stated there (in verse'13), "Play not with dice: no, 
cultivate thy corn-land. Enjoy the grain, and deem that 
wealth sufficient. There are thy cattle, there thy wife, 
gambler." Thus, the gambler is advised to r£ly upon earned 
wealth and not to resort to gambling for it. According to 
the Mahabharata (Udyogaparva, 37.19) too, "Gambling from the 
early ages has been seen to be the cause of enmity among men; 
therefore, it should not be resorted to even in jests by the
1. P.V.Kane, Katyayanasmrt i , cited above, p.329, f.n.933.
2. 'Not our own will betrayed us, but ... wine, dice or 
anger.1 £g., VII.86.6; vide R.T.H.Griffith, trans.,
The hymns of the Rgveda, vol.Ill, (Benares, 1891), p.IcG. 
Also Rg.I.41.9, ibid., vol.I, (Benares, 1889), p.76, f-n.9. 
There appears to be difference of opinion between Wilson. 
Benfey and Ludwig as to the exact import of this verse.
But clearest and most vivid description in this regard 
is available in Rg.X.34.1-14; ibid., vol.IV, (Benares,
1892), pp.169-171.
3. Ibid.. Especially, verses 2-12 at pp.17o-171 show how the 
gambler has lost, due to addiction to gambling, his wife, 
parents, other relatives and all wealth, and became an 
object of hatred.
'The gambler's wife is left forlorn and wretched: the
mother mourns the son who wanders homeless. In constant 
fear, in debt, and seeking riches, he goes by night unto 
the home of others.' (per verse 1o). ‘
wise." Th« fact is, however, that in spite of these advices 
and warnings, gambling lived on and is still present.
Apastamba (II.1o.25.12-13)  ^ refers to a certain setting 
of "the gambling house and says, "Men of rhe first three 
castes, who are pure and truthful, may be allowed to play
there, 1 Thus, gambling seems to be as old as the sastras.
/- 3 4It is treated at great length by the _sastraharas and others ,
but our enquiry relates primarily to its nature: what is meant
by gambling and why should it be classified as an evil or 
a vice?
1. M.N.Dutt, e d ,& trans., Mahabharata, vol.I, (Calcutta, 1896), 
p . 5 6 ;
Also..
dyutam-etatpurakalpe --- nrnam /
tasmad dyutam na seveta hasyarthamapi budhiman //' 
vide S.K.De, ed., B.O.R.I., vol.6, (Poona, 194o), p . 169, 
f.n.17; Cf. Manu, IX.227 which is almost^ identical.
Vide G.Buhler, trans., S.B.E.25, cit.above, p.381;
G.Jha, trans., cit.above, vo.V, p. 183.
On gambling as a vice see Kaut.8.3.41-61, R.P.Kangle, 
trans., The Kautiliya Arthasastra, II, cit.above, pp.395-396 
cf., J.D.M. Derrett, trans., Bharuci*s Commentary on the 
Manusmrti, II, cit.above, pp.47-48.
2. Vide G.Buhler, trans., S.B.E.2, cit.above, pp.16o-161.
3. Manu, IX.221-228, G.Jha, op.cit., vol.V, (Calcutta, 1926), 
pp.182-183? Kautilya, 3.2o.1-13, R.P.Kangle, p t .2, op.cit., 
pp.29o-291; Yajn.I I .199-2o3, vide Apararka on Yajn., A.S.S. 
vol.46, cit.above, pp.8o2-8o5; Brhaspati, XXVI.1-9;
J.Jolly, trans., S.B.E.33, cit.above, pp.385-386;
Narada, XVII.1-8, J.Jolly, trans., op.cit., pp.212-213; 
Katyayana, 933-94 3, P.V.Kane, ed.& trans., cit.above, 329- 
33 2; or text at pp.113-114.
4. The Vivadaratnakara, cit.above, pp.61o-618; The Smrti- 
candri.Ka, trans . , op . c i t . , p p . 5oo-5o2 • The Vivadacintamani , 
cit.above, pp.315-316, (Jha1s trans.); Parasara-madhava,
C .Tarkalankara, ed., vol.3, (Calcutta, 1899), pp.388-393;
The Vyavahara-Balambhatti, N .P .Parvatiya, ed., cit.above, 
p .88o;
The Viramitrodaya, Rajanlti prakasa, V.Prasad, ed., (Benares
1916), pp.152-153; G.Jha, H .L .S ., cit.above, pp.549-557. 
Dharmakos'a, vol.I, p t . 3 , op.cit., p p . 1 893-1 91 5 .
Also see, Hemacandra, Arhanniti, cit.above, p.95, verse 5o:
sura-kaitava-dyutartham para-stri-hetukam tatha / '
rnam pitr-krtam putro deyan naivakadacana //
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1According to Manu (IX.223), gambling is "That which
is done through inanimate things," while "what is done
2 3through animate things is betting." Narada's definition
reads, "Gambling, is artful playing with dice, --- and such
4
other things. Beating consists in sporting with birds
(and other animals) . Neither of these definitions appears
to clarify the purpose of gambling or betting, however,
£
Brhaspati explains, "When birds, rams, bulls or other 
animals are made to fight against one another, after a wager
t 7
has been laid on them, it is called ‘"betting1. " Perhaps a
better exposition appears in the Vframitrodaya (Rajanrti-Prakasa,
-
p. 153). There the gloss on Manu, IX.223 runs as follows: 
Apran ibhih means with dice, tablets and so forth; pran ibhih 
means with rams, cocks and other animals. Gambling and prize­
fighting are names applicabl-e to only such acts as are 
accompanied by betting; where there is no betting, the act
9
is called 'sport1 and not deprecated among people. Thus, 
what appears to be objectionable is placing a wager or betting 
and not 'sport'. Why?
1. apranibhiryat kriyate talloke dyutamucyate / 
pranibhih kriyate yastu vijneyah sa samahvayah //
vide G.Jha, H .L .S ., cit.above, p.54 9; The Viramitrodaya, 
cit.above, p . 152; The Parasara-madhava, cit.above, p.388; 
Apararka on Yajn., cit.above, p.8o2; The Vivada-ratnakar a , 
cit.above, p.61o.
2. G.Jha, H.L.S., op.cit., p.549; also see his trans. of 
Medh.on Manu, cit.above, vol.V, p. 182.
3. aksabandhasalak'adyairdevanam jihmakaritam / 
panakrida vayobhisca //
Nar.XVII.1, vide G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cit., p.549; Parasarg- 
madhava, op.cit., p.388; The Vivada-ratnakara, o p .c i t .,p .61o . .
4. Also, see Manu q.by Apararka on Yajn., op.cit., p.8o2, where he names 
six impements of gambling.
5. G.Jha, H.L.S., op.cit., p.549; cf. J.Jolly's trans.S.B.E.33, op.cit., 
p.212. For the difference, see explanation in f.n.XVII.1 at p.212.
Jha seems to follow Jolly in his Comparatve Notes, pt.III, (Calcutta, 
1929), p.777 on Manu, IX.223.
6. anyonyam parigrhltah paksimesamrgAdayah/ praharante krtapanastam 
vadanti samahvayam // Br., XXVI.3, G.Jha,H.L.S., op.cit., p.549; The
Vivada-ratnakara, op.cit., p.61o; the verse, it m y  be noted, is differ­
ently composed by Madhavacarya, see Parasara-madhava, op.cit., p.389.
7. G.Jha, H.L.S., cp.cit., p.549; J.Jolly, op.cit., p.385.
8. Apranibhih,- aksasalakadibhih / Pranibhih, - mesakukkutadibhih / 
tatrapi panapurvam yatkriyate tadeva dyutam samahvayasca / apanapurvake 
tu na dyutasamahvayasabdau pravarttete / loke tayoh kridasabdenaiva 
vyavaharat / ata eva tayorloke viganabhavah / supra. (f.n.contd.)
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Now, we have noticed above (see pp., 119-120) that
gambling for the purpose of accumulating wealth existed even
during very early ages, and people were aware of its evil
consequences which have been expressed very clearly. Later
on, by the time of Apastamba (see f.n. 2 above p. 12 1), however,
gambling appears to have been subjected to certain ritualistic
and other rules and regulations, perhaps due to a desire for
minimising its bad effects upon society. Also, there appear
to be provisions to collect taxes on gambling and for punishment
by the king of those gamblers who either played other than
in the approved places or quarrelled in the assembly (gambling)- 
2house. Moreover, 7\pastamba, II. 1 o.25.13 read with the
3
comments of Haradatta, seems tc suggest that gambling, unless
played by honest men, was open to disputes and quarrels,
perhaps due to fraudulent behaviour on the part of the gamblers.
4
This view appears to have been supported evei^ by Kautilya 
when he says, "Gamblers indeed are generally fraudulent
5
players." Even if this was so, gambling was not outlawed.
On the contrary, from the discussion so far, it seems quite
f.n. continued from last page)
9. G.Jha, Manusmrti-Notes, (Explanatory) p t .I I , (Cal.,1924), 
p.749; cf. R.P.Kangle, trans., pt.II, cit.above, p.291, 
f.n.13. Here, Kangle glosses, :challenges with bets concern­
ing learning, or skill in art, are not subject to state 
control and may be freely indulged in.'
1. Apastamba, II.1o.25.12, "In the midst of the assembly-house 
(the superintendent of the house) shall raise a play-table 
and sprinkle it with water --- and place on it dice --- ,
as many as are wanted." Vide G.buhler, trans., c i t .above ,p. 16o.
2. 'Having played there, they shall give a fixed sum to the 
gambling-house keeper and go away. The latter shall — - give 
that gain to the king. And the king shall punish those who 
play elsewhere or quarrel in the assembly-house.’
Haradatta on Apastamba, II.10.25.13; see ibid., p . 161,f.n.13.
3. Ibid.
4. Prayaso hi kitavah kutadevinah / Kaut.3.2o.7, 
vide R.P.Kangle, ed., pt.I, cit.above, p . 127.
5. Ibid., trans., pt.II, cit.above, p.291.
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clear that both the dharmasastra and arthasastra approve,
if not encourage, gambling in a certain regulated form.
The? justification for the approval is evidently based on two
1main grounds: (a) to yield revenue to the king and, (b)
2 3
to help detection of thieves or men of secret professions,
4
or men of bad livelihood. In view of the evil effects of 
gambling on the society as a whole, one wonders whether these 
grounds are sufficiently justifiable fo2' approving of gambling. 
Could it be because of this that Manu has so forcefully 
deprecated both gambling and betting?
5
Manu states,
I "The king shall exclude from his kingdom all gambling 
I and betting. Gambling and betting are open theft,
; and should be suppressed ---  He who either does the
I gambling or the betting, or helps others to do it,
I --- all these the king shall strike. ---- If a man has
recourse, either openly or secretly,*to this vice, 
the form of punishment inflicted upon him shall be 
in accordance with the king's discretion." ®
1. Sa samyak palito dadyat rajne bhagam yathakrtam /
jitamudvahayejjetre dadyatsatyam vacah ksami // Yajn.II.2oo 
Athava kitavo rajne dattva bhagam yathoditam / 
prakas'adevanam kuryat // Narada, XVII. 8 
both vide here G.Jha, H .L .S ., cit.above, p.552; 
also, see f.n.2 on p.123 above-
"If it (gambling) has to remain (has to be allowed) he 
(the king) should allow it to be done openly -- and he should 
make it yield revenue (tax)." Katya.935, vide P.V.Kane, 
cit.above, p.33o; cf.verse 939 cn p.331.
2. Dyutam ekamukham karyam taskarajnanakaranat // Yajn.,I I .2o3 
vide G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cit., p.551.
3. Kaut.3.2o.2 as translated by Kangle, pt.II, op.cit., p.29o.
4. "The superintendent of gambling shall have gambling carried 
out at one place, for the purpose of detecting men of bad 
livelihood." Kaut. 3.2o.1-2, per G.Jha, H . L .S ., cit.above, 
p.551 (notes). It may be pointed out here that Kangle's 
translation of gudhajivijnapanartham (as per f.n.3) seems 
correct.
5. Dyutam samahvayam caiva raja rastran nivarayet / ---
tasya dandavikalpah syat yathestam nrpatestatha //
Manu)* IX.221-228 ; 
vide The Viramitrodaya,RajanIti prakasa, cit.above, pp.152-15 
also, G.Jha, H . L . S . , cit.above, p.55o.
6. G.Jha, ibid.
* It may be noted here, that Bharuci on Manu IX.224 takes 
the political aspect as significant, not dharmic.
See J.D.M.Derrett, trans,, vol.11, cit. above, p.267.
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Thus, to him (Manu) these two are evils (or vices) too seriou 
to be allowed bo continue in the society. So are the gambler 
men addicted to this evil deed and, as such, a threat to the 
well-behaved people in the king's realm. It is for this 
reason that, in his view, the king should instantly banish 
or strike them all.
1
Brhaspati refers to this as well as other's views on 
the subject. According to him,
"Gambling has been prohibited by Manu, because it 
destroys truth, honesty and wealth. It has been 
permitted by other (legislators) when conducted 
so as to allow the king a share (of every stake).
It shall take place under the superintendence of 
keepers of gaming houses, as it serves the purpose 
of discovering thieves, --- ."2
Thus, according to his understanding of Manu, gambling is 
destructive of moral values and the material Veil-being of 
people.
3
Katyayana's views, in this respect, seem more revealing 
He says,
"One should not resort to gambling which inflames 
the passions and greed (of men), which engenders 
bad characters, which is cruel, and causes loss of 
wealth to men. Since strife is certain (to follow) 
from gambling just as poison (is sure to issue forth) 
from the mouth of a serpent, therefore the king should 
stop this vice in his country.
Although, Katyayana, unlike Manu, seems to approve (see f.n. 
1, p. 12 4) of the continuance of gambling, provided it is 
undertaken openly and according to rules, under supervision, 
so as to yield revenue (tax), it appears almost certain that
1. Dyutam nisidham manuna satyasaucadhanapaham / tat prava
rtitamanyaisca rajabhagasamanvitam // sabhikadhistitam 
karyam taskarajnyapakam hi tat // Br.XXVI.1-2,
vide G.Jha, ibid.,
2. Vide J.Jolly, cit.above, p. 385.
3. Dyutam naiva tu seveta krodhalobhavivardhakam /
-r- tasmadraja nivarteta visaye vyasanam hi tat //
Katya., 933-934, 
vide P.V.Kane, cit.above, p. 113.
4. Ibid., pp.329-33o.
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he considers gambling as a vice which the king should
stop in his country.
This impression is gained because he very succinctly 
points out how men are turned into cruel characters due to the 
passions and greed inflamed by gambling which instils false 
hopes of winning fortunes. In the process, such men destroy 
their wealth, themselves, their families and society.
Even Yajhavalkya, though he has approve! regulated
1 9 gambling, seems quite opposed to fraudulent or secret
gambling, for he says, "Those who play with false dice or
3
cheat at play shall be branded and banished."
In this regard, Kautilya appears to go as far as 
sanctioning a fine against such gamblers, not branding or 
banishment. Thus, he lays down that, "for fraudulent play 
the lowest fine for violence and confiscation of winnings, 
for cheating fine for theft in addition."^ It is reasonably 
clear, therefore, that both the dharmas'astra and arthasastra 
recognized the fact that gambling was associated more with 
fraud and deceit than honesty and truth.
This suggestion appears generally to be strengthened
if we turn to the views of the commentators on the subject. 
Thus, the Ml taksara on Yajff. , II.2o3, explains that "Gamblers
generally hail from those who amass wealth by theft.
Sarvajhunarayana, on Manu, IX.225, considers them (gamblers)
g
'men of exceedingly crooked behaviour1. Kulluka, on
1. Prapte bhage ca nrpatih prasiddhe dhurtamandale / jitam 
sasabhike sthane dapayed anyatha na tu // Yajn.II.2o1,
vide, G.Jha, H .L .S ., cit.above, p.553.
2. The fraudulent practices and cheating have been deprecated 
by almost all the sastrakaras; see, Manu, IX.222, 226; 
vide, G.Biihler, cit.above, pp.38o-81; Brhaspati,XXVI. 5&9 , 
vide, J.Jolly, cit.above, p.386; Yajn.II.2o2; G.Jha, H . L .S ., 
op.cit., p.555; Narada, XVII.1&6 , vide, J.Jolly, op.cit.,
pp.212-13; Visnu, q. in The Vivada-ratnakara, c i t .above,p.617.
3. Rajna sacihnam nirvasyah kutaksopadhi-devinah // Yajn.II.2o2, , 
vide G.Jha, H.L.S., op.cit., p.555.
4. Kaut., 3.2o.9, vide, R.P.Kangle, trans., pt.II, cit.above, p.291.
5. Vide J .R .Gharpure, trans.,Ya j nvalkya-smrt i, vol.II, cited above, p .341.
6. Vide G.Biihler, trans., op.cit., p.381, f.n.225.
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Manu, IX.22b, calls them 'secret thieves'; while to 
Sarva-panarayana and Nandana gambling carries 'corrupt'^ 
influence on others, i.e., non-gamblers in the society.
t
. It may be concluded, therefore, that in view of the
sastras, gambling seems to be a vice or an evil, which is
conducive of spreading immorality in the society by rousing
virulent passions and greed in men, and hence destructive
of both wealth and happiness. And, although most of the
smrtikaras appear to join Kautilya perhaps unwillingly in
prescribing rules for the proper conduct of gambling,
recognizing its inevitability due to weaknesses of human
nature (in respect of speculative gains) and in spite of
Manu's strong condemnation, this basically unethical and
destructive nature of gambling seems to be at the, root of
the rule that excludes gambling debts of the^ father from the ^ ,
son's liability to pay them.
Before concluding our discussion on the subject, we 
are thus led to consider a relatively minor though important 
point in respect of gambling debts - their scope. What kind 
of debts of the father did the sastrakaras intend to include 
in this category, which the sons need not pay?
We have already referred to the sastrakaras' terms 
enumerating this category (see above p p . 116-120), and the 
renderings of these terms by the various modern scholars.
But that alone does not seem to explain the exact scope of 
this category of debts. Let us, therefore, take help from 
the commentators and digest-writers to determine what those 
terms might mean.
1 . Ibid., f .n .226.
2. On Manu, IX.226, ibid. (for the text, reference may be made 
to V.N.Mandlik, e d . , Manava-dharmasastra, cit.above, p.123o.
3. For a similar view, see J .R.Gharpure, A General Introduction 
with special reference to Yajnvalkya-smrti and the Mitaksara 
(Bombay, 1944), p . 172.
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1
To one grcup of commentators and digest-writers, the
term (i.e., dvutam or aksikam) means either a debt 'for
gambling' or 'for the purpose of gambling'. This is, however,
2
too vague. Another group renders it, 'on account of a defeat 
in gambling'. According to Ramachandra it seems to mean 
'a debt contracfed in connection with dice (or things used 
in gambling), i.e., perhaps for the purchase of dice, as 
well as in respect of gambling itself, i.e., for actual
4
stake. But Asahaya on Narada, IV.1o, renders it, 'due to 
uncontrollable habit (madness or addiction to) gambling'.
A better exposition appears in Medhatithi on Manu, VIII.159.
He explains that, * debts incurred in gambling are^gambling 
debts' i.e., the amount that has been actually lost at play
or the money that can be proved to have been borrowed for the
5
purpose of gambling". One wonders, however^ about what would 
be the position if the money proved to be borrowed for the 
purpose of gambling, has in fact been spent on, say, a 
religious purpose? However, a situation such as this 
would, one might argue, hardly arise. According to ag
suggestion of Jagannatha, 'fine to the king, incurred by 
gaming with dice and any debt connected with such a fine'
** should be, so it appears, included into this category.
Although there could be some relation between (the father's) 
gaining and a fine due to his gaming, in view of the independent 
category of debts due to fines, it may be pointed out here
1. Dyutaniirlt tarn ca rnam, Maskaribhasya on Gautama, XI 1.38, 
vide, Dharmakosa, vol.I, pt.II, cit.above, p.6 78;
dyuta-nimittam Kulluka, aksikam dyuta-nimittam Ragha- 
vananda and Nandana on Manu, VIII.159, vide V.N.Mandlik, 
op.cit., p.975; The Vivada-ratnakara, cit.above, p. 57;
The Viramitrodaya on Yajn., 11.47, vide J .R.Gharpure, cit.ab. 
p. 787; &ulapani on Yajn., 11.47, ibid., p.788.
2. Aksikam dyuta-haritam, Sarvajnanarayana on Manu, VIII.159, 
vide, V.N.Mandlik, op.cit., p.975; dyutasamahvayabhyam 
yajjitam pitra, Govindaraja on Manu, VIII.159, vide Dharmakosa 
op.cit., p.663; dyutaharitam, Visvarupa on Yajn.,II.53, ibid.,
, p.685; dyute parajayanirvrttam, the Mita. on Yajn., 11.47, 
ibid; The Smrticandrika, vide, J.R.Gharpure, trans., cit.ab., 
p.319.
3. Aksikam aksasambandhakrtam dyutakrtam, Ramchandra on Manu, VIII. 159, 
vide, V.N.Mandlik, cit.above, p.975; cf.Jagannatha (on Manu CLI), "Lost 
at play", due in consequence of gaming. It consequently signifies any 
debt contracted for stake in playing with dice, or for the purchase of 
things used in gaming. - vide, H.T.Colebrooke, trans., Digest, I,
cit.above, p.3o4. (footnotes continued)
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that this suggestion appears to confuse the issue- A debt 
due to any fine, no matter how it is incurred, could hardly 
be categorised as a ’gambling debt:.
. Thus, from the above discussion it appears that by 
gambling debt the sastrakaras seen, to mean any debt incurred 
by a habitual gambler (the father In this case) to meet actual 
losses at play with dice etc., or any legitimate expenses in 
connection therewith, but excluding fines due to gambling.
As we have already seen above (see p. 127) why gambling 
has been deprecated by the sastrakaras, we may turn to discuss 
the next category of debts: the debts due on account of
spirituous liquor.
ili
|lll.4 DEBTS DUE ON ACCOUNT OF SPIRITUOUS LIQUOR
i
We have already noted above (see pp. 1101-12o) that 
almost all the satrakaras have excepted the father's debts 
for spirituous liquor from the son's liability. Why? We 
should determine, too, as far as possible, the scope of the 
exception.
The drinking of spirituous liquor has usually been
j?* associated with 'five Mahapatakas' . The Chandogya Upanisad
quotes a verse which declares that, "The five great sinners
are the thief of gold, the drinker of sura ... and one who
)>]
associates with any of the proceeding four , and as the verse
f.n. continued from last page)
4. Yad dyutavyasanandhena krtam, Asahayabhasyam, 37, vide 
Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.696.
5. Vide, G.Jha, trans., Manusmrti, vol.IV, pt.I, cit.above, p.
6. Vide, H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit., p.3o4.
1. P.V.Kane, H .D h ., vol.IV, (Poona, 1953), 1o-16,
Tad esa s'lokah/steno hirnyasya suram pibamsca gurostal- 
pamavasan brahmaha caite patanti catvarah pancamas 
cacarams taih / iti /
Cha.Upa.V.1o-9, vide, ibid., p.12, f.n.25; also see, F.Max 
Muller, trans., S.B.E.1, (Oxford, 1879), pp.83-84.
j
II
2o2
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is apparently a quotation, it seems tc suggest that this 
view existed even prior to that period. We find declarations
f 1of similar expressions made by various sastrakaras of the 
later period. And after a careful study of all these statements 
it seems beyond doubt that they are unanimous in their treat­
ment of drinking spirituous liquor as one of the five great 
sins .
This, of course, is the view of the dharmasastra .
 ^ 2 The arthasastra, like the tiharmasastra, excludes
drinking debts of the father from the son's liability, but
does not appear to treat drinking of spirituous liquor in
the same way as has been done by the. latter. Its attitude
in this respect is apparently different and may be summarised
as follows: - There is no general prohibition against drinking
3' 4wine. It may always be available for medical purpose,
1. "They state that there are five mortal sins (Mahapataka ); 
(viz violating) a guru's bed, drinking (the spirituous 
liquor called) .sura, ... outcasts Vasistha, I.19-2o, 
vide G.Biihier, trans., S.B.E.14, cit. above, p. 5;
"Killing aBrahmana, drinking (the spirituous liquor called)
sura, ..... (mahapataka )". Manu, XI. 55, vide G.Biihier,
trans., S.B.E.25, cited above, p.441, cf.Manu IX.235, at 
p.383 which is almost similar. Also, see Gautama, 21.1; 
Apastamba, 1.21.7-8; vide G.Jha, Notes on Manusmrti, pt.III,
• (Calcutta, 1929), pp.83o-831; "Killing a Brahmana, drinking 
spirituous liquor ... are high ci'imes." Visnu, XXXV.1, vide, 
J.Jolly, trans., S.E.E.7, cit.above, pp.132— 133; The 
Brahmicide, the liquor-drinker ... these are the perpetrators 
of heinous sins (Mahapatakinah)' . Yajn., III.227 , (according 
to the Mitaksara, this rule applied to one who drinks 
prohibited liquor.) Vide, J .R.Ghacpure, trans., vol.2 (5-7), 
(Bombay, 194o), p . 1683.
2. Kaut., 3.16.9, vide R.P.Kanale, trans., pt.II, cited above,
p. 281.
3. Vide, Kangle, op.cit., pt.III, A study, (Bombay,1965), p . 161.
4. Kutumbinah krtyesu svetasuram, ausadhartham varistam, 
anyadva kartum labheran / Kaut. 2.25.35; vide, Kangle,
ed., cit.above, pt. I, p.8o; also, pt.II, op.cit., p. 179.
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1 9and catching criminals or spys". On occasions of festivals 
permission is to be given for the manufacture and consumption
3
of liquor without control. But there seems to end the*
argument in its favour, and though it may be a means of 
getting the state-revenue, Kautilya wishes that, in general, 
it should not be encouraged. Hence, the drinking of wine
4
is to be regulated by the state . He advocates caution
a
against improper indulgence in drinking."' He expects the 
king to have control over his senses0 such as anger or lust.
This is so because, according to him, these are the sources
7 8of various vices which lead to dangerous calamities.
1. Kautilya refers to arrests of criminals while 'they are 
intoxicated with drugged liquor', as Kaut., 4.5.1o, and 17, 
vide ibid., pt.II, p.31o.
2. Traders ... should find out, ... the intentions of strangers
and motives, ... when they are intoxicated" ... Kaut.2.25.15, 
ibid., pt.II, p . 177.
3. Utsava samajayatrasu caturafr sauriko deyah / Kaut.2.25.36,
R.P.Kangle, ed., pt.I, op.cit,, p.8o, also see pt.II, op.cit., 
p . 179.
4. R.P.Kangle, pt.III, op.cit., p. 161; also see Kaut.2.25.1-15, 
ibid., pp.176-177.
5. R.P.Kangle, pt.III, op.cit., pp.13o-131; also, the controls
J**- contained in Kaut. 2.25.3, i.e., "(He should enforce) prohib­
ition of taking wine out of the village ... because of_the 
danger of transgression of the bounds of propriety by Aryas 
and because of the danger of rash acts by bravoes", are 
indications of this caution. Vide, R.P.Kangle, pt.II, op.cit., 
p . 176; also see, Ka u t .8.3.6o-61 (also see f .n .5,p .132 below) .
6. Kaut.1.6 1-3, ibid.; p . 13; also, Kaut.8.3.66, (see f.n5,p. 132 
below).
7. "A group of three (vices) springs from anger and a, group 
of four springs from lust".
Kaut.8.3.4, ibid., at p.455; for further clarification 
see Kaut. 8.3.23 and 38 at p.456.
8. "Lust means the favouring of evil persons, anger, the 
suppression of good persons. Because of the multitude
of evils (resulting from them), both are held to be a 
calamity without end". Kaut.8.3.65, ibid, p.458.
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Lust, especially, breeds vices such as hunting, gambling,
1
pursuit of women and drinking . Also, he mentions that
addiction to women results in addiction to drink^. Of the
f 3
two,' the vice of drinking is more serious, for "the
excellences of drink are: loss of consciousness, insane
behaviour of one not insane, appearing like a corpse when
not deceased, exposing private parts to view,
loss of learning, intellect, strength, wealth and friends,
separation from the good, association with the harmful, and
4
attachment to skill in lute and song, destructive of wealth 
It is for this reason that, "the self-possessed (king) should 
give up anger and lust, the starting point of all calamities, 
the destroyers of patrimony, by waiting upon elders and
5
gaining control over his senses Now, though all this
i
appears to have been addressed to the king, we have no doubt 
that, generally, it is equally applicable to*any individual
g
and not the ruler alone . In short, even Kautilya considers 
drinking a serious vice, and his view seems quite a realistic 
one. We may turn,, at this stage, to see why drinking has 
been so condemned by the dharmasastra as to classify it as one 
of the five mortal sins (see above, p .13 0, f.n.1).
We have already come across the Vedic view (Rgveda,
VII,86.6 referred to above p . 12 0 f.n.2) which appears quite 
significant, for it contains a possible explanation of oui 
problem. It is stated there that, "Not our own will betrayed 
us, but seduction, thoughtlessness, Varuna/ win e , dice or 
anger."g Manifestly one of the causes of our betrayal is win e . 
What is meant here is, it seems, that a person once seduced
1. Kaut.8.3.38, ibid., p.456.
2. Kaut.8.3.54, ibid., p.457.
3. Kaut.8.3.6o, ibid., p.458.
4. Kaut.8.3.61, ibid.
5. Kaut.8.3.66, ibid.• 1
6'. This chapter, i.e. Kaut. 8.3 is entitled, "Purusa-vyasana- 
vargah" which means the group of the vices of man, see, 
p t .I , p.2o9, and pt.II, op.cit., p.455; also see Kangle's 
pt.III, op.cit., p . 131, where he clearly makes a statement 
to this effect.
* For 'excellences' read "'excellencies' (i.e. result)".
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(addicted to) by wine (or any other spirituous liquor), 
becomes thoughtless due to intoxication, and thus under 
the influence of r.he drinks invites self-betryal. The 
consequences of such betrayals could, as mentioned above 
(see p. 132, f.n.4) be endless, both in material as well 
as spiritual sense.
In Man u 1s estimation, "Sura vai malam annanam papma
ca malamucyate / tasmad brahmana-rajanyau vaisyas ca na 
_ *]
suram pibet // , which means "Sura, indeed, is the dirty-
refuse of grains and sin also is called 'dirt1; for this
reason the Brahmana, the Ksatrlya and the Vaisya shall not 
2
drink wine " (Before we examine this view, it may be noted 
here that according to Medhatithi, Jl nhcugh the subject matter 
of the, present context is expiation, yet the syntactical 
indication of the present verse clearly points to prohibition 
of wine. And since it is a distinct sentence, it can'not be
3
regarded as a mere declamation "). The analogy between 
sura and sin might have some value in a metaphorical sense, 
but in reality this description of wine is indicative of 
the fact that its use is forbidden, and the assimilation 
of sin with sura re-enforces the view that wine is one of
1. Manu, XI.93, vide, V.N.Mandlik, cit.above, p. 1392; P.N.Sarma, 
ed., Viramitrodaya, Ahnikaprakasa, (Benares, 1913), p.548.,
H.N.Apte, ed.,. Apararka on Yajn.III.227 , A.S.S.46, cit.above 
p .1o4 4.
2. Vide, G.Jha, trans., vol.V, (Calcutta, 1926), p.414;
(Note: This verse is numbered '92' in his Sanskrit ed.;
vol.I, (Cal.1932), p.398, while G.Buhler's translation 
enumerates it as '94' at p.45c).
3. G.Jha, op.cit., p.415.
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i
the most despicable things. Is it simply because of its
being made out of 'dirty refuse* (if that is true)? One
feels inclined to doubt the wisdom of this assertion, for
the sirmple reason that quite a number of useful things were
and are being made out of such suistance, for example, drugs
and medicines. Why, then, should the great sastrakara like
Manu offer this kind of reasoning to justify his point of
view? Once again, Medhatithi may come to our help. According
to him, M a n u 's prohibition seems to have been directed at the
2
'intoxicating substance, in wine or liquor, and it cannot, 
therefore, be applied to any substance which has not acquired 
intoxicating properties. Thus, "what the prohibition means is, 
that 'one should not drink that which possesses the capacity
3
to cause intoxication* ". Thus it would appear that the
intention behind such prohibition seems to avoid basically
%
even the possibility of getting intoxicated; and also, almost 
certainly to avoid getting into the habit of drinking, the 
most disastrous consequences of which have been placed before 
us so vividly by the Rgveda and arthasastra (see above pp. 
130-132). We need not repeat them again here. Suffice it 
to say that a man who has lost his consciousness and has
1. Medha. on Manu, XI.93, "Thus then, in as much as wine is obtained from 
grains, ... it comes to be spoken of as ’the dirty refuse of grains'.
This description of wine is indicative of the fact that its use is 
forbidden." ... "Sin also is called, 'dirt' - this has been added with
a view to indicate that wire is a most despicable tiling". Vide, G.Jha, 
trans., vol.V, op.cit., p.414..
Quoting this verse, Apararka, on Yajn.Ill .227, comments, 
"Annamalatvamca vrlhyadipistamayyah / evam ca na sambhavat 
gaudi-madhvyoh / na hi gudamadhuni annam / "
(vide H.N.Apte, op.cit., p.1o44); i.e. 'Being the refuse of 
grains' is applicable only to that liquor which is distilled 
from ground grains^ and not to those distilled from molasses 
and honey ... as neither of those two latter is grain'. Vide 
G.Jha, Manusmrt i , Notes, pt.II, cit.above, p.816.
2. While explaining different kinds of wines, he states, "The MadharvI is 
that 'distilled from Madhu, grape-juice, i.e., in its fermented form; 
for fresh grape-juice ... is not forbidden ... wherever the prohibition.
* contains the word madya (intoxicating substance) it cannot apply to 
any other substance which has not acquired intoxicating properties."
Medha.on Manu, XI.94, G.Jha, trans., op.cit., vol.V, p.415.
3. Ibid., p.416.
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become thoughtless due to habitual intoxication from drinking 
wines and liquors could commit any possible sin or crime.
If it is for this reason, the sastrakaras1 classification 
of “drinking spirituous liquor as one of the five great sins 
seems generally justifiable. Thus, for the same reasons, 
according to the dharmasastra, drinking of spirituous liquor 
appears to be an immoral act, and, hence, the sastrakaras 
seem to have excluded any debt for chis purpose (i.e. drinking) 
from the son’s liability to pay his fatner’s debts (see above 
p. 116 # f.n.1) .
Although this may appear convincing, certain additional 
literature available on the subject makes the position 
complicated.
i
Wp have seen above (see p . 130, f.n.3) that according to 
Kautilya there is no general prohibition against drinking 
wine, and yet, due to undesirable consequences, and perhaps 
due also to the financial motive in the interest of the state, 
he advocated certain restrictions (see p . 131, f.n.5) and
i
state-control. On the other hand, he has laid down certain 
concessions, for a limited period, for festivals, gatherings, 
and fairs (see p . 131, f.n.3) as well as on account of personal 
jt** integrity.^
Thus, those who resorted to drinking within the legal 
framework of the state authority, would be doing so, it 
would appear, quite lawfully. If this is so, then can any 
debt arising from this sort of situation be attributable 
to the 'son's liability?
Similarly, even the precepts of the dharmasastra seem 
to have, so far as the prohibition of drinking is concerned, 
certain variations in the degrees of guilt (or sin attached
1. "The controller of spirituous liquors should cause trade in wines and 
ferments to be carried on ... according to (conveniences for) purchase 
and sale; he should fix .. the penalty for those who manufacture, purchase
. or sale in other places". Kaut.2.25.1-2, Kangle, cit.above, Pt.II, p.176; 
also see, Kau£.2.25. 3-15, ibid., pp.176-177; pt.III, cit.above,pp.161,162
2. 'or those of known integrity may carry out a small quantity,' __
Kaut.2.25-4, ibid., p.176.
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to drinking) based on different grounds. These are as under:
(A) kinds of wine or liquor as well as the castes of
the drinkers: - tnus, MedhatTthi, (on Manu, XT.93, see above,
p. 133) states that, "the w7ine extracted from grains should
/ 1
not be drunk by the Brahmana, the Ksatriya or the Vais'ya" .
Again Manu lays down that, "w7ine should be understood to be
of three kinds ... gaudi ... paisti ... and madhavi; as the
one so all the rest should never be drunk by the chief of
2
the twice-born" . And according to Medhatithi, here the use
of the term 'chief of the twice-born' has been used with a view
3
to permit wine-drinking for the Ksatriya and the Vaisya.
1. Vicle, G.Jha, cit. above, vol.V, p. 414.
Besides, it is indicative of the sudra's exclusion.
Apararka on Yajn.Ill.227, quotes this verse and comments, 
"thus then the drinking of liquor distilled from grains is 
forbidden for all twice-born men, and the other two kinds 
for the Brahmana only". Vide G.Jha, Notes, cited above, 
p t .II, p .816:
tatas'ca paistipanam dvijanam pratisiddham / 
paistya itarayosca Brahamanasyeti mantavyam /
Apar.on Yajn.,227, vide H.N.Apte, ed., cited above, pt.II, 
p.1o44.) For similar comment, also see the Mitaksara on Yajri
III.253, vide J .R.Gharpure, trans., cit.above, p . 1754.
2. Manu, XI,94, vide, G.Jha, vol.V, op.cit., p.415.
"Distilled from sugar --- these ten intoxicating drinks
are unclean for the Brahmana? but the Ksatriya or the Vaisya 
commit no wrong in touching cr drinking them." Visnu,
22.82, vide G.Jha, Notes, cit.above, pt.III, d .342.
3. Medha.on Manu, XI, 94, ibid., p.417; where he cites the 
Mahabharata as describing how the Yadavas and the 
Bharatas were found drunk; while the Mitaksara,(op.cit., 
at p . 1754) refers to the same instance.
Ubhau madhvasavaksibavubhau ... /
Arjunasya ca Krsnayam satyayam ca mahatmanah //
The M.Bha. Udyogaparva, 58 5-7; vide S.K.De, ed., B.O.R.I., 
vol.6, (Poona, 194o), p.276. Also see P.C.Roy, trans.,
The Mahabharata, vol.5, (Calcutta, 1886), p.2o8.
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Apararka seems to confirm this rendering. Thus, he (on
Yajn. III.227) quotes and comments upon the verse to the '
effect that
"The liquor distilled from grains is here made an 
example of prohibited drink; which means that this is 
the principal kind of liquor and the other two are 
only secondary; it is for this reason that though 
all the three are equally forbidden for the Brahmana, 
the former alone is forbidden for the Ksatriya and 
the Vaisya".*!
But does this mean that the sin committed due to the principal
kind of liquor r-S greater in degree than that committed by
drinking the rest? The Mitaksara (on Yajn. III.253), seems
not to ,think so; for it considers chat, "this text" (i.e.
Manu, kl.94), "is intended to demonstrate the equality of
sin in!regard to the three kindsof suras, and not as demonstrating 
i _
the equality of these two, viz. the Gaudi and Madhavi with the
2 *Paistisura". If this is so, then one wonders why only the
Paisti is prohibited to the three castes, and, at the same
time, the Gaudi and the Madhavi are left open for the
Ksatriya and the Vais'ya; Whatever may be the reason, this
view seems sounder and more in keeping with the general
prohibition recommended regarding the 'intoxicating substance1
(see above p . 134), irrespective of the kind of wine or liquor.
One thing is quite clear, however: all kinds of liquor are
3forbidden to the Brahmanas.
1. G .Jha, Notes, op.cited, pt.II, p.817;
' Ekam paistlm drstantikrtya .->arvusya Brahmanam prati 
pana nisedham kurvanneka mukhya gaunitareti darsayati / 
evam ca Brahmanasya tistro *pyapeyah, Ksatrlyavaisyayo- 
stu paistyeva1 / Apararka on Ya jrl. Ill. 227 ; vide, H.N.Apte, 
ed., op.cit., p.1o44.
2. The Mita.on Yajh.,III,253, vide, J .R.Gharpure, trans.,
op.cit., p . 1753; also see, G.Jha, Notes, op.cited., pt.II,p81S
3. 1 Yaksaraksah pisacannammadyam mamsamsurasavam /
tadbrahmanena nattavyarndevanarasnata havih // Manu, XI.95; 
vide, V.N.Mandlik, ed.; cit.above, p.1394.; i.e., "Intoxicants, meat,
wine and distilled liquor are the food of Yaksas, Raksasa and Pishachas; 
it should not be taken by the Brahmana who partakes of the offerings to 
the Gods. " Manu, XI.95; vide G.Jha, op.cited, vol.V, p.417; also see, 
G.Biihier, trans., cit.above, p.450; J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p. 1754;
G.Jha, Notes, op.cit., pt.II, p.817, and Madanaparijata (p.814), quoted, 
at ibid., Visnu,22.82,ibid.Ill,p.842? Haradatta on Gaut., II.2o, vide 
G*Blihler, trans., S.B.E.2, cit.above, p.186, f.n.2o.
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(B) Secondly, there were, it seems, certain occasion*-;
and uses for particular purposes, which were treated differently 
from the general rule regarding prohibition. Thus, there is 
mention of cups filled with wine in the Sautramani sacrifice.
And to this Jagannatha refers as an authority for the propos­
ition that "the use of spirituous liquors is authorized by 
2
law on such occasions. As regards spirituous liquor being 
used for medical purposes, and the same being considered by 
the sastras as an excusable act, we note Medhatlthi's explanatior 
for the milder expiation sanctioned by Manu. He says,
"This expiation is meant for those cases where wine 
; is taken as medicine when life is in actual danger; 
i though wine-drinking in such circumstances has been 
I permitted by certain texts.
!
Vijnanesvara appears to agree with this view. He refers to
I
the views of Baudhayana, Yama and Brhaspati fend states that,
"all these three also are to be understood to be in 
the case of drinking for the abatement of a disease 
which cannot be accomplished by any ojher medicine, 
since the prayas'citta is very small".
Undoubtedly, these views support the above proposition in 
respect of the use of wines and liquors for medical purposes.
jp*-
(C) Lastly, a distinction has apparently been made 
while determining the expiation as to whether the act of 
drinking was intentional or innocent, and whether it was the 
first instance or a repeated occurrence. According to
Apastamba, "A drinker of spirituous liquor shall drink
*' 5exceedingly hot liquor so that he dies." This rather
1. 1 Sautramanyamca grahesu', Jaimaui sutras, III.5.14, which means
"And in a Sautramani sacrifice, .in the cups ... some of them are full of 
milk and some of them are full of wine". Vide, M.L.Sandal, trans., The 
Mimamsa sutras of Jaimini, (Allahabad, 1923), p. 144.
2. Vide, H.T.Colebrooke, trans., cit.above, p.3o4.
3. Medha. on Manu, XI.92, vide, G.Jha, cited above, p.413; also see G.Biihier, 
trans., cit.above, p.45o, f.n.93..
4. The Mita.on Yajn., III.254, vide, J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.176o.
5. Apastamba, 1.9.25.3, vide, G.Biihier, trans., op.cit., p.82, also see,
Yajn. 11.253, vide J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.1751.
139
i
vague statement is. however, qualified by others, who apply
this rule to Brahmanas. Even this seems to have been further
qualified so as to apply to those Brahmanas who have drunk sura
both intentionally and repeatedly. Thus, Vasistha lays down
that, "But a Brahmana who repeatedly (and intentionally partakes)
of liquor extracted from rice, he shall drink (liquor of) the
2
same (kind) boiling hot. He becomes pure after death."
Also there are various references to the penances for unintent-
3
ional drinking. Of course, the rules applied to others also,
4
and were not restricted to the Brahmanas alone. Thus, these 
authorities more than prove the point, made above, regarding 
the variations in penances in respect of intentional and / 
or habitual (or otherwise) drinking of wine or liquor. And, 
from the point of view of our study, we need not go into
i
further details.
fc
Now, following this line of argument, there seems hardly
any doubt that the above discussion reveals technically, at
least in certain cases, that the drinking of spirituous
liquor may be neither 'illegal' according to the arthasastra
(see above p . 136), nor 'immoral' in the view of the dharma- 
, _ 5
sastra (see above p . 136, f.n.3). In other words, any debt
1. See, Gaut. XXIII. 1 , vide G.Biihier, op.cit., p.284 ; Baudhayana , 
11,1,1.18, vide G.Biihier, cit. above, p.1o5; Manu, XI. 9o, 
vide G.Jha, cit.above, vol.V, p.412.
2. Vasistha, XX. 22, vide G.Biihier, trans., S.B.E.14, cit. above, 
p.1o5; also see, Haradatta on Gaut.XXIII. 1, where he states, 
"that the offence must have been committed intentionally 
and repeatedly in order to justify so severe an expiation". 
Vide G.Biihier, trans., op.cit., p.,284 .
3. Gaut. XX.III.2, Baudh., II.I.1.19; Vasistha, XX.19;
Medha.on Manu, XI.92; Br.q. by the Mita. on Yajh,III.253& 
Yajn.Ill.255.
4. "For having through ignorance, however, drunk sura ... 
the twice-born of the three varpas become amenable for 
reconsecration." Yajn., III.255, vide J .R.Gharpure, trans., 
op.cit., p . 1762, G.Jha, Notes, cit.above, pt.III, p.842 ; 
see Baudh.,II .I .1.21, which is similar. t ,
5. "Intentionally even if a Ksatriya, or a Vaisya also, 
somehow by drinking the sura wine, do not incur a sin".Brhad 
Yajn. quoted by the Mita.on Yajn. 111,253; also he refers
to Vyasa in support of this view. Vide, J.R.Gharpure, 
trans., op.cit., p . 1754.
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due to such drinking would appear untainted. And if this 
could be accepted, would it not be correct to say that ;
that should fall under the general principle of Hindu law, 
which obliges the son to pay his father's untainted debt?
One would think it should; but even that thinking, it seems, 
would appear to be a fallacy. For, in the first place, the 
above results arose, in fact, from discussions, the context 
of which, in the case of the arthasastra, relates to the
topics concerning 'control over tne senses1 , 'the controller
2 3of spirituous liquors' and'the group of the vices of man'
and in the case of the dharmasastra , it is concerned with
'penances'. Again, the whole discussion is directed at the
behaviour of the drinker and has nothing to do with his son,I
or his son's liability for his father's debt. On the other
hand, the fact is that by nature the spirituous drinks are
i
such that, whether one drinks with or withou^t the sastric
permission, the consequences are hardly likely to differ.
And it is for the avoidance of the consequences that the
sastrakaras have, in spite of a few contrary allowances,
advocated restraint (see above pp.130-134) in the overall
interest of society as a whole. This overriding interest
would rarely be served by extending the creditworthiness
of drunkards by making their sons pay their liquor-bills.
In the view of the sastras, spirituous drinks remain despicable,
and it is in this sense that the above exceptions would seem
illusory, and hence, so far as the father's liquor-bills are
concerned, the definitive and unanimous injunction, laid
down by the sastrakaras (see above p .116, f.n.1-2), expressly
for the purpose of exonerating the son from this liability,
4
would appear justifiable. On this point, the Maskaribhasya 
(on Gautamadharmasutra) seems to agree with this conclusion.
1. Kaut j .lya Arthas'astra, Book I, Chapter 6, vide, R. P. Kangle, 
cit.above, pt.II, pp.13-14.
2. Kautilya Arthasastra, Book II, chapter 25, ibid, pp.176-18o.
3. Kautilya Arthasastra, Book VIII, chapter 3, ibid., pp.455-458
4. Madyam madyanimittam Brahmanasyapratisidhatvat 
Ksatrlyadi visayametad drastavyam/dravyam dadamlti 
madyapane krte dravyamadatva 'sau mriyate tadapi putrasya 
na bhavatiti / Maskari on Gaut., XII.38,
vide, the Dharmakosa, cit.above, vol.I, p.678.
141
Now we may turn to our second problem: the scope of
this exception. As we have seen above (pp.116-121) , the
sastrakaras seem to have merely laid down the exception.
The commentators- have tried to explain it. Govindaraja
(on Manu.VIII.159) states that 'the amount which is due to
the liquor vendor as price of liquor (bought for) drinking'.
Thus, in his view, by saurikam Manu seems to refer to that
debt of the father which he incurred either by way of
drinking liquor or buying it for the purpose of drinking.
Perhaps debts for liquor which was bought for any other
purpose than drinking seem not to have been envisaged.
Also, he does not indicate whether the rule applied to a
habitual or an occasional drinker's debts. According to
2
Medhatlthi's rendering , however,
"debts due to drinking are said to b^ e 'due to liquor' 
'liquor' standing for-all sorts of intoxicating 
drugs. Hence the present denial pertains to the 
debts of a man who is an inveterate drunkard".^
This e x p l a n a t i o n t o o , appears, by implication, to confirm 
the above view. But the scope of the above exception is 
apparently further narrowed to include only the habitual 
drunkard; or it may be that his views lean heavily in favour
1. 'Surapanadeh yad dhvajinah suramulyam', ibid., p.663.
Also see, Visvarupa on Yajn., 11.53, 'Suram pltva yan
mulyam na dattam* / ibid., p.685; 'Surapanena yatkrtam rnam 
the Mit.on Yajn., 11.47, vide B.S. Moghe, cit.above, p.io2 
V . P .Bhandari, ed., The Viramitrodaya, Vyavaharaprakasa, 
cit.above, p.265; N.S.Khiste and J.S.Hosinga, e d . , clt.aho' 
p. 469; R.K.Ranade, cit.above, p.35; J .R .Gharpure, trans., 
cit.above, p.786; 'saurikam tatpltasuramulyam',
Sarva jrianarayana on Manu, VIII. 159, vide, V.N.Mandlik, e d . 
cit.above, p.975, 'Saurikam surapananimittam' , The Vivada-- 
ratnakara, vide P . D . Vidyalanka.ra, ed., cit. above, p. 57;
'for procuring spirituous liquor', the Smrticandrika,
J.R.Gharpure, trans., cit.above, p.319; 'incurred for 
drinking spirituous liquor'; Sulapani on Yajn.II.47, 
vide J.R.Charpure, trans., cit.above, p.788.
2. 'Surapana nimittam saurikam suragrahanamma- 
dyopalaksanarthamtena yah panasaundotyamtamadva” 
pasta-drnapratisedhah / Medha.on Manu, VIII.159,
vide V.N.Mandlik, ed., cited above, p.975.
3. Vide G.Jha, trans., cit.above, vol.IV, pt.I, p.2o3.
142
of applying the exception to the cases of confirmed addicts 
only. This point seems to have been traced further by 
Asahaya.. He, while commenting on Narada, IV. 1o, with 
reference to the term sura states Yatsuravyasanandhenakrtam; ‘ 
meaning thereby (the debt of the father) due to blinding 
(influence of) addiction to drinking of liquor ; i.e., debts 
arising out of the balance of payment due (from purchase 
of liquor) for meeting the demands of one's own habit of 
drinking which cannot be kept under control.
In short, the debt contemplated by the sastrakaras under 
this heading appears to be one which a Hindu father incurs 
by way of drinking or buying liquor for the purpose of drinking 
only. In other words, it seems to exclude all debts due 
for purchases of liquor for any other purpose, such as 
medical use, etc.. Although Medhatithi and Asahaya seem 
to restrict the rule to the cases of inveterate drunkards, 
the majority view (see above p . 14.1, f.n.1) appears to favour 
inclusion of all cases of drinkers, irrespective of how often 
or how much they drink. Thus the scope of this exception *• 
the son need not pay his father's debt for spirituous liquor - 
appears to extend to any debt which the father incurred by 
** way of drinking or buying spirituous liquor for the prupose 
of drinking only.
This leads us to our next topic: debts due to futile
gifts.
i III.5 DEBTS DUE TO FUTILE GIFTS
We have already seen (see pp.117-119) that Vasistha,
Manu, Yajnavalkya, Brhaspati and Vrddhaharlta have, in their 
enumerations of the debts non-exigible from the son, mentioned 
the debts due to 'futile gifts'. The term used by all these
1. 1 Yatsurapanavyasanandhena krtam' / Asahayabhasyam, 37; (on Nar.,
IV. 1o,Dharmakosa, vol.I,p.696) ; "outrageous state of intoxication".
Vide J.Jolly, trans., cit.above, p.45, f.n.lo. According to this trans­
lation, it m y  mean any debt-not necessarily for drinking - incurred while 
one is completely drunk. It m y  be pointed out here that this does not 
seem to be, in this context, appropriate rendering of Asahaya's comments.
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1
sastrakaras to indicate this sort of debt is *vrtha-danam1.
It will be seen that the term has been variously rendered
by not only the commentators but also modern scholars.
It is needful therefore that, in i:he first place, we should
try to determine as far as possible its proper import. We
have to inquire into the c|uJ5)ses of its be i-ng excepted from
the son's liability. The term according to the leading
Sanskrit-English dictionaries^ means, among other things,
'useless or improper gift; a gift that, may be annulled or
revoked, or not made good if promised'. By way of explanation
it is said that it is 'as a gift promised to courtesans,
3
wrestlers, ... etc.. It may, also mean an unnecessary,
foolish, idle, wanton, false, unprofitable or fruitless gift;
a gift made in vain. Of course, all these 'adjectives' used
here to illustrate the meaning of this term vrtha-danam,
though correct in certain contexts, would ncSt necessarily
mean the same thing in all circumstances, and could be open
to nuances of interpretation. Perhaps because of this, various
commentators have.interpreted it in different ways. Thus,
according to Medhatithi (on Manu, VIII.159), it seems to mean
4
"gift promised in joke or under similar circumstances ". 
Medhatithi visualizes a situation in which the promise of 
the father (to the effect) has been fulfilled before his death. 
He then says that the son cannot be made to pay the gift. It 
may not be wrong if we understand Medhatithi's rendering of 
vrtha-danam as an act done for fun, foolishly, or, perhaps, 
in vanity.
1. Vasistha, 16.26; Manu, VIII.153; Yajn.,II.47; Brhaspati XI.51;
Vrdahaharita, 7.249. Cf. Kaut. 3.16.4 "And ... a gift of piety to wicked 
persons or for destructive actions, a gift of wealth tc those who are 
not useful or are harmful, and a gift of love to unworthy persons"; 
vide R.P.Kangle, trans., cit.above, pt.II, p.281 (see also f.n. 2 below 
p. 148) . Although the term vrtha-danam has not been mentioned by Kautilya, 
the way in which the commentators on Manu, Yajn., etc., have rendered 
this term, one is inclined to treat this verse in tire same way.
2. M.Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, cit.above, p.958; V.S.Apte, , 
Sanskrit-English Dictionary, cit.above, p.885.
3. M.Williams, op.cited, p.958.
4. Vide G.Jha, trans., cit.above, vol.IV, pt.I, p.2o2, 'Vrthadanam 
parihasadi-nimittam pratis-ravanam ... pitari mrte putro na dapyate / 
Medha.on Manu, VIII.159; vide V.N.Mandlik, ed., cit.above, p.975.
1 5Qf.n.4 contdi. Bharuci on. Manu V I I I . 158 says that sons are 
not liable to pay futile gifts and gambling debts because 
these a r e ,analogous to suretyship debts; see Derrett, vol.II, 
p.144, Consider. c f . Sternbach, vol.I, p.186 (G., Vas. and K . )
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On the other hand Raghavananda renders it , "promised
2 *in jest or to bards and the like". Govindaraja, Sarvajnana- 
3 4rayana and Kulluka appear to explain it as meaning promise 
to bard?, clowns, pour-boirs and the like . Kulluka actually
instances ’amounts incurred by the father in order to make
' 5presents to eunuchs, etc.1 To Sarasvati-vilasa vrtha-danam
means ’gifts given to dancers ana the like1. According to
the Mitaksara, it means promised to rogues, bards, wrestlers,
6 ~ . 7
etc. In support of this meaning, Vijnanesvara cites a text'
to the effect that what has been given to a rogue, a bard,
wrestlers, quacks, liars and a cheat and to swindlers,
g
itinerant singers, dancers and to thieves carries no fruit.
1. Vide, R.K.Ranade, in (195o) 52 Bom. L.R.33 at p.36.
"Vrthadanam parihasadina magadhadibhyah pratisrutam" 
Raghavananda (on Manu, VIII.159), vide V.N.Mandlik, op.cit., 
p.975.
2. Vrthadanam paritosikadi yatpitra deyatvenangikrtam 1 // 
vide, the Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.663.
3. Vrthadanam charnadisu / Sarvajna. on Manu, VIII.159, 
vide, V.N.Mandlik, op.cit., p.975.
4. Vrthadanam parihasanimittam pandadibhyo deyatvena 
pitrangikrtam1 ... Kulluka on Manu, VIII.159, ibid..
The standard text of Manu with Kulluka (Nirnayasagara Press 
edn., Bombay, 1946, p.318) points dandadibhyah which is an 
obvious error (on account of fines),attributable to the 
editor's incredulity when seeing nandadi.
5. Vrthadanam nartakadidattam'
vide, the Dharmakosa, op.cit.. p.7o9.
6. R.K.Ranade, op.cit., p.36; J .R .Gharpure, trans., cit.above, 
p. 78.6; S.C.Sarkar, Vyavasthacandr ika, vol. I, (Cal., 1878), 
p.244; K .K .Bhattacharya, The law relating to the joint Hindu 
family (Cal., 1885), p.561;
vrthadanam dhurta-bandimalladibbyo yat pratijnatam /
Mit.o'n Yajn. 11. 47, 
vide, the Dharmakosa, o p .c i t ., p .685.
7. Dhurte bandini malle ca kuvaidye kitave sathe / 
catacaranacauresu dattam bhavati nisphalam; ibid.
8. J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.786; J .R .Gharpure, trans., The Smrti- 
candrika, Vya.Kanda, p t . 2, (Bombay, 195o), p.32o; H.T.Cole- 
brooke, cit.above, p .311.
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1
To the Vivada-ratnakara, the term implies a 'fruitless gift'
and the Vivadacintamani seems tc agree with this view for
2it renders it as a futile gift. The consensus of all these 
opinions seems to suggest that by vrtha-danam we should 
understand a fruitless gift, unnecessarily promised or made. 
This, however, is but a part of the explanation. According 
to Nandanacharya, it means a gift not for religious purposes
3
but to singers and the like' . Thus he considers it, besides 
what others have already said above, something like an adharmic 
act. The Vframitrodaya appears to confirm this, for the term
4
is explained there as a gift "without regard to dharma"
_ 5
(i.e., without dharma as its motive). Jagannatha considers 
it as "an unprofitable gift promised", which he says "in effect 
signifies a gift promised with no view to a moral purpose". 
Balambatta seems to tell us that, 'here the gift is futile 
in the sense that it produces no spiritual benefit, not merely 
that it produces no material benefit' to the donor. So, the 
Subodhini commenting on the same passage of Vijnanes'vara, 
points out that, "the author mentioned the invalidity of the 
gift made to rogues, bards, wrestlers etc... by dhurte bandini 
malle c$l ; ... Its invalidity lies on the strength of the
text 'bears no fruit' and not because of the absence of a
- j
visible result? According to this explanation, therefore, 
vrtha-danam is incapable of bearing any fruit at all, and 
hence is invalid. Thus, what appears from the above discussion
1. ' Vrth'idanamaphaladanam 1 , P . D . Vidyalankara, cit.above, p.57.
2. Vide, G.Jha, trans., cit.above, p.29.
3. R.K.Ranade, op.cit., 'Vrthadanam dharmarahitam gayakadibhyo
deyam / Nandana on Manu VIII,159, vide V.N.Mandlik, op. 
c i t ., p .975.
4. The Vframitrodaya, on Yajn. 11.47; vide J .R .Gharpure, op.cit., 
p.787;_
Vrtha dharmam anuddisya danam datum pratisrutam etatsarvam 
paitrkam iha aihika-abhiyoga nivrttyartham put.ro na dadyat / 
The Vframitrodaya, on Yajn.II.47, vide N.S.Khiste and < 1 
J.S.Hosinga, ed., cit.above, p.468.
5. Vide, H .T .Colebrooke, trans., cit.above, pp.3o3-3o4.
6. Dhurtadibhyo dattasya vpthadantvam samulayari ... / atra nisphalamityu- 
ktya paralaukika-phalabhavad vrthadanatvam vivaksitam, na tu 
drsta-phalabhavad iti bhavah / Balambhatta on the Mit., vide N.P.
Paravatiya, Vyavahara-Ba1ambhatti,ed., (Benares, 1914), p.18o.
7. Vide, J.R.Gharpure, trans., Subodhini, (Poona, 193o) , p.6o.
i
I
f
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with regard to the import of the term vrtha-danam may 
briefly be summarized as follows: although the term has
been variously understood and therefore has been variously 
expounded, all the commentators and the digest writers 
appear to hold that it is a futile gift. Some commentators 
consider it so, perhaps, in the sense of sheer waste of 
assets or wealth. To ethers, it appears so, because it has 
no reference to any spiritual or moral benefit. And perhaps 
because of this, according to the Viramitrodaya (see p. 145) 
such gifts are without regard to dharma. Thus, then, from 
the point of view of the sastrakaras, the term vrthadanam 
appears to mean a futile gift, promised or made unnecessarily, 
without any regard to dharma or moral purpose. It will be 
observed that mere want of consideration was not the test,
since an 'unseen' consideration was, to their minds, a real
. . .  *consideration.
What wTe are concerned with here is the debt of the 
father, incurred by way of vrthadanam, with special reference 
to his sons1 liability to pay it. Before we go into the causes 
that exonerate the son from this liability, we must clarify 
a minor point. According to the Vivada-cintamani "futile 
** gift . . . should be understood to be one that has been 'promised', 
(not actually giver); otherwise, as it would have been already 
given, there could be no point in prohibiting its payment".
This view, it may be pointed out here with respect, appears 
to be misleading, for it seems to ignore the necessity of 
prohibition even i f the futile gift is actually given, to 
protect the interests of those whose rights might be affected 
due to such gifts by one who might be but a joint-owner of 
the thing given. This is especially true since gifts allegedly 
for dharma were prima facie binding on the whole family 
( MitSksara (Colebrooke) 1.1.27-29). Moreover, this view 
does not appear to take into account a situation wherein 
a Hindu father makes a futile gift after borrowing money (or '
1. Vide, G.Jha, trans., cit. above, p.29.
any other thing) from others, and is unable to repay either 
due to his death or otherwise. But for the prohibition, would 
not the son be liable to pay it? One would think that he 
would be liable under the general rule of the sastra. It 
would appear therefore that the distinction made by Vacaspati
Misra would lead, unless it is applied to one who is the
N
absolute owner' of the thing given, to the consequence which 
(besides others) he himself does not seem to approve of.
Thus, it may safely be concluded that the prohibition applied 
to the futile gifts both promised as well as actually given. 
iThis. leads us to our enquiry into the causes that exonerate1----- j
the son from his liability to pay such debts to his father.
t
The basic cause of placing this sort of debt into the exeption 
under consideration seems to lie in its unmeritorious nature 
in the eyes of the sastras. Unmeritorious because of its 
disregard of dharma and morality, as appears^to have been 
implied in the comments of Nandanacharya, the Viramitrodaya 
of Mitra Misra, Jagannatha and Balambhatta; or as the Subodhini 
seems to treat it '(invalid) for it bears no fruit1 (see 
above p. 145). Of course, the fruit referred to here has to 
have some connection with righteousness; or so it would appear 
from the implications of the above comments. Thus the whole 
argument seems to revolve around the view that because the 
sastrakaras considered vrtha-danam of an unmeritorious nature, 
debts contracted for such gifts need not be paid. The reason, 
in short, must be that while gifts having an 'unseen fruit' 
(adrsta-phala) will prima facie bind the family, those which 
have none such (e.g. promises to singers, etc.) will not 
(according to dharma itself) be validly incumbent on the sons.
But can we, in support of this proposition, show some direct
 1
or positive connection between such gift and unrighteousness 
or immorality? Let us say, for example, that a Hindu father
1. Vide, G.Jha, op.cited, p.6o; also see f.n.there according 
to which 'at one's pleasure' - even without the consent o f - 
brothers and others - say the Viramitrodaya (p.395);
Svecchadeyam svayampraptam ... (Br.q. in the Vivada- 
ratnakara; cit.above, p.13o;) that is to say, "Self-acquired 
property may be given away at one's own pleasure".
Vide, G.Jha, H . L . S . , cit.above,, p.271.
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incurred debts due to gifts made to singers, dancers or 
wrestlers. Such gifts may be regarded as rewards* given 
in honour or enjoyment of their art and hence would appear 
to 'be valid. But at the same time, especially in the context 
of their sons' liability to pay the debts due to such gifts 
of the father, one needs to go beyond this self-satisfaction 
or enjoyment of the father. It contains symptoms of lust, 
for out of this kind of enjoyment, perhaps, develops the 
liking for dancing girls and the like. Thus, looked at from 
this angle, such gifts could be directly connected with 
immorality (and so also could the gifts to cheats and rogues, 
etc.). Historically, it has been a fact of life for those 
who were rich and powerful, that they generally indulged in 
hiring and keeping singers and dancers and made grandiloquent 
promises and boastful inducements to artistes especially at 
entertainments organised by themselves' (e.g.^the biblical
1. What is given as a reward for satisfaction' ... these eight 
kinds of gifts-are valid" B r ., 15.8, vide G.Jha, H .L .S ., 
op.cit., p.274; 'Reward is, however, variously construed.
It means 'given to dancers and musicians', (the Vivada- 
cint'aman i , p.6o), ibid.; or'given to actors or others'; 
vide, G.Jha, trans., the Vivadacintaman i , cit.above, p.63; 
but according to Apararka, "tustyadyupadhikam putrajanma- 
disravakebhyo yacca"../ conveying happy news, such as that 
of birth of a son ;
vide, H.N.Apte, ed., A.S.S.46; cit,above, p.781; 
also see, G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cited, p.274.
2. 'yrtha-danam dhurtadibhyo datiain' / Parasara-dharmasamhita, 
vide, V . S .Islampurkar, ed., vol.3, p t .2, (Bombay, 1911),
p . 266 ;
' Dharmadanamas'adhusu karmasu caupaghatikesu va/
arthadanamanupakarisvapakarisu va kamadanamanarhesu ca / 
Kaut., 3.16.4,
vide R.P.Kangle, e d ., cited above, p t .I , p. 121 (see also 
f.n.1 on p . 143 above). It should be noted here that these 
gifts are considered by the author as 'avyavaharyam' (see 
Kaut.3.16.2-3); cf. 'Pratisrutyapyadharmasamyuktaya na 
dadyat' / Gaut. q.in the Vivada-ratnakara, op.cit., p. 133; 
'even when one has promised a gift, one should not give , * 
it to a person beset with unrighteousness', 
vide G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cit., p.268.
incident reported at Mark VI.23, and cf. Esther V.3,6).
That habit exists to some extent even to this day. This 
way of life became, in course cf time, something of a matter 
o f ’prestige, leading to a kind of obsession, which results, 
often, in destruction of great men and families, due to 
over-irtdulgence. Often even those who could not afford such 
a style of living were drawn into it. Apparently, such gifts 
had nothing to do with righteousness but, no doubt, were 
amoral, irrespective of their p o s s i b l y  being also immoral.
It is . in this sense, probably, that the commentators 
(see above pp.145-146) considered the term vrtha-danam
_ i
adharmic or immoral; for such gifts could conceivably 
be conducive to spreading vice and crime. It is for this 
reason, then, that the s'astrakaras seem to have excluded 
debts of the father, due to such gifts, from the son's 
liability to pay. t
III.6 DEBTS DUE TO LUST OR ANGER
Kautilya, Yajnavalkya, Vrddhaharita, Brhaspati and 
Narada have clearly expressed their views that a debt of the 
father due to lust need not be paid by the son (see pp.116- 
119 above). Of these, only the last two sastrakaras have 
referred, in this connection, to debt due to anger or wrath.
The Sanskrit words kama and krodha stand for lust and anger 
respectively. Kama-Krodhadi is a Sanskrit cliche for emotional 
unbalance such as deprives the mind of judgment. It seems 
that bpth these words have, in any case a wider connotation
2
in Sanskrit than what is implied by lust or anger in English. 
Thus, kama means, among other things, "wish, desire, love,
1. Jagannatha, while commenting on the Mit.on Yajn.II.47, seems 
to suggest that because such debt comes under the text of 
Vyasa, "nor any debt for a cause repugnant to good morals", 
it need not be discharged by the son. Vide H.T.Colebrooke, 
trans., cit.above, p.311. '
2. H.W.Fowler and F.G.Fowler, adapted by, the Concise Oxford 
dictionary , 4th edn., (Oxford, 195o), p.715, and p.44 
respectively,cf. the meanings of these words, given by the 
three dictionaries referred to below.
* A vrtha-danam indeed!
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i
the object of desire or love, the god of desire or love
or desire of sensual enjoyment, ... desire of carnal
♦ 2
gratification, lust*.* Krodha means ’’anger or wrath , ...
anger considered as the feeling which gives rise to the
3 /raudra sentiment (in rhetoric) " According to the sastras,
however, both these words seem to represent two of the most
vicious human sentiments or vices (see below p.155ff). Having
this information as the background, we may, now, proceed
with our enquiry into the debts due to lust (kamakrtam rnam)
or wrath (krodhakrtam rnam) as envisaged by the s'astrakaras.
(a) Debts due to lust: According to Katyayana, "what
was promised, whether in writing or without writing must be
paid, but (what was promised) to the wife of another should 
i 4 _ 5
be known as a debt due to lust." In view of the Mitaksarai ------------
1. M.Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, cit.above, p.219.
2. V.S.Apte, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, cit.above, p.348? 
also see, L.R.Vaidya, The Standard Sanskrit-English 
Dictionary, 2nd edn., (Bombay, 1916), p.18o4.
3. Ibid., (L.R.Vaidya), p.217.
4. Katya., 564, vide P.V.Kane, trans., cit.above, p.234; also 
see, P.V.Kane, trans., The Vyavahara-Mayukha, cit.above, 
p.217, f.n.1; The Smrticandrika, p.17o, vide J.R.Gharpure, 
trans., cit.above, p.32o; The Vivada-cintamani, vide G.Jha, 
trans., cit.above, p.29; R.K.Ranade, cit.above, p.36;
- H .T .Colebrooke, trans., Digest, vol.I, cit.above, p.3o9.
'Likhitam muktakam vapi deyam yattu pratis'rutam / 
parapurvastriyai yat tu vidyat kamakrtam nrnam /
Katya. 564,
vide P.V.Kane, e d ., op.cit., p.71; also see, the Vivada- 
ratnakara, vide P.D. Vidyalankara, ed., cit.above, p.58; 
the Dharmakosa , cit. .above, vol. I, p t . 2 , p. 71 3? K . 7. Rangaswami 
Aiyangar, e d .; The Krtyakalpataru of Laksmidhara, v o l .12, 
Vyavaharakanda, (Baroaa, 1953), p.316; v ! S .Islampurkar, 
e d . , Paras'arasamhita, cit. above, p . 266 ; The Vlramitrodaya 
(on Yajn.II.47), N.S.Khiste, J.S.Hosinga, ed., cit.above, 
p.469 .
5. Vide, J.R.Gharpure, trans., cit.above, p.786,
H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit., p .311; Kama-krtam strivyas- 
ana nirvrttam', the Mit. on Yajn.11,47; vide, B.S.Moghe, 
ed., cit. above, p.1o2.
It may be noted here that Gaut. (XII.38) , quoted here,differs 
fran others in that itexcludes the term ' pratibhavya - vanik ,* 
but adds kama instead, cf. Medha.on Manu, VI11.1 5*9".
-
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(on Yairi. 11.47) , kama means 'lust' and a debt contracted for
kama is one ’brought about by a passion for women’. Sulapani
treats it as a debt 'for sexual intercourse with women belonging
to others’ . According to the Vivada-cintamani, it is ’Gift
2promised through lust, i.e., in adulterous love-making'.
Thus, what appears from all these renderings is that on one 
hand, the term kama seems to mean, here, an illicit sexual 
relationship between a man and a woman; and that, on the 
other hand, the woman involved seems 'to belong to others’.
Does this mean that there were, no women in the society of 
the day, who belonged to none? For, if there were any free 
women, then obviously the question arises as to the consequences 
if the father (a debtor, in our case) had such a relationship 
with a woman not belonging to others; i.e., a widow.
To the Smrticandrika, 'a woman, belonging to another' -
_ 3
parapurva-striyai - means another's wife', but according
4to the Vivada-ratnakara, the term parapurva, (already married
woman), here stands for all such women as are not married to
the man himself. It may therefore be understood, in view
of this explanation, that even if there were any women not
belonging to others, it made no difference to the basic
proposition, (so long as they were not married to him), and
hence the objection seems to be immaterial. Asahaya's
5
rendering of Narada (IV.1o), appears to throw some further
light on this point. When he says, yat kamaridhena dasisambandhc 
£
krtam , which may mean '(a debt contracted by one) blinded
1. Vide J.R.Gharpure, op.cit., p.788; H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit., 
p.311.
2. Vide G.Jha, cit.above, p.29.
3. Vide J.R.Gharpure, trans., cit.above, p.32o.
4. 'Parapurva sabdasca parinitastrimatraparah', The Vivada- 
ratnakara , vide, P .D .Vidyalankara, e d ., cit.above, p.58; 
also see, G.Jha, trans., The Vivada-cintamani, op.cited, 
at p.29; H .T .Colebrooke, cit.above, p.3o9.
5. According to J.Jolly's trans., cit.above, p.45, (where it 
is N a r ., I .1o ) .
6. Vide the Dharmakos'a, cit. above, p. 696 ; c f .,'Kamakrtam 
dasyadibhih', Naradiyamanusamhitabhasyam; ibid., also see,
J.Jolly, op.cit., p.45, f.n.lo.
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by strong passion (sexual love) for a concubine (or a maid
servant)'. It appears that, here, the emphasis is on the
debtor's strong passion, especially for women other than
his wife, which drives him to incur debt - thus creating
a direct link between 'lust' and 'the debt'. How? The 
-  1Vivada-ratnakara explains the process by which such debt
arises out of lust. It is stated there, "Having promised
a gift to another man's wife and being unable to pay it,
the man borrows the required money and pays it; this is
2
the debt that is said to be 'contracted through lust11.
A valuable passage, this proves the true motive behind the 
transac'i/tjon taints even remoter transactions related to it. 
In the view cf Jagannatha, however, "whatever is promised, 
or borrowed and given, for the abduction of a woman with 
whom intercourse is criminal, must be considered as a debt
3
incurred under the influence of lust", and therefore 
he concludes that such debt need not be paid by the son or 
other heir.
Thus, this discussion quite clearly suggests that the 
debt due to kama (lust) has reference particularly to the 
debtor's passionate sexual relationship - a criminal act
4
with a woman not his own; and also, it seems to confirm, 
without dissent, that such debt is excluded from the son's 
liability, due to the reasons given above.
(b) Debts due to anger or wrath: Although Brhaspati and
Narada have, mentioned this debt, it is Katyayana who has 
explained .it as follows:
1. ' Parapurvvayai dhanam pratis'rutyasampattavrnam
krtva diyate yat tat kamakrtamrnam /'
The Vivada-ratnakara, cit.above, p.58.
2. Ibid., noted by G.Jha, trans., The Vivada-cintamani, p.29, 
f. n.
3. H .T .Colebrooke, trans., cit.above, p.31o.
4. "Consequently that only which was promised for the sake of 
enjoying an adultress, constitutes an obligation incurred 
under the influence of lust." Ibid..
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"Where (the father) after having caused through 
anger (physical) injury to another or having 
destroyed the latter's wealth, promises something
that pacifies him (the person wronged) , that is
declared to be a debt incurred through (the influence 
of) anger."
The comment made above about remoter transactions 
obviously arises again here. Thus, what appears from this 
explanation shows that the cause of liability arises from 
the debtor's criminal act or even from his civil wrong, and
it is his ancjer which is the basic cause of all this.
AparSrka (on Yajff. II .47) , the Vivada-ratnakara, and the
2Smrticandrika have all extended similar explanations.
The Asahayabhasyam (on Nar.IV.1o), however, puts it in a 
slightly different and intriguing way. It is stated there 
that such debt is contracted by one, "incensed by wrath
3
against his own son". On the other hand, the Naradiyamanu-
samhitabhasyam seems to expound the same term (krodha-krtam)
-4like this: krodha-krtam putradidvesena saha bharyadibhir va 
which may mean, 'under the influence of wrath due to hatred 
against (one's own) son or wife'. Thus, Asahaya seems to
1. Vide P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.234; also, all the references 
given in f.n.4 at p.15o;
'yatra himsam samutpadya krodhad dravyam vinasya. va / 
uktam tustikaram yattu vidyatkrodhakrtam tu tat //
Katya., 565;
vide P.V.Kane, ed., cit.above, p.71; also all the references 
cited in f.n.4 at p.15o above.
2. Apararka, quoting Katya., states
'Ayam arthah: parasya himsam dhanavinas'am krtva tat 
tustaye yad dravyam datavyatvenariglkrtam tad rnam 
krodha-jit.am iti / 
vide, H.N. Apte, e d . , A.S.S.46, cit.above, pp.648-649.
'Yattu krodhavas'ena paradravyam vinasya. parasya himsam 
va krtva tadiyatustyartham dhanam datumrnam karoti tat 
krodhakrtam / The Vivada-ratnakara, op.cit., p.58-59; 
for further information see, the Smrticandrika, cit.above, 
p.32o; The Vivada-cintamani, op.cit., p.29.
3. Vide, J.Jolly, trans., S.B.E.33, cit.above, p.45, f.n.lo;
'Yat putrasyaivopari krodhandhenakrtam',
Asahaya on Nar.IV.1o, 
vide the Dharmakos'a, op.cit., p.696,
4. Ibid.
differ from others more in degree than in substance when he
interprets the tejrn krodha,while the last two commentators
have put forward a slightly different view from others in
that they appear to attribute the debtor's act to a desire
to punish his own son. One wonders whether such deliberate
action on the part, of the father could, in the eyes of the
sastras f be justifiable; for prima facie the act appears
unrighteous, and yet there seems hardly any basic difference
so far as the source of this action is concerned. For, in
the view of all of them, it is the 'anger' of the father.
Jagannatha's rendering of the gloss of the Vivada-ratnakara
(see above p. 153, f.n.2) on Katyayana (565), presents us with
yet another version. "What is borrowed to give away for the
purpose of destroying another's property, or injuring another
man through resentment,is a debt incurred under the influence 
1
of wrath ". Here again, the fundamental purpose of this kind 
of debt remains the same though the actual act is supposed 
to be committed by a third party at the instigation of the 
father (debtor). The intention to injure is the common factor.
In this whole discussion, however, there appears to be 
no other reason for incurring such debt than the father's 
anger (krodha). We know already (see above pp. 149 -150) 
that the sastrakaras have absolved the son from liability 
to pay debts due to his father's lust or anger. But what is 
the real justification for this exception?
Jagannatha seems to suggest that there is some similarity
between the debts incurred under the influence of lust and /
2
or wrath. Let us enquire into the matter. In the view of 
the sxastra these two - lust and anger - appear almost like 
two sides of the same coin in the sense that both of them 
are capable of leading men, generally, to indulge in deadly
1. Vide H.T.Colebrooke, cited above, p.31o.
2. 'Here debt must be understood to complete the similarity 
between engagements made under the influence of lust and 
of wrath.' Ibid.
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deadly vices. How?
According to the Bhagavadgita,
'■ "The man who ponders .over objects of sense forms
• an attachment to them; from (that) attachment is
produced desire; and from desire anger is produced 
• (i.e. when the desire is frustrated.)"z
And further, upon Arjura's request to tell him who forces 
men to commit sin, the Deity said,
"It is the desire, it is the wrath, born from the 
quality of passion; it is very ravenous, very - 
sinful. Knew that that is the foe in this world."
Hence one should restrain one's senses, then cast off this
sinful thing which destroys knowledge and experience. Similar
4
views are expressed in the Vinaya texts; and also the 
arthasastra. Manu (11.214) appears to endorse this view 
when he declares that, he becomes a servile^follower of
1. "A group of three (vices) springs from anger, a group of 
four springs from lust". Kaut., 8.3.4; vide R.P.Kangie, 
cit.above, pt.II, p.455; (Kaut., 8.3 - full section, pp.455- 
58, which deals with various vices of man ) .
2. K.T.Telang, trans., Bhagavadgita, S.B.E.8, (Oxford, 1882), 
p.5o;
'Dhyayato visayan pumsah sahgas tesupa-jayate / 
sahgat sanjayate kamah kamat krodho abhijayate //
B h g .2.62;
vide, A.Roy, ed.& trans., The Message of Gita, (London, 1938), 
p . 4 3 .
3. K.T.iTelang, op.cit., p.57, cf. "By this evil karman a man
falls into perdition (evil way), and so there is no greater
enemy to man than lust ... he is led to ... lustful longing",
verse 1817, vide S.Beal, trans., A life of Buddha, S.B.E.19,
(Oxford, 1883), p.263.
4. hLusts have been declared ... wherein the danger is great". 
Kullavagga,.I .32.2; vide T.W.Rhys Davids and H.Oldenberg, 
trans., Vinaya texts, pt.II, S.B.E.17, (Oxford, 1882), p.378, 
also see, "whatsoever brother, ... has not got rid of the 
fever of lust ... his mind does not incline to zeal, exertion, 
perseverance, and struggle." Ketokhila sutta; vide 
T.W.Rhys Davids, trans., Buddhist Suttas, S.B.E.11, (Oxford, 
1881), p.225.
5. Kaut., 8.3.66; vide R.P.Kangie, op.cit., p.4 58.
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1 2 desire and passion * , (or 'anger', according to G.Biihler ),
and could be led on the wrong path, contrary to usage and
scriptures.^
One might argue, on the other hand, that "a strong
.4
desire or urge often leads to success," or "resort to anger
5
is ever needed for putting down evil," so on and so forth. 
Perhaps, because of this, Bharadvaja (and others quoted 
in the whole chapter, Kaut., 8.3), does not regard kopa (i.e., 
anger) and kama (passion) as vices and is, therefore,
g
unconcerned with their relative seriousness. These are, 
however, exceptions; and in the context of our study, where 
passion is understood to represent immoral and criminal sexual
I
activity, and anger to lead to crimes and unjust destruction
of other's property, they could hardly be justified. Certainly,
no normal person would consider it just to burden sons with
%
debts due to such passion or anger of the father, whether or 
not the sons themselves are victims of the latter's anger.
1. G.Jha, trans., op.cit., vol.I, pt.II, (Calcutta, 1921), 
p.511;
'Avidvamsamalam loke vidvamsamapi va punah // 
pramada hyutpatham netum kamakrodha vasanugatam //
Manu, 11.214;
G.Jha, ed., Manusmrti, vol.I, (Calcutta, 1932), p . 186.
2. trans., cit.above, S.B.E.25, p.69, 'for women are able to lead 
astray in (this) world ... man,and (to make) him slave of 
desire and anger'.
This rendering seems correct.
3. Medha.on Manu, 11.214; vide G.Jha, trans., op.cited, vol.I, 
pt.II, p.511.
4. Vide, R.P.Kangie, op.cited, pt.II, p.455, f.n.11.
5. Kaut., 8.3.1o, ibid.
6. f.n.11, also see, Kaut., 8.3.11-12, "Lust is (a means of) 
attainment of success, conciliation, generosity of nature 
and being lovable".
"And resort to lust is ever needed for the enjoyment 
of the fruits of works done".
But Kautilya refers to this argument on merit, see Kaut.,, . 
8.3. 14— 15; ibid.
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There is hardly anything pious in paying such debts.
In conclusion, therefore, it may be stated that the 
sastras seem well-aware of the limited conditional excellences 
of lust and anger. Yet they appear to have made a good 
diagnosis of human frailties. To preserve dharma in society, 
both the dharmasastra and the arthasastra have advocated 
the need to control o n e ’s own senses. This apparently means 
enjoyment of sexual pleasures without contravening one's 
spiritual good and material well-being as laid down by the 
sastras. Excessive or improper indulgence in lust or anger, 
has, therefore, been prohibited, especially because of their 
(lust and anger) tendency to lead to immoral or criminal acts, 
which kre adharmic. It is in view of this, and irrespective 
of what the actual circumstances and outcome may have been 
in practice, that the sastrakaras seem to have generally 
exonerated the son from the payment of his father's debts due 
to lust or wrath: it was good practice to relieve them
from such obligations.
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CHAPTER IV
THE DOCTRINE OF AVYAVAHARIKA DEBTS
IV.1 General *
IV.2 The meaning of the term Avyavaharika debts
IV. 3 The scope of Avyavaharika debts
t
IV.1 GENERAL
’ The doctrine of avyavaharika debts is, perhaps, today 
the main exception to the general rule of Hindu Law that 
it is the ’pious obligation' of a Hindu son to discharge 
his father1 debts. But in spite of the fact that the term 
avyavaharika has been variously translated and rendered by 
different commentators, scholars and jurists, its exact 
import and scope have yet to be defined. It has not been 
possible, so we are told, to give an exact definition or 
an exhaustive enumeration of the avyavaharika debts.
On the contrary, the fact is that the word avyavaharika 
or vyavaharika, though Sanskrit in its origin, is of very 
common use in every-day parlance and its exact meaning,
2
as commonly understood, does not admit of mufeh controversy, 
(for further discussion on this point see below pp.167-68) . 
This leads us to a kind of enigmatic situation in which it 
is hard to believe that the word avyavaharika , which poses 
no problem of understanding for a common man, should prove 
so controversial among scholars and jurists that they cannot 
agree as to its exact meaning.
1. P.V.Kane, H .D h ., cited above, vol.Ill, p.447, "what is 
meant by 'debts that are not vyavaharika has presented the 
greatest difficulty to the medieval commentaries and digests 
and alsc to modern courts;" L .J .Manjrekar, (1947) 19 Bom.
L.R.',J., 3-1 o, at p. 3; V.B.Raju, (April, 19 39) 41 Bom.L.R., 
J., 25-32, at p.32 says, " the word avyavaharika is
incapable of definition in precise terms by the use of 
adjectives other than the indefinitive adjective 'improper';
the writer continues, "there can be no ideal interpretation
of the word avyavaharika except that word itself."
Also, see J.D.M.Derrett, at (1964) 1o Lucknow Law Journal, 
1-13, at p.3 he seems to describe avyavaharika as a topic 
shifting like quick-sands; also his 'Indica Pietas', cit. 
above, pp.37-66, at p.58; R.K.Ranade, A.I.R.1946 J., 51-53, 
at p.51; and (195o) 52 Bom.L.R.,J . , 33-41 at p.38; T.P.Dubey
• A.I.R.1938 J. 141-146 at p . 141.
2. T.P.Dubey, ibid., at p . 144 expresses a similar view.
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IV.2 THE MEANING OF THE TEPM AVYAVAHARIKA DEBTS
How and why has this situation obtained? Let us 
investigate, hopefully with the intention of helping to 
solve the problem.
A
1 The Sastric position: The category of debts that
are not vyavaharika is to be found in the enumerations of
Usanas and Vyasa only. ' According to the first,
dandam va dandas'esam va s'ulkam tacchesam eva va 
na datavyam tu putrena yac ca na vyavabarikam //
or in the words of the latter,
dando va dandaseso va s'ulkam tacchesa eva va / ^
na datavyam tu putrena yac ca na vyavaharikam //
"The son n^ed not pay the fine or the balance of fine, a toll 
or the balance of the toll, or any debt of the father which
4
is 'not vyavaharika1;" or "Neither a fine, nor a toll, nor the 
balance due for either, shall be necessarily paid by the 
son of the debtor, nor any debt for a cause repugnant to
5
good morals."
1. J.D.Mayne, Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 11th edn., 
cit.above, p.398; L .J .Manjrekar, cited above, at p.4; 
R.K.Ranade, cit.above, at p.34.
2. The M 11aksara on Yajn.,II.47; B.S.Moghe, e d . , Yajnavalkya- 
smrti, Vyavaharadhy'aya, (Bom; . , 1879), p.1o2; H.N.Apte, ed., 
Apararka on Yajnavalkyasmrti, A.S.S.46, cit.above, p.64 8;
V .P .Bhaudari, e d ., Viramitrodaya, Vyavaharaprakasa, cit.above 
p.265; N .P .Parvatiya, ed., Balambhatti, cit.above, p. 179; 
Pharmakosa, cit.above, voll, pt.II, p.714; P.V.Kane, H .D h ., 
cited above, vol.Ill, p.44o, f.n.752; J.C.Ghose, cit.above, 
vol.'I, 3rd edn., (Calcutta, 1917), p. 545; L . J. Man jrekar, 
op.cited, p.4.
3. P.D.Vidyalankara, ed., Vivada-ratnakara , (Cal., 1887),
p.50; N.S.Kiste & J .S.Hoshinga, jt.eds., The Viramitrodaya 
and the Mitaksara on Yajnavalkya, (Benares, 1924), p.463;
G.Jha, Hindu Law in its Sources, vol.I, (All., 193o), p.2o8; 
Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.714; T.P.Dubey, cited above, p. 143.
4. Usanas, quoted in the Mi t a . on Yajn.II.47; vide L .J.Manjrekar 
cited above, at p.4
5. H.T. Colebrooke, Digest, cit.above, voll, p.3o7. # «
Mow, although the term yac ca na vyavaharikam is exactly
*
the same in botih the above verses, it may be noted that we 
are not offered 'exactly the same1 translation of the term.
But before making any more comments, it is proposed to see 
w h a t .the commentators, modern jurists and scholars have to 
tell us. -
2. The Commentators1 views: Apararka, while commenting !
on Yajnavalkya, 11.47, glosses na vyavaharikam as na nyayyam-
1 2 ltyarthah that is to say, 'which is not righteous, or proper.'
The Smrticandrika explains the expression na vyavaharikam 
3
saurikamityarthah meaning thereby 'a debt incurred for
4 5spirituous liquor' or 'for drinking'.
The Viramitrodaya on Yajn.II.47, quoting Vyasa, explains
— 6 na vyavaharikam vyavaharabahiskrtam balatkaradikaritam /
i.e., 'not incurred according to law' or 'which is excluded
%
by the law such as that which was caused to be entered into
7
under compulsion.' We note that vyavahara does not mean
'law' but rather the complex of transactions to which a law- 
court would give effect. But the same commentator, Mitra Misra, 
in his Vyavahara-Prakas'a (of the Viramitrodaya) , while on the 
topic of non-payable debts, seems to agree with the Smrticandrika 
when he renders na vyavaharikam as surapanadinimittam-iti
1. Apararka on Yajnavalkya, cited above, p.648; P.V.Kane,
H .D h ., cited above, vol.III, p.447, f.n.754.
2. L.J.Manjrakar, cited above, p.4; R.K.Ranade, cited above, 
p.5j. We must note that nyayam can also be translated
'reasonable'.
3. The Smrticandrika, Vyavahakand a , p.17o, quoted intheDharmako s a , 
cited above, p.715; also see P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.447, f.n. 
754 .
4. J . R.Gharpure, trans.,The Smrticandrika, Vyavahakanda , cit. above, 
pt.II, p.32o; L .J .Manjrekar, cit.above, p.4.
5. R.K.Ranade, cited above, p.51.
6. N.S.Kiste, cited above, p.469, (however, here the letter na 
is missing perhaps due to misprint).
7. J.R.Gharpure, trans., Yajn.Smrt i , (Bom.,1938), p.787; 
R.K.Ranade, cited above, p . 5 1 &  p.38, appears to agree, 
but T.P.Dubey, cit.above, at p. 143 renders it 'what is not 
proper.' '
1 C 2
1 7
arthaii or surapanadinimittam~' . It clearly means, here, 
a debt incurred due to spirituous liquor, or tor drinking
”3
wine 'and the like1.
■t
The •. Vivada-cintamani, on the other hand, glosses na
- 4
vyavaharikam as vyavaharabahiskrtarn or vyavaharabahiskrtair.-
5
ityarthah (see the Viramitrodaya1s identical terminology),
6
i.e. 'what is opposed to the ordinary conduct of a person ' 
or 'what is outside the pale of custom or law (what is net
7
admissible in lav; ) ' or 'what is not admissible under norma]
8 9conditions' or 'excluded from usual causes' -.
But according to the Balambhatti, a commentary of later
period on the Mitaksara of Vijnanesvara, it means na kutum-
1 obopayogityarthah that is to say 'not for the benefit of
11 12 the family ' or 'what was not used for the family.'
—  - -  «   _ _  _ _
t
1. V . P .Bhandari, cited above, p.265.
2. P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.447, f.n.754.
3. G.Jha, Notes, cit.above, p.2o8; V.N.Mandlik, ed.& trans., 
Vyavahara-Mayukka & Yajn.Smrt i , (Bom., 188o), p . 113, f.n.4;
L . J . Man j rakar, op. cit., p. 4*.
4. Vivada-cintaman i , p . 17, quoted by P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.447, 
f.n.754; L.J.Manjrekar, op.cit., p.5.
5. The Dharmakosa, cit.above, p.714 quotes the Vivada-ciritamani
p. 25.
6. R.K.Ranade, op.cit., p.38; L.J.Manjrekar, op.cit., p.5.
7. G.Jha, trans., Vivadacintaman i , op.cit., p.29.
8. G.Jha, Id. L . S . , cited above, p.2o8, notes.
9. H . T tColecrooke, trans., cited above, p.3o8; 
also see, J.D.Mayne, cited above, p.398.
10. J.R.Gharpure, ed., Balambhatti, (Bom., 1914), p.61;
P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.447, f.n.754; P . N .Parvatiya, cit.above 
p.18o; 1.J .Manjrekar, op.cit., p.4; R.K.Ranade, op.cited, 
p. 51 .
11. L.J.Manjrekar, ibid.; R.K.Ranade, op.cit., p.38.
12. G.Jha, H .L .S ., cited above, p.2o8; and his translation of
the Vivada-cintaman i , op.cit., p.29, f.note.
163
A modern translation might be, 'no!-, in the family's real 
interests'.
* 3. The Modern Jurists and Scholars: According to
Jagannatha's Vivada-Bhangarnava,
'-'The expression in the text of Vyasa (na vyavaharikam) , 
is explained by Mis'ra, 'excluded from usual causes'. 
Consequently that debt which is contracted for 
some civil purpose consistent with the prescriptive 
usage of good men, must be paid by sons and the 
rest; but if2it. be the reverse, it need not be 
discharged."
In other words Jagannatha's explanation amounts to * avyavaharika *
means 'not consistent with the prescriptive usage of good
. 3: m e n . '
j
We have already referred to the rendering of na vyava­
harikam by H .T .Colebrooke (see above p.16o) as 'any debt for 
cause repugnant to good morals' *
V.N.Mandlik,^ Jogendranath Bhattacharya^ and Ganganatha
7
Jha use perhaps the shortest term 'not proper', to translate 
na vyavaharikam.
W.Stokes appears to agree, in his edition of Hindu Law 
Books, with the above view. In this book (as per Borrodaile's 
translation of the Vyavahara-Mayukka) na vyavaharikam is
Q
rendered 'debts improper, (not sanctioned by law or custom)
1 . Vacaspati Mis'ra, the author of the Vivada-cintaman i .
2. H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit., p.3o8; J.D.Mayne, op.cited, pp.398- 
399 1
3. Ibid.; V.B.Raju, cit.above, pp.26, 31. The original of the 
phrase is obviously sistacara-viruddham.
4. H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit., p.3o7; p.V.Kane, op.cit., p.447, 
f.n.7 54; J.D.Mayne, op.cit., p.398; V.B.Raju, op.cit.,
p.31; L .J .Manjrekar, op.cit., p.5; R.K.Ranade, op.cit., p.38.
5. V.N.Mandlik, cit.above, p . 113; J.D.Mayne op.cit., p.399;
L.J.Manjrekar, op.cit., p.5; R.K.Ranade, op.cit., p.38.
6. J.D.Mayne, op.cit., p.39 9; and R.K.Ranade, ibid., quote him 
as stating this in his commentaries on Hindu L a w (2nd edn.,, 
p.247),and L.J.Manjrekar, ibid., also refers to this view'.
7. Hindu Law in its Sources, cit.ab., p.2o8; L.J.Manjrekar, ibid
8. W. Stokes, ed., Hindu Law books, (Mad. , 1865), p. 123;
L.J.Manjrekar, ibid.
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Girish Chandra Tarkalankara .seems to mean by the
i
term avyavaharika 'not necessary for life'.
< J.R.Gharpure explains it thus: "Whatever is not legal
2or capable of being recovered by a suit".
To j .D .M.Derrett it means (literally) 'unenforceable
3 4by process' or 'not legally enforcible* (because immoral
5
or illegal) or 'such debts as are not capable of being 
exacted (by the creditor from the father) in a law court1.
Lastly, it may be noted that "the words conventionally
n
used to represent avyavaharika are 'illegal or immoral1'; 
and though, " (that) expression was doubtless originally 
meant to render avyavaharika, it has come to be used as a
compendious term to cover all the cases enumerated in the
1 ,.8smrtis.
%
We have, up to this stage, merely stated the situation
9
as it has been viewed by the smrtis , commentators and digest 
writers, as well as a few modern jurists and scholars. What 
we have observed so far may be summed up as follows:
(a) The controversial term na vyavaharikam as originally 
used by Usanas and Vyasa, appears to have been applied in 
the same context, namely: the enumeration of a certain kind
of debts of a Hindu father, which are non-exigible from his 
sons.
1. J.Mukerjee quotes him in C.Mahtor: v .G.Prasad, (1911),
I.LIR., 39 Cal.862, at p.868; but does not agree with his 
view; Manjrekar, op.cit., p.5; R.K.Ranade, cit.above, 
p.39.
2. J.R.Gharpure, cit.above, p.78b; V.B.Raju, cit.above, p.31; 
Manjrekar, ibid.; see our explanation of vyavahara above*
3. I.M.H.L., cited above, p. 313.
4. Ibid., in his select glossary (p.xci).
5. Ibid.
6. 1Indica Pietas1, cit.above, p.49.
7. C.M.H.L., p .1o 5 .
8. J.D.Mayne, op.cit., p.399.
9. For the arthasastra-view, see below p. 171 ff.
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(b) The controversy seems to begin with the various 
interpretations given of the term na vyavah'drjkam by different 
commentators, e.g. na nvayam ityarthafr (Apararka), 
vyavaharabahiskrtam balatkaradikaritam (Viramitrodaya), 
vyavaharabahiskrtam (Vivada-cintamani), na kutumbopayogi- 
tyarthah ' (Balambhatti) and saurikam ityarthah or surapana- 
dinimittam (Smrticandrika and V iramitrodays •Vyavahara-Prakasa) 
see above pp.161-162). Thus, in place of one original term, 
we have at least five variations, none of which appears,
on face of it, to agree exactly with the rest, but at the 
same time all seem to explain the meaning of the term na 
vyavaharikam in their own particular sense*
(c) The trend of these multiple explanations of the 
term na vyavaharikam, set in motion by the commentators, 
appears to have expanded during the period of the modern 
jurists and scholars (see pp. 163 -164). have from them
their own renderings of the original and of the commentators1 
renderings of na vyavaharikam. One may well argue, however, 
that their interpretations of the term were most likely 
influenced by their understanding of the commentaries on
the subject, e.g. Colebrooke's translation; or, indeed, 
vice versa, for example the various renderings of the term 
vyavaharabahiskrtam in the Vivada-cintamani (p.162, f.n.6-9).
Unfortunately, these and similar combinations seem to have 
produced the present jungle of interpretations (see above 
pp. 16 1-164) .
(d) Perhaps due to the above situation, a compromise 
appears to have been struck by treating na vyavaharikam as
1 illegal or immoral1.
Of course, it has not been our purpose merely to state 
the present position in respect of the debts coming under 
the category of avyavaharika, but to try and solve the 
problem as far as possible. Thus, up to now, we have 
explained how the present situation came about. Now, let * 
us ask: why?
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The word vyavaharika is an adjective derived from the
word vyavahara, and the terms na vyavaharikam or avyavaharika
convey the same meaning. According to leading Sanskrit-
1English Dictionaries, the word vyavahara means, among other
things, "doing, performing, action practice, conduct,
behaviour, commerce or intercourse; affair, matter; usage,
custom, wont, ordinary life, common practice; mercantile
transaction, traffic, trade with, dealing in (comp.);
a contract; legal procedure, contest at law, litigation,
law suit, legal process; practice of lav; and kingly government;
mathematical process; administration of justice; majority(age);
propriety, adherence to law or custom;" etc., and the word
vyavaharika means, "relating to business, engaged in business,
2
practical; judicial, legal; litigant; usual, customary".
j
Although the above list of the various meanings of the 
word vyavahara looks quite long, it is not complete, and yet 
it appears to be sufficient to explain certain basic facts.
i) All these renderings cannot be attributed to this 
word at one and the same time, and hence each could make 
sense only in its proper context.
ii) At the same time, we notice that none of the diction-
j
aries referred to above have mentioned in their enumerations 
of these various meanings of this word any of the following;
i.e., saurikam ityarthah or kutu.iabopayogitya'°rthah (the 
propriety or otherwise of these senses attributed in this 
context will be discussed below, sec pp.17o-171).
1. M.Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, cit.above, 
p.1o34; V.S.Apte, Sanskrit-Englisn Dictionary, (Poona,1959), 
vol.Ill, p . 1514. ~ —  “
2. Ibid.
It may be noted here that these words, though Sanskrit in 
origin, are living and currently used in most of the modern 
Indian languages and convey the same meanings. The following 
Dictionaries may be referred to:
(a) R.C.Pathak, comp. & ed., Dhargawa's Hindi-English . 
Dictionary, 3rd edn., (Benares, 1946), p.1o11; K.Prasad, 
ed., Brhat-Hindi Kos a , 2nd edn., (Benares, Savant 2o13), 
pp.1296-7, (b) J .T .Molesworth, comp., A Dictionary, Marafhi
and English, 2nd edn., (Bom., 1857), pp.776-77.
(c) M.B.Belsare, ed., An Etimological Gujarati-English 
Dictionary, 3rd edn., (Ahmedabad, 1927), p.1o75.
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iii) Besides, the word is not a dead one. It is a living 
1word and is, even today, used in everyday conversation by 
prople, villagers and town-dwellers alike, irrespective 
of their educational level, all over the country.
Why then should the efforts of the jurists and scholars 
in search of a clear and conclusive definition of the term 
avyavaharika debts have gone in vain? An examination of 
our above findings might throw some light on this problem.
It is proposed to start in reverse order.
Nov.', the fact of the popular understanding of the word 
avyavaharika can be proved only by talking to the people and, 
therefore, we have to resort to the next best method available 
to us. Heie are a couple of examples, taken from the Marathi 
language.
(a) A publisher writes, "Shri Ranjit De^ai kahanl sangu 
lagale, ani mazya vyavaharika choukati apoapa kadhl galuna 
padalya, mala samajale nahl. Vyavaharacha vichara nahisa
J 2zhala." That is to say, 1 (when) Shri Ranjit Desai began 
to tell the story, I did not even realise when I lost 'business­
m a n 1 in me (or my usual attitude as a businessman). The 
thought of business disappeared.1
(b) In the preface the author of the book describes,
"Shivaji dharmic hota, pana dharmabhola navhata. Vyavahari 
hota, pana dbeyas'unya navhata. "3 This means, 'Shivaji was 
religious, but not a blind follower of it. He was practical, 
but not without ideals.' This is how the term figures in 
Marathi. Also, in a sense, the above examples, though chosen 
at random, clearly indicate by implication, what is 'proper'
1. It might be because of the difficulty of defining it on
one hand, or its being a living word on the other, the modern 
jurists and scholars have, in their translations of the word, 
left it in its original form.
2. R.Desai, Shriman Yogi, Vol.I, (Poona, 1968), p.1o, here, - 
the publisher, R .J .Deshmukh, is telling how he came to 
make up his mind to publish this w o r k .
3. Ibid., p. 14, also on the same page, the author uses the word 
vyavahara in compound rajavyavaharakosa .
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or 1 improper1 in the circumstances: Thus, in (a) even
altruistic attitude on his part has been considered by a 
businessman (the publisher) as a proper one in the circum­
stances, though .normally he would have preferred to be more 
businesslike than altruistic; similarly, while describing 
Shavaji's character in (b) it is shown that it is good to 
be a practical man but at the same time it is improper to 
become completely unprincipled. Thus, the term almost 
certainly seems to convey a sense of the 'propriety' of an 
act, mental or actual. Arid looked at from this point of 
view and its present-day common use in a number of modern 
Indian languages, it appears that as commonly understood 
the word vyavaharika has a contemporary, conventional sense 
of 'righteinisness', a kind of indicator which points to the 
prevalent norm representing good values of human behaviour. 
Perhaps this is why most of the commentators and scholars 
have glossed it "righteous", and "proper1 etc.
It is respectfully submitted that in Marathi, as in other 
Indian languages, any average person would have hardly any 
difficulty at all in understanding these variations of the 
meaning conveyed by the use of the word vyavaharika in 
similar contexts. In fact, the context in which the word 
is used seems to determine its appropriate meaning.
This view may be explained further with reference to
our second observation (see p. 166). We have stated there
that none of the dictionaries referred to there have enumerated
saurikam il.yarthah or kutumbopavogltyarrhah etc. as a meaning
1of the word avyavaharika. It is also true that these 
dictionaries do not include the words 'righteous' or 'proper' 
as possible meanings of vyavaharika. Though the number of 
dictionaries referred to here may be incomplete, those referred 
to do exclude all these words from their enumerations. And
t1 . See M.Monier-Williams, cit.above, p. 112; V.S.Apte, cit.above, 
p.272; R.C.Pathak, cit.above, p.79; K.Prasad, cit.above, 
p. 114; J .T .Molesworth, cit.above, p.52.
yet quite a few commentators and scholars, as we have seen 
above (pp.161-164), do attribute these meanings to the term 
avyavaharika. Why ?
The answer to this question lies, perhaps, in the 
implied rather than literal meaning of these renderings 
which alone are enumerated in these dictionaries. What do 
we really mean by these, words: 'custom or common practice',
for example? A custom or common practice, speaking generally, 
will have some reference, it would appear, to the benefit 
of the society as a whole, otherwise it would not so be 
regarded. Likewise, the word vyavahara, apart from its 
obvious association with a law-court in any dharmasastric 
text, seems to convey 'something in the interest of all 
concerned', something good, 'good' in the sense of 'moral' 
or 'legal' values as accepted by the contemporary society 
as a whole. Thus, (i) the debts incurred fo^ : spirituous
liquors have been regarded almost unanimously by the sastrakaras
3 4and others (see above page 162) as 'bad debts'.
(ii) Vyavaharabahiskram is further explained as balatkarad:-
karitam i.e., 'that which was caused to be entered into under
compulsion (see above p.162). But compulsion of what? An
invalid or dubious transaction in which the apparent validity
is vitiated by undue influence, force, fraud, or the like.
1. Jagannatha's explanation (see p . 163) appears to suggest 
this view when he explains the term thus, "consistent with 
the (prescriptive usage of good men" (sistacaraviruddham)
2. Manu, VIII.159; Yajn., 11.47; Kaut., 3.16.9; vasistha,
XV.31; Brhaspati, XI.51; Narada, IV.1o; Katyayana, 554.
3. Apararka, cit.above, p.648; Medhatithi on Manu, VIII.159; 
vide G.Jha, trans., cit.above, vol.IV, pt.I, p.2o1-3;
The Mit.on Yajn., 11.47, see J.R.Gharpure, cit.above, p.Go
4. The expression 'bad' is here used in the sense that such 
debts as these are deprecated by the sastrakaras.
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jn»-
1(iii) We also knew that according to the sastras the debt 
incurred for the purpose of the family is a 'proper' debt, 
the converse of which na kutumbopayogltyarthah may be a 'b a d 1 
debt or 'improper' debt. Similarly, (iv) a debt incurred 
for na nyayam ityarthah i.e., for 'unrighteous' or 'improper' 
cause is a 'bad' debt. Now, in this sense, though described 
differently, all these debts have, it seems, one thing in 
common in that they are sastrically considered as against 
'righteousness' or vyavahara (and hence deprecated). Thus 
the word vyavaharika has reference to 'something good', 
'something proper'.
Besides, we may be right in our understanding that the
I
various terms, used above by these commentators to denote
na vyavaharikam, were in fact used by way of an illustration
to show the impropriety of these kinds of debts, the taint
%
of which makes them avyavaharika debts.
This explanation seems to carry even greater weight if
* 2we refer to the arthasastra view on this subject, as we shall 
immediately (p. 171 ff) .
1. " ---  even one person, who is capable, may conclude a gift,
hypothecation, or sale, of immoveable property, if a 
calamity affecting the whole family require it or the support 
of the family render it necessary or indispensable duties, 
such as the obsequies of the father or the like, make it 
unavoidable." The Mitaksa r a , I.i.28-9, quoted by J.D.M. 
Derrett, I .M .H .L ., cited above, p.266;
"Kutumbartha, as'akt~ena ", 5 when unable to maintain
the family1 (a debt incurred to meet this situation must 
be paid) Katya. 542 vide P.V.Kane, ed.& trans., Katyayan- 
smrt i , cit.above, pp. ($8,225; also see Katya. 545;
Yajn. 11.45; Apararka, cited above, p.64 7; The Vivada- 
ratnakara, cited above, p.56.
2. Kaut.,3.16.3; vide R.P.Kangie, ed.& trans., cited above, 
pt.II, p.281, see f.n.3 where Kangle states "sarvasvam etc. 
these are the avyavaharika gifts." . He is probably right 
here when he treats these i.e. sarvasvam, putradaramatmanam
  (see his pt.I,p.121) are illustrations of gifts that
are avyavaharika, i.e., ought not to be admitted to legal' 
effect; and therefore, voidable or revocable.
footnote continued next page)
Jfi*-
This inquiry, therefore, leads us to believe that, 
though these terms, i.e. saurikam ityarthah and na 
kut.uinbopayogit.varfhah do not appear in the dictionaries 
as meanings of the term avyavaharika (see p. 168, f.n.1), 
by implication they appear to illustrate its real meaning 
as commonly understood and explained above, i.e., ’improper' 
according to sastras, (see p. 168). This might be the reason 
why the commentaries used them to explain the term na 
vy a va h a r i k a m .
We have tried to clarify, so far, the meaning of the 
term avyavaharika as it has been expounded by the dharmasastras 
Let us see what the arthasastra has to tell us in this respect.
j
The Arthasastra View: Kautilya seems to have explained
2
revocable gifts and debts in the same section (3.16.1-9)
_ 3thus dattam avyavaharyam ekatranusaye varteta which
~  §
f.n. continued from last page) cf. Brhaspati, XV.2,
"samanyam putradaradhisarvvasvanyasayacitam / 
pratisrutam tathanyasya na deyantvastadha smrtam //" 
quoted in the Vivada-ratnakara, cit.above, p. 127, the 
translation of which is "That which may not be given is 
declared to be of eight sorts, joint property, a son, 
a wife, a pledge, one's entire wealth, a deposit, what 
has been borrowed for use, and what has been promised to 
another." Vide J.Jolly, trans., S.B.E.33, cit.above, p.312.
G.Jha, trans., the Vivada-cintaman i , cit.above, p.57.
Also, see Narada, IV.4-5, "A Bailment for delivery, an 
article borrowed for a special occasion, a pledge, common 
property, deposit, son and wife and the entice property when
there is progeny, --- and also what has been promised to
another, --- these the teachers have declared to be whac
should not be given away, even under distressful circum­
stances." Vide, G.Jha, ibid., p.58; also see, J.Jolly, 
ibid., p .128 -
Also, Yajn., 11.175, "svam kutumbavirodhena deyam 
darasutadrte / nanvaye sati sarvasvam yaccanyasmai 
pratisrutam " //, vide, Apararka, cited above, p. 779 ; 
which means, 'Only such things may be given away as do not 
injure one's own family, the wife and the son being always 
excepted; the entire property also should not be given away, 
if there is progeny; nor should one give what has been 
promised to another person. '
■1 . Kaut., 3.16.1, R.P.Kangie, cit. above, pt.II, p. 281.
2. Chapter, 16,sec.68, ibid.
3. Kaut., 3.16.2, R.P.Kangie, ed., cit.above, p t .I , p . 121, 
also see, Dharmakosa, cit.above, p.794.
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jp*-
Kangle translates as, "A gift, not negotiable, shall remain in.
1revocation in one place." This translation appears meaning­
less. It is literal, perhaps, because it has not been 
properly understood.
j.J.Meyer~' translates, "Anything given (presented), which 
is not negotiable, i.e., not marketable, belongs solely and 
alone to 'withdrawal1 (i.e. the chapter dealing with Rescissions 
of Sale and Purchase) .
3R.Shamashastry1s translation is, "Invalid gifts shall 
be kept in the safe custody of some persons."
T.Ganapati Sastri's c o m m e n t a r y  (Trivandrum edn., II, p.94)
i _
reads, dattam avyavaharyam ityadi. vagdattam vyavaharayogyam 
ced, ekatra anusaye varteta, anus'aye eva kevale varteta. 
na tva anusayat kadapi mucyetetyarthah. This means,
"Assuming that, e.g., oral gifts are not legally effective 
they are subject to unilateral rescision, that is, are subject 
to mere rescission. They can never be released, or freed,
(from the possibility of) rescission." This has the merit 
of making sense; (whereas Shamashastry's translation ignores 
that anusaya has the special sense required in the immediately 
preceeding chapter. No doubt Kangle is right in observing 
that, at any rate.) It is suggested, however, that the correct 
translation of Ka u t .3.16.2 seems to be, A gift if incapable
5
of legal effect remains subject to unilateral rescission 
(repudiation). In other words, according to the arthasastra, 
the meqning of the word avyavaharyc.o (and here it applies to 
gifts as well as debts) appears tc be 'void' or 1 voidabler 
in law.
1. R.P.Kangie, cit.above, p.281.
2. Das Altindische Buch vom Welt.- und Staatsleben, Das Artha­
sastra des Kautilya by J.J.Meyer, (1926), pp.297-98.
3. R.Shamashastry, Kautilya's Arthasastra,(Bangalore, 1915), 
p. 23 9.
4. Also, see Dharmakosa, cited above, p.795. 4
5. It appears that the renderings of J.D.M.Derret and J.R. 
Gharpure (see p.16 4) agree with the arthasastra's inter­
pretation of the word avyavaharyam.
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What, then is the import of the term avyavaharika debt? 
From the above investigation, it appears that:
(a) accord inn to the dharmasastra, the meaning of the 
term seems to be 'improper1, judged from the point of view 
of the contemporary conventional sense of righteousness, 
i.e., that which is consistent with the prescriptive usage 
of good men. Accordingly, the term may be applicable to 
various situations that are deprecated by the sastras, 
depending on the circumstances of every case; and
(b) the arthasastra seems to agree, in principle, with 
the view of the dharmasastra, following it to its logical 
conclusion when it treats the term avyavaharyam as void or 
voidable in law.
IV. 3 THE SCOPE OF AVYAVAHARIKA QjEBTS
i) We have already noticed above that the Smrticandrika 
and Viramitrodaya (Vyavahara-Prakas'a) , while explaining the 
term avyavaharika, seem to have equated it with at least one 
of the clearly enumerated kinds of debts, i.e., saurikam. 
Accordingly, saurikam is within avyavaharika. Does this 
mean that the latter represents all the remaining specified 
kinds of debts that are excepted by the smrtis? Logically 
it will appear so, because none of them, speaking generally, 
appears to fit into what the sastras would consider 
vyavaharik a .
ii) Secondly, one suspects that Usanas and Vyasa really
intended to convey this sense by the use of this term. The
reason for this assumption is obvious. All sastrakaras
who have written on this subject have specifically mentioned 
2
certain debts which the sons need not pay. But these two
1. See Mitaksara, I.i.28-9; Katya., 545; Yajn., 11.45; etc. 
cit.above, in f.n. 1 on p.17o;
*2. For example, Brhaspati, XI. 51, "sauraksikam vrthadanarn 
kamakrodhapratisrutam / pratibhavyam dandas'ulkasesam 
putran na dapayet // vide here from the Viramitrodaya , 
cit.above, p.468; also, M a n u ,VII I .159; Yajn.II.47; Kaut., 
3.16.9 e t c .
have, in this context, listed only danda and sulka (which 
are indeed included in the others' enumerations) and 'any 
debt which is not vvavaharikam (see p.16o) - Now, though 
the enumerations of the rest, are not exactly identical, they 
are remarkably similar. Thus, in the similar context, one 
is inclined to think that the phrase 'any debt which is net 
vyavaharikam' might represent the specified debts at least.
:- iii) Besides, the arthasastra clearly treats all these
: 1" 
various heads of debts under the same section (see p. 171,
f.n.2), which deals w i t h 'avyavaharika gifts and debts'.
It is suggested, therefore, that the term avyavaharika may
be taken ejusdem generis with the enumerated debts.
In conclusion, it may be stated that the term avyavc.harika 
debts seems to mean, according to both the dharmasastra and 
arthasastra, debts improper in a particular context, whether 
moral or legal, and hence void or voidable; but due to the 
nature of the term, every case has to be judged on its own 
merits. Moreover, if avyavaharika is to be taken ejusdem 
generis with the enumerated debts, sons cannot be made to 
pay any debts which the sastra refused to recognise.
Of course, ideas of morality change, and they change not 
only with time but also with place. And, in a country like 
India, where uhere still remain different standards of morality 
for different groups of people in the society, and where 
thousands of rniJ.es lie between the southern and northern, 
eastern and western borders of the country, one needs little 
imagination to grasp the scope for the multiplicity of moral 
standards. On the other hand there is the problem of sorting 
out the illegalities. Laws change too. What sort of illegality 
matters in the Hindu law of tainted debts - civil or criminal - 
and at which stage? Then, regarding the degrees of illegality
1. Kaut., 3.16.1-9; R'.P.Kangle, cit. above, p. 281.
(especially, 3.16.9 which enlists specific debts that 
need not be paid by the sons or other heirs).
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and immorality: where should one start and stop, in the
process of determination of ' tai?it' or otherwise, in respect 
of a debt? These and similar other questions that we face 
due to the complexities of modern life will have to be dealt 
with (see below chapter VI and VI.ij .
jt*r
\
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CHAPTER V
SOME FOREIGN LEGAL CONCEPTS 
AND
MODERN HINDU LAW OF 'TAINTED' DEBTS
V.1 Introduction %
V.2 Initial problems faced by the British Judges
V.3 English Law regarding payment of the ancestor's 
or testator's debts
V.4 The concept of 'Benefit of the Soul'
V.5 Import of the phrase 'Illegal or Immoral'
V.6 The doctrine of 'Antecedent Debts'
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V.1 INTRODUCTION
1We need not go into the details of tne creation of 
modern Hindu Law. We are concerned with the doctrine cf 
'tainted debts', and therefore our object should be to deal 
only with those questions which might affect this doctrine.
1. For the details see, J .D.M.Derrett, R .L .S .I ., cit.above,
pp.229-25o; J.D.Mayne, cit.above, (1878 e d n .), pp.3o-32; and 
its preface; R.Lingat, cit.above, pp.136-142;
H.S.Maine, Village Communities in the Eas*b and Wes t ,
(London, 1871), pp.36ff;
M.P.Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History, (Bombay, 1972), 
p p .5 8 2 f f ;
The letter of Sir W.Jones, dated 19/3/1788, quoted by
H .T .Colebrooke, Digest, vol.I, cited above, preface 
pp.V-X;
A.Steele, The Law and Custom of Hindoo Castes, new edn.; 
(London, 1868), preface. Besides, the prefaces of the 
following books throw light on this subject:
W.H.Macnaghten, Principles and precedents of Hindu Law, 
vol.I, (Cal., 1829);
F. W.Macnaghten, Considerations on Hindoo Lav/, (Serampore 
1824);
J.H.Nelson, A View of Hindu L a w , (Mad. ./Cal. /Bomb£tv , 1 877,', 
Also, A Prospectus of the Scientific Study of the Hindu 
Law, (London, 1881);
S.G.'Grady, e d . , Institutes of Hindu Law, 3rd edn., (London, 
1869), see preface to original translation by Sir W.Jones 
of Laws of Mann;
W.Stokes, The Anglo Indian Codes, vol.I, (Oxford, 1837),
H.S. Cunningham, A Digest of Hindu Law, (Mad., 1887),
W*H. Macnaghten, Principles of Hindu and Mohammadan L a w ,
2nd edn., (Lond./Edinburg, 1862);
Also, J .D .M.Derrett on J.H.Nelson, at C.H.Philips, ed., 
Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, (London, 1961), 
p p .3 5 4-3 7 2;
A.Gledhill, 'The Influence of Common Law and Equity on 
Hindu Law since 18oo', (1954) 3 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, pp.5 76 ff.,
V.Ramaswami, 'Hindu Law and English Judges', at (196o)
S.C.J., p.225 f f .
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What did the British administcators in India understand 
by this doctrine? Did they differ from its original exponents . 
or their commentators? To answer these and related 
questions, we will have to investigate and examine the 
case law. But first let us take, a very brief glance at 
their initial problems in administering Hindu law, and then 
see whether they had any notions from their own legal system 
similar to those of Hindu law on the point concerned which 
might have come to their aid, and in the process might have 
influenced those of Hindu law.
v -2 INITIAL PROBLEMS FACED 3Y THE BRITISH JUDGES 
-]
Sgnce the British undertook administration of Hindu law,
they had to face, first, the problem of the languaage of the
sastras from which the Hindu law is derived. To mitigate
this difficulty, a few, like W.Jones and H . Colebrooke,
learned Sanskrit and undertook translations of Sanskrit
treatises into English. In the meantime, native experts,
called pandits, were employed to assist the judges. In this
way between the end of the 18th century and 1864 Hindu law
2
was not judicially known to the judges . They took from the
3
pandits the law governing any case to which Hindu law applied.
In the course of time, however, it was realised that the
4pandits were not entirely reliable - or so it seemed, at least.
1. J.D.M.Derrett on J.H.Nelson, op.cit., p.365, n.34;
W.H.Macnagthen, Principles, op.cit., preface, pp.V.XIII.
2. Note the remarks of the Court in 1861 to the effect that,
"the chief authorities in Mithila law have not been rendered 
available, by being translated into English, to the judges 
unlearned in Sanskrit language, and that we are thus, many 
of us at least, unable from our own scrutiny of the text
to ascertain and vouch for the accuracy of the lav; as laid 
down by our predecessors in the court".; Musst.Junnuk Kishoree 
v.Baboo Raghunundun Sing, (1861); S.D.A. Rep., 213, 218.
3. A.Gledhill, op.cit., p.576.
4. W.Jones, q .H .T .Colebrooke, op.cit., p.VI;
J.D.Mayne, op.cit., pp.3o-31.
Moreover, as increased knowledge became available through
discovery and translations of various sastric texts, it
became clear that different interpretations are given of
original text books by different commentators, and that, among
these, writers of particular tenets are held as authorities
in different provinces of India'. The law which the English
found in India was, therefore, net of a nature to bear the
2
strict criteria applied by English lawyers . It resembled 
the conglomeration of civil and canoo law sources available 
to contemporary doctors in Doct(pOs1 Commons very much more 
closely than even the most chaotic material actually applied 
then in the courts of King's Bench and the Common Pleas and 
other Common lav; courts. In addition, mistakes in the fewI
available translations, as well as misunderstandings either 
did/ or were feared to complicate matters further.
i
Though the choice of law was made from *the sastric
authorities, the procedure applied in the administration was,
after the first Civil Procedure Code, uniformly as imported
from Westminster.. The legal system, developed from this
combination, imposed a degree of rigidity and uniformity
4upon Hindu law, which it had not known earlier . The whole 
administration of Hindu law of this period has been described 
by J.D.Mayne, who said, "It was as if a German were to 
administer English law from the resources of a library 
furnished with Fleta, Glanvi.lle and Bracton, and terminating
5
with Lord Coke" . Though this is not accurate, as Hindu
1. A.Steele, op.cit., pp.VII-VIII.
2. H.S.Maine, op.cit., p.37.
3. For a rapid picture of the sources available in the law 
of marriage and inheritance, see J.D.M.Derrett, Henry 
SwinbH£S.^ ... (York, 1 973). On Doctors' Commons the recent 
work of Squibb was not available to me.
4. A.Gledhill, op.cit., pp.577-78; H.S.Maine, op.cit., 
pp.4 4-45; J.D.Mayne, op.cit., p.31. .
5. Ibid.
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treatises written after 18oo were available to the pandits, 
and a few scholars able to read Sanskrit , the c'J/r^cism has 
its points and the consequences of the situation were probably 
inevitable. The precepts of the sastra  ^ were mistaken 
for principles of law. The whole system appears to have 
been misjudged by scholars as well as lawyers and judges.
3
According to J.D.M.Derrett , "It is clear that the 
British (mistaking the sastra for a system akin to Canon Law, 
as they knew it) made this mistake" and it is the analogy 
with Canon Law, which by 177o was known to lawyers in London 
very much as a system of principles rather than precepts,
which is crucial to this story.
I
In these circumstances, obviously, the influence of
I
certain concepts of English law, in its wider perspectives,
I
upon the native law was inevitable. Let u s feturn to those 
concepts.
V.3 ENGLISH LAW REGARDING PAYMENT OF
THE ANCESTOR'S OR TESTATOR'S DEBTS
We turn first to the English judges' knowledge in respect 
of law relating to debt-liability, particularly for debts not 
one's own. How did the English law treat problems relating 
to the repayment of debts of a deceased?
We know that in Hindu lav/ it is the son who is generally 
held liable for his father's debt.s from a very early time. 
According to the Canon Law the heir is bound to pay debts of
1. J.D.M.Derrett, R.L.S.I ., op.cit., chapter 8
2. Cf. "These are not simple recommendations which wisdom 
would tender, or rules of equity that ought to be obeyed.
The rule of dharma retains its peculiar quality even when 
it involves judicial consequences. Its authority resides 
essentially in the faith of the Hindu in a divine regulation 
of the world, the law of which is expressed by that rule."
R. Lingat, op.cit., pp.135-36.
3. Dharmasastra and Judicial Literature, cit.above, p.4.
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the deceased arising out of delict (which includes tort and 
crime), but at Roman Law he was obliged to pay those arising 
out of a contract etc., and those arising out of delict 
only to the extent that the deceased's goods reached him and 
only when suit was commenced in the debtor's/accused's life 
time .
Thus, there the liability to pay debts has some reference
to inheritance'"'. The English position at the beginning of
3
the 16th century, as has been explained by C.St.Germain , 
appears to be slightly different.
4
In those days, it seems, privity of blood between the 
ancestor and his heir was necessary for inheritance, though
1. Gloss of Berngrdus on Decretales Gregorii I X , Book III, 
tit. XXVIII, cap. 14 and vers. 1 sed eiuirS haeredes1.
2. For implications of various kinds of succession in relation 
to debt liabilities see, R.Sohm, The Institutes (of Roman 
Law) , vide J.C.Ledlie, trans., 3rd edn., (19o7), p.5o5;
H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of the 
Roman Law, 2nd edn., (1952), pp.131-132.
3. The author of The Doctor and Student, first published in 
c. 1523, is highly regarded. It is said about him that
his "studies in the Common Law, and his knowledge of English 
law, naturally led him to interest himself in the development 
of equity, which upto this time, had been closely connected 
with the Canon Law, because it had been mainly developed 
by the ecclesiastical chancellors. He was able to look critically 
the rules of English law, and, with the help of his 
know'.edge of the Canon Lav/, to point to those parts of it 
which needed the help of equity if it was to fulfil the 
main object of law - the furtherance of justice and the 
promotion of virtue."
W. S .' Kcidsworth, A History of English Lav/, voi.V, (1st 
published, 1924), pp.266-67.
4. C. St.Germain, Two Dialogues in English between a Doctor and 
a Student, Dialogue II, (London, 1687 edn.), p.318,
or see p.261 of edn. (Cincinnati, 1874) of the same:
Regarding 'Heir1, "that he shall have advantage by the same 
ancestor ... for the privity of blood that is between them" 
... etc. But "he must be of the whole blood, not a bas(a/id, 
alien"; vide M.Bacon, A New Abridgement of the L a w , vol.IV, 
(7th edn. , 1832) , p.155(m) . As regards the concept of "Heres"
(in Roman Law) , which is different from that of "Heir" in English law, • 
it should be noted that "In the language of English jurisprudence, Heir 
denotes a successor to real estate, while Excecutor, the notion of which 
is derived to some extend from Roman law, denotes a successor appointed 
to succeed to personal property. Again, Heir denotes a successor to real 
estate in case of intestacy. Devisee denotes a successor to real estate 
under a will"; vide, E.Poste, trans.& comm., Instiutes of Roman Law by 
Gaius, 4th edn., (Oxford, 19o4), p.187.
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"the son and heir hath no power over the inheritance during
i
the life of the ancestor" . So far as the heir's liability
to pay his father's or ancestor's debts is concerned, generally
2this holds only if he received assets from the deceased
ancestor. It is not personal and is limited to the extent 
3of the assets . However, it is suggested Ln respect of 
contractual liabilities, in conscience, the liability which 
arose due to clearest cause of debt should be attended to 
first, and then, among the debts of like cause, the one which
4
bears most need and greatest charity . Here it would seem that 
the principles of morality and righteousness, as well as
1. M.Bacon, op.cit., p . 155. There is an exception to this rule 
in the case of the Duchy of Cornwall. Ibid, p . 154.
I
2. "If the father bind him and his heirs to the payment of 
a debt, and die, in that case the son shall not be bound 
to pay the debt, unless he have assets by*descent from 
his father." C. St.Germain, op.cit., (1687 edn.), p.319; 
or (1874 edn.), p.261.
It may be noted, however, that in the case where, "one 
seised in fee mortgages to A and afterwards binds himself 
and his heirs by bond to A and dies; if the heir comes to 
redeem this mortgage, he must pay the bond debt as well 
as the mortgage, but if the heir assigns the equity of 
redumption to J.S. who brings his bill to redeem, he shall 
pay the mortgage only, and not the bond." Coleman v.Winch, 
(1721) 1 P.WMS. 775.
Apparently, the heir in this case suffers disadvantage, 
in lieu of his inheritance.
3. "But the body of the heir is protected, for it would
be most unreasonable to subject the heir to the payment 
of his ancestor's debt, any farther than the value of 
the assets descended." Vide, M.Bacon, op.cit., p«164; 
also, "But now the heir is liable at law for the value 
of the assets he has aliened per Lord Macclesfield
in the Colemai's case, op. cit. , at p.777; also see Luson' s 
Case, 1 DYER, 81a.
4. C. St.Germain, op.cit., (1874 edn.), p . 131.
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necessities of life and charitable deeds of the deceased
have been taken into consideration while g i v i n g  preference
to certain debts over other debts. According to the Canon
Law’,, the benefit of the soul of the testator also has to be
considered^. But, at the common law, he who comes first will 
2take first .
Where, however, the liability involve? a tort or arises
ex delicto, generally the maxim 'Actio personalis moritur cum
persona’ applies, and neither the executor nor heir is 
' 3
compellable by law to make amends . So far as Equity is 
concerned, assets permitting, the executor may meet such 
obligations, provided he has already paid all legacies etc., 
though charitable gifts may have been left out^. On the 
other hand it is also said, "that the son shall not bear the 
wickedness of the father , i.e., understood spiritually 
But as to temporal goods, the opinion of thd doctors is,
1. While speaking about the discretionary powers of the 
Executors, it is said, "that the authority to make executors, 
and that they shall dispose the goods f o r  the testator, is
by the custom of this realm:, but then, I think, as thou 
sayest, that by the law of God they shall be bound to do 
the first, that is, to the most profit of the soul of their 
testator". - C .S t .Germain, ibid., p.13o.
However, this liability, too, was limited to the extent 
of the testator's goods. - Vide, T.Wentworth, The Office 
and. Duty of Executors, (London, 1 774 edn.), p. 155.
2. C. St.Germain, op.cit., (1874 edn.), pp,13o-131.
3. "Although executors do represent the persons of their 
testators; yet if the testator commit any trespass upon the 
goods of another, or upon his person or lands, no action 
lieth for this against the executor; for 'actio personalis 
moritur cum persona'." - Vide, T.Wentworth, op.cit., p . 127. 
Hence, "Debt for an escape will not lie against the heir
of the gaoler"; per Luson's case, op.cit.. Cf. "Debt does 
not lie against the executors of the warden, for suffering 
one in execution to escape from the fleet, unless the warden 
was convicted in his life time". Whitacres v.Onsley,
3 DYER, 322b.. It should be noted here that, "this maxim 
not being generally true, but liable to many exceptions, , - 
leaves the law undefined as to the kind of personal actions 
die with the person or survive against the executor."
- Vide, C. St.Germain, op.cit., (1874 edn.), p . 128, n.
4. Ibid.
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1that the son sometJ me may bear the offence of his father
The position of the English, i.e., secular, law as at 
c. 1775, (when the British were about to involve themselves 
seriously in the administration of justice in India), may 
be stated in the words of Lord Mansfield, who, while delivering
the unanimous opinion of the Court in the case of Hambly
0
v .Trott" , said:
"Where the cause of action is money due, or a contract 
to be performed, gain or acquisition of the testator, 
by the work and labour, or property of another, or 
a promise of the testator express or implied; where 
these are the causes of action, the action survives 
against the executor. But where the cause of action 
is a tort, as arises ex delicto (as is said in Sir 
T.Raym. 57, Hale v.Blandford,) supposed to be by 
;force and against the King's peace, there the action 
(dies; as battery, false imprisonment, trespass, words,nuisance, 
jobstructing lights, diverting a water course, escape 
‘against the sheriff, and many other cases of the 
like kind."3 *
Thus, it would appear that where prima facie the cause of 
action arises ex delicto, i.e., from any of the public or 
private criminal injuries or wrongs, as stated by his Lordship, 
all such actions are buried with the offender. It must also 
be remembered that by this period the administration of estates 
had passed for practical purposes to the courts of Equity 
and the testamentary jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical courts 
had withered.
To sum up, it may be deduced from this discussion that 
the liability to pay debts not one's own survives, generally,
1
only to the extent of the deceased's own assets left behind him. 
A number of persona], obligations die with the person. As 
regards surviving liabilities both courts of law and Equity 
seem, in an attempt to do justice and promote virtue, to have
1. Ibid, p.262; The argument goes like this: - If he (son or 
heir) receives benefit from his ancestor then, in some cases 
at least, it is not unreasonable for him to suffer some
. disadvantage for the same ancestor. Ibid, p.261.
2. (1776) 1 COWP. 371
3. Ibid, at p.375
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paid conscious attention to matters of law as well as those 
of conscience. The executor or heir has no personal liability 
for debts of the deceased.
f
V.4 THE CONCEPT OF 'BENEFIT OF THE SOUL'
To the English judges in India the idea of a relationship 
between a person's debt liability and his spiritual happiness 
was not completely new; nor was it unknown to them that 
religion and its institutions had extended a considerable 
influence on the development of lav; relating to recovery of 
debts in their own country. We find, in respect of proving 
testaments, that 
i
;"the reason why spiritual men have the proving of 
(testaments is, because it is to be intended; that 
,'the spiritual men have better consciences then lay men, 
and that they have more knowledge what thing is more 
for the profit, and benefit of the soi^Le of the 
testator, then lay men have; and that they will 
looke more then lay men, that the debts of the 
deceased be paid and satisfied of his goods,
and that they will see his will^ performed so far 
as his goods will extend, etc."
It would appear from this passage that the emphasis, at least 
nominally, lies clearly on the benefit of the soul of the 
deceased testator, and that, in this respect, the payment
1. "The interest which from very early times the Church 
claimed in the moveable or personal property of deceased 
person is best explained by its teaching that the first 
and the best destination of a dead man's goods was to 
purchase masses for his soul and out of this view of the 
proper objects of wealth the whole testamentary and 
intestate jurisdiction of the Ecclcosiastical Courts appears 
to have grown." Vide, H.S.Maine, The Early History of 
Institutions, 7th edn., (London, 1897), p.332.
2. P.V.Kane seems to detect 'germs of idea of will' even in 
Hindu law, see his Katyayana-smrt i , ed.& trans., cit.above, 
p.234 , n. 566 .
3. J.Perkins, A Profitable Booke, (London, 1642), p.213; 
or see its 15th edn., (London, 1827), p.94, sec.486.
(The 1st edition of this book, which treats the laws of 
England, seems to have appeared in c. 1528.)
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of his temporal debts held an important place in view of the 
Ecclesiastical Courts; and that the liability is to be 
pursued to the extent of his assets. That, there is a definite 
link between the payment of debts of the deceased and his 
spiritual welfare appears to have been confirmed by the saiae 
author, while explaining why the deceased's debts should have 
priority over his assets as against his legaci.es etc.. Thus !
he says, I
’■'And although a man devise a chattel real or personal
by his will, yet the executors are bound in law to
pay the debts of the deceased before they pay or
deliver any legacies. And therefore the common law
of the realm is, that the devisees of chattel real
or personal cannot enter upon the legacies, nor
take them without the assignment or delivery of the
executors, or by their assent, or without the assignment or
delivery or assent of one of them; and the reason
is, because the soul of the testator shall not be^
in danger for the nonpayment of his de-bts, etc.."
Moreover, it was on the basis of the principle and for the
purpose of fulfilling the wishes of the deceased, that it 
2
was enacted that an alienation of the deceased's assets
made by even one of the executors "shall be as good and
3
effectual in the law" as if it was made by all the executors.
It should be noted, however, that any act on the part of the 
deceased, which was intended to defeat the bona fide claims
4
of his creditors, was severely deprecated , and in law it has
1. Ibid, (15th edn.,) p.94, sec. 488; or p.214 (of 1642 edn.)
2. 21 Hen. 8. c.4; vide here Richard Burn, The Ecclesiastical 
Law, vol.IV, (8th edn., 1824), pp.33o-332.
3. Ibid., p.332; also E .V.Williams, A Treatise on the Law of 
Executors and Administrators, vol.II, (8th edn., 1879), 
pt.III, book 1, p.9 5o; A.Thomson, A Compendium of Modern 
Equity, (London, 1899), p.211.
4. "By a constitution of Archbishop Stratford, all who shall 
give away or alienate their goods upon their death-beds, 
to defeat their creditors, to their wives and children; 
and all who shall counsel the same, or assist therein, or 
receive the said goods; shall incur the penalty of the 
greater excommunication: and the giver shall not have 
Christian burial." (Lind.161) ;,see R .Burn, op. cit., p.332.
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considered as a fraudulent deed, and hence void and of no 
effect . Any explanation that could be advanced to justify 
this refusal to respect such fraudulent wishes of the deceased 
is likely to have its basis in some moral principles. It 
may, therefore, be concluded that the principles governing 
this branch of English law have their roots in religion 
as well as morality. The wishes of the deceased were to be 
honoured for the benefit of his soul, i.e., provided they 
were morally acceptable. Thus, the development of the law 
on this subject seems to have proceeded along this kind of 
reasoning.
The application of these principles to practical problems,
however, produced certain curious results. It appears that
while ascertaining the real intention of the testator the
Courts of Equity developed a tendency (advantageous to their
own jurisdiction) according to which wills seem to have been
construed so as to charge real estate, by implication for the
benefit of creditors; (such implication, however, may be
afterwards destroyed^). The justification for such construction
seems to come from the court's desire so to construe wills
'for the benefit of creditors, and that men should not sin in 
3
their graves '. The date (1751) should be noted. It was 
only sixteen years before the East India Company acquired 
responsibility for civil justice throughout Bengal, Bihar
4
and Orissa. In a later case , (as in the above referred to), 
the question to be determined by Lyndhurst, L.C., was 'Whether 
this will constitutes a charge upon the jpstator's real estate 
for the payment of his debts.' As far as rhe facts were 
concerned, the material part of the will commenced with these
1. "For the avoiding of fraudulent deeds, ... it is enacted, 
that every such deed or conveyance shall (as against such 
creditors) be void and of none effect." (13 El.c.5); ibid.
2. Thomas v.Britnell, (1751), 2 Ves.Sen. 313, 315.
j
3. So observed Sir John Strange, ibid., p.314.
4. Price v. North, (1841), I Phillips, ch. 85.
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words: "First. I will that all my just debts, funeral expenses, 
and the costs and charges of proving this my will be fully 
paid and satisfied''.1 The testator then devised all his real 
estate to his daughter and her issue in strict settlement; 
and then after giving one specific and one pecuniary legacy 
he gave all the residue of his personal estate (after and 
.subject to the payment of his just debts etc.) to his said 
daughter. According to the Lord Chance.] lor,
"The first direction in the will clearly amounts to 
a charge: that is admitted; but if is only a charge
by implication and may therefore be rebutted, provided 
there be anything to be found in other parts of the 
will inconsistent with the2supposition that such was 
the testator 1s intention".■
3
After referring to Thomas v. Britnell and two other cases, 
he continues,
"Now, what is here relied on for repeiling the 
implication? It is the last clause. But when the 
testator bequeaths his personal estate 'after and 
subject to the payment of his debts', he does nothing 
inconsistent with an intention to charge his real 
estate with them also as an auxiliary fund; and 
therefore, such a direction cannot control the 
operation of the general charges Courts of Equity 
have always been desirous of sustaining such charges 
for the benefit of creditors, and the presumption in 
favour of them is not to be repelled by anything short  ^
of clear and manifest evidence of a contrary intention."
Hence, he declared that the real estates are equitable assets 
instead of legal. It may be observed here that although the 
liability to pay debts of the deceased was originally recognised 
and supported mainly, among other reasons, on. the ground (s 
of 'spiritual profit or benefit of the deceased's soul', the 
real beneficiary emerging from the application of that principle 
was the creditor.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., pp.86-87
3. (1751) 2 Ves. Sen.313
4. 1 Phillips, Ch. 85, 87-88 (My emphasis).
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Legal effects of certain obligations of the deceased:
We have noticed above (see pp.182-183) that the payment of 
debts of the deceased has been given priority over his other 
wishes such as legacies etc., and the executors are, therefore, 
legally bound to follow this course. But. what would be 
the position of an executor or administrator, assuming that 
he is faced with claims arising out of various kinds of 
obligations of the deceased?
We must first note here that any personal contracts for
i
service of the deceased clearly die with him (see pp.184-186 
above) . Yet it has been generally established from very e;arly 
times that a personal claim, such as that on which the testator 
or intestate might have been sued in his life-time, survives 
his death, and is enforceable against his executor or administ­
rator. It is, therefore, cTear that the executors or administ- 
rators are answerable, as far as they have assets of the 
deceased, for debts of every description due from him, either 
debts of record as judgements, statutes or recognizance; 
or debts due on special contracts, as for rent or on bonds, 
covenants and the like, under seal; or debts on simple contracts,
as notes unsealed and promises not in writing, either expressed 
2
or implied . Thus, in general, it is the duty of the deceased's
3
representative to perform his contracts . We are told that,
“Any voluntary bond is good against an executor or 
administrator, unless some creditor be thereby deprived 
of his debt. Indeed, if the bond be merely voluntary,- 
a real debt, though by simple contract only shall 
have the preference: But if there be no debt at all,
1. H.G.Hanbury, Modern Equity, (5th edn., 1949), pt.IV, p.5bo.
2. E.V. Williams, op.cit., vol.II, pt.IV, Book II, pp.1728-29.
3. Ahmed Angullia v. E state and Trust Agency, (1938), A.C.624,
(P.C.), at p.639.
C f . In re Rushbrook's Will Trusts, (1948) 1 Ch.421, 424. ,
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then a bondr however voluntary, must be paid by 
an executor.“1
Thus, a debt created on the basis of some consideration, as
against the one which is based on a mere promise, is given
perference; though even among such debts, a debt which is
incurred by way of giving a bond 'for a wicked consideration'",
i.e., to induce a woman to live in adultery with the deceased
debtor, has been held to be worse than a voluntary one'.
Clearly, it would appear that in such a case as this, the
reason for the postponement is the Immoral as well as illegal
3
nature of the consideration , i.e., purpose.
Apart from this kind of case, it appears that if the 
contracts of the deceased are onerous, his executor or 
administrator should do the best he can for the estate by 
attempting to come to terms ‘with the contractee.
"The test is; could the contractee enforce the 
contract? If so, the representative must not break 
it. If, however, the contract was unenforceable, 
he is entitled, and indeed bound, to take advantage 
of the legal flaw that renders it so, even though 
it involves his taking up a line of defence from 
which he might in his own case, as an honourable man, 
have shrunk."
1. Edwards v. The Countess of Warwick, q. in Lechmere v . 
Carlisle (Earl o f ) , (1733) 3 P.WMS. 211, 222; R.Burn, op. 
cit., p.353; also J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Juris­
prudence , vol.I, (loth edn., 187o), p.4 2o; and also,
"A bond or covenant merely voluntary shall be postponed to 
to simple contract debts which are bona fide owing for 
valuable consideration; but such bond or covenant, if not 
to the prejudice of creditors, must be paid by the executor, 
and in preference to legacies. For a bond or covenant, 
however voluntary, transfers a right in the life-time of 
obligor; whereas legacies arise from the will, which takes effect 
only from the testator's death, and therefore, they ought 
to be postponed to a right created in life-time."
Vide, E.V.Williams, A Treatise on the law of Executors and 
Administrators, (8th edn., 1879), pt.III, bk.II, p.1o19.
2. The Lady Cox's Case, (1734), 3 P.WMS. 339, 341.
3. For, "if such bond had been given to a lawful wife after » 
marriage, this had been a voluntary bond, and void against 
creditors (ante p.222); much more, when given to one who was 
no wife and upon such an illicit consideration." - Ibid.
4. H.G. Hanbury, op.cit., pt. IV, p.56o.
Evidently, though legally a correct way of saving the estate 
of the deceased, it seems contrary to the principles of 
justice, equity and good conscience. Can such acts be 
conducive to the benefit of the soul of the deceased? It 
may be because of this sort of uneasiness in the minds of 
many, that it has even been considered that, "to plead the
i
Statute of Limitation is unconscionable."
Time-barred debts: In view of this feeling, perhaps,
the Courts of Equity have taken a softer line in respect of 
the payment of debts barred by the Statute of Limitation.
Thus, it has been laid down that,
"if one by will subjects his lands to the payment 
of his debts, debts barred by the Statute of Limitation 
shall be paid; for they are debts in equity, and 
the duty remains; the Statute hath not extinguished 
it, though it hath taken away the remedy".
In other words, though the law has prohibited the creditor's
pursuing his right, it has not stopped the testator from
recognising such debts, and thus bringing them out of the
Statute. But if an administrator wanted to plead the Statute
of Limitations, for the purpose of saving the estate of the
3
deceased, the plea would be allowed to stand; though, on 
the other hand, it has been said by the Lord Chancellor 
Hardwicke, that "no executor was compellable, either in law
1. Observed by L.J.Cotton, in re Rownson, (1885), 29 Ch. 0. 358 
at p. 362 (my emphasis).
2. R.Burn, op.cit., p.358;
Also, for a similar view see H. Meggison, A Treatise of 
the administration of Assets in Equity, (London, 1832), 
p.311 .
3. Stratford (Earl of) v. Blakeway, (1727) 6 Brown, 63o, 633. 
Reversing the decree of the Lord Chancellor, the House
of Lords stated, "that the plea should stand for an answer, 
with liberty to except; ... and that the benefit of the 
plea should be saved to the appellant till the hearing 
of the cause".
This point is, however, considered as settled by Lord 
Mansfield who expresses himself thus in Trueman v.Fenton, 
(1777) 2 Cowp. 544, at p.548: - "Though all legal remedy
f.n. continued next page
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or equity, to take advantage of the statute of .limitations
1
against a demand otherwise well founded." Thus, the matter
appears to have been left to the conscience or the sense of
justice of the executor; and in view of this "an executor
may pay a debt proved to be justly due by his testator,
2although barred by the Statute of Limitations." In certain 
cases, however, where the debt has been declared to be barred, 
judicially he must not pay it; for, if he does so, he would
3
be guilty of a devastavit. Also, it would appear that in 
cases of collusion or fraud no one would be allowed to take
4
benefit of this rule ; but there appears to be no reason why 
even an executor or administrator should not be allowed to
t
retain assets for a just debt due to himself. In fact, "the
5right to retain has been lately confirmed."
f.n. continued from last page) may be gone,vthe debts are 
clearly not extinguished in conscience. How far have the 
Courts of Equity gone upon these principles? Where a man 
devises his estate for payment of his debts, a Court of 
Equity says (and a Court of Law in a case properly before 
them would say the same), all debts barred by the Statute 
of Limitations shall come in and share the benefit-, of the 
devise; because they are due in conscience: therefore, 
though barred by lav/, they shall be held to be revived 
and charged by the bequest." The case involved debts 
revived by a bankrupt, and according to him such debts were 
"due in conscience not withstanding he has obtained his 
certificate". (My empasis.)
1. Norton v. Frecker, (1737) 1 ATK. 524, 526; Fry, L.J.,
considered this rule as "an anomaly - a single exception 
and is not to be extended" - see in re Rownson's case, 
op.cit., pp.364-65.
2. E.V.Williams, op.cit., pt.IV, book ii, p.181o.
3. Midgley v. Midgley, (1893) 3 Ch.D.282, 3o7.
4. J.Story, op.cit., vol.2, P.776.
5. E.V.Williams, op.cit., pt.III, book ii, p.1o53; also see, 
Stahlschmidt v.Lett, 1 Sm & Giff. 415; J. Story, op.cit.,
vol.I, p.578.
Before concluding this discussion, it may not be out 
of place to note the significance of the denial of an attempt 
to extend the exception in respect of the time - barred'debts, 
by analogy, to an obligation, verbally undertaken in consider­
ation of marriage: an obligation which is incapable of being
enforced, because it falls within the 4th sec, of the Statute 
of Frauds (29 Car. 2, C.3), which provides that after the 
date therein mentioned no action shall be brought to charge
a debt upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage
1
unless it is evidenced by writing. The attempt failed.
What is important from our point of view is the reasoning
which appears to have led to this failure. Now, we have seen
above that time-barred debts are otherwise good debts and
existing in conscience. Is the nature, therefore, of an
obligation by way of a verbal promise in consideration of
marriage, identical or even similar either at law or in
equity, so as to equate these two liabilities? The Court 
2
thought not. Apparently, the decision seems to have relied 
more on technical than philosophical grounds. However, the 
judges might have been influenced by the argument on behalf 
of the plaintiff-respondent that "an executor may not pay
3
a debt which was incurred pro turpi causa: a debt tainted
by moral turpitude; for such debts have, since early times,
1. In re Rovmson. Field v. White, (1885) 29 Ch.D.358.
2. Bowen, L.J., said, "and if you have a contract which is not 
capable of being enforced either at law or in equity,
I fail to see that a contract of that sort creates a 
debt or liability against the estate of a testator".
Ibid., p .364.
3. Ibid., p .36o.
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1
been proclaimed void. How much the Court valued this argument,
however, is not very clear. According to the law laid down
therein, the representative of the deceased "must not pay
a debt which is irrecoverable'owing to the absence of writing
2
under Section 4 of the Statute of Fraud".
In conclusion, it may be stated that the British judges 
knew the concept or ’benefit of the soul' in relation to the 
deceased's debt-liebility well. They used it, in early days, 
to justify his debt repayment, though to the extent of his 
assets only; thereby saving him from 'sinning in his grave'.
The liability was attached to the property of the deceased.
In the course of time the importance of the concept seems to 
have been left in the background; while the principles, 
developed on the basis of equity and good conscience, in the 
interest of justice, have come to forefront. Thus, the British 
judges disregarded the last will of a testator if it were to 
frustrate the bona fide claims of his creditors. On the other hand
1. In the case of Robinson v.Gee, (1749) 1 Ves.Sen.251,
besides various other assignments, one Samuel had given
a bond upon articles to one Mrs. Hanks. The bond imported 
a direct assignment by the husband of his wife Mrs. Hanks 
(who was herself a party) to the use of Samuel, etc. and 
the question was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to 
be relieved against these claims.
The Lord Chancellor said, "As to this question, if it can be called 
so, of the danands of Mrs.Hanks: it is an extraordinary case, and such, 
as, I hope, never will be again; it is a direct assignment of his wile, 
and is a scandalous prostitution of the law; for the bond looks as vf 
drawn by a lawyer ..., this isa bond • * • ex turpi causa, and 
is infected wTith the turpitude of the articles; so that as 
to the creditors, it must be set aside: as must also the
assignment and bill of sale; which are infected with the 
infirmity of the consideration". - at p.254.
In another case, Winchcombe v.Bishop of Winchester and 
Pulleston, (1617), Hobart, 165, where simony was involved, the
Court said, "All this is spoken as if this were only void 
against the King: but I hold it utterly void even to strangers 
that may take lawful advantage of it; and therefore, note 
the nature of the case, that is contractus ex turpi causa, 
and contra bonos mores, and so it is against law, and void by 
the statute, even between the parties". - at p . 167.
2. H.G. Hanbury, op.cit., at p.56o.
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not all the claims were treated as of one category. These 
were differentiated according to their nature, having regard 
to their origin and purpose in view of moral as well as 
legal rules prevailing at the time. In short, as regards 
the validity of an obligation for the purpose of its enforcement, 
generally the Courts have given more value not to the distant j
spiritual benefits, but to immediate worldly considerations, 
though moral principles have played and are still playing '
their part in the process of shaping the law.
V •5 IMPORT OF THE PHRASE 'ILLEGAL OR IMMORAL1
I
The important phrase 'illegal, or immoral' seems to come 
ultimately from relatively modern understandings of Roman law. 
On the question of validity or otherwise of the juristic acts, 
we find that according to Roman lav;, v
"Though the facts are sufficient to constitute 
a juristic act, the act performed is nevertheless 
null and void if it is either immoral or illegal.
An immoral juristic act, such as a promise to pay 
a reward for an immoral service, is null and void 
in any event. An illegal juristic act is void if 
(as must be assumed prima facie to be the case) it is 
the intention of the law that the prohibited act shall 
be null and void. Thus, if a law absolutely prohibits 
certain marriages, a marriage contracted in contra­
vention of the law is a nullity. The Romans called 
a law of this kind 'lex perfects '. But the lawgiver 
may confine himself to visiting the prohibited act 
with legal disadvantages of another kind, while 
leaving the validity of the act untouched.
That is the case, for example, with a law imposing 
a merely temporary prohibition on certain marriages.
The Romans called a law of this kind 'lex imperfecta1. 
In either case the juristic act is prohibited, but 
whereas a lex perfects is imperative, and is concerned 
with the validity of the act, a lex imperfecta is only 
regulative, and is concerned with the effect of the 
act."1
1. R.Sohm, The Institutes (of Roman Law) , vide here the translatioi 
of J.C.Ledlie, 3rd edn., (Oxford, 19o7), p.2o8.
Also see, M.Kaser, Das Romische Privatrecht, (Munchen,1955), 
pp.216-218, vide here the translation of R.Dannenbring,
Roman Private L a w , (2nd edn., 1968), pp.51-52.
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As regards illegal transactions, evasion of the law, in the 
sense that the words of a statute were respected but its . i
intention evaded, was then prevented: "Such evasion of the 
law was prohibited, some times expressly, some rimes by an
i
extensive interpretation of the prohibiting statute*"
On the other han d } "Acts contra bonos mores (turpia? which 
violated the good ancestral custom (contra bonos mores) , ;
were suppressed by the jurists and the emperors. What 
constituted such violation of the 'boni meres' was decided", 
it is important to note here, "according to the moral standards 
of the people, not according to religious or philosophical 
doctrines."  ^ (My emphasis.) Thus it is clear that the test 
seems to be accordance or otherwise with the prevalent ideas 
about morality at a particular time, and perhaps, in a particular 
region.
\
It will be remembered that the Ecclesiastical Courts in 
the case of executors and administrators, and the Chancery 
Courts in the case of trusts, used to derive their learning 
regarding debts that could not be proved, or unenforceable 
contracts, from Reman Law directly or indirectly. And as we 
have seen above (see pp.191-196), the result was that 'illegal1 
or 'immoral' contracts and conditions were void or voidable, 
but, in either event, would not be enforced. It follows 
that such debts could not possibly be exacted from the 'heir',
i.e., in English law the executor. Also, no trustee could be 
compe lled to pay an illegal or immoral debt; (and if he did 
so, he could be compelled by the legatee or beneficiary to
3
restore the amount personally. ) It is jn this sense that the 
phrase 'illegal or immoral' was understood in English law even
1. Ibid., p .51.
2. Ibid.
3. "An executor or administrator who has wasted or misapplied 
the assets of his testator or intestate is personally 
liable to make good the loss thereby occasioned."
Vide, A.Thomson, op.cit., p.211.
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before it was introduced to describe certain kinds of debts 
in Hindu law. .
It may be noted, however, that " the drafting 
of Roman leges lacked the particularity of that of English 
Statutes." Apart from English law, the terms ’illegal^..:'. —  
and ’immoral* have also been used in other modern laws, 
such as French law and German law, in the context of 
prohibited contracts. Briefly, in these days,
” English law takes the hardest attitude toward 
contracts violating a legal provision, refusing to 
permit intervention by the courts even where the 
violation is of a trifling sort. French law takes 
a less severe attitude,generally permitting mutual 
restitution of performances where the contract is 
void. German law has developed the most flexible 
approach, partly by considering the purpose of the 
prohibitions - and as. a result maintaining the 
validity of some of them - partly by introducing 
the concept o f ’pending invalidity*.
However, the same author continues, " Legal, pro­
in the field of contract are on the increase, 
narrow and severe interpretation'of their effect 
about inequitable results,” and advises further 
investigation of how other legal systems deal with these 
problems.
1. J.A.C. Thomas, • Textbook of Roman L a w ,'( Amsterdam,
New York, Oxford, 1976), p. 246, f.n.72.
For further information a^ , regards the refinement that 
has taken.place in respect., of the application of the 
terms 'illegal'- and 'immordl' in modern English law, 
reference may fruitfully be made to J.C. Smith and 
J.A.C. Thomas, A Casebook on Contracts, 6th edn.,
( London, 1977), pp.531-580.
2. C. Szladits, ' Illegality of Prohibited Contracts: 
Comparative Aspects,' at XXth Century Comparative 
and Conflicts Law,. Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel 
E. Yntema, (Leyden, 1961), pp.221-231, at p.231.
hibitions 
and a too 
may bring
3. Ibid.
Whatever the distinctions between actions brought 
by a party to an illegal and/or immoral contract and ,.•• •' 
actions brought by a third party interested in the subject 
matter of the contract, all the learning, older and more 
modern, on this subject attaches to the defect in 
contractual capacity of the contracting parties themselves 
In our subject the father’s debt might or might not have 
been exigible from him personally during his lifetime, 
yet it might be avyavaharika as regards his sons. We are 
therefore ( vocabulary apart ) in a„different arena of 
thought when we come to the pious obligation. The theme . 
cannot properly be pursued here because we have no 
evidence which debts would be unenforcible against the' 
father in traditional Hindu law on grounds of 
immorality or illegality, for the fact that avyavaharika 
is specially mentioned in our sastric texts strongly . 
suggests an independent criterion.
We may turn now to the last of the concepts 
under discussion : the doctrihe of antecedency.
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V,6 THE DOCTRINE OF ANTECEDENT DEBTS
(A ) The origin, meaning and the s c o p e :
(i) The origin: So far as our purpose is concerned,
suffice it to state that the expression ’antecedent debt1
is well known in Equity and the Law of Trust. Where a trustee,
in breach of trust, transfers trust property to a third person
who pays value for it wjithout notice of the breach of trust,
the transferee, known as a bona fide purchaser, acquires
beneficial ownership and is under no liability to the 
2
beneficiary. The definition of value for this purpose is 
very strict. In general, to be protected, tlie purchaser 
must pay money or money's worth. A promise to pay, the 
discharge of an antecedent debt, or acceptance of the transfer 
as security for an antecedent debt is not sufficient 'value' 
to entitle the purchaser to protection as a bona fide purchaser.
1. For example, the term is used thus: "In view of Courts of 
equity, ..., and cases of such as sale or pledge for an 
antecedent debt of the executor." Vide, J.Story, op.cit., 
vol.I, p.579.
2. "If a bona fide purchaser has no notice, either expressly or 
constructively, he merits the full protection of the court 
and his title cannot be impeached, even in equity, so long 
as notice is brought home to him only after he acquires the 
legal property." Vide, T.Lewin, On Trusts, 16th edn.,
(1 964), p.655; also see, A.Underhill, Lev; of Trust and 
Trustees, 12th edn., (197o), p.681; J.Story, op.cit., vol.I, 
p. 578 . It may be noted here that an almost identical provis­
ion is made in the Indian Law of Trust, for saving of rights 
of certain transferees. Thus, "Nothing in section 63 
entitles the beneficiary to any right in respect of property 
in the hands of - (a) a transferee in good faith for 
consideration without having notice of the trust, either 
when the purchase-money was paid, or when the conveyance 
was executed". Vide, T.V.Sanjiva Raw, The Indian Trusts A c t , 
(Act II of) 1882, (Madras, 191o ), p.289, section 64.
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1
Thus, in Hardingham v.Nicholls, wherein a bill was brought
to be let into possession of an estate, the defendant pleaded
a purchase for a valuable consideration, and that the money
was'paid, or was bona fide secured to be paid. The fact
was, that the consideration-money was never paid, but only
secured to be paid. It has been held there by the Lord
Chancellor, that "the defendant has not paid the money yet,
2
and therefore, as he has notice now of the plaintiff's
title, the m o n e y  he has only secured to be paid, may never
3
be paid, and consequently the plea must be over-ruled."
There is no need for us to go into further details here except 
to note that in order to grasp the above rule, it must be 
seen against the general background of the right of a trustee 
to bind the trust for the payment of antecedent debts of the 
trust; i.e., it is not presumed that he transfers in breach 
of trust if this is his intention. This is sufficient to 
prove that the term 'antecedent debt' already existed in 
Equity and the Law of Trust long before it was brought into, 
or 'discovered', in Hindu Law.
During the early period of the British administration 
of justice in India, when the British judges faced difficulties 
since, on the one hand, they lacked knowledge of Hindu law 
and, on the other hand, the Pandit's assistance in the matter 
gave rise to suspicion and therefore became unreliable, 
obviously they sought enlightenment through the principles of 
justice, equity and good conscience. In the context of the 
Hindu father's alienations of joint family property for the 
payment of his just debts, and his son's liability for the same
1. (1745) 3 ATK. 3o4 = 26 Eng.Rep., 977.
2. Even as regards notice, it has been held, that "denying 
notice of plaintiff's title at the time of the execution 
of the deed, or the payment of the consideration-money, 
is not sufficient; you must swear you had no notice at or 
before the execution. " Fitzgerald v.Burk, ( 1742) 2 ATK 397 .
Also see, Story v.Lord Windsor, (1743) 2 ATK.63o, 
631. = 26 Eng.Rep., 776, pp.776-777.
3. (1745) 3 ATK. 3o4; = 26 Eng. Rep. 977.
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under the doctrine of the pious obligation subject to the 
rule of ‘tainted dents ; and of the need of protecting, in 
appropriate cases, certain alienee’s rights, the main questions 
seemed to them similar to those’ arising in cases involving 
alienations by trustees having beneficial interest in the 
trust-property, for the payment of just antecedent debts of 
the trust. This seems to have led to the introduction of 
the concept of 'bona fide purchaser for value' in Hindu law. 
With it came, cr so it appears, the term 'antecedent debt' 
almost unconsciously, just to describe the father's pre­
existing debts, (see below pp.204-206). So long as the Hindu 
law rule, that the son's liability could be enforced only 
after his father's death - real or civil - was observed, there 
was no serious problem, but as soon as the rule was extended 
so as to apply during the father's life time, this plain term 
turned into 'the doctrine of antecedent debts'. Now, instead 
of helping the bona fide alienee, it was required to go to 
the son's rescue for saving, his birth-right from the clutches 
of his father's suddenly increased power of alienation of the 
joint family property. Let us turn to its new role in Hindu 
law.
(ii) The meaning: In English law, the term 'antecedent
debt' probably meant no more than a just and already existing 
debt other than the cause, the consideration for the transfer 
immediately under discussion; whereas in English Equity 
payment of an antecedent debt as contrasted with the instant 
contract will not support the claim of a bona fide purchaser 
for value without notice against the beneficiaries, in Hindu 
law by contrast the beneficiaries (the sons) are bound if the 
purchaser (the alienee) provides money to pay the father's 
antecedent debt irrespective of the instant contract. This
1. Reference may be made to Musst. Junnuk Kishoree v.Baboo
Raghoonundun Sing, (1861) S .D .A .R e p .213; Girdhari Lall v.Kanto 
La 11 , (1 874) L.R. 1 Ind. Ap.321; Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo
Proshad Singh, (1879) L.R.6 Ind.Ap.88; following Hanooman 
Pershaud's case (1856) 6 M.I.A.393, which was a case of a 
de facto manager (mother as guardian of her minor son).
Also see, J.D.M.Derrett, C.M.H.L., op.cit., p.427.
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is because, unlike an English trustee, a Hindu father's debts 
cannot bind the beneficiaries so as by themselves to constitute, 
a charge. At Hindu law its meaning as well as its application 
caused, eventually, a great controversy-1 
2
In a, case decided in 1861, the tei.m 'antecedent, economy1 
has been used probably to indicate prior liabilities (debts 
etc.) or otherwise of the debtor - the father alienor. Later 
on, after citing this case with approval, their Lordships of 
the Privy Council referred to a previous decision"3 of the Board, 
and while in the course of comparative juxtaposition of these 
two decisions in the context of the son's liability to pay 
his father's debts, observed that the latter decision has 
gone beyond that of the first,
("because it treats the obligation of a son to pay his 
I father's debts, unless contracted for an immoral 
purpose, as affording of itself a sufficient answer 
to a suit brought by a son either to impeach sales by 
private contract for the purpose of raising money 
in order to satisfy pre-existing debts, or to 
recover property sold in execution of decrees of 
Courts;" 4 ■
but immediately following that, in the first proposition that 
they deduced from these two decisions, they seem to replace 
the term 'pre-existing debts' by ‘an antecedent debt'. In 
this sense, therefore, the term 'antecedent debt' would mean 
a debt existing prior to the transaction in question. Literally, 
this may seem to be the correct meaning of the term, but when
1. In this regard reference may be made to:
'The Doctrine of Antecedent debt‘, an anonymous article, at 
A.I.R. 1923 Journal and P.C., pp.7i-8o and 82-88; K.S.Mathur, 
at A.I.R. 1 937 J.& P.C., 49-53;‘ R .K .Ranade, ( 1 953) 55 Bom.
L.R., J., 94-1o2; and (1961) 63 Bom. L.R., J., 81-84;
J.D.M.Derrett, (1955) 18 S.C.J., 139-15o; also see his
I . M . H . L . , cit.above, pp. 275-277 ; ‘Indica Pietas’, cit.above, 
pp.52-56; C .M . H .L ., cit.above, pp.97-1o1; P.V.Kane, H .D h ., 
cit.above, v o l . Ill, p . 45o.
2. (1861) S.D.A. Rep.213, 221; It is argued there, "that as 
purchasers, they could not be required to be prepared with
- proofs of the antecedent economy or good conduct of the owner 
of the estate", (p. 221); also see Hanooman Pershaud's case, op. cit. ,p. 418
3. Girdhari Lall1s ca s e , op.cit.; (1874) L.R. 1 Ind.A p .321.
4. Suraj Bansi Koer's case, op.cit., (1879) L.R.6 Ind.Ap.88, pp.1o5-1o6.
5. Ibid., p .10 6 .
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it came to be construed in relation to other legal concepts.-
and in different circumstances, its meaning seems to have
been variously understood (see below pp. 206-207 ) . However,
the controversy was settled, so far as the meaning is concerned,
by the Privy Council in the case of Brij Narain v.Mangala 
1
Prasad. According to the definition there, "Antecedent 
Debt means antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to 
say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part 
of the transaction impeached. T o  this, in itself, there 
appeared no objection.
(iii) The scope: When its scope came under scrutiny,
however, different High Courts in India, and even the Privy 
Council, seem to have differed. For the understanding of
3
this difference of opinion, one must see the term 'antecedent
debts' in the context of the powers of a Hindu father to bind
his male issue under the doctrine of the Pious Obligation,
especially in its extended boundaries in view of the principle
of 'bona fide' alienee's equitable rights. Thus, seen in this
context, the above definition may mean an indebtedness of the
father prior in time to, and independent in origin of, the
particular transaction of joint family property, whether by
way of sale, mortgage or other disposition which is sought
4to be enforced against the male issue. In this context, 
therefore, "according to Madras and Allahabad rulings, it 
referred to a debt which existed prior to the date of sale or 
mortgage, and not to a debt incurred at the time of the sale 
or mortgage;" ... and "according to Bombay and Calcutta 
decisions, a debt, though not existing prior to the date of
1. (1923) 26 Bom. L.R.5oo (P.C.).
2. Ibid., p.5o8, (proposition iv, per Lord Dunedin). The 
words are slightly differently reported in different 
reports: see (1923) 51 I.A.129; 46 All.95; A.I.R.1924 P.C.5o.
3. As regards the position at the English law, see p.199 
above where we have referred to trustee's powers.
4. R.K.Ranade, op.cit., at p.95, has given almost identical 
definition.
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sale or mortgage, was recognised as an antecedent debt, if 
it was put into litigation in a subsequent suit." The latter 
view is apparently in conflict with the strict construction 
of the above definition of the Privy Council. But even the 
Privy Council seemed uncertain as to the proper function
9 —
of this doctrine.'- In fact, the abrogation of the sastric 
Hindu law injunction regarding the application of the ^on's 
pious obligation (i.e., only after the father1s death as 
referred to above), itself produced this dilemma. Thus, in
3
a suit of 1861, brought on behalf of a minor son during his 
father's life-time, to recover joint family property from the 
father's various alienees, it was held that the Court would 
not interfere with the sales, which had "taken place by the 
intervention of the Courts for debts, which, though caused
4
by extravagance, were such as a son would be liable for."
Thus, the intervention of the court in conjunction with the
5
son's inability to prove "the invalid nature of the debts"
seems to have been the first cause of by-passing the old
Hindu Law rule (while this happened, incidently, the sastric
rule was not invoked here). Afterwards in 1874, it was
emphasized by the Privy Council, in Girdhari Lall v.Kantoo
Lall, "that the fact that the father alienor is alive is 
1 ^
irrelevant." Thus, the sastric rule was brushed aside for
1. Ibi d .
2. In Sab u Rainachandra v.Bhup Singh (1917) I.L.R.39 All .437 
(P.C.); The Privy Council speaks of this doctrine as having 
arisen from the necessity of protecting the rights of third 
persons, but in Brij Narain's case (op.cit.), the doctrine 
has been described by their Lordships of the P.C. as a part 
of the doctrine of Pious Obligation.
3. Musst. Junnuk Kishoree's case, op.cit., (1861) S.D.A.Rep.213.
4. Ibid., p .222.
5. Ibid.. It may be noted here that in the case of Hanooman- 
Persaud Panday v .Musst.Babooee, (1856) 6 M.I.A.393, the
liability of the ancestral estate was held to depend on the 
nature of the debt. But in that case the father was dead.
6. (1874) L.R.1 I.A.321.
7. Ibid., pp.33o-331; also see, J .D.M.Derrett, at (1955)
18 S.C.J., op.cit., p . 141.
the purpose of protecting the bona fide alienee’s equitable 
1
interest. What was not realized, it seems at the time, 
was the direct effect of the logical extention of this 
protection on the birthright of the Hindu son.
It could be aigued that the presence of the sastric rule 
might have affected the father and his creditors as alienees, 
both psychologically as well as in practice, as a deterrent,
(a) because, the father would have known, then, that it would 
be he himself, in the first place, who would have to pay his 
personal debts and, therefore, he would have been more cautious 
in his borrowings; and (b) the would-be money-lender or an 
alienee of the father, too, would have thought twice before 
parting with his money, as he would have known that he could 
not have easy access to the joint family property, in case 
the loan was meant for the father's personal purposes, until 
the death, real or civil, of his debtor. He could have lawful 
access to the joint family property, provided the money lent 
was for a just purpose of the joint family. Otherwise, however 
the suggested legal position would have made him behave careful 
in all his dealings with any Hindu father.
It could be argued that this would have hampered the 
father's creditworthiness in the money-market. But what would 
his credit facility be for? It would appear that the argument 
is misleading, for it ignores the fact that he was free tc 
alienate the whole joint family property, if he did so only 
in the interest of a recognisable family need or benefit. 
However, creditors could be Muslims or Christians, and the 
internal logic of the Hindu family law did not bind them - 
and in a poly-communal country the attraction towards legal 
liberty was overwhelming. The question of the credit-facility 
is of relative importance even today, depending upon the 
facts of each case.
1'. Girdhari Lall's case, cited above, 
(1874) L.R. 1 I.A.321, at p.332.
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Then again, one might sympathise with a bona fide
creditor or alienee, assuming that he was tricked into the
transaction by a clever father. Hindu law does not admit, 
directly or by implication, any kind of cheating by the 
father, and therefore, one would imagine, that it would
not condone such dealings. In this sense, if the Court had
attempted to protect, in appropriate cases, such innocent 
alienees, even in the absence of any express Hindu law rule 
to that effect, cne would have hardly disagreed with it. 
xlfter all, Hindu law does, like English law, admit of 
exceptions.
The fact is, however, that the process, which began for 
the benefit or protection of bona fide alienees, has unmistak­
ably resulted into making it possible to enforce his father's 
debts against the son from the moment he incurred the liability; 
thus exposing the whole joint family property for disposal 
by the father almost at will. Out of this situation arose 
the above-mentioned difference of opinion. In some quarters, 
it was hoped, evidently, to put some brake on the father's 
power of alienation and to salvage something of the son's 
birthright. It is to this end that the doctrine of antecedent 
debt is supposed to work.
(B) Its p lace in modern Hindu law: Its place depends
obviously upon its utility in view of the function it has 
been assigned to perform. In the present situation, technicality 
rather than substance seems to have assumed the greater import­
ance. True, there cannot be legal liability of the son unless 
an untainted debt of the father is already in existence.
In view of this,- it has been rightly said in respect of 
mortgages that "strictly and accurately no mortgage can be 
enforced against the family unless it was granted by the 
manager either for legal necessity or for the benefit of the
1. J.D.M.Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', cit.above, p.54.
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family or, alternatively, for the payment of an antecedent
debt binding on the coparceners under the pious obiigation."
Thus, when the doctrine of antecedent debt was applied to
determine the son's liability particularly in respect of
2mortgages, it is well-known that serious problems arose.
Thus one is at a loss to understand the anomalous situation 
created by this doctrine, in which a creditor with the security
3
of a mortgage has been placed in a position worse than that
of a creditor who has advanced a loan only on the father's
personal covenant; for, as against the latter, the former
is obliged to institute a suit, first, to establish the
father's liability, and then to enforce it. Obviously, this
4has startled many. One wonders whether there is any ether
legal system in which a secured creditor is c o m p a r a t i v e l y
worse off than an unsecured one. Now, in order to mitigate
5 \this situation, the Supreme Court seems to have suggested 
a compromise, the success of which depends entirely on the 
son's failure (or unwillingness) to challenge the mortgage;
£ for, if he so fails, in,/view of the Court, then he cannot 
prevent the sale, once the mortgage decree has been passed.
If the sons become so charitable, presumably, as the Supreme 
Court expects them to be, then of what use is this doctrine?
With respect, it must be pointed out here that the suggestion 
seems more of a pious nature than a practical one. Besides, 
there have been other suggestions to the effect that the
1. J.D.M.Derrett, C .M .H .L , op.cit., p.98; also see n.2 there 
for the authorities on the point.
2. Reference may be made to J .D .M .Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', 
op.cit., p.54; R.K.Ranade, at (1953) 55 Bom. L.R.,J., 94, 
99-1oo; K.S.Mathur, op.cit., pp.5o-51; J.D.M.Derrett, at 
(1955) 18 S.C.J., op.cit., pp.142-143; also see his C .M .H .L ., 
op.cit., pp.98-99; I .M .H .L ., op.cit., pp.276-277.
3. "The debt secured by a mortgage was not antecedent to that 
same mortgage, and therefore, that mortgage itself conferred 
no rights over the interests of the sons." Vide J .D .M .Derrett, 
'Indica Pietas', op.cit., p.54; also see the authorities 
cited there in f.n.43 & 44.
4. R.K.Ranade, op.cit., p.99.
5. In the case of Faqir Chand v.Sardarni Harnam Kaur, A.I.R. 
1967 S.C. 727 at p. 731.
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doctrine of 'antecedency1 should be abolished, either
1 2 completely or partially, so far as it applies to mortgages.
Now, the suggestion that 'antecedency' should be completely
abolished, while .the doctrine of Pious Obligation is applicable
during the father's life-time, is to say, by implication,
that the sons' birthright need not be protected, for any
alienation of the father could carry away their interest.
Thus, this suggestion would make sense only if we decided to
disregard the son's birthright or, alternatively, if we
brought back the old sastric rule that the son's pious duty
commenced only after his father's death.! real or civil. The
second suggestion, on the other hand, appears to aim at
avoiding unnecessary litigation, ana to that extent is useful.
3
Howevep, the example cited there does not necessarily represent 
the usual situation. Whether the father takes money first 
or after giving security will remain a question of fact. 
Generally, the intensity of the father's want or need vis-a-vis 
the lender's advantage would determine who imposes his will 
on the other party; and, in most cases, it is the money-lender. 
Unless the security is given first he would not normally lend 
money. So, the presumption could not always be in favour of 
the alienee. If that be the case, then, to eliminate the 
facility of postponing the alienee's claim is likely to do 
more harm to the son's interest.
1. I.Bhaumik, at Law Quarterly (Calcutta), vol.6, No.2 (1969), 
p. 128 ff.
2. J.D.M.Derrett, C.M.H.L., op.cit., p.1oo, n.1o
3. "When sons challenge an alienation ... he owed no money 
to anyone! But in this case the father first becomes 
indebted (when he takes the money) and then alienates 
... ". Vide, ibid., p.1o1.
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In conclusion, however, it may be paid that this 
discussion proves how Hindu law is affected by doctrines 
such as 1 antecedent debts1. The same appears to be true 
in respect of the concepts of 'benefit to the debtor's soul1 
and 'immoral or .illegal debts' (see the following chapter). 
In fact, "the common law of England, with its statutory 
modifications and the doctrines of the Bi'itish courts of 
equity, has deeply coloured and influenced she laws and 
the system of judicial administration" of India.
1. M.C.Setalvad, The Common Law in India, (Bombay, 197o), p.1.
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CHAPTER VI
t h e "c o n c e p t  o f  a v y a v a h a r i k a  d e b t s  a s  d e v e l o p e d  t h r o u g h
JUDGE-MADE LAW
V I . 1 Genera],
V I .2 The meaning of the term avyavaharika
V I .3 The extent of the concept of avyavaharika debts
VI.3.1 Cases involving debts arising out of borrowing or 
imprudent transactions of the father
(i) Debts due to the 
indulgences
father's
(ii) Commercial debts ....
(iii) Debts due to fines
(iv) Debts on account of costs
V I .3.2 Debts arising out of certain objectionable conduct 
or acts of the father
(i) Cases involving acts of the father simply 
to hurt others
(ii) Cases involving the father's acts leading to 
some benefit to him or the the joint family 
at the cost of others
(a) Cases involving mesne profits
(b) Cases involving misappropriation of 
other's property
i
(i) Criminal misappropriation or theft case
(ii) Cases of misappropriation where the 
father's liability has been treated 
as a breach of trust or civil duty
VI.3.3 Cases on time-barred debts.
V I .4 Modern uncertainties concerning the concept of 
avyavaharika debts
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V I . 1 GENERAL
V  We have already discussed (see above chapter IV, p p . 153— 
175) the sastric position of the concept of avyavaharika debt, 
as understood by commentators and modern scholars. Now we 
shall enquire into its treatment by the courts.
It may not be out of place, however, to note that after 
a certain knowledge of some sastric texts, commentaries and 
digests on the Hindu law, and through their experience of 
the Pandits' opinions^, the British judges in India (as well 
as the scholars of the time) seemed to conclude that the lav; 
lacked^ certainty (see above pp.179-180).
To ascertain the principles of Hindu law, therefore,
F.W.Macnaghten said,
\
"We ought in our decisions, to be guided by those 
rules, which are most consistent with its general 
tenor, which have been preferred to others, by the 
most of their commentators, and which appear to 
be most rational in themselves. We shall then by 
a series of adjudications give consistency to the  ^
law, and leave the rights of a people unmolested."
According to him, "nothing but an ascertainment of the law,
4
can prove a corrective of this evil." This ideal, it would
1. The Privy Council, in 1861, said "where an opinion, apparently 
discordant from works of current and established authority,
is delivered by Pandits, it must not be taken on their 
authority to be a correct exposition of the law. They 
should be questioned further as to authorities, usage and 
generally received opinions." - The Collector of Masulipatam 
v. Cavaly Vencatta Narainpah, (1865) 2 Suth. W.R. 61, (P.C.).
2. "I apprehend that the Hindu Law, in its pure and original 
state, does not furnish many instances of uncertainty or 
confusion. The speculation of commentators have done much 
to unsettle it, and the venality of the Pandits has done 
more." - W.H. Macnaghten, Principles and Precedents of 
Hindu Law, vol.1, cit.above, preliminary remarks, p.IV
3. Considerations on Hindoo Law, cit.above, preface, pp.XI-XII.
4. Ibid.
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appear, remained the directive principle throughout the
1British Period. Bearing this desire of tne courts in mind, 
let, us investigate how the judges construed and applied the 
concept of avyavaharika debt. We may, then, be able to 
explain its modern significance and predict its likely future.
VI •2 THE MEANING OF THE TERM AVYAVAHARIKA 
2
H .T .Colebrooke translated the term na vyavaharikam as 
"for a cause repugnant to good morals" to which we have 
already referred above (see p. 160) along with its other 
renderings. But we may note the early date of his translation,
3
i.e., c. 1796, though it was published in 1801.
i
Now, it would appear that this rendering was sufficient
i
for administering Hindu law on the subject, for the meaning
of this term did not come up directly for judicial pronouncement
4
until the case of Durbar v. Khachar.
5
The courts had recognized the son's liability to pay his 
father's debts, but, on the other hand, they were also aware 
of the rule that "should a father contract one for the purchase 
of spirituous liquors, or debauchery, or other improper
g
objects, it is not obligatory on the son" . (My emphasis).
1. "Our principle is simply this - uniformity when you can have 
it, diversity when you must have it, but in all cases, 
certainty." T .B .Macaulay's view, q.by W.Stokes, The Anglo- 
Indian Codes, cit.above, at p.X cf the general introduction.
2. He was himself a judge of Mirzapcre, resident at the court of 
Berar, (see the front page of his Digest, cit.above), and 
subsequently for long a judge of the Sadar Dewani Adalat,
and a great scholar.
3. Ibid., preface, p.XXV.
4. (1908) I.L.R. 32 Bom. 348.
5. A.H.Mahomed v.J.Seat Cossaul Chund, (1779) Mort.Montr.272.
6. Timmarah v.Veneapah, (1807), vide T.Strange, Hindu Law, II, 3rd edn., 
(Madras, 1859), p.456. Here, the son of an insolvant debtor was held 
liable to pay the decretal debt which was not one excepted by the Hindu Lav
It may be noted here that it appears from the case of Nhanee v .
Hureeram Dhooluba, (1814) 1 Bor. 95, that the Courts were aware of all 
the other excepted debts which the sastrakaras have enumerated elsewhere. 
See, note there at p.101 wherein "the balance of debts, etc." is mentioned.
The full quote runs as follows, "The balance of a debt contracted for 
Liquor, Sexual intercourse, or Gambling; a Fine; the amount of a toll, 
(Shoolk); and a gift; and 'Vrithu Dan' that is money promised to Swindlers, 
such debt of his Father, a son shall not pay." - Keshow Rao Diwakur v .
N.J. Patunkur, (1822) 2 Bor. 194, 200.
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Subject to the Pandit's intention, the term 'other improper 
objects' mjght be taken here to point to eitner the remaining 
listed debts or avyavaharika debts. But, assuming that he 
intended to state both the listed debts by naming only two 
of them illustratively, as well as the residuary category, 
then the term 'improper objects' mighc represent the term 
avyavaharika, meaning thereby the debts incurred for improper 
purposes. It is not clear, however, what should be understood 
by 'improper purposes'. Once again, if the choice of the 
debts for spirituous liquors and debauchery is viewed as 
indicative of the nature of the rest of the debts, then 
improper purposes might have some reference to despised and / 
or immoral debts.
Later, in the case of Musst. Junnuk Kishoree Koonwur v .
i
Baboo Rughoonundun, the Court was prepared, it seems, to
hold, if proved by the strongest and most reliable evidence
2
as to the particular nature of the dissipation of the debtor 
(father), that the son was not liable for his father's debts, 
incurred for the satisfaction of his dissipations, as being 
repugnant to good morals. But, as there was no mention of 
any particular nature of dissipation, which might have explained 
the phrase 'being repugnant to good morals', the case hardly 
throws any further light on the meaning of the term avyavaharika .
1. (1861) S.D.A.R. (L.B*)213.
2. The Couit observed, "all dissipation tends to extravagance, 
but ,al] extravagances are not caused by dissipation repugnant 
to good morals in the Hindoo sense of the term." Ibid, p.220.
This was a case of various debts and consequent sales of 
ancestral property by the father for his extravagant living, 
though no connection between his debts and immorality was 
proved. The property sold was of a value far beyond the 
amounts of decrees, and many alienations were made for very 
small considerations as against actual value of the properties 
There was not any legal necessity. Most of the alienees 
knew or were in position to know actual family circumstances 
as well as the father - alienor's habits.
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This decision ma!<es it clear, however, that mere 
extravagance as such does not amount to a purpose repugnant
i
to good morals, though the debts contracted "as an act of
2
reckless extravagance or of wanton waste" might be construed
3
as an unjust debt, and hence avyavaharika. The Privy Council
4
has repeated],y cited, with approval, ti" e above decision of 
the Sudder Diwanee Adaulat, and perhaps, as a result of this 
convincing decision it seems to have accepted the interpretation 
as given therein'' of the phrase 'repugnant to good morals1. 
Having regard to that decision, however, the Privy Council 
observed that,
1. Ibid., p.220, also see Beer Persad v.Doorga Persad, (1864), 
extra vol., Suth, W.R. 310.
2. Devi Pitta v. Saudagar Singh, (1900) 35 Punj. Records, No.65, 
p.291, at p.296 (F.B.). v
3. Ibid., "the words 'just debt1 mean a debt which is actually 
due, and which is not immoral, illegal, or opposed to public 
policy. It also means a debt not contracted as an act of 
reckless extravagance or of wanton waste or with the intention 
of destroying the interests of reversioners." (My emphasis). 
C.f Sardari Mai v.Khan Bahadar Khan, (1899) 34 Punj. Record 
No. 11, p.56; at p.65 a definition of a just debt is given.
It is said to be
"one which (1) is really due and (2) has been 
contracted for a purpose other than immoral or 
forbidden by law7 or opposed to public policy, and 
(3) can be recovered from his person or property 
generally".
And further at p.66 - If a creditor has knowingly advanced 
money "for acts of wilful and wanton waste and reckless 
extravagance, ... the debt due to him cannot be called
a just debt."
4• See Glrdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall, (1 b74 ) 1 I .A . 321 , 332;
Suraj Bunsl Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh, (1879) 6 I.A. 88, 
pp. 104-105.
5. Musst. Junnuk Kishoree's case, cit.above,
at p.220; also at p.222, it is stated that to succeed 
the son must prove that the debts were "immoral, and such 
as under Hindoo law, the son would not be liable for."
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"it was necessary for the son, in order to 
set aside the sale of property for the purpose 
of paying the father's debts, to show that the 
debt was illegal or contracted for an immoral 
purpose."/ (My emphasis).
Thus, the well-known phrase 'illegal or immoral1 in the 
Hindu law of debts, might have come into being as a result 
of this construction. And, since then, though the expression 
was doubtless originally meant to render avyavaharik a , it has 
come to be used as a compendious term to cover all the cases 
in the smrtis.^
Although a definition of avyavaharika was not agreed upon, 
this lack of definition, characteristically, did not prevent 
Courts from deciding whether or not a particular debt was 
tainted and so irrecoverable or not. In view of their limited
understanding, the debts of the father incurred, for example,
3 4by way of grossly extravagant expenses, fraud, mis-appropriat
1. Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall, cit.above, (p213,f.n.4) at 
p.332. Obviously, the term 'illegal' represents such debts 
as 'under Hindoo Law, the son would not be liable for1, 
referred to in the above f.n.5. Now, as there is no 
mention of any enumerated debts, in the Sudder Diwanee 
Adulat's case, this phrase could not be construed as 
representing those debts. If this is so, then it may be 
taken to mean various debts which would come under 
avyavaharika category, save immoral debts. In this 
sense, Knight, J.'s observation that "it is this word 
(i.e., avyavaharika) that has crept into our text books 
unaef the guise, or disguise, of 'illegal or immoral'
(my emphasis,) might be correct. (See Durbar v.Khachar, 
cit.above, (p.211 , f .n.4 ) , at p. 351). On the other hand, 
the term 'illegal' is apparently capable of meaning all the 
excepted debts, in a sense, including listed debts, for 
according to Hindu Law, they are illegal debts.
2. J .D .Mayne, Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 11th e d n .,
(Mad., 1950), p.399.
3. Sita Ram v.Zalim Singh, (1886) I.L.R. 8 All. 231, the son 
was held liable because the evidence did not establish 
that the father has wasted the money for immoral purposes.
4. Shah Wajed Hossein v. Baboo Nanku Singh, (1876) 25 Suth.W .R .
311, the debt incurred for meeting liability arising out of 
the father's fraud (leasing his principal's. property without 
authority) was held to be binding on the son.
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1 2 ion of other's property, decrees of the Courts for damages,
1 4
mesne profits," interest and costs, or even imprudent trans-
5 6actions, , and time-barred debts, v/ere variously construed,
1. Mahab.Tr Prasad v. Basdeo Singh, (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 234 ; 
Pareman Pass v. Bhattu Mahtcn, (1897) I.L.R. 24 All. 6 72; 
Mc-Dowell v. Ragava Chetty, (19C4) I . L . R . 27 M a d . 71:
- criminal misappropriation, hence sons were held not liable. 
But, in Natasayyan v. Ponnusamt, (1893) I.L.R. 16 Mad.99;
Kanemar v. Krishna Chariya, (1908) I .L .R . 31 M a d .161; and
Erasala v. A.R. Chetty, (1908) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 4 72; - sons 
were held liable, for the debts were considered to be 
mere breach of a civil duty.
2. Jai Kumar v. Gauri Nath, (1906) I.L.R. 28 All. 718; -
a promissory note given by the father to satisfy bona fide 
decree. It was contended that the promissory note was given 
for strifling prosecution. It was not proved. The son was 
held liable.
But in Kartar Singh v. Harjhimal, (1879) Punj. Records No. 
128; p.282, the father had stolen and converted to his own 
use certain property belonging to a third 'person, who sued 
and obtained a decree against him for the value of the 
property.
The son objected to its execution, but the Court ruled that 
it was impossible to hold that a debt created by a decree 
is a debt contracted for an illegal or immoral purpose, 
merely because the act from which the obligation to compens­
ation arose was an illegal or immoral act. The son was held 
to be liable for the debts.
In view of the later decision (see f.n.2-5 atp.217 b e l o w ) 
this decision seems to have gone too far, though it seems 
to be in keeping with the views of the orthodox Hindu Court 
of c. 1677; see below p.227 f.n. 1.
3. Peary Lai v. Chandi Charan, (1906) 11 C.W.N.163; the father
had wrongfully possessed land, hence the decree for possession 
and mesne profits against him. The son was held liable.
4. In Musst. Nanomi Babuasin v. Nodun Mohun, (1885), 13 I.A.1,
the liability arose out of a loan; but mesne profits, interest 
and costs also were involved. The Judicial committee observed 
(at p.19) that "whichever it was, they think the High Court 
are clearly right in holding that it must be taken as a
joint family debt." Son was held liable.
5. In Khalilul Rahman v.Gobind Pershad, (1893) I.L.R, 20 Cal.
328, the father incurred debts which were neither for 
necessity nor illegal or immoral, though they were of 
imprudent or unreasonable character, and it was held that
a pious duty of the son attaches to them under the mitaksara 
law.
Also see "mere imprudence on the part of the borrower does 
not bring the debts in the category of avyavaharika debts."
- Rajeshwar v. Mangniram, A.I.R. 1933 Nag. 89, at p. 92.
6. Narayansami v. Samidas, (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad 293; Here,
though the debt of the father, secured by promissory note, 
had been declared barred by limitation, it was held that 
the son was bound to pay it.
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without going into the exact meaning of the term avyavaharika .
ThJ c brings ns to the first judici al rendering of the 
term avvavdharika. Thus, Knight, J. has translated it as
i
"unusual, or not.sanctioned by law or custom." In the
view of Mockerjee, J. "the term vyavaharika m a y  be accurately
2rendered as equivalent to lawful, usual or customary."
Sadashiva Ayyar, J. has said,
'•'If I might venture upon giving my own translation 
of the expression avyavaharika, I would paraphrase 
an avyavaharika debt as a debt which is not 
supportable as valid by legal arguments and on 
which no right could be established in the creditors' 
favour in a court of justice."3
According to v/enkatasubba Rao, J. the right meaning of the
4
word may be said to be "grossly immoral or flagrantly unjust", 
while in the view of the Allahabad High Court, an element of
1. Durbar v. Khachar, cit.above, (p.2l1,n.4 ) at p.351. This
definition did, however, not find approval in later cases 
of the same high court: Ramakrishna v.Narayan, (1915)
I.L.R. 40 Bom. '126, (debts due to trade, carried in contra­
vention of Government Servants' conduct rules, 1904).
Hanamant Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji, (1918) I.L.R. 43 B o m .
612, (breach of civil duty); Bal Rajaram v. Maneklal, (1931)
I.L.R. 56 Bom. 36, (a case of debts due to recklessly or 
imprudently managed trade); sons were held liable.
2. Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad, (1911) I.L.R. 39 Cal.
862 , 86 8.
3. Venugopal Naidu v. Ramanadhan Chetty, A.I.R. 1914 M a d . 654, 
655; ~ (1912) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 458, 460; also see Mohammad 
Ali v . Jhao L a i , A.I.R. 1928 Oudh. 1o; cf, Sardari Mai y.
Khan; Bahadur Khan, cit.above, (p.213, f.n.3).
In the view of the Nagpur High Court, "the word avyavaharika 
does not merely comprise debts which are illegal or immoral 
only, but all debts which the court regards as inequitable 
or unjust in point of Hindu Law to make the son liable." 
Rajeshwar v. Mangniram, A.I.R. 1933 Nag. 89, 91.
But Nagpur High Court agreed, in this case (see p.91,
C. 1-2) with this definition of Sadashiva Ayyar, J.
4. Ramsubramania v. Sivakami, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 841, at p.843.
For the facts see below p. 222.
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criminality may make a debt avyavaharika,. * being repugnant
to good m o r a l s /  But Beaument, C.J. has defined it as
4
"illegal, dishonest or immoral." Lastly, in Hemraj v. Khem 
TV 5Chap', Sir Madhavan Nair, delivering the judgement of the 
Judicial Committee{ says,
"having regard to the principles underlying the 
rule of 'pious obligation1, which forms the 
foundation for the son's l i a b i l i t y , 6 their 
Lordships think that the translation of the 
term avya'/aharika as given by Colebrooke makes 
the nearest approach to the true conception of 
the term as used in the smrti text, and may well 
be taken to represent its correct meaning. In 
their Lordships' view, the term does not admit 
of a more precise definition".^
1. Jagannath v. Jugal Kishore, (1926) I.L.R. 48 All. 9.
For further details, see ‘below p. 228.
2. Widya Wanti v. Jai Dayal, A.I.R. 1932 Lah. 541;
Bai Mani v. Usafali, (1931) 33 Bom. L.R. 130; Toshanpal 
v. Dist. Judge of Agr a , (1934) I.L.R. 56 All. 548 (P.C.); 
Suraji v. Ratanlal, (1943) 47 C.W.N.266.
3. Brij Behari Lai v. Phunni Lai, A.I.R. 1938 All. 377;
Garuda Sanyasayya v. Nerella Murthenna, (1918) 35 M.L.J.
661, 633.
4. Govindprasad v. Raghunathprasad, I.L.R. 19 39 Bom.533 
(F.B.): at p. 543 or see (1938) 41 Bom. L.R. 589 (F.B.).
5. (1 943) L.R. 70 I.A. 171 .
6. "The pious obligation ofthe son to pay his father's debts
... is confined to debts contracted for moral purposes." 
Jettyapa v. Laximaya, Bom. H.C. unreported printed 
judgements, vol. V, (1881-83), 579, at p.581. The present 
position is "if the debts are not vyavaharika or are 
avyavaharika the doctrine of Pious Obligation cannot be 
invoked". Luhar v. Doshi, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 964, 96 6;
also see Jakati v. Borkar, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 282, 287.
Also see above, Chapter I, pp.46-51.
7. Hemraj v. Khem Chand, cit.above (see f.n. 5) at p.178.
The Supreme Court's observations appear to affirm this 
position: Luhar v. Doshi, cit.above, (see f.n.6) , at
p. 966 , para 8; Jakati v. Borkar, cit.above, (see f.n.6)
at p.286, para 9; also e e , Loganathan v. Ponnuswami, A.I.R. 
1969 Mad.15; State v.Mohan Lai, A.I.R. 1971 Raj.318 p.320. 
Also, J .D .M.Derrett, I.M.H.L., cit.above, p.314; N.R. 
Raghavachariar, Hindu Law, 6th edn., cit.above, p.346; 
J.D.Mayne, Treatise on Hindu Law and usage, 11th edn., cit. 
above, p.39 9; F.D.Mulla, Principles of Hindu L a w , 13th edn., 
cit.above, p.351, also L .J.Manjrekar, 'Avyavaharika debts'
at(1947) 19 Bom.L.R.,J., 3 at p.5.
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Thus, this mere statement of what the Courts have meant by 
the term avyavaharika debt brings us back to our starting 
point, and this appears to be the present position.
Obviously one wonders why the Courts differed from 
Colebrooke's definition in the first place. In view of the 
fact that they did differ, it would be unrealistic to suppose 
that now they are satisfied with his rendering. However, 
if we examine the causes that led to various definitions 
and interpretations of this term avyavatarika , we may be 
able to grasp its proper meaning as well as its scope.
It may be noted in the first place that we are not 
concerned here only with the laymen’s understanding of the 
word avyavaharika, but we are interested in its import from 
the standpoint of excepted debts in connection with religious 
and moral liability of a Hindu son. The definition that may 
be arrived at by the Courts is expected, therefore, to take 
into account on the one hand, the religious and moral nature 
of the liability, and on the other hand the intention of the 
sastras, in excluding these debts from the son's pious 
obligation to pay them.
In this context, it seems quite clear from the cases, 
referred to above (pp. 211-17) that those debts which are tainted 
with moral turpitude would generally be regarded as avyavaharika. 
According to the sastras the merits and demerits may be shared 
among the father and his sons. But as far as the repayment 
of excepted debts is concerned, it is clearly stated that it 
is not the son's responsibility, (see above pp.60-64). By 
implication therefore, in view of the sastras, any payment 
by the son of such debts might not confer any spiritual benefit, 
which is the main purpose of the son's liability. Considering 
this as the correct position, any construction of the term 
avyavaharika debt, which would not conform to this view, might 
lack the sanction of Hindu law. Let us examine the cases
1. For in spite of this approval, the A.P.High Court has 
produced yet another rendering of the term; see below, 
p . 254 , f . n . 1
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on this subject.
1
In Durbar v. Khachar the plaintiff had obtained a decree
against the defendant's father for damages to the plaintiff's
property, caused by a dam created by the latter which
obstructed the passage of water thereto. On the latter's
death the decree was sought to be enforced against his son
with respect to the ancestral estate in the hands of the son.
According to the lower Appeal Court the act of the father
was 'illegal, wrongful and malicious', and conferred no benefit
upon the ancestral estate. The High Court accepted the
findings, but treated the act as no more or less than a civil
wrong. ' In view of the facts of the case and in the context 
1 2of the texts cited, the definition of avyavaharika given by
i 3 4 *Knight, J. appears to comprise the enumerated debts, besides
all improper ones. This is evident when he says,
"put into simple English, the texts amount to this: 
that the son is not to be held liable for debts 
which the father ought not, as a decent and 
respectable man, to have incurred. He is answerable 
for the debts legitimately incurred by his father: 
not for those^attributable to his failings, follies 
or caprices."
1. Durbar v. Khachar, cit.above, (p.211,f.n.4 ) at p. 350.
2. Brhaspati, XI.51; Usanas quoted in the Mitaksara on Yajn.
11.48, (according to others Yajn. 11.47, see above p.61).
It may be noted here that the actual wording used in
J.Bhattacharya's Hindu L a w , 2nd edn., (Cal. 1 893) at p. 247 
differs from that which is quoted in this case. There Usanas' 
sloka is translated as follows: "A fine or the balance of a 
fine, ..., are not to be paid by the son, neither shall
he discharge debts improper (not sanctioned by law or custom)
The words in the bracket are missing in Knight, J . ’s quote, 
but his definition includes them. Thus, in fact, he has 
merely reproduced Mr. Bhattacharya’s rendering .. - see 
Durbar's case, op.cit., p.351.
3. It may be noted here that the other judge on the Bench -
Mr. Justice Chandavarkar was himself an eminent Hindu lawyer 
and scholar, who has agreed to this definition.
4. But according to Wassoodew, J., "the application of the rule 
of ejusdem generis would be out of place in view of the fact 
that the rule containing the exception in question purports 
to assimilate the views of the different Smrti writers in
a compendious form". - Govindprasad v .Raghunathprasad, cit. 
above, (p.217, f.n.4 ), at pp.547-48 .
5. Durbar v. Khachar, op.cit., p.351.
It if m  this sense, that avyavaharika bears wider significance 
than its rendering merely as 'illegal' or 1 immoral1. But in 
view of the facts of this case, vhat appears to have been 
missing from their Lordships' construction is the actual spirit 
of 'righteousness as applied in an orthodox Hindu Court' 
(vyavahara); because it appears that the concept of 'benefit 
to the ancestral property' has unduly influenced this construct 
ion. This definition is, therefore, abstract and misleading: 
abstract, because it does not precisely point to the immoral 
nature of the debt; and misleading, because it seems to intro­
duce the test of benefit to estate, perhaps in a completely
2
different sense from that which Balarabhatta seems to have
in mind (see above p . 162).
I
Moreover, the other test laid down in this case of 'a
decent and respectable man' seems more idealistic than realistic
for it would be impossible to be sure that eyen a decent and
respectable man would not be subject to some 'failing' or
commit 'follies'! Thus, looked at from the construction
placed upon it, the definition seems to comprise cases involving
3
a slight lapse on the part of the father from strict rectitude. 
In this sense, therefore, it appears to place "too restricted 
a construction upon the term avyavaharika and excludes debts
4
for which the son may be held legitimately liable."
1. Ibid., pp.351-352.
2. Balambhatta seems to interpret na vyavaharikam as na 
kutumbopayogltyarthah perhaps in the sense that where the 
father had incurred debts which he spent, presumably, on 
sastrically despised purposes instead of spending them for 
the benefit of the family. It is in such contexts that the 
debts spent, not ir. the family's interest, were, in his 
opinion, avyavaharika.
Cf, Deoba v. Babaia, A.I.R. 1927 Nag. 337. In this case the question 
was whether a Hindu son be held liable for torts committed by his father 
.... even if these torts resulted in no benefit to the joint estate.
Held that such liability does not amount to a debt which he is bound to 
discharge, and is distinct from obligations legally incurred in consequ­
ence of a contract or quasi-contract. But he can be held liable for 
, . such torts only to the extent to which •'die family estate has been 
benefited (p.338).
3. R.K.Ranade, cit.above, p.39.
"It is not every impropriety or every lapse from right conduct
f.n. continued next page
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According to Mockerjee, J. vyavahariku (the positive) 
means “lawful, usual or customary",* Which hardly differs 
from that of Knight, J . , in the sense that avyavaharika is 
equivalent to not 'lawful, usual or customary'. The facts 
of the cases were almost identical. But this did not prevent 
him from holding that,
"the liability imposed by the Court upon the 
father to indemnify the person, with whose property 
he had improperly interfered created a debt 
which might justly be recovered from the ancestral 
property in the hands of the son."^
Thus, the difference lies not so much in the wording but in
its interpretation; and therefore, according to Mookerjee, J.,
3such debts of the father would not be avyavaharika.
4
In Ver.ugopala Naidu v. Ramanadhan Chetty, (1914) the 
father was accountable as trustee for certain sums and the 
sons were held liable, on the footing of general principles 
of morality, i.e., it is a sacred obligation to restore to
5
those lawfully entitled the money unlawfully retained.
f.n. from last page) that stamps the debt as immoral;"
- per Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Ramasubramania v.Sivakami, 
cit.above, (p.216, f.n.4). On the other hand, the degree of 
purdence required of a Hindu father is expected to be higher 
in view of his not being the sole owner of the joint family 
property. Thus, while delivering the judgement of the Full 
Bench, Boys, J. says,
"in view of the fact that he was not the sole owner of the property 
but others had an interest in the. property, the degree of prudence 
required of him would be greater, as in the case of a trustee, than 
if he were the sole owner."
See Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das, (1928) 25 A.L.J.841, (F.B.)
at p .84 4 .
4. Mookerjee, J. in Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad, cit.above, 
(p.216, f.n.2), at p.874.
1. Ibid, at p.868.
2. Ibid., at p .874.
3. This view has been approved in Venugapala Naidu v .Ramanandhan 
Chetty, see f.n.4; and Gursaran Das v. Mohan L a i , (1923),
I.L.R. 4 Lah.93, at p.97. Both these cases involved civil 
misappropriation and failure to account on the father's part; 
and the sons were held liable.
4. A.I.R. 1914 Mad.654.
5. Following Natasayan's case, cit.above, (p.215,f.n.1) . This 
view has been approved in Hanmant Kashinath v.Ganesh Annaji, 
(1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom.612, at p.621
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It is in this context, that Sadasiva Aiyar, J,, despite his
inclination to accept Colebrooke’s rendering, lias paraphrased
(see above p.216) avyavaharika debt in a round-about way.
After referring* to this and Justice Mookerjee’s renderings
~  1
with approval, in Gursaran Das v,. Mohan Lai (1923), where 
misappropriation and failure to account on the father’s part 
was invoiced, the Court observed, "Every breach of civil 
liability does not necessarily involve a moral turpitude."
This construction appears to make good sense, but this very 
essential requisite seems to be missing, or at least not 
apparent, in these definitions, and therefore they are open 
to various constructions.
In Ramasubramania v. Sivakami (1925), the question was
whether in execution of a decree for mesne profits, the shares
of the sons of the judgement debtor, in the ^oint familjy
property, are liable to be attached and sold. After citing
all the above mentioned definitions, and in view of the facts 
2
of the case before him, Venkatasubba Rao, J. has given his 
own version (see above p.216) of what is meant by avyavaharika 
debt. According to him, a debt is avyavaharika, so as to 
enable the son to claim immunity, only "when the father's 
conduct is utterly repugnant to good morals, or is grossly 
unjust as flagrantly dishonest", but "if the debt is in its 
inception not immoral, subsequent dishonesty of the father
3
does nor. exempt the son".
It may be noted there that in the course of his judgement 
(at p.84 3) Hr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao has clearly stated 
that the question to be asked in such cases is, "Did the father
1. op.cir., (see f.n.3, p.221), at p.98. Also, see Perumal 
Chetti v. Province of Madras, A.I.R. i 9 5 5 Mad. 382, at
p. 385. This was case of debts due to non-payment of Court- 
f e e .
2. Ramasubramania v.Sivakami, cit.above, (p.216, f.n.2), 
at p . 843 .
3. Ibid., at p.845. Please note that the rules are stated here 
in reverse order.
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contract the debt for an immoral purpose?" If this is the basic 
test, then it follows that whenever the father's debt is 
challenged by the son, the first question to be considered 
should be 'why' and not 'when' or 'how' he incurred the debt. 
Thus, in such cases, it would appear that it is by reference 
to its purpose, and nothing else, that the nature of the debt 
should be determined. Accordingly, applying the test that 
'if the debt is in i+-s inception not immoral e t c . 1 to cases 
in which the father incurs debt by borrowing, would mean 
almost every such debt is binding on the son, even if the 
father spends it later for an immoral purpose. For there has 
to be some gap in point of time between taking of the loan and 
spending the amount. Or should we take it that the test is 
meant for only those cases wherein the liability to pay arises 
out of the father's misconduct; (for further discussion see 
below p p .225- 227). v
The common-law method of ascertainment of the law by 
piece-meal application of juridical skill to individual sets 
of facts shows its weakness in a context such as ours. The 
learned judge had a particular set of facts before him and he 
was attempting to generalize from it without realising that 
obligation can well arise without any purpose at all!
Both his test and the definition of avyavaharika have 
been criticized by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in 
the case of Govindprasad v. Raghunathprasad, (193S). As
regards the first part of the above rendering, Wasoodew, J. 
observed,
"the attributes of morality, justice or honesty 
simpliciter, without more, forcibly convey the 
implication of the word avyavaharikam. I think that 
interpretation of the word is the nearest approach 
to the intention of the law-giver, and does no 
violence to the rule of strict interpretation of 
an exception to a general rule according to Hindu 
law. In my opinion there is no warrant for 
restricting its application to criminal acts of
1. I.L.R. (1939) Bom.533.
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the father. The word, according to my interpret­
ation of the text, is used in a comprehensive
sense and there is nothing to fetter the discretion
of the Court in applying a proper standard of 
morality, legality or honesty in deciding the 
question of the son's liability. In fact no 
better or more elastic formula can be devised 
in the application of the rule in the circumstances 
of each case."^
The realism, modernity, and at the same time probable 
authenticity of this outlook, is obvious. It may, however, 
be said that Venkatasubba Rao, J. must have been conscious 
of the effect of this rule, for he has himself stated that 
the rule is not static and therefore subject to variation.
i
AS regards the latter part, both Beaumont, C.J. and
Lokur,;J. have expressed doubts as to its exact meaning.
In t h e :view of Lokur, J.,this
\
"rule is somewhat misleading, and it is possible 
to conceive cases where it will be difficult to 
decide whether a debt was immoral in its inception 
or became so at the later stage. Thus for instance, 
if the father takes a bicycle on hire promising to 
return it, and if he dishonestly disposes of it 
and misappropriates the sale-proceeds, it will be 
difficult to say whether he took it on hire with 
a dishonest intention from the beginning or was 
subsequently tempted to sell it dishonestly."3
Thus, obviously, the weakness of the rule is apparent. 
Beaumont, C.J. thought, on the other hand, that
"there can be only one relevant date to consider 
and that is the date on which was incurred the 
liability of the father which is sought to be 
enforced against the son. The question must be 
whether at that date the liability was of the 
nature alleged."4
1. Ibid., at p.550. Both Beaumont, C.J. and Lokur, J. have 
expressed their disapprovals to the restrictive construction 
of avyavaharika; see pp.543, 555 respectively.
2. Ibid., at pp.544, 554 respectively.
3. Ibid., at p .554.
4. Ibid., at p.544. Other two judges seem to have agreed
with the chief justice.
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It may be respectfully stated, however, that even this rule 
is not immune from criticism. Let us say, for example, that 
Rama borrows R s . 100 from Soma today, with no provable 
intention of spending the money for illegal, immoral or 
dishonest purposes. Here it will be seen that on this date 
the act of borrowing or the consequent liability is not 
repugnant to good morals. But after a week he spends the 
money for spirituous liquors, which he drinks; and due to an 
overdose of the drinks he suffers a stroke. Now the question 
is whether his son is liable to pay his debts to Soma. It 
is possible that according to the smrtis themselves Rama's 
son would not be liable, because the Hindu jurist would 
discourage the giving of credit for purposes not cleared from 
undharmic intentions, i.e., the lender's not having ascertained 
that the money was needed for unobjectionable purposes is, 
under the heading of avyavaharika, likened to cases where he 
specifically lent for immoral purposes. But according to 
the above alleged rule as to the date laid down by the Bombay 
High Court the son would be liable, and the same would apply 
to Venkatasubba Rao, J.'s rule which has been approved by the 
Privy Council in Hemraj v. Khem Chand (1 943) . In spite of 
this approval, it may be said that this kind of test seems 
unnecessarily to complicate the issue of determining whether 
a debt is avyavaharika or not; and at the same time such tests 
seem not only not warranted by the smrtis but are in fact 
contrary to the spirit of the texts.^ To obviate this situation 
it has been suggested that
"to determine whether a debt or liability is 
avyavaharika we have to consider not only the 
nature of the act out of which the debt or 
liability arose, but also the nature of the purpose 
for which the debt or liability is in fact incurred 
and if either the act or the purpose is avyavaharika the
1. (1943) 70 I.A. 171, at p . 177, "It also appears to be clear 
on principle, and on authority, that examination of the nature 
or character of the debt should be made with reference to 
the time when it originated, in other words when the 
liability was first incurred by the father. If on such 
examination, it is found that at its inception the debt
was not tarnished or tainted with immorality or illegality, 
then it must be held that it would be binding on the son."
2. L.J. Manjrekar, cited above, at p . 10
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debt or the liability would be avyavaharika; 
and it is immaterial to consider the time 
or the dace on which the act is done or the 
debt is incurred.
The same writer has stated that
> '
"if this test is accepted then in case of
torts and crimes, it is the nature of the act
wnich gives rise to the liability that determines
the nature of the liability. And in case of
aebts ex contractu or quasi ex contractu it is the nature
of the purpose for which the debt is incurred
that determines the nature of the debt."2
To one who is acquainted with the piece-neal development of 
the case-law this is an attractive proposition. On the face 
of it, it appears to be a simple and easy way out, but unless 
we examine its true significance its acceptance may be unwise.
Let us suppose, for example, that the father criminally
misappropriates a large sum of money and spends the whole
amount in purchasing large landed properties. A small portion
of this he gives to his continuously kept concubine, but the
rest of the property remains in his joint family consisting
of himself and his son. Now, while a suit for recovery of
the amount is pending, the father dies, and the question arises
whether or not his son would be liable. According to the
above test (as well as on the authority of the PriviJ Council's
decision in the case of Toshanpal v. The District Judge of 
3
Agra ) the liability of the father would bg, avyavaharika, 
and hence not binding on the son. Thus, by accepting this 
test, therefore, we would be allowing Hindu sons to accumulate 
wealth out of the father's crimes without incurring any 
liability. Did the sastras intend this result, and could 
this, in their view, be the meaning of avyavaharika debt for
1. Ibid., p.8. The words 'it is immaterial' are too strong. 
Read 'it is insufficient'.
2. Ibid., at pp.8-9
3. (1934) I.L.R. 56 All. 548 (P.C.); for the facts and the 
decision in this case, see below p.374.
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the purpose of absolving the son from his liability to pay 
his father's debt?
’ It would appear that so far as that portion of the 
property which the father gave to his concubine is concerned, 
the sastras would have certainly relieved the son from his 
liability. But as far as his liability in respect of the 
share he received in the property is concerned, though the 
sastras are not quite clear on this point, it would appear 
from the practice followed in such cases that the son seems 
to have been made to reimburse such victims of the father's 
act. ^
It is clear from the above example, therefore, that the 
application of the test, so far as it concerns determination 
of the nature of the liability arising out of the father's 
tortious or criminal acts, is inadequate in view of the 
sastras or Hindu ideas of righteousness, to enable us to 
arrive at a satisfactory construction of such actions of the 
father as avyavaharika or otherwise.
1. In a case of 10-12-1677, reported in the historical records 
of the Pawar Family, where the father had, with others, 
killed a village Government officer and forcibly made av/ay 
with a certain amount of revenue collected by the officer, 
it was decided that in the absence of his father, who had 
disappeared since, due to fear of reprisals, the son must 
not only repay the actual amount stolen but also pay 
compensation to the son of the officer for the murder.
The amounts recovered were Rs 1260 and Rs 1240 respectively, 
Vide' M.V.Gujar, 2nd edn., Pawar, Visvasrao, Gharanyacha 
Aitihasic Kagad-Samgrah, cit.above, pp.1-2; see Appendix II 
below.
Also, there is a similar case, decided in 1610. It 
involved murders, forcible appropriation of property etc.. 
Although the son won his case in the end, it is quite clear 
from the statements of facts of both the parties in the 
case that the son was made to pay compensation and fine 
imposed on his father. See, Mahajara in re Jagadale, 
cit.above at p.47, f.n.
Also, the decision in Kartar Singh v.Harji M a i , (1879)
P.R. No. 128, pp.282-83 is on the same line, (for details 
see above,p. 215, f.n. 2
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As regards the father's contractual or quasi-contractual 
debts, if the purpose of such debts Is proved to be avyavaharika,
i.e., tainted by moral turpitude, then undoubtedly such debts 
would be held avyavaharika , and to that extent the test is 
agreeable to the sastrin precepts. Thus it may be correct 
to say that the above test is acceptable only in part, and 
therefore needs correction (see below p. 231) .
Nov/ mention may be made of rhe view adopted by the ^
Allahabad High Court in 1926 in Jagannath Prasad v.Jugal Kishore.
In this case, the father, who was receiver of certain property 
belonging to others, managed it in^irregular manner and
misappropriated some of it. It was held there that an element
I
of criminality may be necessary to constitute immorality of 
a debtiso as to enable the sons to escape liability. In order
i
to ascertain what constitutes 'immorality' for this purpose,
V
the Court has laid down that
the test to be applied in cases where the father's 
liability arose out of an act of misappropriation 
by him,"is whether or not the action of the father 
which resulted in the debt was infected with an 
element of criminality."^
That is to say that 'criminal' is equal to 'immoral' which
in turn amounts to avyavaharika. In other words, 'criminal'
3means avyavaharika. The converse, however, may not necessarily 
be t^rje; for avyavaharika is much wider in its connotation 
than 'criminal', e.g., debts for spirituous liquors may, in 
the absence of any prohibition laws, involve no criminal 
element, but such debts are, in viev/ of Hindu lav/, avyavaharika.
1 . (1926) I.L.R. 48 All.9
2. Ibid., at p .10.
3. In this respect there appears to be some misunderstanding 
on the part of Beaumont, C.J., for his Lordship seems to 
consider 'criminality' as a direct translation of avyavaharika 
In this context he remarked that it is "repugnant to good 
sense to construe ancient texts in the light of a system of criminal 
jurisprudence developed long after."
Govindprasad v. Raghunathprasad, cit.above, (see p.2 23,
f.n.1), at p .542.
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Moreover, as regards the liability arising out of a criminal 
act of the father, unless the proceeds of the same were also 
applied for avyavaharika purposes, the liability would hardly 
have absolved his son, in view of the customary Hindu law.
For, in.practice, historically speaking, such debts seem 
to have been extracted from the son, particularly when 
proceeds from such acts were applied for the family's benefit. 
Besides, in the case of Kartar Singh v. Harji Mai, (1878), 
the father stole and converted to his own use certain property 
belonging to the defendant who sued and obtained a decree 
against the father for the value of the property. In execution 
of this decree joint family land was attached. His minor son 
brought the present suit through his guardian to set aside 
the attachment on the ground that the debt was contracted for 
an immoral purpose, but the Court held the property liable 
and sold it. The Court said,
"it is impossible to hold that the debt created 
by the decree is a debt contracted for an illegal 
or immoral purpose, merely because the act from 
which the obligation to make compensation arose 
was an illegal or immoral act or both illegal and 
immoral."^
We may consider this view to be similar to what we have said 
above.
Then again, the test of 'criminal element1 may seem to 
be an artificial one, particularly in view of the fact that 
modern legislation has created a large number of offences 
involving slight or no moral turpitude, i.e., offences under 
road safety Acts, or labour, factory or municipal Acts. Thus, 
for instance, in a case where rash driving of the father has 
led to his conviction and wherein the Court has ordered him 
to compensate the injured party, it might be difficult to
1. The sastras would no doubt expect the perpetrator to suffer 
for such acts (see Manu, X.91, cited above, at p.82). But 
in practice the son was made to pay (see above f.n.1 at
p.227).
2. Per Plowden, J. at pp.282-283, in (1879) P.R., No.128, also 
cit. above, f.n.1 at p.227.
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construe whether or not such liabil.ity was avyavaharika,
particularly if it was proved that the father drove his motor
vehicle at an excessive speed in order to procure medical
aid for his wife, child or anybody else seriously ill or
who has met with an accident. A similar problem may arise
in a case where an employer had employed knowingly an underage
child in his factory's offi.ce as an office-boy, who, out
of his ovm curiosity and without any knowledge of the employer,
came in-co contact with the factory machinery and was seriously
hurt. The employer is held criminally liable under the Factory
Act, and is ordered to pay compensation. The factory being
a joint family concern, his sons challenge the liability
as being criminal and hence avyavaharika. Now7, the facts
proved clearly show that the child belonged to a respectable
but desperately poor family consisting of the boy himself, his
*
widowed mother and two younger sisters The mother could not 
seek employment due to family as well as social tradition.
There was no other source of income nor was there any relative 
to help the family. In these circumstances, and after repeated 
approaches to him, the employer had, out of sheer feeling 
of kindness, given the child perhaps the safest and lightest 
of jobs he could. In view of these facts, even if the father's 
act has offended factory legislation, hjs act could hardly 
be construed as one tainted with moral turpitude. Thus, the 
limitations of the above test are clear.
Of course, this does not mean that every criminal act 
would be morally untainted. What it means, however, is that 
such acts may or may not be so tainted depending on the facts 
of each case. But even then, in view of the spirit of 
customary Hindu law and justice, to construe the father's 
criminal act as avyavaharika appears to be one thing, and so 
to do in respect of the liability arising from such act is 
another. For, as may be deduced from the above discussion, 
unless the purpose for which the liability was in fact incurred 
is also taken into account, the real nature of the liability
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might not be properly determined. To construe a debt as
1
avyavaharika , therefore, it appears to be essential., at
least in appropriate cases, that both the nature of the
father's criminal act and that of its purpose have to be
taken into account. Otherwise, the test of criminal element
would, as a principle, make it more attractive for a Hindu
2father to misappropriate other people's property; and 
this would certainly be contrary to the spirit of the sastras = 
or for that matter that of any just lav/. In short, therefore, 
any definition of the term avyavaharika should comply with 
both the spirit and practice of Hindu law.
The definition adopted by Beaumont, C.J. (see above, 
p. 217) is a shorter and simpler version of Mr. Justice 
Venkatasubba R a o 's definition with the adverbs omitted, and 
to that extent it gives wider scope to the meaning of the 
term avyavaharika. While it has the merit of simplicity, it 
may be said that the definition does not seem to exhaust
what avyavaharika is intended to convey. According to both
3 , 4 _
the dharmasastra and arthasastra avyavaharika might include
such an act of the father as the giving away of the entire
1. In the case of Govindprasad v .Raghunathprasad, cited above,
(p.223, f.n.1), their Lordships seem to have based their 
judgement on similar basis. The Chief Justice has said 
there at p.544, "I think, therefore, that the claim against 
him was in respect of a liability essentially dishonest in 
character, and incurred for a dishonest purpose." Hence the 
son was not held liable.
2. J.D.M.Derrett, C .M .H .L ., cited above, p . 104, f.n.2
3. Apararka on Yajh. 11.175, see above, pp.170-71, f.n.2.
Where we have discussed the views of various commentators 
on the dharmas'astra and the arthas'astra.
4. Kaut. 3.16.3, see above, p p .170-171, f .n .2.. Also see,
Sham Singh v. Musst. Umraotee, (1813) 2 Select Reports, S.D.A 
92. In this case the father gave away whole ancestral 
property to his eldest son. The Court held "By Hindu law as 
current in Mithila (Tirhoot), a father cannot give away the 
whole ancestral property to one son, to the exclusion of
his other sons." This view was affirmed in Musst. Junnuk 
Kishoree's case, (cit.above), at p.219.
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family property when he has progeny. He might do this foi 
a pious purpose, but even then that act, which may not be
illegal, dishonest or immoral in a conventional sense, may
-  1 still be avyavaharika. The same rule applies to his debts.
The father's extremely extiravagant act of ridding the family
of its property, irrespective of its purpose, seems therefore,
/ - 2 to have been construed by the sastras as a vyavaharika .
It is this aspect of the term which is apparently absent from
the definition of Chief Justice Beaumonc,
3
Lastly, we come to the definition adopted by the Privy
4
Council in Hemraj v. Khemchand, which the Supreme Court has
5
subsequently affirmed.
I
!
As noted above (see above pp.217-218), their Lordships 
of the Privy Council have merely approved the translation of 
the term avyavaharika as given by Colebrooke) i.e., 'a debt 
for a cause repugnant to good morals', for, in their opinion, 
it makes the nearest approach to the true conception of the 
term as used in the smrti text. The rationale of their 
Lordships' view seems to lie in that
(i) the son is liable to pay just debts of his father 
under the doctrine of Pious Obligation;
(ii) the doctrine has reference to the nature or character 
of the debt which creates the liability;
(iii) the duty cast on the son being religious or moral, 
the character of the debt should be examined from the standpoint 
of justice and morality;
1. Ibid.
2. This sastric view appears to be similar to the view adopted 
in the case of Devi Pitta v.Saudagar Singh (see above p.213, 
f.n.3). According to this a debt contracted as an act of 
reckless extravagance or of wanton waste or with intention 
of destroying other's interests in the property may be 
construed as an unjust or avyavaharika debt.
3. See above pp.217, 218.
4. Cited above, (p.217, f.n.6). For the facts of the case, see 
below pp. 234-35.
5. In Luhar v. Doshi, see above, (p.217, f.n.7)
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(iv) the examination of the nature or the character 
of the debt should be made with reference to the time when 
it originated;
(v) on such examination, if it is found that at its 
inception the debt was not tarnished or tainted with 
immorality or illegality, then it must be held that it would 
.be binding on the son. In other words such debt is not 
avyavaharika?
(vi) the rule is not rigid, but has to be applied with
reference to the circumstances of each case? and that these 
*]
principles should be kept in mind in interpreting the term 
avyavaharika used in the texts.
In short, when a particular debt is called in question
it will be the duty of the Courts to examine its nature in
the light of these principles, which, in the view of their
\
Lordships, are not exhaustive but only basic; and to see 
whether in the circumstances it is of the kind which will give 
exemption to the son from the liability of paying it, on the 
ground that it is repugnant to good morals.
Seen in the light of the above, their Lordships' rendering 
clearly appears to be flexible enough to accommodate almost 
all cases of avyavaharika debts; but at the same time its 
flexibility may well be the cause of continuing the present 
uncertainty and confusion that surrounds this controversial 
doctrine. For, when it comes to their application, these
principles might well fail to be interpreted in the same way
by different judges.
As regards the principles themselves, the first three and 
the last one seem apparently in keeping with the letter and 
spirit of Hindu law. But the same cannot be said of the
remaining two, i.e., (iv) and (v). Principle (iv), in partic­
ular, has already attracted certain valid criticism. In the 
course of the discussion above (see p.222 ff) we have shown 
Certain weaknesses implicit in this principle. Its
1. Hemraj v. Khemchand, op.cit., pp.176-77.
2. Ibid., at p . 178.
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indiscriminate application may, therefore, lead in certain 
cases to consequences fundamentally contrary to the dictates 
of customary Hindu lav;, in that the son might be forced 
to pay a debt which his father might have in fact incurred 
for an immoral purpose. This may be explained by an example 
of a case with slightly different facts to those just discussed.
Let us suppose;. for instance, a Hindu father is the-, 
secretary of a co-operative society. He is authorised to hold 
a certain amount of its funds in his possession for its day- 
to-day expenses. Normally a virtuous and respectable man 
somehow he gets involved with a group of dancing girls visiting 
his village. He spends the society's money on costly saris 
and liquor for them with the intention of seducing a particularly 
beautiful one to have a sexual relationship with him. In a 
suit to recover the amount, ‘the society obtains a decree against 
the father. But before the attachment of his joint family 
property, the falser commits suicide as he could not stand 
the strain of loss of face due to the adverse publicity. In 
the circumstances could his son be held liable for his debt? 
Applying the above principle, he would be held liable for the 
debt which was incurred undoubtedly for an immoral purpose: 
a result which Hindu law expressly prohibits.
Turning, however, to the actual facts of the present case, 
namely, Hemraj v. Khemchand, it would appear that they warranted 
a slightly different approach in establishing the nature of
the father's act and the consequent liability of the son.
' 1The facts of the case were as follows: In a partition suit
between Hemraj, Dhanpal and others, which was referred to 
arbitration with the result that a decree in terms of the award 
was passed by the Court, a promissory note executed in favour 
of Dhanpal for money advanced by him out of joint family funds 
was allotted to Hemraj. The award provided that the document 
should be filed in Court within seven days of the decree.
Dhanpal did not do so, though he filed instead, without giving
1. Ibid., at pp.172-173.
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notice to Hemraj, another promissory note of 21.6.1926 which 
was a forgery. Hemraj filed his application for execution 
of the decree. Dhanpal then filed the original promissory 
note by which time it had become time-barred. Later, Hemraj 
filed a suit for the amount due under the aforesaid promissory 
note making Dhanpal a defendant besides its executants. The 
suit was decreed only against Dhanpal. It was admitted in 
the suit that the document of 21.6.1926 was a forgery. The 
proceedings showed that Dhanpal allowed the promissory note 
to become time-barred by acting fraudulently towards Hemraj.
In the execution application taken out by Hemraj subsequently, 
to execute the decree in the above suit, the respondents who
I
were sons of Dhanpal, since deceased, took abjection on the
grounds that since the debt was created by the misconduct and
!
stupidity of Dhanpal, there was no liability^on their part 
(they were survivors to Dhanpal1 s interest, burdened with 
debts binding on the family) to pay, and hence the ancestral 
property in their hands was not liable to be attached and 
sold. Both the subordinate Court and Allahabad High Court 
upheld the objection and dismissed the suit on the ground 
that the debt was avyavaharika. Hemraj then appealed to the 
Privy Council. It is obvious that the facts provide^/excellent 
test for our so called principles. Was justice to be done to 
the party defrauded?
The main question to be decided was, therefore, whether 
the judgement debt in question was in the nature of an avyava­
harika debt which would be exempted from the respondents' 
pious obligation of discharging their father's debt.
In this case, the fact is that the father's act had, due 
to the operation of the law of Limitation, resulted in a certain 
loss to the plaintiff without any material benefit to the 
father or his joint family, the real beneficiary being the 
original debtors; a result which could hardly fit into the 
sastric notion of releasing debtors from their indebtedness.
But that is beside the point. The intrusion of the law of
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Limitation, though material, was in fact incidental. The 
liability arose out of the father's deliberate act of allowing 
the,promissory note, which remained in his possession after 
the partition, to become time-barred. No question of either 
borrowing money or spending of borrowed money for immoral 
purposes was involved. Nor was it a case of incurring the 
liability, as in the case of mesne profits, by way of taking 
any unlawful benefit out of the father's wrongful act. In 
a sense, therefore, the nature of the father’s act in this 
case would appear to be similar to what it was in Durbar v . 
Khacher and Chhakauri Mahton v. Gangaprasad (see above p.219),
i.e., merely to cause damage to other's property. It is the 
nature of this kind of act and its consequent liability which 
had to be determined.
The Privy Council judged the act of the,father in the 
light of the principles laid down above (see pp.232-233), 
and concluded that the debt was not avyavaharika. In their 
Lordships' opinion the debt was rightly due to Hemraj from 
the defendants' father, because in its origin the liability 
was just; and hence the sons were held to be liable.
Besides the above principles, their Lordships referred
i
to Natesayyan v. Ponnusami (1892) and Peary Lai v. Chandi 
2Charan (1906) in support of their decision. The learned 
Judges in Natesayyan's case, while describing the father's 
debt and the liability arising out of that debt on the part 
of his sons, observed that
"upon any intelligible principles of morality 
a debt due by the father by reason of his 
having retained for himself money he was bound to 
pay to another would be a debt of the most 
sacred obligation, and for the non-discharge 
of which punishment in a further state might 
be expected to be inflicted, if in any. The son 
is not bound to do anything to relieve his father
1. (1893) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 99
2. (1906) 11 C.W.N. 163.
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from the consequences of his vicious indulgences, 
but he is surely bound to do that which his 
father himself would do were it possible, namely, 
to restore to those lawfully entitled money he 
has unlawfully retained."1
After quoting this observation with approval, their Lordships 
went so far as to state that the language of this principle
"may well be used to describe appropriately the 
nature of obligation of the respondents in this 
case also, to discharge the debt^brought about 
by the conduct of their father."
Thus, they seem to have equated the nature of the son's liability 
in this case with that of the above two cases.
In view of the facts of these cases, however, the equation
would appear to be misleading, for the above observation seems
to refer to the general principle of morality regarding repayment
of debts, and suggests that the son should pay what his father
would have paid were it possible for him to do so. It should
be noted, however, that the learned Judges have specifically
referred in this connection to restoring to those lawfully
entitled money he has unlawfully retained. (My emphasis). It
would appear, therefore, that the principle enunciated in the
above observation might be applicable only to those cases
where the father has not only deprived others of their property,
but also unlawfully retained it, probably for the purpose of
enriching his own property. In fact, this is what had taken
place in both the cases referred to above. We have an instance,
however, where even if the facts were dissimilar, the above
principle was relied on in the later case (1914) of VenugopaJ a
3Naidu v. Ramanadhan Chatty.
In Natesayyanfs case, the father collected sums of money,
on behalf of the plaintiff's family, but neither paid them
4
nor accounted for them. In Peary Lai's case, the father
1. (189 3) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 99 at p . 104
2'. Hemraj v. Khemchand, cited above, at p. 179.
3. A.I.R. 1914 Mad. 654, at p.655, c.1
4. (189 3) I.L.R.16 Mad. 99, at p. 104
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became liable to pay a large sum of money because he had
kept the owner out of possession of property which lawfully
belonged to the latter, and to the profits of which he was
entitled. Thus,-by unlawful recept of these profits, the
judgement debtor enriched his own estate which had later by
survivorship passed into the hands of his sons. It is in
view of these facts that the above observation was referred
1to and applied. In Venugopala N aidu's case, the members of 
the committee of a temple unnecessarily expended the temple 
money and they were directed by the Courts to reimburse the 
temple with that amount out of their private funds; the 
plaintiff, having paid the amount himself, sued the legal 
representative, i.e., the sons of one of the committee members, 
along with the rest for contribution. Although the facts were 
different, the sons were held liable on the grounds of the 
general principle of morality laid down in Natesayyan v .
Ponnusami. It would appear, however, from the facts of 
Natesayyan’s case that the principle 'it. is a sacred obligation 
to restore to those lawfully entitled the money unlawfully 
retained' would seem to apply, so far as the son's liability 
is concerned, only to those cases where the basis of the father's 
liability lies in his act of wrongfully depriving others of 
their property for the purpose of (and leading in fact to) 
unlawful e n r i c h m e n t  of his joint family estate. Otherwise, 
the principle, as stated therein, does not seem to interpret 
the Hindu law correctly. For, as observed by Venkatasubba 
Rao, J .
"This statement does not correctly interpret the 
Hindu Law. Every debt, that is justly due, is 
not necessarily a debt, not tainted with i l l e g d ^ i V
or immorality. ---- The question is, did the father
contract the debt for an immoral purpose? And 
the question is not : does not morality demand that 
the debt should be paid back? The mistake, if 
I may say so with respect, arises from a confusion 
of standpoints. There is hardly any debt, of which 
it can be said that it is not just that it should 
be repaid. But the Hindu law in dealing with the
1. (1906) 1 1 C.W.N. 163, at p . 169
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P-ious obligation of the son does not look at 
the question from this point of view."”*
, In justice, no one, the father or his son, should be 
allowed to take advantage of such unlawful gains. This is 
exactly what the administrators of customary Hindu law seem 
to have done in the past in such cases [see above p.226).
But here the point is whether the case before the Privy 
Council falls under this category. Speaking accurately, 
it would not appear to be the case; for, as we have seen 
above (see pp.235-236), unlike the afore-menticned cases, 
the act of the father in the present case resulted only in 
depriving Hemraj of a certain share of his property. There 
seems to be no evidence as to any real benefit accruing from 
the act either to the father or his sons - the respondents.
In point of fact, therefore, the nature of such an act as 
this could hardly be the same as that in the'cases referred 
to above, and hence the principle enunciated in the above 
observation may not exactly be applicable to this case.
The Privy Council's finding, based on principles (iv) 
and (v) (see above p.233), that the debt was true and just
in its inception, seems to have led to no further inquiry
on the part of their Lordships as to the real purpose of 
Dhanpal1s actions leading to his indebtedness. It may 
respectfully be said that this judgement appears to be the 
result of an enquiry which seems to stop short of what the
spirit o: customary Hindu law would want the Courts to do
in the process of determining the nature of the debt of the 
father. We have already noted above (see p.231) that in order 
to determine whether or not the son is liable to pay his 
father's debt it is essential to look into both the nature 
of his act as well as that of the purpose for which he 
committed the act. Had the Privy Council gone into this, 
supposing it to be possible, would it have come to any different 
conclusion?
1. Ramasubramania v. Sivakami, cit.above, (see p.222), at 
p. 843, c . 2.
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As regards the nature of the act, if one .looks closely 
at the facts of the case, it is abundantly clear from the 
findings of the lower Courts that Dhanpal had all along 
been acting dishonestly and fraudulently towards Hemraj.
These actions of the debtor, involving dishonesty, fraud 
and forgery, seem evidently immoral and illegal. But why 
did he act so?
"He cannot be allowed to take advantage of his cleverness 
2and fraud" , said the Subordinate Judge in his judgement. 
Supposing, therefore, that the father had retained the 
promissory note for the purpose of recovering the amount from 
the original debtors for his own benefit, which might well 
have been his intention, in fact, and had really reaped the 
benefit; then, even according to the sastras, both the father 
and after him his sons would have been liable for the amount.
For, according to the Aitareya-brahmana V I .7 cited in the
-  3Mitaksara on Yajnavalkya 11.127,
1. "It was admitted in the suit that the document dated June 21, 
was a forgery. The proceedings showed that Dhanpal allowed 
the promissory note to become barred by acting fraudulently 
towards Hemraj. In the course of the judgement the Subordin­
ate Judge remarked: 'Dhanpal defendant has all along bean 
acting dishonestly towards the plaintiff, and he cannot be
allowed to take advantage of his cleverness and fraud.' ---
According to the judgement of the High Court, 'Dhanpal nab. 
been guilty of dishonesty and grossly improper conduct,'" 
Hemraj v. Khemchand, cited above (at p.217, f.n.6) p p . 173-7 4. 
These extract taken from the statement of facts of this case 
would be sufficient to prove the point.
2. Ibid.
3. Mita.I .IX ,6-7; see also P.V.Kane, H .D h ., III, cit.above, p. 
636; J.D.M.Derrett, at 1968 Adyar Library Bulletin 53 8, 553; 
Derrett, (1968) 2 M.L.J., J.41,50.
W.Stokes, ed., Hindu Law Books, (Mad., 1865), p.404. The 
same verse is numbered Yajn.II.126 in V.N.Mandlik, ed.& trans. 
The Vyavahara-Mayukha and Yajnavalkya Smrti, (Bom., 1880), 
p. 218; S.S.Khedwal, ed., Yajnavalkya Smrti with the Mitaksara 
(Bom., 1900), p . 192. * .
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"Whoever debars or excludes from partition, an 
heir or person entitled to a share, and does 
not yield to him his due allotment; he, being 
thus debarred of his sh?,re, destroys or annihilates 
that person who so debars him of his right: or, 
if he do'not immediately destroy him, he destroys 
his sou or his grandson. It is thus pronounced to 
be criminal in any person to withhold common 
property, without any distinction of eldest 
(or youngest)."1
We may be correct, therefore, if we deduce from this commentary
that (a) the act of withholding other's share may be considered 
2
to be a crime; (b) that the liability resulting from the 
act may be attributed to the doer as well as his sons; and
(c) that the criminal nature of the father's act by itself|
may not be sufficient to relieve the sons from their predicament,
i
i.e., from their pious obligation to pay the amount so withheld
i
by the1 father. In other words, even if the father's act is 
criminal, when it comes to determine the nature of the son's 
liability which arises out of that act, it would not, in view 
of the above rendering, be labelled as avyavaharika. The 
principle underlying this rule might be applicable as well, 
by analogy, even to the cases in which the father has mis­
appropriated a stranger's property. And, whatever might be
1. H .T .Colebrooke, trans., Two Treatises on Hindu Law of 
Inheritance, (Cal., 1810), p. 2 95 ; W.Stokes, op.cit., p.405,
"Yobhaginam bhagarham bhagan rmndate bhagad apakaroti 
bhagam tasmai na prayacchati sa bhaganunna enam 
nottaram cayate nasayati dcsinam karoti / Yadi tain 
na nas'ayati tada tasya put ram pautram va nas'ayatiti 
jyestavise§amantarena va sadharana-dravyapahari.no 
dosah srutah // "
Vide, S.S.Khedwal, op.cit., pp.192-93.
2. The criminal nature of this kind of act is also apparent 
from Manu IX.213, "If an eldest brother, through avarice, 
defrauds the younger ones, he shall lose his 'seniority' 
and his share, and shall also be punished by the kin g ."
Vide, G.Jha, trans., Manusmrti with the Manubhasya of 
Medhatlthi, vol.V., (Cal., 1 926), p . 177; also see, G.Biihler, 
trans., The Laws of Manu, S.B.E.25, (Oxford, 1886), p. 377 ; 
J.D.M.Derrett, trans., Bharuci's Commentary on the Manusmrti,
II, cit.above, p.264.
"Yo jyesto vinikurvita lobhad bhratrn yaviyasah //
So ajyestah syad abhagas'ca niyantavyasca rajabhih // 213// 
Vide G.Jha, ed., Manusmrt i , o p .c i t .,v o l .II , (Cal.1939), p.303.
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the nature of his act - criminal or civil, his son would, it 
seems, be held liable to restore it to its lawful owner.
Looked at from this point of view, which is based on the 
sastric position referred to above, the principle seems to 
support the rule laid down in Natesayyanfs case (see pp.236- 
237), though for a different reason; yet it does not seem 
•to apply to the situation in Hemraj v. Khemchand, because 
there the father has destroyed a certain share of Hemraj and 
not retained it as envisaged in the above examples. Only the 
original debtors, if anyone, seem to have gained from the 
^  action of Dhanpal. It is hard to believe, hoover, that Dhanpal 
acted the way he did for the benefit of his debtors. So, what 
else could be the purpose of his act?
Once again, let us suppose that Dhanpal wanted to punish 
Hemraj for bringing a family feud or differences to public 
notice by taking the matter to the Court. The disruption of 
the joint family might have led, rightly or wrongly, to 
undesirable gossip among relatives and the community. This 
might have annoyed Dhanpal. He might have taken it ill, 
thinking that the people might - or did in fact, look down 
upon him as the head of the joint family: a sort of disgrace
deeply felt in Hindu society even to this day. Moreover, 
joint family partitions hardly lead, once separation occurs, 
to an amicable and peaceful relationship amongst the members, 
due to '/aiious reasons rooted in the partition. Whatever 
might have been the real reason, looking at the actions of
1. As regards to the distinction, Seshagiri Ayyar, J. has 
observed that
1 the distinction between a civil and criminal breach of trust 
is very thin and it would not be easy in all cases to say whether 
the breach of trust is of a such a character as would not 
subject the father to a prosecution."
T .K .Srinivasa Aiyangar v.Kuppuswami Aiyengar, (1921),
I.L.R.44 Mad.801, at p.806; A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 447, at p.450; 
(1921) M.W.N. 630, at p.633.
Also, Venkatasubba Rao, J. has said, "In my opinion, the 
distinction between a crime and a breach of a civil duty in 
this context is extremely artificial and finds no support in 
the texts of the Hindu Law." - Ramasubramania v.Sivakami, 
A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 841, at p.844, c.1.
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Dhanpal, it may bo suggested that he might have behaved the
way he did towards Hemraj because he was annoyed and wanted
to take revenge. Otherwise, .a.clever man would not normally
allow himself to*become liable for a large amount of money
by deliberately holding back the promissory note so long
as to render it worthless. Thus, if we accept that he
incurred the liability due to his anger, then, in view of 
/- 1tne sastras, his sons would not be held liable to pay it.
The sastric injunction on the subject came up for the
judicial scrutiny in Ramasubramania v. Sivakami.^ According
to Katyayana, "Having done an injury to another, or destroyed
his things through anger, if anything is promised in satisfact-
3
ion, it is called a debt for anger."
After stating the above rendering, and after discussing 
certain important commentaries upon it, Venkatasubba Rao, J. 
said,
"I would understand Katyayana's text to mean that 
the injury inflicted, or damage caused, should be 
the result of the wanton and flagrant violation 
of another's right from anger, engendered by 
malice or revenge, for instance, an act of 
incendiarism. To such and similar casgs only, 
the text of Katyayana is applicable."
Although the adjectives 'wanton' and 'flagrant' in this 
observation may seem to be unncecessary (see above p.223 
where Wassoodew, J. says that these adjectives are unwarranted 
in this context), Dhanpal's behaviour towards Hemraj would 
hardly escape the description. Seen in the light of the above 
observation, Dhanpal's debt would appear to be avyavaharika, 
provided that we accept (as it likely) that his behaviour 
was actuated and led by anger and his desire for revenge.
1. Brhaspati, XI.51, Narada, IV.10 and the explanation of 
these verses as appears in Katyayana,. 565 . For the texts and 
their translations and commentaries upon them, see above,
p. 153, f.n.1.
2. A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 841, at pp.846-7.
3. J.C.Ghose, Hindu L a w , cit.above, p.546? *
4. Ramasubramania v. Sivakami, cit.above, (see f .n .2) ,p.847 , c . 1
Also see Katyayana (Kane ed.,trans.) para.565.
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Whether either of the above theories is coerect or not 
is of little significance now, but it may be deduced from 
the above discussion that the Privy Council might have come 
to a different conclusion if their Lordships had inquired 
into the real purpose of Dhanpal's actions leading to his 
indebtedness. What is clear from the above discussion is, 
however, that the test laid down in rules (iv) and (v) seems 
to be of equivocal help and in some cases can be misleading.
An equally important principle, enunciated by the Privy 
Council, that "the duty cast on the son being religious or 
moral, the character of the debt should be examined from 
the standpoint of justice and morality" (see above, rule (iid) a 
p. 232) requires some clarification.
We may ask, why did the Privy Council find it necessary
i
in 1943 to give this directive to the Courts? Perhaps to 
overcome the confusion of various standpoints that led to 
different renderings of the term avyavaharika, as will be seen. 
This is evident from the facts and decisions of the cases 
(discussed above at pp.219-232), which have attempted to 
define the term avyavaharika debt. Thus, for example, the
term avyavaharika appears to have been construed in Durbar v.
1 2 Khachar, from the standpoint of the duties of the father
1. (1908) I.L.R. 32 Bom.348.
2. As regards to the duties of the father, Wallis, C.J. observe 
in T .K .Srinivasa Aiyangar v.Kuppuswami Aiyengar, (1921)
I.L.R.44 Mad.801 at pp.803-4, that
"Any liability which the father may incur to the 
alienees on such unconditional setting aside of the 
alienation arises from his own immoral act in making 
the alienation in the first instance, in breach of 
the duty he owed to his sons as manager of the joint 
family property, and I do not think the sons can 
properly be held to be under any pious obligation 
to relieve him from the consequences of his unsuccessful 
attempt to defraud them."
This view has been rejected by Madhavan Nair, J. (as he
then was) in Ramasubramania v.Sivakami, A.I.R. 1925 Mad.
841, at p.852, c.1 in these words:
f.n. continued next page.
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of a family; while in the case of Cnhakauri Mahton v. Ganga 
1Prasad, it seems to have been consrrued from the standpoint
f.n. continued froi.i last page)
"With very great respect, I am net prepared to accept 
this view of the son's liability. If the question 
is to be looked at from the standpoint: of the father's 
duty towards sons, then the sons will be able to 
claim exemption from liability, in almost all the 
cases that may be brought against them."
It may be noted here that the reference that "The principle,
laid down in Durbar v.Khachar --- seems to have been
accepted by Wallis, C.J., in Venkatacharyulu v. Mohanapanda," 
etc. as given at p.851, c.2 is wrong. Chief Justice Wallis 
was not on the Bench which decided this case. As we know, 
the quotation comes from T .K .Srinivasa Aiyangar's case.
The facts of this case were as follows: It was a partition
suilp by the son against the father and his alienee. The 
Court found that certain alienations were not binding on 
the'son. It held, therefore, that the son was entitled to 
get a decree for his share in the family properties without 
any condition being imposed on him to refund the consideration 
paid by the alienee to the father.
The decision in this case appears to have been based on 
the fact that no debt existed on the date of the partition.
In the context of the peculiar facts of this case, and 
where it was not shown that the purchase money had been 
carried to the joint family assets, the stand taken by 
Chief Justice Wallis does not seem to be wrong. In fact, 
the question of what had happened to the purchase-money 
was neither raised nor was it discussed in the appeal.
It is difficult, therefore, to opine as to the nature of 
the father's liability, which forms the basis of the son's 
pious obligation.
However, this does not mean that the view of Wallis, C.J. 
should be accepted as a general rule applying to all cases, 
and irrespective of their facts. Seen in this light,
Madhavan Nair, J.'s criticism seems to make some sense.
But at the same time, it should not be forgotten that 
in certain cases, at least, (see above p.232), the father's 
duty towards his sons and family does play its part in 
determining the nature of his liability.
1. (1911) I.L.R.39 Cal. 862
i
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of doing justice to an innocent victim of the father's unjust 
act. In Natesayyan v. Ponnusami, it seems to have been 
looked at from the standpoint of general principles of morality. 
These instances seem sufficient to illustrate the point. Of 
course, this confusion of various standpoints was already
2detected and commented upon in Ramasubrrmania v. Sivakami:
•the case which seems to have considerably influenced the 
judgement of the Privy Council. It may, therefore, be correct 
to say that the observations made there on the confusion of 
standpoints might have led the Privy Council to lay down the 
principle of 'justice and morality'.
On the face of it, the principle appears to be simple 
and straightforward. But the significance of the term 'justice 
and morality' in general and that viewed in the context of 
the principles of customary Hindu law may not always be the 
same. For it may be true to say that under the principles 
of justice and morality generally, all debts should be repaid 
by the debtor, and the sastras insist upon the observance
of this rule. But, when the son of the debtor is called upon
to pay the debt of his fahter, 'justice-and-morality' pertaining
to the son's liability depends on the nature of the debt.
Because of this crucial distinction between their respective 
liabilites, one should not confuse what may seem just and 
moral in general with what the sastras would have considered
1. (1892) I.L.R.16 Mad. 99.
2. Ramafeubramania's case, A.I.R. 19 25 Mad. 841.
Madhavan Nair, J. (as he then was) said, at p.852, c.2, 
"This conflict is probably due to a confusion of the 
various standpoints, from which the nature of a particular 
debt may be regarded, viz., the standpoint of the creditor, 
the standpoint of the son (virtually the debtor) and the 
detached standpoint of an outsider."
In the same case, above p.84 3, c.2, after referring to 
the general principle of morality laid down in Natesayyan's 
case, Venkatasubba Rao, J. said,
"The mistake, if I may say so with respect, arises from a 
confusion of standpoints. There is hardly any debt, of which 
it can be said that it is not just that it should be repaid.
But the Hindu law in dealing with the pious obligation of the 
son does not look at the question from this point of view."
It may be noted here that Mr.Justice Madhavan Nair himself 
delivered the judgement in Hemraj v. Khemchand.
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as 'just or moral' for the purpose of repayment of the 
father's debt by his son. The distinction is further clarified 
by the Privy Council when it .says,
, "In this connection regard may also be had to the 
■debts mentioned in the texts which the son need
not p a y , most of which are of an objectionable
character/5 1
Thus, it would appear from the above explanation that the 
significance of the term 'justice and morality' in this 
context should be limited to the scope of the sastrically 
considered just debts of the father for which the son would 
be held liable under the doctrine of Pious Obligation. It 
is from the son's liability, perceived as above, that the 
Courts are expected, it seems, to examine the nature of the 
father's debt. Any other approach would therefore seem to 
be beside the point, and hence fallacious.
The above principles were intended to be of assistance
to the Courts in interpreting the term avyavaharika. They
are not its actual definition. As we know, their Lordships
of the Privy Council have, for this purpose, adopted Colebrooke's
translation, i.e., 'a debt for a cause repugnant to good morals'.
For, in their opinion, this translation "makes the nearest
approach to the true conception of the term as used in the
smrt-i text, and may well be taken to represent its correct,
2meaning," But does it really represent its correct meaning?
It. is respectfully submitted that it does not seem to 
do so, for the phrase 'repugnant to good morals' does not 
exhaust completely v/hat the term avyavaharika is sastrically 
intended to include. These may be debts for causes which 
are not repugnant to good morals, but which may still be 
avyavaharika. For instance, if a father borrows a large sum
1. Hemraj v. Khemchand, (1943) L.R.70 I.A. 171, at p . 177.
2*. Hemraj v. Khemchand, cit.above, at p. 178.
.3. Apararka on Yajn.II.175; Kaut.3.16.3, cited above,
pp.170-71, f.n.2, also see above, p.231, f.n. 3 and 4.
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of money, out of proportion to the value of the family estate, 
and gives it to a distant relative or donates it to a charity
_ 1
hospital, then it would be held to be an avyavaharika d e b t , ' 
although the act of the father is not repugnant to good 
morals. Thus, according to the sastric conception of the 
term, avyavaharika appears to have a wider significance than 
what is meant by 'repugnant to good morals' in English, and 
therefore this phrase cannot be taken to represent its correct 
meaning,
Besides, Colebrooke's translation appears to be vague 
in that we still have to consider what is repugnant to good 
morals, not in English but in Hindu terms. The meaning of 
the word 'immoral' or 'repugnant to good morals' would, 
moreover, vary with the times and also with the persons 
construing the words. ‘
In spite of this being so, since the decision in Hemraj
v. Khemchand in 194 3 it appears to have been taken for granted
by the Supreme Court that the issue of defining avyavaharika
is settled. For, following that precedent, the Supreme Court
2
seems to have preferred Colebrooke's rendering as the
1. V.B.Raju, cited above, p.32. Also, he has suggested that 
in certain cases debts incurred by the father for a new 
business involving highly speculative and hazardous ventures 
would be considered avyavaharika (see p.29 and 32). But the 
cases cited are not directly on the point, though it can
be argued that such cases might be covered under 'gambling 
debt'1 and that by implication these decisions might lead 
us to the conclusion that debts due to such businesses would 
be avyavaharika debts.
Also, according to the Nagpur High Court,
"The word avyavaharika does not merely comprise debts which 
are illegal or immoral only, but all debts which the Court 
regards as inequitable or unjust in point of Hindu Law to 
make the son liable."
Vide Rajeshwar v. Mangniram, A.I.R. 1 933 Nag.89, at p.91.
Also, the decisions in Devi Pitta v.Saudagar Singh, (1900) 
35 Punj. Record No.65, p.291; and Sardari Mai v.Khan Eahadar 
Khan, (1899) 34 Punj. Record No.11, p.56 may fit into this 
category of debts, for the definition of a just debt adopted 
there need not necessarily be based on 'morality1 alone.
(See above p.213, f.n.3).
2. Jakati v.Borkar, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 282, at p.286; and 
Luhar v.Doshi, A.I.R. 1960 S.C.964, at p.966.
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definition of the terra avyavaharika. The Supreme Court has
referred, in passing, to a few diverse renderings by others,
but* it has given no other reason for its preference except 
1repeating what the Privy Council had stated in this
respect, (see p.217-218) The Court's attitude seems to
indicate, if one may say so, that it avoided any inquiry
2
into its original sources to determine the exact significance
of the term. Mo doubt the facts did not require the court
0 3
to make such an inquiry. The sastras, rather than what
seems to be a defective precedent, would have been the proper
place to look for help in respect of this question. In the
4
view of the Supreme Court's authority, however, it seems 
that all the Courts in India would be obliged not only to 
settle for something which is apparently less than correct, 
but also to perpetuate, perhaps unwillingly, this incorrect 
rendering. For, instead of solving, the Supreme Court seems 
to have simply buried the controversy.
1. Ibid., at p.286, para.9, and at p.966, para.8 respectively.
2. In Luhar v. Doshi, after referring to certain other renderings
of the term, the Supreme Court observed,
"But it appears that in Hemraj v.Khemchand,  , the Privy Council
has, on the whole, preferred to treat Colebrooks1s translation as 
making the nearest approach to the real interpretation of the 
word used by Usanas; but whatever may be the exact denotation of
the word, it is clear that --  as soon as it is shown that the
debt is immoral the doctrine of pious obligation cannot be invoked, 
in support of such a debt." (My emphasis). Ibid.
3. Perhaps, an effort in this direction could have been as 
valuable as it proved in respect of the father's power tc 
make a gift of affection to his daughter of a reasonable
portion of immovable property. Reference may be had in
this regard to Guramma v.Mallappa, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 510.
4. "The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding 
on all Courts within the territory of India." The Indian 
Constitution, part V, Art.141. One might conceivably 
call upon the much-cited Quinn v. Leathern, (1901), A.C.
495; (1901) H.L.1 again, however.
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The real reasons for the difference of opinion among 
the Courts, as regards to the exact meaning of the term 
avy'avanarika, seem to lie in the following: (1) In view
of their impression of the general nature of the listed 
debts, Colebrooke’s translation of the terra avyavaharika 
debts seems to have led the English Judges to believe in 
the beginning that its significance amounted to that of the 
term 'illegal or immoral' debts in the sense in which they 
knew it from Roman law, as we have seen above (see p . 196 ff) .
(2) Later on interpretation of v/hat is 'illegal or immoral' 
in the Hindu law of debts on the one hand, and the common law 
approach, as opposed to that of an orthodox Hindu Court, 
of ascertainment of the law by piecc-meal application of 
judicial skill to individual sets of facts on the other, 
seem to have resulted in misinterpretation of the original 
term; for example see the cases which involved criminality 
(pp.229-231 above) or criminal and civil misappropriation 
discussed above (at pp.236-238). (3) In their well-intentioned
efforts to ascertain the law, such discrepancies appear to 
have been overlooked and perpetuated by the Courts due to an
2
unreflective application of the Common law doctrine of precedent
1 . "The advantage of the old system seems to have been its deliberate 
reservation in favour of local custom at all levels of law- 
ascertainment, couplea with a general superstitious belief in 
the supersensory effects of failure to give truth its chance.
The public's beliefs in justice therefore had several avenues 
leading from hope, and fantasy, into action. Social change 
and social control could correspond to jocal and even temporary 
needs, without the aid of the statutes, or of a class of inter­
preters of regulations or precedents - indeed there was no need 
for precedent as we know it."
Vide J.D.M.Derrett, see G.Smith and J .D.M.Derrett, cit.above, 
Journal of American Oriental Society, vol.95, No.3 (Sept. 
1975), p.417, at p.42o.
2. While dealing with a single judge's refusal to follow his
High Court's Full Bench decision, the Supreme Court observed, 
"We cannot but deprecate this practice as it destroys 
the certainty of the law which the theory of judicial 
precedent seeks to establish." Vide Kamalammal v.Venkat- 
alakshmi, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1349, at p . 1358, par a .21,c .1-2.
f.n. continued next page
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and stare decisis.1
Eut with the passing of time knowledge of the sastric 
implications improved and these discrepancies were brought
f.n. continued from last page) (This case involved a question 
of inheritance of a congenital deaf-mute who was sole 
surviving coparcener.)
Cf. "The great boasts of the present system, v i z .certainty 
and uniformity, though often belied in the progress of 
appeals and the High Court's divergencies in interpretation 
of the law, is conceivably enhanced when one considers what 
India had achieved under her own steam." 
per J .D .M,Derrett, op.cit., at p,420, c.1-2
The practice of following precedents led judicial decisions 
to become one of the sources of Hindu law, and upon these 
the Courts were expected to rely more for their law than 
other sources such as sastras or custom. It has been stated 
that
"since the British occupation of India another element has been 
added, that of judicial decisions of Indian Courts and of Privy 
Council on appeal from them. The rulings of the Privy Council are 
final and it is only in cases not covered by such rulings that 
recourse need be had to other sources." 
per Coutts Trotter, J. in Pudiava Nadan v. Pavanasa Nadan, 
A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 215 (F.B.), at p.218, c.1. (This case 
involved a question as to whether one congenitally blind 
was excluded from succession.)
However, as regards the authority of the texts and effects 
of judicial precedents, the Calcutta High Court has very 
recently held that,
" Judicial precedents though founded on reasonable and logical 
grounds cannot give jurisdiction to Courts to change law as 
laid down in the texts of Hindu Taw- A Court of law is concerned 
with application of the law to the facts of the case before it 
and while it has jurisdiction to interpret the law where the 
law is ambiguous or not clear, it has no jurisdiction to add 
to the law." See the brief note at p.38o, c.2.
Vide, Milan Kumar v .S m .P .Dassi , A.I.R. 1974 Cal. 380 
(Special Bench),see pp.385-86. (In this case, in a partition 
between brothers, their mother's right to and quantum of 
share were the issues to be decided.)
1. "First and foremost in cases of this character the principle 
of stare decisis must inevitably come into operation." 
per Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), in Luhar v.Doshi, 
cit.above, at p.970, para.17. Also see Venkanna v.Laxmi 
Sannappa, A.I.R. 1951 Bom.57; at pp.66-67 this principle is 
explained with the help of a number of authorities.
f.n. continued next page.
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to the Courts' notice; therefore the term avyavaharika 
came, for the first time, under judicial scrutiny. The 
efforts of the Courts in this respect led, as we know, to 
various definitions of the term. This time, it seems to 
have so happened due to (a) diverse facts arid circumstances, 
in the context of which the Courts were obliged to define the 
term, (see above pp.219-232); (b) Even if the facts were
similar, they were looked at from different standpoints by 
different judges, (see above pp.244-245); (c) In some cases,
confusion of general principles of morality as seen above 
at pp.237-239; (d) Certain definitions differing only in
degree, e.g., see the definitions of Venkatasubba Rao, J. and 
Beaumont, C.J. (above p.231). Thus, besides the facts and 
circumstances of cases concerned, personal views of the judges
f.n. continued from last page)
However, as regards to the above view of the Supreme 
Court, J.D.M.Derrett, at (1964) 10 Lucknow Law Journal, 
p.1, has said "as the Supreme Court and indeed other Indian 
courts have repeatedly shown, there may well be grounds for 
departing from previous decisions if these are shown to be 
wrong in principle." Also, according to the same author, 
in his A Critique of Modern Hindu Law, cited above,
"(1) precedents differ, and complete harmony is not to be 
found, even if it were desirable, which it frequently is 
not; and (2) in many fields, and especially family law, 
stare decisis either has only a moderate control, or 
controls only the framework, and not the details of the 
law." (see p.391, sec. 502).
It may not be out of place to refer to an instance in 
which the House of Lords has departed from the ratio decidendi 
of a former decision of the House, although it recognized 
the correctness of the actual decision in that case (i.e., 
Duncan v.Cammell Laird & Co,Ltd. (1942) 1 All. E.R.587.
In this connection, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest observed, 
"Though precedent is an indispensable foundation on which to 
decide what is the law, there may be times when a departure from 
precedent is in the interest of justice and the proper development 
of the law."
Conway v.Rimmer, (1968) 1 All. E.R. 874, at p.892. (The case
involved refusal to produce certain documents on the ground 
of Crown Privilege.)
Also see
Bengal Immunity Co.v.State of Bihar, A.I.R.1955 S.C.661;
M.Chhagganlal v.Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay,A .I .R . 
1974 S.C.2oo9, para. 43-47; K.C.Dora v .G .Annamanaidu, A.I.R. 
1974 S.C.1069, para.75-76. These cases, too, throw light 
on the subject; Maktul v.Manbhari, A.I.R.1958 S.C.918, 
para 9.
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seem to have caused this diversity (a factor which one should 
hesitate' - let it be admitted - to deprecate) . (4) Like
other terms which are intended to be of general application 
to various sets of facts, the term avyavaharika is obviously 
very difficult to define precisely; and tc that extent, 
this difficulty seems to have contributed to the diversity.
Before we put forward our suggestion in order to solve 
the problem, it may be observed that if the modern Courts 
still admit, as they do, that the concept of avyavaharika 
is the same as in the sastras, then for the purpose of its 
correct exposition, we would be justified in going back to 
the sastrie view.
As mentioned above (at p.218), we are not interested in 
each and every meaning of the word given by dictionaries.
For, '
"In interpreting these 'Smritis' which were rendered 
thousands of years ago it is not safe to merely 
to take the dictionary meaning and apply it to 
the texts. In this connection it has to be 
remembered that these 'Smritis' also deal with religious 
and moral law. According to Hindu conception 
'Dharma' is of widest significance and includes 
religious, moral, social and legal duties and can 
only be defined by its content." 1
The term required to serve our purpose is therefore expected
to be capable of representing, as accurately as possible,
the whole significance which the sastrakaras seem to have
intended to attribute to the term avyavaharika in the context
of the son's religious and moral liability to pay his father's
just debts. It should also be one which the modern Courts
of law would find acceptable to meet the needs of the day
without disturbing, as far as possible, the present position.
We may recall what we have discovered while examining the 
/—
sastric position as regards the meaning of the term vyavaharika, 
which is the positive from. This refers to those acts and 
values (whether spiritual, moral or otherwise) which were
1. Per Kuppuswami, J. in J.Devaraja Rao v.Income-tax Officer, 
A.I.R. 1970 A.P. 426 (F.B.) at pp.429-30.
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conventionally regarded as righteous or proper by contemporary
society (see above pp.169-173). Avyavaharika, the negative
form, would therefore imply acts and values repugnant to
those norms. It-is suggested, therefore, that the term
avyavaharika debt ..nay be defined as follows: A debt incurred
by the father for an unrighteous and wholly improper or 
2immoral purpose is an avyavaharika debt. This rendering 
appears to be more accurate than the most favoured definition 
to this day, i.e., Colebrooke's. For it includes not only 
immoral debts of the father, but also those of his unjust 
debts which may not be immoral but which may still be 
avyavaharika. It is in this sense that the term seems to
3 4
have been used from the time of the sastrakaras to this day.
We cannot claim, however, that even this definition 
would escape criticism. At the outset, it might be asked 
what exactly is meant by the terms 'unrighteous', 'wholly
5
improper' or 'immoral'? We have already seen, in the context
of the term avyavaharika, how one might be faced with
difficulties in respect of defining such terms as these,
£
and how they might reasonably be overcome. In order to 
solve this sort of difficulty, Rajamannar, C.J. observed that
1. "A debt incurred by the father for an unrighteous and wholly 
improper purpose is an avyavaharika debt which will not be 
binding on the son." Vide M.Veera Raghaviah v. M.China 
Verriah, A.I.R. 1975 A.P. 350, at p.355. In this case the 
fath.er incurred debts for prosecuting suits in order to 
defeat legitimate rights of his only son. Held, the son 
was not liable for the debts of his father.
Also, see above p.248, f.n.1.
2. There is hardly any need to give any authority, for, debts 
incurred by the father for an immoral purpose have been 
held without exception to be avyavaharika by all the High 
Courts, Privy Council and the Supreme Court.
3. See above f.n.3-4 at p.231 and f.n.1-2 at p.232, and f.n.3 
at p.247 and f.n.1 at p.248.
4. See above, f.n.1 at p.253.
5. See above, pp.160-173, and also pp.249-253.
6. See above, pp.169-173, as well as pp.253-254.
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"the conception of Pharma and Nyaya changes, and 
the term avyavaharika has to be applied to a 
particular case from the standpoint of notions 
of Pharma and^Nyaya prevailing at the time of 
the dispute". (My emphasis).
Likewise, the construction of these terms would seem to depend, 
in a given set of circumstances, on generally accepted notions 
of the people as regards what is 'right1 and 'wrong' or 'just' 
and 'unjust', in vlew of prevailing social, economic, religious 
or moral convictions. One would expect, therefore, that, 
generally speaking, these terms should be construed according 
to the significance attached to them in the particular society 
of the day.
Moreover, the question of defining the terms would also
2
be affected by the mental attitude of the judges towards 
the father's conduct in incurring the debt and the degree 
of moral disapprobation it would invoke."^
Thus, the meaning of these terms might vary according 
to different circumstances as well as the mental attitude of 
the judges. In view of this, it would seem impossible to 
determine it exactly so as to be applicable to all sorts of 
cases.
1. Perumal v. Province of Madras, I.L.R.1955 Mad.1179, at 
p . 1187; or A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 382 , at p. 386.
In this case it was contended that court-fee amounted 
to danda or fine. But it was held to be of fiscal nature, 
and it was not avyavaharika, because there was no element 
of moral turpitude involved in it.
2. A good example of how this result would come about is the 
definition of the term avyavaharika adopted (in Govindprasad 
v .Raghunathprasad, A.I.R.1939 Bom.289, (F.B.) by Beaumont, 
C.J. and by Venkatasubba Rao, J . , (in Ramasubramania v . 
Sivakami, A.I.R. 1925 Mad.841), cited above, p.217.
3. "After all, in each case the decision of this question has to
depend on the mental attitude of the judge and the degree of 
moral disapprobation it invokes. In such vague matters like 
this, only a general principle like the above can be laid 
down, leaving its application to the facts of each case and 
to the good sense of the judges, who have to deal with them,"
N .R.Raghavachariar, Hindu Law, cited above, p.346.
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The terms could reasonably be ascertained, however, 
in a given set of circumstances. In this regard, it may 
respectfully be suggested that the judges intent upon enforcing 
properly the purpose of the provision of Hindu law, i.e., that 
an avyavaharika debt of the father is not enforceable from 
his son, would do well, while keeping the exception within 
its proper scope, if, for example, they would free themselves 
in appropriate cases from their occasional rigid adherence 
to the principles of 'precedents1 and 5 stare decisis1, and 
then determine in each case as to whether or not the father's 
debt is unrighteous etc. in the context of the son's liability 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, mainly with reference
to the father's conduct, not as 'an ordinary man' in the sense
1 2 of a sple owner, but as 'the father of a joint Hindu family' .
i
1. For, before birth of his sons, any Hindu could dispose of 
his property in any manner he pleased and afterborn sons 
could not assail his alienation either on the ground of 
immoral purpose or for want of legal necessity. Vide 
Dwarka Prasad v. Firm Lalchand, A.I.R. 1974 Pat.103, at 
p. 112. In this case, afterborn sons challenged their 
father's alienations made before their birth. It was held 
that they could not succeed.
2. In connection with a manager's alienation, it has been said 
that
"the degree of prudence which might fairly be required from 
a person who was not the sole owner of the property might 
naturally be somewhat greater than that which might be 
expected in the case of a sole owner"; 
per Beys, J. in Jagat Narian v .Mathuradas, (1928) 26 A.L.J.R.
841, (F.B.), at p.846.
Although the power of an ordinary manager and that of 
a father-manager differ accordiny to Hindu law, in view of 
the above observation, it may be said that even the father 
who is not the sole owner would be expected to deal more 
carefully with the joint family property than a sole owner. 
Moreover, in accordance with the renderings by Balambhatta 
and Apararka (see above, pp.161-162) of the term avyavaharika 
debt, a similar degree of caution in respect of his debts 
might well be expected from the father.
The following seems to support our view. Thus, while 
commenting on the tendency as to how the term avyavaharika 
is presently defined, J.D.M.Derrett has said that
"Today the most favoured explanation is that it is not so wide 
in its meaning as 'what a decent and respectable man would not
f.n. continued next page
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It is hero that the judges are expected to use their good 
sense and fulfil rhe intentions of the law-givers.
" T h e  charge of vagueness cannot be avoided altogether, 
but it can be said that this definition is no vaguer than 
others. In any case, a certain amount of vagueness is 
implicit in all definitions which are intended to be of general 
application to various sets of facts.
VI.3 THE EXTENT OF THE CONCEPT OF AVYAVAHARIKA DEBTS
There appears to be some confusion as regards the scope 
of this concept. We have already noted above (see p.214) 
how the term avyavaharika debts came to be regarded as 
'illegal or immoral debts'. The Privy Council has also said 
that "debts in the nature of avyavaharika are debts which
would be comprised in the expression 'illegal or immoral'
1 2 debts". Most of the text-book writers seem to acquiesce
in this view, but very few of them have tried to explain why
or what is precisely the scope of the term. As regards the
expression 'illegal or immoral', Mayne says,
f.n. continued from last page)
'incur', nor so narrow as 'not lawful, usual or customary', 
what is contrary to public policy', but rather 'what is not 
customarily or properly incurred by a Hindu father of a family',
being tainted by moral turpitude."
Vide I M . H . L . , cited above, at p. 31 4, sec. 509.
1. Hemraj v. Khemchand, cited above, pp.177-73.
2. J.D.Mayne, Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, cited above, 
at p.399; "The writers of the text-books use the two terms 
as comprising all the debts for which the sons are declared 
not liable." G.Sarkar Sastri, A Treatise on Hindu L a w ,
6th edn., (Cal.1927), at p.387; N .R.Raghavachariar, Hindu 
Law, cited above, at p.344; The term 'illegal or immoral' 
"expresses in a paraphrase the Sanskrit term 'avyavaharika';" 
per J.D.M. Derrett, I.M.H.L., cited above, at p.313, (mis­
leadingly) ; R.K.Agarwala, Hindu L a w , 5th edn., (All.1971), 
pp. 393-395; P.Diwan, Modern Hindu Lav/, 2nd edn., (All.
1974), p.270.
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"The expression was doubtless originally meant 
to render avyavaharika, but it has come to be 
used as a compendious term to cover all the 
cases enumerated in the Smritis,"1
However, his treatment of these debts seems to imply that
there is some distinction between avyavaharika and the rest
of the enumerated debts. He has treated certain enumerated
debts individually, and yet, without any explanation, he
has discussed, under the heading avyavaharika debts, cases
2
of debts due to fine and concubine which are themselves 
enumerated debts. N .R .Raghavachariar has adopted a slightly 
different method in that he has discussed all these debts in 
the section called 'Debts nor attracting pious obligation'.
After dealing with commercial, surety and time-barred debts 
of the father, he seems to suggest that
"The whole question can be considered under 
the term Avyavaharika which may be adopted 
as a compendious expression describing the 
debts to which the pious obligation does 
not attach."3
Although he does not seem to differ in substance from Mayne 
his approach offers some explanation. Logically, all those 
debts which do not attract the son's pious obligation would 
be avyavaharika, and in that sense the term avyavaharika may 
be taken to include the rest of the enumerated debts in the 
smrtis, but even this explanation does not seem to bring ou4-. 
the precise scope of the term.
According to J .D.M.Derrett this term represents "a do. fin.it-
4
ion of a residuary class of 'tainted' debts," such as, for
1. J.D.Mayne, opp.cited, p.399.
2. Ibid., Sec.319-A, at p.405, f.n.(e) and (ei); Also, for a 
similar treatment see F.D.Mulla, 14th edn., cited above, at 
p.387, f.n.(e); N .R.Raghavachariar has also included debts 
due to fine in his classification of 'avyavaharika debLs'
at p.345, (see No.6 - 'fines imposed as a result of criminal 
trial'.)
3. Ibid., at p.344.
4. Introduction to Modern Hindu L a w , op.cit., pp.313-314.
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example, those incurred in the course of an act punishable
under the Penal Code or wagering contracts or highly tortious 
1
acts, etc.. In other words, he appears to have excluded, 
by implication, all the other enumerated debts from the scope 
of the term avyavaharika debts. Kis rendering appears to be 
substantially correct; .in the sense that all the debts, which 
do not fall specifically under any of the enumerated categories, 
but which have been considered to be outside the scope of the 
son's liability, have been held so on the ground of their 
being avyavaharika .
On the other hand, seen in the light of its rendering 
particularly in the Smrtichandrika and Vyavaharaprakas'a of 
the Viramitrodaya where it has been defined very clearly 
as meaning 'for liquor or drinking wine' (see above, p p . 161- 
162) which is definitely an -enumerated debt, it cannot 
realistically be denied that even the listed debts seem to 
be avyavaharika. We have come to the same conclusion above 
while determining its scope in the section on the sastric
position (see above, pp.173-174). In fact, it would appear
- 2 
that the term avyavaharika is wide enough to cover both the
listed debts as well as non-listed debts because of their
unrighteous or immoral nature, and therefore, it might be
appropriate to discuss the whole case law involving both the
listed and non-listed avyavaharika debts under the scope of
3
this concept.
1. j.bid., at p.314, (Sec.510).
2. Besides the views of J.D.Mayne and N.R.Raghavachariar which 
we have already quoted; see also the following view as 
regards all the tainted debts: "The fact of the matter is , 
that today there has remained only one broad head 'avyavahaika1 
debts." Vide P.Diwan, Modern Hindu Law, cited above, at
p.270; "According to recent decisions debts for spirituous 
liquors,   debts arising out of promises without considerat­
ion, surety debts, etc. are 'avyavaharika' debts." Vide 
R.K.Agarwala, Hindu L a w , cited above, at p.394.
3. In fact this has been done in F.D.Mulla, cited above, sec.
298, p.350 ff, or see its latest i.e. 14th edn., (Bom.1974), 
at p.385 ff; also, P.Diwan, cited above, at pp.270-272;
R.K.Agarwala, op.cited, pp.393-394.
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The father may be indebted due to actual borrowing of 
money or by way of some objectionable act on his part which
i
has-resulted in making him liable to a certain amount of 
money. We have already noted above (see pp. 214-215) that 
the debts of the father by way of grossly extravagant expenses, 
imprudent transactions, fraud, misappropriation of other's 
property, decrees of the Courts for damages, mesne profits, 
costs etc. and even time-barred debts have been considered 
as falling under the category of avyavaharika deots.
It is proposed, however, for the sake of convenience 
in discussing these debts, that they may be classified accord­
ingly to their origin. Thus, the first two kinds of debts may 
be discussed under the debts due to borrowing; and the rest
i
of them, except the last named, under debts due to some 
objectionable conduct on the part of the father. It may be 
noted here that it is neither scientific nor an exclusive 
classification, for, there might be cases, such as, for example, 
those involving costs, which might fall under either of these 
headings.
V I .3.1 CASES INVOLVING DEBTS ARISING OUT OF BORROWING 
OR IMPRUDENT TRANSACTIONS OF THE FATHER
(i) Debts due to the father's extravagant indulgencies.
The debts discussed here would be roughly those which 
the father had incurred orally or in writing, or by alienation
1 . "The ward used in the text for debt is ' rina' which literally means 
a loan, but it is obvious that there is no difference in 
principle between a case in which a liability to repay 
is cast upon by actual borrowing and a case in which a person 
is bound to discharge an obligation created by a judgement 
of Court."
Vide Raghunandan Sahu v. Badri Teli, A.I.R. 1938 All.263,
at p.264, c.2. This was a case involving debts due for 
malicious prosecution. (See below p. 354 ff.)
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of the joint family property to meet his extravagant 
indulgences and where such transactions were thought to be 
imprudent.
In several cases, in which the liability incurred by 
the father had been proved to be not for any legal necessity 
of the family, as will be seen below, attempts were made 
repeatedly to show that such debts were the outcome of the 
father*s extravagant or immoral living and hence avyavaharika.
To begin with, in Timmarah v. Vencapah1 (1807), the son
of an insolvent debtor was held to be liable for the payment
of the decretal debt which was not found to be excepted by
Hindu law. It appears that the decision was based on the
Pandit's advice to the effect that if a father contracts a
debt "for the purpose of spirituous liquor, or debauchery, or
2other improper objects, it is not obligatoryvon the son." 
Although the precise nature of the debt has not been mentioned 
in the report it seems that it was not avyavaharika. However, 
the importance of -this, perhaps the earliest case reported 
on the subject, seems to lie in its indication as to which 
of the father's debts would be regarded as avyavaharika. The 
term 'other improper objects', which appears to be synonymous 
with the term avyavaharika (see also, p.212 above) would 
obviously attract our attention while discussing other cases 
in this section.
3
In Oomed Rai v. Heera Lall (1851),
i
"The sons of a living father were, with his suspected 
collusion, attempting, in a suit against a creditor, 
to get rid of the charge on an ancestral estate
1. Vide here T.Strange, Hindu L a w , II, 3rd edn., (Madras, 
1859), p.456; also, see above at p.211, f.n.6.
2. Ibid.
3. 6 S.D.A. (N.W.P.) 218.
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created by the father, on the ground of the 
alleqed misconduct of.the father in extravagant 
waste of the estate."1
The creditor appears to have succeeded in establishing
his claim. Unfortunately, due to incomplete reporting
the case, we are unable to comment upon this decision.
after referring to this decision the Privy Council, in
2famous case of Hunoomanpersaud Panday '1856) has made 
observations which are worth quoting here:
"Unless the debt was of such a nature that it was 
not the duty of the son to pay it ; the discharge 
of it, even though it affected ancestral estate, 
would still be an act of pious duty in the son.
By Hindoo law, the freedom of the son from the 
obligation to discharge the father's debt, has 
respect to the nature of the debt, and not to 
the nature of the estate, whether ancestral or 
acquired by the creator of the debt." >, (My emphasis).
Obviously, the emphasis on the nature of the father's debt 
in this observation would seem, by implication, to have 
reference to avyavaharika debts. Our problem is, however, 
to find out how the Courts have treated debts due to extra­
vagance or imprudence. The question came up for judicial 
opinion in Mussumat Junnuk Kishoree Koonwur v. Rughoonundun
4
Sing (1861). In this case the father, who was a young man
1. The facts of the case quoted here as they have been stated 
by the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v.Mussumat 
Babocee Munraj Koonweree, (1856), 6 M.I.A. 3 93, at p.418.
For,; the reporting of the case has confined itself to that 
part of the decision which concerned to the point whether 
'heirs should pay their ancestor's debts before they alienated 
any ancestral property'.
2. Ibid.. This case is concerned with the powers of a de facto 
manager (mother in this case) in connection with certain 
transactions with the’ ancestral property made in order to 
pay debts of a Hindu minor's father, deceased.
3. Per Lord Justice Knight Bruce, at p.421.
4. (1861) 1 S.D.A. (L.B.) 213. The question (as to whether
the father's debts, due to extravagance, were of such a 
nature as under Hindu law to render the property in which 
the sons have a vested interest under no circumstances 
liabie) was raised in 2nd issue at p.217.
of
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and who had inherited a large estate - both movable and 
immovable, squandered almost all of it in a space of four 
years allegedly for the purpose of 'playing and toying'.
A number of alienations of the ancestral property made by 
him were not for any family necessity. These alienations 
were challenged, on behalf of his infant son, on the ground 
that they were made without any necessity, but merely to 
satisfy his present extravagances. It was attempted to he 
shown by the evidence of witnesses that the extravagances 
of the father were of the nature of dissipations, for which
under Hindu law, as being repugnant to good morals, the son
would under no circumstances be liable, and therefore on 
this ground the sale of property in which the son has a 
vested interest was illegal.
However, the Court was *not satisfied with the nature 
of the evidence adduced. It said that
"all dissipation tends to extravagance, but all 
extravagances are not caused by dissipation
repugnant to good morals in the Hindoo sense
of that term, and nothing but the strongest and 
most reliable evidence as to the particular 
nature of the dissipation of the debtor, would 
justify our giving a verdict on the second issue 
in plaintiff's favour, and as no evidence of that 
kind is before us, we find for the defendant 
upon it"*.
Now, it is clear that the Court attempted to find whether
extravagance due to dissipation was avyavaharika; and this
it did in view of the definition of that term as given by
Colebrooke. According to its findings, the father's debts,
"though caused by extravagance, were such as a son wou3d be 
2
liable for". In other words, extravagance as such would 
not render the father's debt avyavaharika unless it was also 
immoral. We have already shown above (see p.254) that the 
term avyavaharika has wider meaning than 'repugnant to good 
morals'. In addition to immoral purposes, it includes 
Unrighteous as well as wholly improper purposes on the part
1. Ibid., at p.220.
2. Ibid., at p .222.
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of the father. Looked at from thin point of view on the one 
hand, and the size of the squandered estate as well as the 
short period in which it was squandered on the other, one 
wonders whether the extravagance of the father in this case, 
even if it would not have been canned by immoral dissipation, 
would justly be exempted from ayvayaharika. It does not 
seem to be.
In spite of its findings that the debts of the father 
were not for causes repugnant to good morals, after careful 
analysis of all the evidence, the court came to the conclusion 
that the father's liability which arose out of his own extra­
vagance and not out of any legal necessity, would not, after
i
all, bind the son's interest in those properties, the
alienations of which took place without the intervention of 
i 1
the courts. This result has been achieved,^however, not
with the help of any expressed principle of Hindu law, but
with the help of the English law of Equity and Trust. The
court observed,
"Now in sales made without the intervention of 
a court of justice when the vendor is a trustee 
for others as well as part owner, and the purchaser 
a stranger, such purchaser is, as contended for by the 
learned Advocate General, under an obligation to 
enquire and see that no breach of trust is by the 
act of sale to him committed, when moreover, the 
purchaser is not a stranger, but a person knowing 
not only the position of the vendor, but the 
circumstances of the family, the obligation is 
stronger upon them of making such enquiry, and 
if the transaction, of whatever nature it may 
be, be afterwards called in question, the onus 
is clearly upon him of shewing what those facts 
were which were represented to him, as raising 
the necessity, which was sufficient to justify it 
in his mind under the law applicable to the case.
"After an attentive analysis of all the evidence 
placed before us by the defendants, we are unable 
to say, that any such proof of a satisfactory 
nature has been placed before us by them in this 
case, but the doctrine has been openly adopted 
by them that the sales themselves prove their own 
ncessity; we think that this doctrine is altogether 
an erroneous one, and that on the simple failure
1. Ibid., p .223.
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by them to prove that they had made any enquiry 
as to the legal necessity of: the sales in either 
class of cases under consideration, this case 
* might at once be decided against them; but on 
referring to the evidence of the plaintiff, the 
nature of all these transactions at once becomes 
apparent, and also the fact, that they were all 
without exception entered into without any legal 
necessity, considerable sums in the aggregate 
were paid over to the debtor, for which bonds 
to a large amount were given and decrees have 
been obtained on those bonds, and the transaction 
seems to have been part of a system entered 
into by certain parties, including the principal 
defendant, to ease plaintiff's father of his 
ancestral property by supplying his extravagances.
The existence of a bond debt or a decree founded 
I on it, are neither of them as a general rule 
j sufficient to warrant a private sale of property 
j partly held in trust beyond the amount of the 
decree or bond debt without the intervention of 
: the court, and it follows a fortiori, that where
there are neither decrees or bond debts, the sale 
of trust property at all can, under no circumstances, 
except those of.strict legal necessity, be upheld 
by the court."
After reading this judgement, one might ask whether the cause 
of justice could have been served better. Just though this 
judgement seems to be, it is based partly upon Hindu law 
and partly upon English law. (For the significance of these 
principles in Hindu law, see below the chapter on notice).
In short, according to the court, the debts of the father, 
arising out of extravagance but not caused by immoral 
dissipations, would not be avyavaharika debts, and the son 
would be liable for them. However, the same debts would, 
it seems, be irrecoverable (in a modern version of avyavaharika) 
in the sense that the son would not be liable for them, 
provided that the creditors did not make any enquiry as to 
the existence of legal necessity, or more so, if they knowingly 
conspired to supply his extravagance. Before going over to 
the next case, it may be mentioned here that the standard of 
evidence laid down by the court, for proving the nature of
1. Ibid, pp.222-223.
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a particular debt, appears (in the light of the law after 
1856) to be too high, particularly in the context of the 
facts of this case, though it may well be reasonable in 
certain other cases, such as those involving collusion between 
the sons and their father.
The Plaintiffs (sons) had alleaed, in Girdliaree Lall v.
2
Kantoo Lall, (1874) that the sale was made to pay debts 
incurred by fathers through extravagance and immorality, and 
to provide funds for the like purposes etc. The Principal 
Sudder Ameen had found that the Plaintiffs had entirely failed 
to establish that the debts contracted by their fathers were 
for an immoral purpose. Accordina to him,
j
I "It is true that some of the witnesses have said 
j that money was spent on dancing; but, from the 
! peculiar habits of the people of this part of 
the country, spending a little money'on festive 
occasions, to which this dancing was confined, 
is not reprehensible .... On these grounds 
the sales of properties which have been taken 
in execution of decrees, and by intervention of 
Courts, though for debts having their origin in 
extravagance, cannot be interfered with, as the 
sons are liable for such debts. 113 (My emphasis) .
On appeal to the High Court, one of the Plaintiffs, Kantoo 
Lall, succeeded because the High Court found that "there was 
no evidence to shew that the fathers required to raise money 
for any pressing necessity, for the benefit of the family."^
The Privy Council, however, restored the Principal Sudder 
Ameen' s, decision on the ground that the sons failed to prove 
that the debts were incurred for an immoral purpose. The 
Privy Council was, it seems, of the opinion that there was 
collusion between the fathers and the sons. Although hardly 
anything has been said by the Privy Council on the 'extravagant'
1. See above p.262, f.n.2.
2. (1874) 1 I.A. 321 (P.C.).
3. Ibid., at p .323.
4. Ibid., at p .326.
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origin of the debt, it might be correct to say that it, 
probably, was of the same opinion as that of the Principal 
Sudder Ameen.
1In Suraj Bunsl Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh (1679) , the
father was indebted not for any legal necessity but for mere
2purposes of extravagance. According to the High Court,
"The on.ly necessity of Adit Sahai was his own improper and 
immoral way of life, which craved the expenditure of funds 
not derivable from his regular income.'' These findings 
as regards the matters of fact were affirmed by the Privy 
Council, though it did not agree with the decision of the 
High Court.
The High Court held that the sons failed to prove that 
the decree for sale was improper. The rationale of the High 
Court's decision seems to lie in its following observation:
"There are plenty of witnesses who depose to the 
fact that Adit Sahai was a young man of dissipated 
habits, was fond of drinking and natches, and spent 
a great deal of money; but none of them are able 
to give any particulars, of the debt for which the 
decree was given, or to show that the money advanced 
was to clear off debts of a disreputable character, 
so as to make the decree of the lendej, who knowingly 
made such advances, an improper one."
Thus, the High Court found the evidence insufficient to prove 
the sons' case because none of the witnesses could give any 
particulars of the debt, i.e., to pinpoint a disreputable 
cause for which the amount advanced to the father was spent.
We may ask whether the facts and the circumstances of the 
case required this kind of proof. It was already overwhelmingly 
proved that not only there was no legal necessity, but also 
the father's debt arose out of his extravagant expenditure 
on immoral purposes. One would think it reasonable to expect, 
in the circumstances, that the witnesses should produce evidence 
of that nature such as that the debtor often visited drinking 
and gambling houses, or was seen always drunk, or spent most
1 . (1879) 6 I.A. 88.
2. As found by the trial Court, see ibid., at p. 89.
3. Ibid., at p .91.
4. Ibid., at p .92.
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of his time and money in the company of n a bches or prostitutes;: 
but to expect a witness to produce a receipt, for example, 
showing that a particular sum of money from the loan was paid 
by the father r_o a prostitute, would seem to be going too far, 
For how often would a man like Adit Sahai, who is infected 
by so many vices, leave behind the kind of evidence which 
the Court seems to have expected from the witnesses, particul­
arly in a society which deprecated the kind of immoral acts 
he was involved in?
The Privy Council found that the ruling of the High Court
was erroneous. For, in the opinion of their Lordships of
the Privy Council, the evidence, which was sufficient to
prove that the original indebtedness of the father was for
immoral purposes, would not be insufficient to prove the
2
same against the respondents in this case. ‘This view of 
the Privy Council seems to indicate, though it has not said 
so in so many words, that to secure the son's interest generally 
the evidence adduced by him need not necessarily be such that 
it should always prove the direct relation between the debt 
impeached and the alleged immoral act or purpose for which 
it was incurred or applied. However, the fact is that the 
controversy as regards the proof of direct connection between 
a debt of the father and an alleged vicious act on the part 
of the father continued, and therefore it has repeatedly 
attracted judicial attention.
Thus in Sadashiv Dinkar Joshi and others v. Dinkar
3
Narayan Joshi and others (1882) the sons (riaintiff-Appellants) 
sued their father and the present alienee of their ancestral 
lands on the ground that the alienation was not binding on 
their shares. The lands were originally mortgaged by the 
father. Upon the suit by the mortgagee to realise his security, 
a decree was passed in execution of which the property was 
sold. The same property was resold to the present defendant 
no. 2. The father did not appear. The second defendant alleged 
collusion between the plaintiffs and their father.
1. Ibid., at p. 107.
2. Ibid.
3. (1882) I.L.R., 6 Bom. 520.
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1
After referring ho Girdharilall v. Kantoolall and
relying on the now famous propositions laid down in Suraj
Bunsi Koer's care,- the High Court affirmed the decision
of the lower Court on the ground that the sons "have not
proved anything beyond the fact that their father kept a
mistress, and have rot proved any connection between that
3
act and the debt in question." Seen in the light- of the 
alleged collusion, a showing by the sons of some connection 
between the debt and the alleged immorality would seem to 
be justifiable.
4
In Hanuman Singh v. Nanak Chand (1884) it was alleged 
that the alienation in question was not binding on the sou 
because Balwant Singh, the father of the minor plaintiff- 
appellant, 'indulged in prime of his life in immoral pursuits, 
gambling and extravagance, and consequently involved himself 
in debt: the creditors knowingly advanced loans for immoral 
purposes and extravagance. The defendant also lent money 
while Balwant Singh was in a state of infatuation, for defraying 
the expenses of gambling and licentiousness, as well as to
5
meet other immoral expenditures', etc.. The appellant's
father v/as alive and lived with him and his mother in the
same house. In view of the fact and due to the defendant's
6suggestion to that effect, the Court suspected that the father
1. (1874) 1 I.A. 321; discussed above at pp.265-266.
2. (1879) 6 I.A. 88; discussed above at pp.266-267.
3. (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom. 520, at p.523, per Westropp, C.J.
4. (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 193.
5. Ibid., at pp.194-195.
6. "Looking, however, to the fact that the plaintiff is a minor, who 
at the time of institution of this litigation was little more 
than ten years of age, and that he was then and is now residing 
at Meerut with his mother, in the same house as his father 
Balwant Singh, against whom he has by the plaint preferred such 
grave charges of profligacy and extravagance, there is certainly 
some ground for suspecting that Balwant Singh is at the bottom
of this suit, as suggested by the defendant." 
per Straight, J . , ibid., at pp.201-202; Stuart, C.J., also 
came to similar conclusion; see ibid., at p.203.
It may respectfully be pointed out here that the mere 
fact of living together alone might not always be a good
f.n. continued next page
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was at the bottom of this suit. Obviously this suspicion
seems to have affected, in the main, the decision of the
Court, We have two separate judgements from the two judges
who decided this appeal. Neither of them, however, seems
to have inquired whether building the house concerned was
a necessity when it was actually built. Both of them have
found that the father was guilty of gross extravagance and
grave misconduct, and that by the most reckless and profligate
expenditure he had frittered away the entire ancestral estate.
Mr. Justice Straight seems to have made a distinction between
the general misconduct of the father and his application of
2
the debt in question, and the son's inability to prove
f.n. continued from last page)
ground for suspecting the plaintiff's bona fides in such 
suits. Even if the father is an immoral arid extravagant 
man, he would rarely leave or would rarely be driven 
out of the family home for various reasons such as 
social, religious, economic or even moral, e.g., generally 
speaking, a Hindu wife would have hardly left her husband, 
particularly in those days, however immoral or extravagant 
he might have been. For, to her he was and still is 
supposed to be everything. Even if she disliked him, 
living apart would have been, at least socially, unbearable 
in most cases.
1 . "The evidence given on behalf of che plaintiff no doubt goes 
far to establish gross extravagance ana grave misconduct on 
the part of Balwant Singh, and the fact seems abundantly 
established, that by the most reckless and profligate 
expenditure he has frittered away the entire ancestral estate, 
which came to him on the death of his fahter Ran jit Singh." 
per Straight, J . , at p. 201,
"Balwant Singh's misconduct as a spend-thrift is ful-ly 
proved." per Stuart, C.J., at p.203.
2. With reference to the statements of the several witnesses 
for the plaintiff, Mr. Justice Straight said,
"It seems to me enough to say that not one of them is able 
to speak as to the purposes to which the money borrowed from 
the defendant was devoted having been of an immoral kind in the 
sense of the Hindu Law."
Ibid., at p .201.
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precisely that the loan was used for immoral purpose seems 
to have led him to decide in favour of the defendant. On 
the-other hand. Chief Justice Stuart seems to have taken into 
account the father's recklessness and misconduct, which, in 
his view, led to the borrowing from the defendant and therefore 
found that the debt "was not of a faultless character."
Also, unlike his colleague, he was of the opinion that the 
burden of proof was on the defendant; and but for the 
suspicion as regards the bona fides of the plaintiff in 
bringing this suit, it would appear that the Chief Justice 
might have held in favour of the plaintiff.
Although the authority of this decision would seem to 
be rather weak, due to the different opinions of the judges, 
it has brought to the forefront, from our point of view, an 
important issue, i.e., whether or not the Coijrts should, in 
cases where the sons have failed to prove a direct connection 
between the father's debt and his immorality, take into 
account the father's general gross misconduct or his immoral 
behaviour while considering the nature of a particular debt 
when the debt was not incurred for any legal necessity.
2
In the case of Krishnaji Lakshman v. Vithal Ravji Renge 
(1887) the father's mortgage of ancestral, property led to 
sale of the property in execution of the decree obtained by 
mortgagee of the father. His son then sued to set aside the 
alienation on the ground, inter alia, that the debts were 
contracted for immoral purposes.
The son proved that the mortgage-debts were in fact 
contracted for immoral purposes. The High Court remarked, 
however,
1. "Balwant Singh's misconduct as a spendthrift is fully proved by 
the evidence which has been taken, and more than one of the 
defendant's own witnesses speak to facts showing his character
in this respect, and it is in my opinion perfectly fair to suggest 
that if it had not been for Balwant Singh's reckless extravagance 
..., the money advanced to him by the defendant for the purpose 
of building the house mentioned in the pleadings would never have 
been required. The debt, therefore, to the defendant was not of 
a faultless character." per Stuart, C.J., ibid., at p.203.
2. (1887) I.L.R. 12 Bom. 625.
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" the case of those appellant-defendanrs who purchased 
at auction sales stands on a different, footing. The 
Subordinate Judge has disallowed their claim as 
, against the plaintiff's share in the lands sold 
merely on the ground thait the sales were made in 
execution of decrees for debts contracted by his 
father for immoral purposes. But, in dealing with 
this part of the case, the Subordinate Judge has not 
considered the question whether the purchasers had 
notice that the debts were so c o n t r a c t e d 1
This was in the opinion of the Court essential in a case 
such as this. The son's interest was saved, however, on 
the ground that the father's interest only was bargained and 
paid for, and not the son's; and thus, the Court would appear 
to have defeated the other principle of law which the Court 
had approved as essential for the purpose of deciding this 
sort of case. For, had the Court carried it to its logical 
conclusion, the son might have failed to save his share.
Would not the rule of law, in this situation, be simply 
illusory if it could be so defeated? It seems so, and for 
that reason this decision appears to be a bad one.
In the case of Bhagbut Pershad v. Mussumat Girja Koer  ^
(188 8) certain ancestral property was sold in execution of 
a decree passed against three Hindu brothers in an action 
brought upon their bonds for recovery of a certain amount. 
Afterwards, the suit to set aside the sale was brought by the 
widows on their and their sons' behalf on the ground that the 
debts were incurred by their husbands during minority of their 
sons for immoral and licentious purposes.
According to the judgement of. the High Court, it v/as 
proved that the debtors were leading a life of debauchery and 
sensuality; and if the lenders had made proper inquiry they 
would have found that the necessities of the loan arose from
1. Per Parsons, J . , ibid., at p.631.
For this proposition the Court relied, perhaps wrongly,
• on the case of Suraj Bunsi Koer, (1879) L.R., 6 I.A. 88, 
cited above.
2. (1888) 15 I.A. 99.
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their improper and immoral way of life. But the evidence
adduced was not sufficient to establish that the debts
1
impeached were actually applied to immoral purposes. Even
if this was so, it would appear that the High Court held
in favour of the sons, due to the lack of proper inquiry
on the part of the money-lenders, who had sued and recovered
their judgements in the execution of which the sale took
place. However, the Privy Council found the High Court's
decision erroneous. For, in their 'Lordships1 view, it was
necessary for the sons, in this case, to prove that the debt
was contracted for an immoral purpose, and it was not for
2the creditors to show that they made a proper inquiry, etc..
It would appear that this decision affirmed that unless the 
evidenge adduced by the son proved the direct connection 
between the debt and his father's immorality, he would not 
succeed. v
The father in the case of Meenakshi Naidu v. Immudi
3
Kanaka Ramaya Kounden (1888) had incurred debts on a promissory 
note. The note-holder obtained a money decree against the 
father. The son of the debtor alleged that the debt was 
contracted for illegal and immoral purposes. The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council agreed with the findings of 
the High Court that
"The income which remained for the support of the 
family was not large, and although the first 
Defendant may have been extravagant in his 
expenditure in proportion to his fortune, and 
have indulged in immorality, it is not shewn 
that the loan was taken with the intention
that it should be expended in immoral purposes,
or that it was so expended;" 4
and, therefore, held that the son was liable for it. This,
again, is a case in which the son seems to have failed due to 
lack of evidence showing direct connection between the debt 
and his father's immoral purposes.
1. Ibid., at p . 103.
2 . Ibid., at p.105.
3. (1888) 16 I.A. 1
4. Ibid., at p.2
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i
In the case of Chintamanrao Mehandale v. Kashinath .
(1890) the mortgagee of the father sued for sale or fore­
closure, The mortgage sued upon was executed to the plaintiff's 
father in 1878 by the defendant's father (since deceased).
The defendant contended that the debt was contracted for 
immoral purposes, and therefore the ancestral p r o p e r t y  was 
not liable. He further stated that his father was of such 
vicious or extravagant habits that in 1868 he had published 
a notice in the newspapers warning people against lending 
his father money. It was proved by the evidence that the 
father was in fact a man of vicious and extravagant habits.
It was therefore argued on behalf of the appellant (defendant) 
in the High Court that the onus of proof was shifted once the 
son had proved general immorality and extravagance of the 
father. Moreover, it was said that the creditor had notice
S
of these habits, and ought to have inquired as to the object 
for which he was lending money.
Sargent, C.J., while delivering the judgement of the 
Division Bench, concluded as follows:
"It has, however, been contended before us that 
the burden of proof was discharged by the defendant 
whan he had established that his father was an 
extravagant man who kept a mistress and delighted 
in nautches, and that the onus was then shifted to 
the plaintiff of proving that this particular 
transaction was not for an illegal or immoral 
purpose. This is inconsistent with the rulings 
in Hanuman Singh v. Nanakchand, I .L .R ., 6 A11.193,
;and Gadashiv Dinkar v. Dinkar Narayan, I.L.R.,
6 Bom.520, which are to the effect that some 
connection must be shown between the debt and 
the father's immoralities. This evidence was 
♦ wanting, although it might perhaps be to some
extent inferred from the evidence as a whole 
that the loan was used to minister to the father's 
extravagant habits."2
1. (1890) I.L.R., 14 Bom. 320
2. Ibid., at p.327.
It may be noted here that the decision has been cited with 
approval, not only as regards to the nature of evidence,
f.n. continued next page.
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N o w , looking to the facts of the case, particularly 
in view of the public notice given to all future creditors 
of the father, and in the absence of any collusion on the 
part of the debtor and his son, the onus of proof should 
have shifted, it seems, in order to avoid any injustice 
being done, once the son had proved that his father had all 
along been indulging in immoral pursuits. Moreover, the 
decisions relied upon here would seem to be of doubtful 
applicability^ for, in both those cases, the High Courts 
had suspected collusion on the part of the father and sons.
The father of the minors, in the case of Bhavani Bakhsh 
1v. Ram Dai (1891) incurred debts to meet personal expenses 
which were beyond his means. Consequently the whole of the 
family interest in a certain Zamindari estate was mortgaged. 
When the creditors attached’the property for^sale, the sons 
objected on the ground that their shares in the property 
were not liable because of the immoral nature of the debt. 
The father died while the suit was pending. The creditor 
lived within two doors of the debtor.
f.n. continued from last page) but also for showing the
extent of the father's power of binding his son's interest 
in the ancestral property in the following cases:
(a) Joharmal v. Eknath, (1900) I.L.R., 24 Bom. 343, at p.345 
In this case, a money-decree was passed against the father, 
and in execution of that decree ancestral property was sold 
at a Court sale. His sons obstructed on the ground that 
the house was their ancestral property. No illegality or 
immorality was alleged or proved. Held that the property 
was liable.
(b) Ramchandra v .Fakirappa, (1900) 2 Bom.L.R., 450, at p.452 
The Mortgagee sued to realise loan to the father. No illegal 
ity or immorality or any legal necessity was proved. The 
sons (respondents) failed.
(c) Hurmukh Rai v.Narotam Pass, (1907) 9 Bom.L.R.125, at 
p. 135. It was alleged that the father's debts were of 
wagering or speculative nature and hence illegal. On the 
son's failure to prove that they were so, the Court held 
against the son.
(d) Chandradeo Singh v.Mata Prasad, (1909) I.L.R.31 All.176 
(F.B.), at p.225, (per Banerji, J.). In this case, the 
reference to the F.B. concerned the question as to what 
constituted 'an antecedent debt.'
1. (1891) I.L.R. 13 All. 216.
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It was proved, on behalf of the sons, by oral as well 
as documentary evidence, that the father's debt was, in 
fact, incurred for immoral purposes; and that the creditors 
had knowledge that it was so incurred. The sons were held 
to be not. liable for the debt. Looking to the facts of the 
case, however, one would think that it was not necessary, 
here, for the sons to prove the creditors' knowledge in 
respect of nature of the debt. Of course, it did not harm 
their cause.
Although the decision does not seem to offer anything 
new, the description of money-lenders in general, given in 
the above context by Straight, J . , while delivering the 
judgement of the Court, would be of great help to us. He said,
"Then comes the question, had the defendants 
notice that they were borrowed for those immoral 
purposes? The learned Subordinate Judge has 
found that they had, and I agree with him that 
the creditor, not only in this case, but in 
ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, knows to 
a nicety the status and character of the father 
and of the family, the number of his children, 
his mode and way of life and the purposes for 
which he wants the money. The money-lenders 
in the towns and villages of these provinces 
never lend their money without the most thorough 
and searching inquiry into the character and 
antecedents of the borrower."2, (My emphasis).
Also, this case appears to be a good example of hew a crafty 
money-lender could encourage extravagance of someone, like 
the father in this case, by supplying money to meet his 
improper or immoral habits, in order to ease him of his
1. "We know of no express authority for the proposition ... 
that a son who disputes his liability to pay his father's 
debt contracted for immoral purposes must ordinarily prove 
that the lender was aware of the object for which the money 
was borrowed."
per Stanley, C.J., and Burkitt, J., see (1906) I.L.R. 28 
All. 508, at p.521. For the facts and fuller discussion 
of this case see below p. 281 ff.
2. Ibid., at p.223.
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ancestral property# without any concern for his family’s 
welfare.
1. In the case of Narayen Shridhnr Naik v. Jagariath Genesh
( : 891) , as regards to the facts of the case, it is stated
that "Money was not borrowed for reasonable purposes, but
2for expenditure in vice," as found by the first appeal Court.
The High Court held in favour of the son. It said,
"I don't think the son can be required to show that 
the money was actually spent in immoral purposes.
It would be impossible when money is spent in vicious 
and immoral pursuits to trace out the items of 
expenditure and prove them. It is sufficient if it 
I is proved that the money was borrowed for immoral 
I purposes, that the father was spending money in 
I debauchery and that there is no evidence to prove 
j that the money was spent properly."3
It sounds a good decision, though, in the absence of the actual 
circumstances, we are unable to make any critical comment on 
this judgement.
Briefly the facts in the case of Khalilul Rahman v.Gobind
4
Pershad (1892) were that the father borrowed and spent a 
considerable amount of money for the needless and imprudent 
purpose of establishing one of the sons' having been given in 
adoption, in order to deprive the adoptive father's only 
daughter from succeeding to her father's vast estate. The 
subordinate judge had held that the expenses on the litigation
5
"would come under the denomination of idle gifts", and
therefore, the defendants (other sons) ought not to be called
upon to pay. However, the High Court refused to affirm this
view, saying that
"The exception has too long been limited to illegal 
and immoral purposes to justify us in introducing 
an extention of it, which would include transaction, 
the character of which was no more than 'imprudent', 
or 'unconscientiously imprudent', or 'unreasonable'.
1 . (1891) , 4 OP.L.R., 29.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., at p.30.
4. (1893) I.L.R., 20 Cal., 328.
5. Ibid., at p.332.
27/
If it could be done in any casef it perhaps ought to be done 
in the present, in which a prosperous family has 
been ruined by litigation, in which defendants 2 , 
t 3, and 4 , members of it, had no possible interest. 15 1
(My emphasis).
Obviously', in the absence of any authority from the previously 
decided cases, the Court declined to hold that the debt was 
avyavahclrika.
The fact that the prosperous family had been ruined due
to the greedy father's sinister intention of gaining another's
estate for one of his sons, by depriving the rightful heir
of the estate, did not, in the view of the High Court, amount
to an 'immoral act'; this would seem to be hardly justifiable,
particularly in view of our definition of the term avyavaharika
(see above p.254). Their argument to the effect that to hold
avyavaharika the money spent on useless and grossly imprudent
objects would undoubtedly open a way of mitigating the effect
of a course of decisions, would appear to be representative
of unwillingness on the part of the judges, accustomed to
3
the doctrine of precedent and stare decisis, to be flexible, 
when they seem to have sensed that some injustice might result 
from their decision.
In the case of Vasudev Morbhat Kale v. Krishnaji Ballal
4
Gokhale (1895) the ancestral property was sold in execution 
of a decree against the father. The sons objected, in the suit 
for partition by the purchaser, on, among others, the ground 
that the debts were contracted for immoral purposes and not 
for the benefit of the family. In view of this, extravagance 
on the part of the father seems to have been implied.
1. Ibid., at p.337.
2. Ibid.
3. For the effect of this tendency on the part of the judiciary, 
please see above clause (3) at p.250 and f.n.2 at p.250 and 
f.n.1 at p.251.
4. (1896) I.L.R. 2o Bom.534.
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The High Court said,
"There is no finding that debt incurred by 
the deceased father was for an immoral or illegal 
purpose. The onus of proving that was not shifted 
on to the plaintiff by proof of immoral habits."^
The Court relied on the decision in Chintamanrav v. Kashinath,^ 
in spite of the fact that the facts of these two cases seem 
to differ.
The mortgagee in Kishan La] v. Garuruddhwaja Prasad Singh 
(1899) had sued both the father (the defendant-respondent) 
and his minor son for sale of the whole property mortgaged 
to him. One of the questions to be decided by the High Court 
in this appeal was whether the grounds on which the Lower 
Court dismissed the suit against the son were sufficient for 
giving, the decision in favour of the son. The Lower Court 
had found, *
"that Garuruddhwaja is an extremely immoral and 
extravagant man, and that he has wasted property 
worth lakhs of rupees in a very short time.
Therefore, the sons and grandsons of such a man 
should not be held liable for any debt incurred 
by him."4
But the High Court disagreed on the ground that "a mere general 
allegation that the f^hjtler led an extravagant, immoral and 
licentious life would, even if proved, not be sufficient to
5
relieve the son". In view of lack of any evidence to show 
that the debt impeached and the debtor's immorality were 
directly related, the decision would seem to be a justifiable 
one. In this case the respondent (son) was not represented 
by counsel at the hearing of the appeal. Had he been so 
represented, there might have been something for us to comment 
upon.
6
In the case of Sheo Darshan Singh v.Sheo Bakhsh Singh 
(1899) the mortgagee brought a suit against the mortgagor and
1. Ibid., at pp.536-537.
2. (1890) I.L.R., 14 Bom. 320, discussed above at p.273.
3. (1899) I.L.R., 21 All. 238.
4. Ibid., at p.240.
5. Ibid.
6. (1901) 4 The Oudh Cases, 277.
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his sens *nd grandsons for sale of the mortgagee1 property.
The defence on the part of the appellants was that the debts 
were incurred for immoral purposes and they were therefore 
not liable to pay them.
At pages 278-279 of the report, the acting Chief Justice 
Mr. Spankie has recorded the oral evidence adduced on behalf
■I
of both the appellants as well as the respondent. The j
respondent's witness was the mortgagor himself. This would
seem to exclude any possibility of collusion between the
debtor and his sons and grandsons. If anything, it might
suggest collussi.on between the plaintiff-respondent and his
debtor. In answer to questions, "he stated that he contracted
the debts for 'extravagance1, and spent the money in buying
clothes and paying dancing girls at the Holi and Diwali
festivals, ... he used to give R s . 200 or R s > 400 to dancing
girls." On the other hand, all the witnesses on behalf of
the appellants had stated that the debtor v^as a debauchee
and licentious man, and spent money on dancing girls, prostitutes
etc., though nontof them had said that the money borrowed was
2the money so spent or named a particular prostitute.
The High Court came to the conclusion that
"proof of immoral habits is not proof that any 
particular debt was contracted for immoral 
purposes. The connection between the immorality 
and the debt must be proved.
4
The decisions in the cases of Sadashiv Dinkar v.Narayan,
’ 5 6Chintamanrav v. Kashinath, and Vasudev v. Krishnaji were
cited in support, respectively. Also, following Khalilul
7
Rahman v. Gobind Pershad, it said "Money borrowed to be spent 
extravagantly cannot be said to have been borrowed for an
o
immoral or an illegal purpose."
1. Ibid., at p.278.
2. Ibid., at pp.278-279.
3'. Ibid. , at p. 279 .
4. (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom. 520 discussed above at p.267.
5. (1890) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 320, discussed above at p.273.
6. (1896) I.L.R. 20 Bom. 534, discussed above at p.277.
7. (1892) I.L.R. 20 Cal. 328, discussed above at p.276.
8. (1901) 4 The Oudh Cases, 277, at p.280.
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In the absence of any legal necessity, and in view of 
the evidence on both the sides to the effect that the debtor 
spent money on the dancing girls, it may be said that the 
evidence had proved conclusively that the debt fell under one 
of the listed debts, i.e., vrthadanam. Accordingly, it 
should have been held, it seems, to be avyavaharika, and 
therefore not binding on the sons. But in spite of all the 
evidence, the Court did not even think "that it is proved 
that Bisram Singh spent his money recklessly and extravagantly O' 
This decision hardly seems convincing.
2
In Ningareddi v. Lakshmava (1901) the father had given 
a certain portion of the joint family property to his concubine 
for her life by way of maintenance. After his death, his sor 
filed this suit to recover possession of the land. In view
of the facts the concubine's, right to maintenance was upheld,
but the gift-deed of the father was held to lie not binding 
on the son as the liability arose out of immoral purpose of 
the father.
However, an attempt appears to have been made to project 
the liability as a debt of the father, contracted to fulfil 
his moral obligation, i.e., a debt in the nature of compensation 
made to the woman by way of maintenance for the injury done 
to her by the past illicit cohabitation. While rejecting the 
argument, Chandavarkar, J. said,
"That is the real nature of the liability, 
according to Gibson v. Dickie (1815) 3 M.& S.463. 
j If, then, it is a compensation for injury done 
to the woman, it is a debt which sounding in 
damages is in the nature of a fine or penalty,
which, according to the texts bearing on the
subject, a Hindu son is not bound to pay."^
Although the argument was obviously based on the English 
decision, the way in which it was countered by the learned 
judge appears to be hardly satisfactory: he has construed
the term compensation as a fine or penalty, perhaps, in order 
to keep the pious obligation of the son away from the liability.
1. Ibid.
2. (1902) I.L.R. 26 Bom. 163.
3. Ibid., at p . 170.
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True, the nature of the injury or damage here had reference 
to immoral activities of the father and hence the nature of 
the,liability arising therefrom was tainted, but there might 
be cases wherein.compensation might arise out of a just cause 
or an honest mistake, and if the above construction is accepted 
even just debts of the father would be excluded from the son's 
pious obligation, and that would not be Hindu law.
i
In the case of Maharaj Singh v . Balwant Singh (1306) 
the facts, stated briefly, were as follows: The father died
indebted to various creditors, leaving behind a large estate 
and two sons of whom one was a minor. The elder son contracted 
a loan to pay his deceased father's, as well as some of hisI
own debts by mortgaging certain ancestral estate to a Bank.
j
The minor son had signed the mortgage deed. The Bank assigned 
its rights to the plaintiff-respondent, Balwant Singh. He 
brought the suit against both the brothers on the sole basis 
of the mortgage; and no claim, it may be noted, was made, not 
even in the alternative, on the ground of the son's pious 
obligation to pay his father's debt.
Although Balwant Singh succeeded against the elder brother
of Maharaj Singh, the High Court found that the appellant was
under age and therefore, the Bank's mortgage was void and
hence not binding upon him. Thus, strictly in accordance
with the plaint, the case would have ended there, as the
plaintiff (respondent) had failed in establishing the case
which he had made in his plaint as against the appellant. In
view, however, of the fact that the appellant in his defence
had set up the case that the debts of Raja Shankar Singh,
his late father, were immoral and an issue was framed on this
question, so that it could not be said that the appellant
was taken by surprise, the High Court did not think it just
to take a narrow view of the plaint and thereby shut out
the consideration of the important issue, i.e., the nature
of the debts of the father. Thus, the Court allowed itself
2
to examine the issue which was not in the plaint. In this
1. (1906) I.L.R. 28 All. 508.
2. Ibid., see p.518.
context the findings o£ the Court, in respect of the son's 
liability concerning immoral debts of the father, would 
appear, being obiter, to be of less value, but the good 
sense and plausibility of certain remarks of Burkitt., J.
i
would certainly deserve great respect and our careful 
attention,
It was contended on behalf of the respondent that 
unless Maharaj Singh could show that these debts were incurred 
for immoral purposes, and tha t .the creditors who made the 
advances did so with the knowledge of the object of the loan, 
the appellant could not succeed. As regards this contention, 
after very careful scrutiny of all the evidence, the Court 
observed:
"The evidence establishes beyond any question, 
and indeed it is not denied by the plaintiff- 
respondent, that Shankar Singh was a man of 
dissolute and dissipated habits. He squandered 
in a few years the accumulations of income made 
by his father, ... and incurred other heavy 
liabilites. No necessity for expenditure of 
moneys which the income of the estate could 
not satisfy is suggested other than that which 
might arise out of a dissolute and extravagant 
mode of life ... Now that a large part of moneys 
borrowed by Raja Shankar Singh were borrowed 
for immoral purposes there can be no doubt.
His income was more than ample to meet his 
ordinary requirements, and in addition to his 
income he had the large accumulations amassed 
by his father. Experience tells us that his 
licentious mode of life was not and could not 
{ have been concealed from his neighbours. It was 
no doubt the common talk of the bazar. No 
intending lender could fail to have learnt of 
it if he had made any inquiry whatever. We know 
of no express authority for the proposition 
advanced by Mr. Sundar Lai that a son who disputes 
his liability to pay his father's debt contracted 
for immoral purposes must ordinarily prove that 
the lender was aware of the object for which money 
was borrowed, though there is the highest authority 
that he must do so if he is attempting to recover 
ancestral property which has already passed out 
of the family. If the onus of proving such knowledge 
lies on a son, it would be, we think, next to 
impossible for him to discharge it." ^
1. For a similar view, see J.D.M.Derrett, at Lucknow Law Journal, 
cited above, at p. 11.
2. (1906) I.L.R. 28 All. 508, at p.521.
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Moreover, the Court has given (at pp.522-525) sufficient 
details of expenditure to show that the indebtedness of 
Raja Shankar Singh was due to his immoral course of life. 
According to tne-Court,
: The moneys which he borrowed appear to us 
to have been undoubtedly borrowed for the 
purposes of his tours of lust and debauchery.
The appellant does not profess to give specific 
proof of the expenditure in immoral pursuits 
of all the moneys which were borrovred, nor could 
he possibly do so. All that he professes to 
have done is to show specific instances of the 
application of large sums of money in payments 
made to prostitutes and in the purchase of ligucr 
and to give general evidence from which it m a y , 
he contends, reasonably be inferred that the 
deots were tainted with immorality."1 (My emphasis).
These observations of the Court prove their importance. Not 
only their considered opinion as regards the'issues raised 
in the contention of the respondent, but also the manner in 
which the judges arrived at that opinion appear very valuable 
for the purpose of this discussion. Had the Court strictly 
followed the trend of decisions prevailing at the time, i.e., 
unless the son proves that the direct connection between the 
father's immorality and the debt impeached he would fail, 
it would have come to a different conclusion; for the son 
could have, as the judges have said above, hardly done so in 
the circumstances. The Court's opinion seems to manifest the 
kind of attitude which the Courts of law should adopt, in 
decisions involving cases such as this, i.e., reasonable 
flexibility. What the Court seems to have done in this case 
is that it followed the spirit of the Law, without ignoring 
its terms in that it paid reasonable attention to precedents 
but did not follow them blindly. In its opinion, circumstantial 
evidence positively proving the extravagant expenditure of 
money by the father on immoral purposes, in the absence of 
any proved legal necessity would seem to be of equal evidential 
Value, in determining the nature of a debt, to that which
1. Ibid, at pp. 525-526.
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would prove that & particular debt was incurred for immoral 
purposes. Also, though it was, in their opinion, not 
necessary in this case for the appellant to prove the 
creditor's knowledge of the purpose for which the debt was 
incurred,.the public knowledge of the father's immoral 
pursuits, it wculd appear, was, in their view, sufficient 
for any intending money lender to know or to put him on his 
guard before giving any credit to the father of the appellant.
Thus, f i n a l l y  the Court declared,
"The evidence irresistibly leads us to the conclusion 
that there was no necessity for those debts or any 
of them other than that which the gratification 
of his vicious habits created. He had more than 
ample income for the maintenance in luxury of 
himself and his family. There is not even a 
suggestion of the existence of any family necessity 
for the loans. Under all the circumstances^we 
think the appellant has made out his case."
Whatever might be the place of this decision amongst 
legal precedents, it cannot be denied that it makes good sense
2
In the case of Babu Singh v. Bihari Lai (1908) two 
brothers had borrowed money by way of a mortgage of ancestral 
property. In the mortgagee's suit, their sons alleged that 
the debt was tainted with illegality and immorality. A 
prostitute was produced, in the Lower Court, who deposed that 
a certain amount of money was paid to her by one of the 
brothers. On the other hand, there was evidence to the effect 
that his daughter's marriage was celebrated about the time
of incurring the debt. The High Court, following Kishan Lai
3 ^v. Gururuddhwaja, and Chintamanrav Mehandale v. Kashinath , ‘
held that even if there was some general evidence to show that
the fathers were profligates, it was not sufficient to exoner
ate the sons of the debtors from their pious duty to pay
5
their father's debts.
1. Ibid., at p .544
2. (1908), I.L.R., 30 All. 156.
3. (1899), I.L.R., 21 All. 238, this case is discussed above, 
p. 278 ff.
4. (189o), I.L.R., 14 Bom. 320, this case is discussed above,
p. 273 ff.
5. (1908) I.L.R., 30 All. 156, at p . 161.
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In the case of Shri Sitaram Pandit y. Shri Harihar Pandit 
(1910) an amount, paid by the father to the adoptive mother 
to induce her to adopt his son, was held to be illegal 
according to Hindu law, since the payment was vitiated by 
the fact that it was in the nature of a bribe; and therefore, 
the son was not liable. The debc for a bribe would undoubtedly 
be avyavaharika. For even according to the sastras a bribe 
was despised and any liability arising out of it was considered 
to be void or non-existent.~ Such debts of the father, there­
fore, could hardly be vyavaharika or binding on the son.
The case of Dattatraya Vishnu Dhamankar v. Vishnu Narayan
3
Dhamankar (1911) was a suit by the son for partition of 
certain ancestral properties in which he prayed for a declar-
i
ation that incumbrances created by his father, by way of 
mortgage, were not binding as against him anql on his share
1. (1910) 12 Bom. L.R.91o
2. "Adattam tu bhayakrodhas^kavegaruganvitaih /
Tathotkoca parlhasavyatyasacchalayogatah // "
Nar.VII.9 quoted in the Vyavahara-Mayukha, vide P.V.Kane, 
ed. and trans., (Bombay, 1926), p.204. For translation 
see pp.372-74. At p.372 the word utkocha is translated 
as meaning 'bribe', and is one of the sixteen invalid gifts.
H.T.Colebrooke has translated the verse thus:
"What has been given by men agitated with fear, anger, 
lust, grief, or the pain of an incurable desease; or as 
a bribe, or in jest, or by mistake, or through any 
fraudulent practice, must be considered as ungiven."
Vide Digest, vol.II, cited above, p . 181. J.Jolly has 
rendered these gifts invalid or void; see, J.Jolly, trans.,
S.B.E. 33, cit.above, pp.129-30. The translation by 
V.N.Mandlik is similar; see the Vyavahara-Mayukha, ed.
and trans. by him, (Bombay, 1880), pp. 1 23-24 . Also,P.V.Kane &
S.G.Patwardhan,_ trans., The W avahara-Mayfikna, (Bom. 1933), pp.233-34.
The Vyavahara-Mayukfia nas also quoted the views of other 
sastrakaras on the subject, see P.V.Kane, op.cit., p.205 
and pp.374-75; V.N.Mandlik, op.cit., p.124; also see H.T. 
Colebrooke, op.cit., p . 194; cf. Brhaspati X V I .11, i.e.,
"When anything has been given through desire of a reward 
... or for an immoral purpose, the owner may resume the 
gift." Vide J.Jolly, trans., op.cit., p.343.
Bribe was generally considered to be a serious crime, and 
was severely punished. See, Vardhaman Upadhyaya, Dandaviveka, 
vide B .Bhattacharya, trans., (Cal., 1973), pp.86-88.
3. (1911) 13 Bom. L.R . , 1161.
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in the properties. He claimed that the debts were for immoral 
purposes such as the support of prostitutes and the expenses 
of natches and other tamashas.
As a result of this suit the mortgagees commenced their 
suits to enforce their mortgages. It was proved that certain 
sums were spent by the father for the support of a prostitute 
and her household and on jewellery and clothes for her' and 
in the expenses of tamashas etc.. On the other hand, there 
was evidence to show that a considerable amount of money 
was borrowed for family ceremonies; and that the father 
and the son had suppressed the account books relating to 
family affairs which it was conclusively established were 
in existence prior to the date of the suit.
The High Court held in favour of the mortgagees on the
ground that, although it had been proved to the satisfaction
of the Court that the father was addicted to immorality and
extravagance, there was no evidence of connection between
1
a particular debt .and the immoral expenditure.
Although the law could have helped the son in this case, 
it would appear that he himself contributed to his own mis­
fortune by suppressing the evidence. Then again, had there 
been only one creditor of the father, the Court might have 
been able to give some relief in proportion to the father's 
expenditure on his immoral pursuits. The difficulty, however, 
which might have led to this decision seems to be this that 
in view;of two sets of mortgages, it was impossible upon the 
evidence to ascertain whose advances were applied for the 
benefit of the prostitute and the tamashas . In view of the 
facts, it mignt be correct to say that in the interest of 
proper justice, the proof of the connection between a particular 
debt and immoral expenditure of the father would be essential 
in cases such as this.
1. Ibid., see p. 1166.
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The case of Sri Na.rain v. La la Raghubans Pal (1912) 
was one in which two brothers incurred various debts, proved 
to be for family purposes, though there was some evidence 
to show that one.of the brothers was of immoral character.
His sons,, the appellants, contended that he was spendthrift, 
debauchee, drunkard and imprudent, and therefore, their 
^hjtres were not affected by his debts. As there was no 
evidence to connect the debts directly with the father’s 
immoral habits, the Privy Council held that the sons could 
not succeed in this case.
In fact, looking to the dates at which the debts were 
incurred and the previous transactions to which they relate 
it would appear that they were not debts incurred for immoral 
purposes. This being so, unless some clear proof as to the 
connection between the fathe’r's immorality apd his debts was 
shown, it would have been impossible to hold in favour of 
the sons; and hence this would seem to be a good decision.
However, application of the principle of showing direct
connection between the father's debt and his immoral habits
in the case of Dhulipallia Butchayya v. Kuppa Venkatakrishnayya^
(1920) would appear to be not so convincing. For, in this
case, it would appear from what was found by both the Lower 
3Courts that the father led an immoral life, that the income 
of the family was sufficient to meet its normal needs, and 
that there was no legal necessity to justify the father’s debt 
on a promissory note. Although the sons could not prove which 
specific part of the debt was spent for immoral purposes, the 
circumstances of the case would seem to place some onus upon 
the creditor to prove for what purpose he lent the money. 
However, the High Court insisted upon the principle stated 
above and held against the sons.
1 . (1912) 17 C.W.N. 124 (P.C.)
2. (1920) 58 I.C. 797.
3. Ibid., see pp. 797-98.
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Also, in Sundara Goundan v. K. Armuga Goundan, (1920),
where the mortgagee of the father had sued, the son alleged
that his father's debt was incurred for an immoral purpose
and therefore he was not liable. His father had kept a
concubine. The father himself gave evidence to that effect.
In the opinion of the High Court, however, the evidence
was not sufficient to exonerate the son because no connection
was established between the debt and any immoral or illegal
purpose. It was necessary for the son, said the Court, to
establish that connection. The mere fact that the father
kept concubine was not sufficient. "It is sufficient, however,
if the Court can draw an inference from the evidence as to
2the connection between the debt and the immoral purpose," 
said the Court. It would appear that in this case the Court 
had some reason to believe that there was collusion between
V
the father and the son. Through his father, the son would 
have been able to produce evidence to prove the connection 
between the debt and the immorality.
3
In the case of Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Kuppuswami Aiyangar 
(1920) we come across a slightly different point of view as 
regards the father's alienation of the ancestral property 
and the nature of liability arising out of it. This was a 
suit by the son for partition against his father and the 
father's alienee. No extravagance or immorality on the part 
of the father was alleged, but it was claimed that the son was 
not bound by the alienation. The alienation appears to have 
been made neither for immoral purpose nor for any family 
necessity. The Subordinate Judge found for the son subject 
to his refunding to the alienees the consideration paid by 
them to the father.
In the appeal by the son, the High Court gave him his 
decree without any condition. What is interesting, however, 
is that the jud^s who came to this conclusion, based their
1. A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 96 8.
2. Ibid., at p.969.
3. (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 801.
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judgement? on different grounds. According to Wallis, C.J.,
"Any liability which the father may incur to the 
* alienees on such unconditional setting aside of the
. alienation arises from his own immora.1 act in
making the alienation in the first instance, in 
breach of the duty which he owed to his sons as 
manager of the joint family property, and I do 
not think the sons can properly be held to be 
under any pious obligation to relieve him from 
the consequences of his unsuccessful attempt 
to defraud them."**
This view, though strikingly different from what we have
seen so far, would seem to amount to what Balambhatta (see
above p . 220, f.n.2) meant by avyavaharika. It may be noted,
however,- that this view did not, as will be seen presently,
2receive any support from the Courts of law. The judgement 
of Mr. Justice Seshagiri Ayyar would seem to have been based 
on the following ground: *
"A son is bound to pay only such debts of his 
father as exist while they are joint; and a son 
getting a decree for partition becomes divided from 
his father as from the date of suit for partition.
Any liability of the father to refund the consideration 
to the alienee arising as the result of the decree 
for partition is amiability for unliquidated damages 
and net a debt, and even if it becomes a judgement- 
debt it is not a debt existing on the date of suit 
for partition."
Although this view would seem to be technically correct, it 
would hardly fit into the sastric notion of the son's liability 
to pay his father's debt. Moreover, if accepted, this view 
might encourage cheating of creditors or distrust in the Hindu 
father's creditworthiness. None of the consequences would 
help serve the community.
4
In the case of Sheonarain v. Nathu (1922) the father 
mortgaged ancestral property. His mortgagees brought suit to 
enforce the mortgages. No family necessity was proved. The 
father indulged in gambling, drinking and spent money on
1. Ibid., at pp.803-804.
2. Ibid., at pp.804-809
3. As per the head-note given at p.802.
4. A.I.R. 1922 Nag. 1 (F.B.)
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prostitutes. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that 
to claim exemption from his father's antecedent debts, the 
son,must prove that the money borrowed was applied to immoral 
purposes. However, the Court was of the opinion that
"such proof is not indispensable. The issue 
whether the debts were contracted for immoral 
purposes is one of fact and may be proved by 
inference from evidence showing that they were 
contracted daring a period of extravagant immoral 
habits. But in such a case there must be 
definite and convincing proof that the immoral 
practices were contemporary with the loans and 
could not have been indulged in without the 
use of the borrowed amounts."^
It may be said in support of this view of the Court that it 
was proper in the circumstances of the case. For, there was 
no need to borrow for any family purpose; and, in spite of 
the father's known immoral activities, the alienees advanced 
huge amounts to the father without making any enquiry.
2
In Chet Ram v. Ram Singh (1922) the joint family
consisted of the father, Amar Singh, his sons and his sons'
sons. The father mortgaged ancestral property largely for
his personal purposes and later sold it to the mortgagees,
again not for any family necessity. The plaintiffs were minors
and sued through their guardian, Ram Singh. It was found
beyond any dispute that Amar Singh was a man of extravagant
habits, not leading a moral life and addicted to drink, v;ho
3incurred this debt for his own personal purposes. It was, 
except a very small portion, neither incurred nor used for 
family purposes or necessity, nor was it an antecedent debt.
The Privy Council held in favour of the minors on the 
ground that Amar Singh "had improperly and illegally sold
1. Ibid., at p .4.
2. (1922) 49 I.A. 228.
3. Ibid., at p. 232.
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1
the family property; and such a sale cannot stand." It
may be noted that in this appeal,- although it was argued
on behalf of the appellant that, the debt not being shown
to have been incurred for immoral purposes, the respondents
should be held liable; the Privy Council dealt mainly with
2
the power of the father in respect of alienation of ancestral 
property and the doctrine of antecedency; and came to the 
above conclusion without going into the question of immorality 
or otherwise of the debt. Perhaps, the fact that the vendor 
was a man of extravagant and immoral character might have 
affected this judgement, though there was hardly anything to 
support this suggestion directly.
i
In Tulshi Ram v. Bishnath Prasad  ^ (1927) the father 
incurred debts and to pay back those debts raised a large 
amount upon a mortgage of ancestral property> The mortgagee 
obtained a money decree against the father. But his minor 
son challenged it on the ground that his father was a man of 
grossly immoral character and that the money taken by him, 
if at all , was spent on immoral objects. It was proved 
that soon after attaining majority the father had entered
1. Ibid., at p.234. The Privy Council relied on its own decision 
in Sahu Ram Chandra v.Bhup Singh , (1917) 44 I.A.126, where 
the suit was brought to enforce a mortgage, not for legal 
necessity nor for an immoral purpose, though twenty seven 
years after it was granted. It was held that there was no 
antecedent debt; and the alienation was not supported by
any legal necessity and therefore the father could not bind 
ancestral property as against his sons and grandsons, for, 
in the circumstances, his alienation amounted to a deliberate 
breach of trust.
2. The power of the father and that of a manager of the joint 
family seems to have been confused in these cases. For, in 
Brij Narain v.Mangla Prasad, (1923) 51 I.A. 129, the Privy
Council laid down that, " (1) The managing member of a joint 
undivided estate cannot alienate or burden the estate qua manager 
except for purposes of necessity; but (2) If he is the father
and other members are the sons he may, by incurring debt, so long 
as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate open to be 
taken in execution proceeding upon a decree for payment of that debt." 
at p.139.
f.n. continued next page.
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upon a reckless and extravagant career of immoral pursuits.
The High Court accepted the proof of general immoral character
of the father about the time when this mortgage-deed was
executed or even about the time when uhe previous antecedent
2
debts were incurred. But at the same time it was strongly
3of the opinion that the father was behind this suit, which 
in their opinion was a collusive one. For the father had 
avoided going into the witness-box and had suppressed evidence 
by not producing his own account bocks which admittedly
4
existed. On the other hand, there was evidence showing that 
the mortgagee had made reasonable enquiries. In view of these 
circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that 
unless there was definite evidence to prove the connection 
between the debts and the father’s immorality, the son'sI
claim must fail. Considering the facts of the case, this 
would seem to be a good decision. v
The question to be decided in Shyam Narain Singh v.Suraj
5
Narain Pandey (1933) was whether a general charge of 
immorality was sufficient to defeat the creditor's claim.
In this case, the Subordinate Court decided the case in favour 
of the sons despite the fact that there was no evidence 
sufficient to connect the particular cases of expenditure 
directly with the act of immorality alleged. What seems to 
have been proved in this case, was that the faihjtjer was leading 
a licentious life and living beyond his means, and that there
f.notes, continued from last page)
In this case, the father of the plaintiffs (minor sons) 
had mortgaged ancestral estate to repay debts incurred 
upon two earlier mortgages of the same estate. It was not 
proved for what precise purpose the money raised by the 
two earlier mortgages had been used. The main questions 
to be decided were whether the payment of the earlier 
mortgages constituted an antecedent debt, and if so, 
whether the sons were liable for the same during the life­
time of the father. The Privy Council answered both the 
questions affirmatively.
3. A.I.R. 1927 All. 735.
1. Ibid., at p.738, c.1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., at p.737, c.1.
4. Ibid., at p.737, c.2.
5. A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 38.
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was no legal necessity for the debts. In view of this it 
was argued that the sons
*."were entitled to the presumption tnat those loans 
must have been expended for licentious purposes and 
that it was not necessary for them to prove that 
each item was expended on an immoral purpose." ^
Both the High Court and the Privy Council rejected this argument;
but while doing so the Privy Council observed that the question
2
was purely one of fact. If that is so, then, it might be 
correct to say chat in order to establish the facts, once 
the son lias shown beyond any doubt that his father did in 
fact lead an immoral life, that he lived beyond his means 
and that there was no legal necessity for the debts, the 
Courts should insist upon the creditors at least to prove 
that they lent money bona fide. However, this observation 
seems unwarranted. This decision of the Pri^y Council might 
be one of the shortest of its reported decisions. The law 
report does not contain even the full facts of the case.
3
The case of Kajeshwar v. Mangniram Gangabisan (1933) 
involved a mortgage of ancestral property by the father. The 
mortgagee obtained a decree against the father. The son who 
was impleaded in the suit as a defendant, appealed on the 
gound that his father led an extravagant life and was given 
to prostitution, and indulged in tamashas for which he 
contracted various debts. There was no legal necessity for 
incurring the debts except to meet his immoral indulgences.
In fact', the father had in his permanent keeping a mistress, 
though there was no direct evidence to show that he spent 
extravagantly on her. The family income was sufficient to 
live comfortably. But, it was also found that the period 
during which the said debts were incurred was a bad period 
due to failure of crops, and therefore, the High Court had 
a reason to infer that the debts were incurred to maintain 
himself. On the other hand, since the death of his mother in 
1919, the appellant lived with his maternal uncle. In other
1. Ibid., at p.39, c.1
2. Ibid., at p.39, c.2
3. A.I.R. 1933 Nag. 89.
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words the family expenses should have been reduced to that 
extent, but on the contrary, all the antecedent debts seen 
to have been incurred during 19 19 to 1921. No collusion was 
alleged between the father and the son. The H.i^bfg) Court 
began by stating that "it is not the character of the father
i
but the nature of the debt which has to be proved"; and 
one would not generally object to that.
After discussing what is meant by the term avyavahari.ra 
and the quantum of proof required to prove it, the Court 
said that
"the connexion between the debts and the immoral 
habits of the father must be established ... In any 
case the burden is incumbent on the son to prove 
that the father was in the habit of spending his 
income in vices, that he incurred the debts for 
such purposes and that without incurring debts 
it was impossible to gratify his immoral 
propensities."
It refused to presume that the debts were incurred for immoral 
purposes because in its view the proof of mere general immoral 
conduct of the father was not sufficient to do so. In any 
case the terms of these dicta seem too wide. A specific 
tainted debt suffices.
Now on behalf of the son it was proved that his father 
had kept a mistress, and that he caused some tamashas to be
3
held in front of his house. All this could not have taken 
place without some extravagant expense on the father's part. 
Could this expenditure be regarded as vyavaharika particularly 
in view of the fact that the time when all this happened was 
economically bad? In these circumstances, the inference that 
the father incurred the debts for maintaining himself only 
would seem, in the absence of any concrete evidence to that 
effect, to be unduly cautious. The motive for this appears 
at once, for, in the end, the Court said, "It is quite possible
1. Ibid., at p.90, c.2.
2. Ibid., at p.91, c.2.
3. Ibid.
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that he could have avoided these debts by exercise of a 
little prudence, but mere imprudence does not bring the
i
debts in the category of avyavaharika debts." To label the 
behaviour of the.father in this case mere imprudence would 
seem to be quite disturbing, particularly when it was in 
fact (to modern eyes) quite immoral.
Moreover, the rule that the onus of proof lies completely 
on the son to the extent of proving the exact connection 
between the debt and his father's immorality, even when there 
was no collusion between the son and his father, would seem 
to give complete immunity to creditors from their duty to 
make proper inquiry as to whether the debt was required for 
any legal necessity. In this case, had the creditors made 
any enquiry, they would have hardly failed to know that the 
fahter1 of the appellant had a mistress or he^was in the habit 
of holding tamashas in front of his house; for both these 
things must have been within public knowledge. It might be 
correct to say that the cause of justice would have been 
better served had the Court shifted the onus on to the creditors 
once the son had proved his father's immoral activities, to 
prove that they lent money after enquiry and in good faith.
It could be argued, on the contrary, as J .D.M.Derrett? has 
done in his 'Lucknow' article, that if the creditor could 
prove sufficient bona fide enquiry the question of pious 
obligation would never arise and therefore taint would not be 
seriously considered (such is indeed the effect of Hunooman 
Persaud'1 s case) . The answer is that this is not our contention. 
We allege that in order to prove specific taint the son having 
shown vicious activities on his father's part contemporaneously 
with the loan, the creditor to rebut the presumption thus 
raised must show that his enquiries at the time satisfied him, 
as they could have satisfied any reasonable person, that 
money was needed for an untainted purpose. For a man who 
squanders money on vicious proclivities is certainly likely to 
need money for private purposes of an indifferent character.
1. Ibid., at p.92, c.1
2. See A.I.R. 1960 Journal 2-5 and 1976 1 M.L.J. 100.
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In the case of L.ingayya v. Punnayya (1 9 42} , a case of 
signif.icance, the father of respondents had sold ancestral 
property. They brought a suit after the death of their 
father to set aside the sale saying that the fathe?' was 
insane, that no consideration had passed and that there was 
no necessity for the sale. It was proved that the father 
■was sane and consideration had passed but there was no 
necessity for the sale. Both the Courts beicw held in favour 
of the sens, hence this appeal. The main question to be 
answered concerned the son's pious obligation in respect 
of the liability arising on the sale being set aside by the 
Court: in other words, whether a debt., incurred by the father
for his own necessity, neither illegal nor immoral, by exceed­
ing his power of alienation of ancestral property would be 
considered an avyavaharika debt.
\
The Full Benjch came to the conclusion that such a debt 
as in this case would bind the sons. It said,
"the Hindu law makes no difference between 
a mortgage and a sale in this connection and 
therefore the fact that the father has abused his 
powers does not taint his obligation to the 
alienee to an extent which would justify the ^
Court in holding that it is not vyavaharika."
This is a well considered decision, and one would not like 
to complain about it. But one might ask whether this rule 
would do justice, in the sense of Hindu law, in the case 
where the father exceeded his powers to the extent that the 
whole ancestral estate was lost due to his alienation purely 
for his personal purposes.
1. A.I.E. 1942 Mad. 183 (F.B.).
2. Ibid., at p . 186, c.2. Also see "It is therefore difficult to 
see how the fact that money was obtained for such purposes 
under a purported sale, so long as the object was neither 
illegal nor immoral can alter the character of the liability 
or convert the resulting obligation into an avyavaharika 
debt." per Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J . , at p. 1 89, c .2.
The terms in which the rule is stated would seem to 
indicate that it is a flexible rule. For, the terms 'that 
the father has abused his powers does not taint his obligation 
to the alienee to an extent which would justify the Court in 
holding that it was not vyavaharika' would seem to imply that 
such abuse of powers would attribute some taint to the father's 
obligation, thcugh in this case it might have not been 
sufficient to justify the Court in holding that it was avyava­
harika . If the terms were used in this sense then the rule 
would seem to fit into the spirit of Hindu law, otherwise it 
could lead to destruction of the whole joint family property; 
and the result, as we have already noted above (see pp.231-32), 
would not seem to represent the correct position of Hindu law 
on the subject, particularly when the joint family consisted 
of the father and sons.
\ 1
The case of Lakshmanswami v. Raghavacharyulu (1943)
was concerned with the father's debts, incurred for the purpose
of meeting his concubine's grand-daughter's marriage. However,
the Court below held that the debt was binding on the son
because the creditor was a bona fide lender without knowledge
of the purpose for which the amount was borrowed. Presently
we are not concerned with the question of the 'lender's knowl- 
2
edge', and therefore, it would be proper to deal with the 
question whether the debt was in fact avyavaharika. The debt 
arose out of money borrowed on promissory notes by the father.
As regards to the nature of the debt, it was argued on 
behalf of the creditors that there was no clear proof that 
the borrowings by the father were for payment to his concubine; 
and that, even if the amount was paid to her, the purpose of 
the borrowings could not be regarded as immoral; for, she 
was in the continuous and exclusive keeping of the father and
1 . A.I.R. 1 943 xMad. 292.
2. This problem, though we have occasionally referred to it
in course of our enquiry so far, will be discussed thoroughly 
in the following chapter: see below p. 4o7 ff.
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was thus an avaruddhastri within the meaning of Hindu law 
texts, which recognise her status and provide for her niainten-'
i
ance . It was also suggested that the father was 'morally1
2bound to meet the expenses of her grand-daugher1s marriage.
The High Court agreed with none of these contentions. 
Although there was no direct evidence that the sums borrowed 
were the identical amounts paid to the concubine, the 
circumstantial evidence before the Court was so clear that 
the Court could not resist holding that the amount was paid, 
to her. As regards to the second contention, Mr. Justice 
Patanjali Sast3?.i, while delivering the judgement of the 
Division Bench, said,
"This argument is based on an obvious fallacy 
and cannot be accepted. The fact that Hindu 
law, like some othei: ancient systems of law, 
recognises and makes provision for certain 
human frailties cannot be taken as elevating 
them to the plane of good morals. Nor can 
the so called moral duty of a paramour to 
provide his concubine with funds to meet her 
expenses render his borrowing for the purpose  ^
a vyavaharika debt as between him and his son."
Thus, the Court held that the debt was not binding on the son. 
The decision would seem to be prima facie righteous according 
to Hindu law, even if the Court did not bother to cite any 
authority in its support. As the debt was for the purpose 
of the concubine of the father, undoubtedly it was avyavsharika
4
In the case of Shankar Rao v. Kamtaprasad (1947) the 
father 'incurred, on the security of mortgage of ancestral 
estate, a large amount of debts from various money-lenders.
The father caused a dispute with his brother in respect of 
the joint family property, and spent a lot of money in 
prosecution of the resulting Court cases. Also, he was given 
to drinking and debauchery. His sons claimed that there was 
no legal necessity but the debts were incurred for immoral
1. J.D.M.Derrett, I.M.H.L., cit.above, p.422, Sec.671.
2. Lakshmanswami1s case, cit. above, p.2 94, c.2.
3. Ibid., at pp.294-295.
4 -A .I .R. 1 947 Nag. 129.
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purposes. Allegations that there was collusion between the 
debtor and his creditors, on the one hand, and that between 
the-debtor and his sons on the other hand, were made. The 
sons suppressed the account books which were maintained by 
their grandfahter as well as their father. There was some 
evidence mostly in general terms showing that the father was 
given to drinking, and that he kept a mistress or two, but
•]
to what extent he spent money on ehem had not been made clear. 
On the other hand, there was evidence to the effect that the 
family spent a considerable amount of money on a religious 
festival, when dancing girls from different parts of India 
came to the village and that a large expenditure was incurred 
on that account. However, there was nothing to indicate that 
there was any debauchery at that time.
i
J
After careful consideration of all the evidence the Court 
came to the conclusion that it was not sufficient to enable 
the Court to hold that the plaintiffs had discharged the 
burden of proof upon them to establish that the debts in 
question were incurred by their father for immoral purposes.
It said,
"mere proof of general immorality is not sufficient 
to discharge this burden; there must be proof of
direct connection between the debt or the. expenditure
and the acts of immorality."'
In view of the facts of the case the decision would seem to
be inevitable. For, in view of the fact that there were severa
creditors of the father, and that there were certain items of 
expenditure not falling under excepted categories according 
to Hindu law, it would have been impossible for the Court to 
decide otherwise, unless the sons could have shown that the 
loan from a particular creditor was applied by the father for 
his immoral purposes. Thus, the sons were made to suffer not 
only for what they were liable for, but also for something 
for which they could not have been liable.
1. Ibid., at p . 135, c.2
2. Ibid., para. 27 .
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i
In the case of Ramrao Shamrao v. Dattadayal Blshandayal 
(1948) certain transactions entered into by the fathers 
(three brothers) were challenged by their sons on the ground 
that the debts were incurred for immoral purposes. One of 
the brothers was minor at the time of the transactions but 
he was later induced, through his mother, to a consent decree. 
In this case, the High Court dealt mainly with the question 
of res judicata, and then as regards the sons: challenge on 
the ground of immorality, observed that
"under Hindu law the sons cannot challenge the 
antecedent debt of their father unless they can 
first establish their father's immorality and 
next establish some reasonable connection between 
the debt and the immorality that is to say, unless 
they can show tha£ the debt was borrowed for 
immoral purposes'/
It would appear that in this case the issue of the consent 
decree of the father had attracted more attention of the Court 
than the alleged immorality of the father, and consequently 
the Court's findings on the first issue would seem to have 
affected the consideration of the second issue. In the end 
the Court held that proving general immorality of the father
3
was not sufficient, and therefore, the sons must fail.
4
The case of Ramamurthi v. Kuppuswami (1950) involved 
debts of the father incurred by way of indemnity. The father 
of the defendants (sons) in this case executed a sale-deed 
of ancestral property in favour of the plaintiff's father.
The main question to be dealt with was whether the liability 
to indemnify was an avyavaharika debt as understood in Hindu 
law.
The High Court, after discussing certain cases as regards 
what is meant by an avyavaharika debt, came to the conclusion 
that such a debt as this, "incurred by the father to help a 
third party whatever may be its magnitude is held to be binding
1. A.I.R. 1948 Nag. 304.
2. Ibid., at p.307, c.2.
3. Ibid., at p.308, c.1.
4. A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 621.
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on the son," and therefore, said the Court, "we hold that
_ 2 
the debt is not a a vy a vaharika debt." According to the
Court,
t-
"the only wo-rkable proposition and an easily 
ascertainable test is tc find whether the 
liability of the father is tainted at the 
source. We 'will have to examine the nature 
and the character of the debt with reference to 
the time it originated, in other words, when 
the liability was first incurred by the father.
So tested, can it be said that the liability 
of the father is tainted by immorality or 
illegality or incurring of the liability is 
grossly unjust or flagrantly dishonest?"^
Moreover, assuming that the father acted in excess of his
powers, the Court observed that "the transaction may be
imprudent and it may be even in abuse of his powers. But
it cannot be said that that -fact in itself makes a debt a
4 %
avyavaharika debt."
Now, though the conclusion reached in this case would 
seem to be correct according to both the sastric and modern 
Hindu law, the test to determine what is avyavaharika would
5
seem, as we have already shown above, not to be universally 
acceptable or absolutely proper. Besides, the degree of 
imprudence or abuse of his power on the part of the father 
would seem to be material factors, as will be seen, affecting 
the nature of his debts in certain cases.
7
In the case of Udmiram v. Balramdas (1956) the son of 
a debtor brought the suit, through his next friend, for 
declaration that his father's debts, contracted by mortgaging 
ancestral property and on promissory note, were contracted; 
not for any family necessity, but for illegal and immoral
1. Ibid., at p.624, c.2.
2. Ibid., at p.625, c.2.
3. Ibid., at p.625, c.1.
4. Ibid.,
5. For this (the discussion of Ramasubramania v. Sivakami, 
A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 841; and Hemraj v. Khem Chand, A.I.R. 194 3 
P.C. 142.) see above pp.222-224, and 232 ff.
6. See below p. 316 ff.
7. A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 76.
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purposes, and therefore, not binding on the plaintiff's 
share in the ancestral property. It was alleged that the 
father had taken to gambling and certain defendants, who 
were'involved in the gambling, themselves advanced him money 
and also caused loans to be advanced to him by the present 
appellants (defendants I & 2), to meet his gambling expenses. 
The Lower Court had found that all the debts were, as alleged 
by the plaintiff, incurred for purposes of gambling and 
therefore were not binding on the son. The defendants 1 & 2 
appealed. In the appeal, the issue that the father was given 
to gambling was not seriously contested, but it was contended 
that the son had not established the connection between the 
debts borrowed by the father and his alleged gambling; and 
that the son had also to prove that the lenders had knowledge 
of the father's immoral purposes. Presently, as stated above, 
we are concerned only with the first part of'this contention, 
for the rest will be dealt with in our chapter on the doctrine 
of 1 notice 1.
The High Court, after taking into account certain cases 
previously decided by the Court, as well as a decision of the 
Madras High Co(j^ G)t, approved the view that
"though it is not necessary to prove by direct 
evidence that the money borrowed is expended 
on the vice, yet it is necessary for the sons to 
establish the connection between the debt borrowed 
and the immoral habits of the father. And this 
can be proved by leading circumstantial evidence 
from which such an inference can reasonably be 
; drawn
In view of this, the Court was of the opinion that,
"if the sons are able to establish that during 
the period the debts were borrowed by the father 
he was indulging in a life of vice and that the 
life of vice could not be indulged in but for 
the borrowings and that there was no other 
necessity for the borrowings, and fur(hjt)er if 
it is not established that the borrowings were 
utilized for some purpose which had no connection 
with the vice, then a reasonable inference can 
be drawn that the debts borrowed were for immoral
1. Ibid., at p.79, c.1.
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purposes. It is not necessary for the* 
sons to further establish by direct evidence 
that the debts borrowed were utilized to feed 
the vice . " 1
This, the son would seem to have done in this case; for he
had proved that the family's income during the period of the
borrowings was sufficient to meet its normal expenses, and
there was, therefore, no legal necessity for the loans of
the father, and that che only purpose which required the
father to borrow was his gambling. There was no evidence
2
to prove the contrary. The Court held that none of the
3 Lrt
unsecured debts was binding on the son. But its decision
regards to the secured debts of the father would seem to be
controversial, because it held that, "the son cannot succeed
without proof that the alienee was aware of the character of 
4the debts." Whether or not this rule applied to such cases 
will be discussed below (Chapter VII ). It would be worth 
noting, however, that though there were various creditors of 
the father in this case, like the case in Shankar Rao v. 
Kamtaprasad, discussed above (see pp.298-300), the Court had 
no practical difficulty in deciding this case because all of 
the father's borrowings here were found to be incurred for 
immoral purposes, which was not the situation in Shankar Rao's 
case; and therefore, it seems that the Court was able to 
decide this case even in the absence of the son’s proving a 
direct connection between each of the various debts of the 
father and his immorality. Thus, the application of the rule
i
as regards the proof of direct connection between debt and 
immorality of the father to every case would seem unnecessary, 
and in some cases harmful to the cause of justice.
5
It was curiously contended in P. Bholaiah v. P.Budagaiah 
(1958) that the debts, incurred by the father for the purpose
9
of treatment of venereal diseases which he had contracted as
1'. Ibid. ,
2. Ibid., at pp.80-81, paras. 30-34.
3. Ibid., at p.80, para. 25.
4. Ibid., see para. 21.
5. A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 89.
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a result of his gratification of lust, were, avyavaharika,
and therefore, not binding on the son. The father had sold
ancestral property.
According to the High Court,
"debts due for lust (Kama) fall within the  ^
exception recognised by the ancient Smrithi."
But, in its view,
"there is a distinction between a debt incurred 
by the father for the gratification of lust and 
that incurred by him for treatment of the diseases 
which he had contracted as a result of such 
gratification. In the former, there is undoubtedly 
j an element of immorality, .... But once a man is
afflicted with a disease, no matter how it originated,
I it is essential that he should be given treatment 
j in order that he should get himself restored to 
j normal health. There is nothing immoral in the 
' father taking a course of treatment for getting 
himself cured of d i s e a s e s . "2
Such a debt "cannot be classed as a debt tarnished or tainted
3
with immorality." The son was, therefore, held to be liable 
for the debt. Thus, the debt was held to be vyavaharika.
The decision would seem to be a correct one; for the debt 
represented the expenditure incurred by the father for the 
medical treatment which he had received.
4
In the case of Dwarampudi Nagaratnamba v.Kunku Ramayya
(1962) alienations of ancestral property by the father to his 
concubine were questioned by the sons on the ground that they 
were not supported by consideration nor were they for any 
legal necessity or family benefit. They were alleged to be 
made for the father's immoral purposes, and therefore, were 
not binding on them.
There was no legal necessity for the sale. It was found 
that the alienee had no means of her own to pay for her 
purchase of the property. According to the High Court, the 
father executed the sale deeds in view of his past cohabitation
1. Ibid., at p.90, para. 10.
2. Ibid., para. 11.
3. Ibid., para. 13.
4. (1962) 2 And. W.R. 169.
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with the -tlienee. Thus, the consideration being immoral, 
it was held that the transaction was not binding on the sons.
It would seem to be a correct dicision. Also, it may be 
noted here that in the course of its judgement, the High 
Court had observed that
"when the sons call in question the alienations 
made by their father, it is always the duty of 
the purchaser to prove either that there was 
legal necessity in fact or that she had made 
proper and bona fide enquiry and did all that 
was reasonable to satisfy as to the existence 
of such necessity."
Unfortunately, we have come across a number of decisions in 
which this duty of the alienee has not always been adequately 
put to test.
3
In the case of Moman v. Radha Kishan (1974), the father
- 11 ■ ~ 1  ....... . .. ......  .... i
of the plaintiff-respondent, a minor, sold ancestral property 
allegedly for household expenses and for the construction of 
a house. The facts proved on behalf of the son were, however, 
that there was no legal necessity whatsoever for the sale.
The father was a drunkard and died of over-drinking. Also, 
there was nothing on the record to shoto that the vendee made 
any enquiry regarding the fact as to whether the vendor really 
needed money for the construction of a house. In view of 
these facts the High Court held that the appeal filed by the 
vendee bailed and was dismissed. Surprisingly, no question 
was raised as regards the proof of direct connection between 
the amohnt raised by the sale and the father's immoral expendit­
ure on his drinks. Thus, it might be correct to say, that in 
this case the mere circumstance that the father was a confirmed 
drinkard was enough, in the absence of any legal necessity for 
the sale on the one hand and that of any enquiry on the part 
of the vendee on the other, to invalidate the father's alienat­
ion, and therefore, the alienee's claim. This supports our 
observation regarding Udmiram (above ).
1. Ibid., at p. 174.
2. Ibid., at p .174.
3. A.I.R. 1974 P.& H. 186.
3G6
In the case of Kandaswami Gounder v. Chinnamarimuthu 
Gounder (1974) an alienation of joint family property made 
by the father was challenged, on behalf of his minor sons, 
on the ground that the debts for which it was made were 
avyavaharika debts. Although the facts of the case have noi 
been fully reported, it seems to have been alleged that the 
father was leading- a wayward life and had neglected the minors. 
The evidence adduced on behalf the minors would seem to have 
been inconclusive. For, while rejecting the sons' claim, 
the High Court stated that
"it mush be positively established that the 
father not only neglected the interests of 
the family^in particular the minor coparceners, 
but also that he was openly and publicly leading 
a wayward life. Such immoral living must be 
testified to by witnesses whose testimony had to 
be compellingly acceptable."
No mention is made here of the rule regarding direct connection 
between the debt of the father and his immoral pursuits. 
However, the circumstantial evidence required for sustaining 
the sons' claim is quite clearly expected to be so strong as 
to compel the Court to accept it. Of course, what evidence 
would be 'compellingly acceptable1 to the Courts is difficult 
to predict for it would depend on the views of the judges as 
regards the quantity and quality of such evidence.
3
In the case of Thoga v. Suresh Chander (1975) certain 
joint family property was sold by the father to the appellant 
who was, his tenant. The son filed a suit for declaration 
that the alienation was invalid on the grounds that the sale 
was without any legal necessity or benefit to the estate; 
and that his father was a man of immoral character and had 
made the sale to meet his expenses for immoral purposes. The 
appellant had pleaded that he had invested huge sums of money 
to improve the land and that there was collusion between the 
plaintiff and his father in bringing this suit. The alienee's 
two sons were domestic servants at the alienor's house.
1 . ( 1 974) 1 M.L.J. 11, (N.R.C.) .
2. Ibid., c .1.
3. A.I.R. 1975 J.& K. 16.
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It was proved that the debts were tainted with immorality, 
but the Lower Courts differed as regards the alienee's knowl­
edge of the tainted nature of the debts. The fact that the 
alienee was a tenant and his sons worked at the house of the 
alienor led the lower Appellate Court to presume that the
alienee had notice of the immoral nature of the debts.
However, the High Court disagreed for, in its view, 
there was no evidence on record to show that the alienee 
had notice of the father's immoral purposes. As regards 
this, the Court said that
"even if it were assumed that the first defendant 
had knowledge that the second defendant was 
j leading an immoral life, the question arises 
I whether it should, therefore, be reasonably 
i inferred that the first defendant was aware of
the fact that the debts incurred by the second
! defendant were tainted with immorality. Here 
I must pause and say that there is aitiple evidence 
on record to show that the second defendant 
was in affluent circumstances having various 
sources of income; he had lands other than 
the disputed one which gave him rent and produce; 
he acted as a Prohit which naturally brought him 
the offerings; he worked as a P.W.D. Contractor 
which gave him some profits. Could therefore 
anybody imagine that he wanted debts to meet the 
expenses for immoral purposes? Obviously not.
The inference to the contrary drawn by the 
learned District Judge is manifestly erroneous - 
the error lies in his failure to consider the 
circumstances mentioned above," 1
The alienee's appeal was allowed cn the ground that he had 
no notice of the debts being tainted with immorality.
Apparently, this was a case of no legal necessity.
Also, the High Court found no reason, it seems, to disagree 
with the unanimous findings of both the Lower Courts as 
regards the immoral nature of the father's debts. Moreover, 
as regards the alleged collusion between the vendor and his 
son, no mention is made in the report as to whether or not 
it was proved; or, on the other hand, nothing is said as to 
whether the alienee made any enquiry. - •
1. Ibid., at p . 17, c.2.
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In view of these facts, which were so dissimilar to 
those of Girdhari Lai's case (see above p.265), which laid 
down the rule as regards the son's onus cf proving the 
purchaser's knowledge, one would be inclined to doubt the 
correctness of applying the rule in this case. The alienation 
was voluntary and not a Court auction sale. The alienee was 
not only a tenant of the vendor but also Jived in the same
-j
locality as the vendor, and therefore one would reasonably 
think that he must have known his character. Moreover, no 
stranger was involved in the transaction impeached. The 
circumstances would therefore show that in this case the son 
need not have to prove that the alienee knew about the father's
I
immoral purposes. Strictly speaking, the affluent circumstances
of the .'vendor, quoted above as described by the High Court,
could be used to argue that the alienee should have known
\
that the sale would not have been for any legal necessity, 
and hence he should have made sure before purchasing the lands 
that it was for a purpose which was not contrary to Hindu law!
As this was a case of an affluent landlord and his poor
tenant, we may assume for the sake of argument that the vendor
was a clever man who completely misled the vendee, which could
not be ruled out in a case like this, and induced him to buy
the property; and therefore, in order to avoid injustice being
done to the vendee, the Court gave him relief in equity.
But, in the absence of any enquiry on the part of the vendee,
no such relief would be justifiable in this case; and the
fact is that the Court dismissed his appeal specifically o n .
this ground. In any case, even if this were a case of complete
deception, to make the son liable under Hindu law for his
2
father's proved immoral debts would seem to be erroneous.
In the conclusion of this section, it may be observed 
that in most of the cases discussed above the father's debts 
arose out of his extravagance either due to his immoral 
pursuits or otherwise. In very few cases it was because of
1. Ibid.
2. For a similar view, see J.D.M.Derrett, Lucknow Law Journal, 
cit.above, at pp.4-8.
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his imprudent acts that the ancestral property was ruined.
The sons almost consistently contended that such debts of 
the-father were avyavaharika, and therefore they could not, 
in Hindu law, be held liable. Perhaps the construction that 
the debts which are tainted by 'illegality or immorality' are 
avyavaharika, might have prompted them to challenge the father's 
alienations made in excess of his legal power, i.e., trans­
actions made without legal necessity. Or it may be that due 
to their philosophic and social background, in Hindu eyes 
even the extravagance as such of the father amounted to an 
avyavaharika act particularly if seen in the light of the 
family circumstances. This view finds, as we have seen, 
a certain degree of support in the interpretation of the 
sastric precepts on the subject, see commentaries of Apararka 
(see above p.247, f.n.3) and Balambhatta (see above p.220, 
f.n.2). However, this point of view would seem to have 
attracted hardly any attention of either the modern lawyers 
or judges. Presently therefore, 'immorality' alone would 
seem to have become the touchstone in the matter of deciding 
whether or not such debts of the father are avyavaharika.
Thus, under the influence of Colebrooke's definition of the 
term avyavaharika, and that of its later version, coined by 
the Courts themselves, i.e., the term 'illegal or immoral'
(see above pp.249-250), the modern Courts would seem to have 
consistently refused to consider such debts of the father as 
avyavaharika unless it was proved that the debts were 'immoral' 
(see ab'ove p. 262 ff) . Consequently, the sons have been 
effectively prohibited from setting up their rights against 
such debts of the father if not tainted with immorality.
Moreover, the fear that the father would use the sons' 
right of intervention to defraid innocent and bona fide creditors 
or purchasers, would seem to have gone far in the direction of 
practically abolishing the sons' coparcenary right by birth, 
by placing the sons at the mercy of designing and unprincipled 
creditors who may feed and stimulate the father's dissipation
310
and extravagance (see, for example, pp.2.75-276) , and thereby 
impoverish the family, by relying in support of their conduce 
upon the pious obligation of the sons to pay the debts.1 
In fact, we have.seen ( see above pp.267-68, 281-273, 278-279, 
286-88, 293-94, 301-03, 306-08, 310) that in many cases the 
sons could not succeed because they failed to prove direct 
connection between such debts of the father and his immoral 
pursuits, or the purchaser or creditor's knowledge of such 
immorality: the rules which would seem to have developed
by the Courts to protect the purchaser or creditor of the 
father. Of course, in the case of real collusion between 
the father and his sons, such rules have their place, but 
their application irrespective of such collusions would seem 
to be unwarranted and therefore unjust (see for example, 
above pp.272-74 and pp.283-85).
On the whole, we may be correct in saying that although 
all such debts of the father could not be construed as avyava­
harika , there has to be some reasonable limit, depending on 
the .circumstances of the family in each case, below which 
the father's debts incurred irrespective of any legal necessity 
and which were not proved to be for an unrighteous or utterly 
improper or immoral purpose, might be considered to be 'just 
debts'; but if his extravagant debts would go beyond that 
limit, then, not only in view of the commentaries of Apararka 
(see above p. 247, f.n.3) and Balambhatta (see above p.220, 
f.n.2) in respect of the term avyavaharika, but also as 
considered in certain cases such as Devi Pitta's case (see 
above p.213, f.n.3) and Kandaswami's case (see above p.3o6) 
the liability in respect of such debts of the father might 
well be construed as avyavaharika. Devi Pitta's case was 
concerned with the father's antecedent debts, not found to 
be illegal or immoral. In this case, the Full Bench has said,
1. That such a result would obtain was expressly stated 
by Muttusami Ayyar, J. as far back as in 1881.
See, Ponnappa v. Pappuvayyangar, (1881) I.L.R. 4 Mad. 1,
at pp.36-37.
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"The words 'just debt' mean a debt which 
is actually due, and which is not immoral, 
illegal,or opposed to public policy. It also
* means a debt not contracted as an act of reckless
• ■ extravagance or of wanton waste or with the intention
of destroying the interests of the reversioners as 
laid down in Sardari Mai v. Khan Bahadar Kahn.
It need not be one incurred for a necessary purpose, 
but we think that if a non-necessary debt is 
unreasonably large compared to the means and 
station in life of the proprietor it cannot come 
under the definition of a just, debt. Similajrly, 
if a number of comparatively small loans for 
non-necessary purposes are contracted within an 
unreasonably short period they collectively may 
amount to extravagance judged by the tests 
previously mentioned, and may.(be excluded from 
j the category of just debts."
i
Thus, for the purpose of determining the nature of 
extravagant debts of the father, in the context of the son's
V
liability, such debts of his should be looked at, it seems, 
from both their quantitative and qualitative aspects. 
Quantitative means their size in the context of the circum­
stances of the family; and qualitative implies considering 
them in the light of contemporary conventional ethical and 
moral values of the society, i.e., whether or not they are 
of righteous or unrighteous, moral or immoral nature.
(ii) Commercial debts.
We have so far dealt with the cases in which the father's 
liability to pay others arose out of his borrowing or as a 
result of his alienations of joint family property mainly 
for his personal purposes which were thought to be of avyava­
harika nature. Now, we will turn to his debts which were not 
incurred exclusively for his personal purposes, but which 
were alleged, and in certain cases were held, to be avyavaharika 
These were the cases, among others, which involved his debts 
concerning his trading or commercial activities, or transactions 
of speculative nature. As will be seen presently, the term
1. (1900) 35 P.R. (No. 65), 291 (F.B.), at p.296.
The point of view no longer represents Hindu law on 
the subject, see below, p. 312 ff.
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t -j
y a nik-sulka, used by Gautama, seems to have been wrongly 
relied on for the allegation that such debts of the father 
were avyavaharika.
Although the son's liability to pay his father's debt due
to usual trade or commerce had been already recognised by 
2tne Court, attempts were made to shew, relying on the text 
of Gautama, that such debts were not binding on the sons. Thus, 
the question was for the first time raised in 1925 in the
3
case of Achutaramayya v. Ratnajee Bhootajee , where the father 
of the appellants was sued with them for the debts incurred 
by him for the purpose of carrying on trade in hardware.
The appellants' counsel relied on the text of Gautama, and 
contended that they were not liable for their father's commercial
debts.! However, the High Court rejected this contention
/
and held that the sons were liable for the debts.\
In the course of his judgement, Coutts Trotter, C.J., 
referred to the Privy Council's interpretation of the term 
avyavaharika, and observed,
"that the particular instances given in the Smritis 
must be treated as a mere expression of opinion 
on the part of the authors as to what classes of 
debts would fall under the general words. A modern 
Court would therefore be free in interpreting the 
general term to consider the particular instances 
given as obsolete under the conditions of today.
I am clearly of opinion that commercial debts fall 
into this category and that we ought to say that
1. Gaut., XII, 41 for the fuller discussion, see above p.70-74.
2. Ramakrishna v.Narayan, (1915) I.L.R. 4o Bom. 126. In this 
case, the sons were held liable for their father's debts 
incurred in a trade in fish, undertaken by him in contravent­
ion of Government Servant's Cunduct Rules, 1904. The Court 
was of the opinion that the alleged contravention did not 
constitute the debts avyavaharika.
Also, in Dasappa v. M.Nunjundia (1893) a loan taken by 
the father for certain contract works was held to be binding 
on the sons, as it was not proved to be for immoral or 
illegal purposes; (1893) 16 Mys. L.R. 1o3.
3. (1925) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 211.
1
the pious obligation extends to them.”
This observation clearly shows how the Courts tended to treat 
the'listed debts under the general term, i.e., avyavaharika 
or 'illegal or immoral'. Although the conclusion reached 
here would seem to be correct, the manner in which the Court 
arrived at this conclusion would seem to be not convincing.
For the Court did not go into what was really meant by the 
term van ik-sulka, which was the basis of the appellants' 
contention. Had the Court inquired, it would have found, 
as we have shewn above (see p. 272, ff), that the term could 
have hardly meant commercial debts; and the question of 
considering the liability under the doctrine of avyavaharika 
debts would not have arisen.
In the case of Rajagopal Pillai v. Veeraperumal Pillal^
(1927) the father had incurred debts in the bourse of carrying 
on a business in timber. To repay these debts the father 
raised money by alienations of ancestral property. In the 
suit by his son for partition, it was contended that the 
family was not a trading family, and that if the debts were 
incurred in a trade which was commenced by the father, the 
son was not liable for them, because they were avyavaharika 
debts. For this position, the text of Gautama was relied upon 
But after discussing what is meant by the term avyavaharika , 
and following the above case, it was held that the debts were 
not avyavaharika; and therefore the son was liable for them, 
The Court said,
"It is impossible to believe that even in remote 
antiquity commercial debts were regarded as immoral
1. Ibid., at p.213. His views on the subject appear, also,
at J.D.Mayne, The Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 9th edn. 
(Mad., 1922), p.404. However, the discussion hardly throws 
any li§ght on the subject. He cited no authority in support 
of his observation there. Moreover, the analogy on which 
he seems to have based his observation would seem to be 
defective; for the Privy Council's rendering of the term 
avyavaharika was itself, as shown above, inaccurate. It is 
'an unenlightened discussion', per J.D.M.Derrett, 1Indica 
Pietas', cit.above, at p.49, f.n.32.
2. (1927) 53 M.L.J., 232.
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debts. Trade is enjoined as a duty in the 
case of one of the three higher castes and it 
is incompatible with that notion to regard 
commerce as degrading. The very fact that, 
cut of so many texts, the solitary text of 
Gautama alone can be cited in support of this 
' theory shows that the rule enunciated by him 
did not correctly reflect^the prevalent 
opinion even of his day."
One would not disagree with the findings of the Court, but 
its implied acceptance, without any proper enquiry, of the 
construction placed upon the term van ik-dulka as meaning 
'commercial debts' would hardly seem satisfactory, for whether 
Gautama's language amounts to commercial debts or merchant's 
toll is not clear. So, did Gautama in fact mean 'commercial 
debts' by vanik-sulka?
We know that all the other sastrakaras have used the
term s'ulka in this context, meaning certain * tolls' or 'bride- 
2
price'. However, Gautama has qualified the term sulka by
the use of the word vanik, which taken together in this
3
context would seem to mean 'trader's toll', i.e., a toll 
due to trade or commerce; and to that extent he would appear 
to be more precise than other sastrakaras. In view of this, 
therefore, it would seem erroneous to construe, in the first 
place, the term as 'commercial debts' in the sense of a 
liability incurred for starting or carrying on a trade or 
commerce. Supposing, however, for the sake of argument that 
it meant 'commercial debts' incurred for starting or carrying 
on a business; still, it would be very difficult to believe,
4
particularly if he himself has clearly enjoined trade as
1. Per Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao; ibid., at pp.239-4o.
2. For cases on this please see above pp.287-294.
3. Jagannatha takes van ik-s'ulka as a single expression meaning 
commercial tolls or duties payable at wharfs and the like 
- vide, H .T .Colectrooke, trans., Digest, I., cit.above,
pp. 306-307; also see above p.74.
4’. Gaut. X.49, "The additional (occupationsbf a Vaisya are, 
agriculture, trade, tending cattle, and lending money at 
interest." - Vide G.Biihler, trans., S.B.E.2, (Oxford, 1879) 
at p .229.
a duty in the ease of one of the three higher castes, that
a great thinker like Gautama would include all kinds of
trading liabilities under this category, irrespective of
their nature. If at all he meant ’commercial debts' by the
term vanik-sulka, then the trade or commerce contemplated
by him might have been such as the one wh(<^ i|h the sastras
would not have approved of at the time of his writing. In
the absence of any direct evidence to the contrary, it would
appear, therefore, that, a normal commercial debt would not
fall under the excepted category as the modern Courtsz have
said. It is for this reason that we would not disagree with
3
the findings of the Court; and yet, in our opinion, had the 
Court examined the text of Gautama in this manner, the 
question of considering it as obsolete would not have arisen.
However, since the decisions in the two cases discussed
1. See, an observation that
"when Gautama says that a father's commercial debts need not be 
repaid by the son, he is certainly not referring to the debts 
incurred in the usual course of carrying on a business or 
trade but evidently to sums borrowed for speculative and 
hazardous ventures, involving something like gambling;" 
would seem to make some sense; See J.D.Mayne, cit.above, 
(11th edn.), at p.399.
2. "The debt incurred by the father in respect of trade trans­
actions cannot be said to be illegal or immoral or ayy_3vvtl 
harika.1 per Parker, J., at p.379, see, Annabhat y . Sb ivappa ,■
(1928) I.L.R. 52 Bom. 376. In this case, the father's
debt due to trade started by him was challenged by his 
son on the ground that it was not an ancestral family trade. 
The son failed because the Court held that the debt was 
not avyavaharika. *
3. Rajagopal's case was followed in Venkatasami Naiker v .
Palaniappa Chettiar, (1929) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 227, wherein
the father, with the consent of his adult sons, had mortgaged 
joint family property for trade started by him. It was 
challenged by his minor son on the ground that the father 
had no power to do so, and that the trade was speculative.
The son failed.
see also Parmanand Jain v. Firm Babulal.A.I.R. 1976 
M.P.187, which affirms this view (see below p.317,n.5).
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above, the stand taken by the sons to challenge the validity 
of their father's commercial debts would seem to have varied, 
as will be seen presently, due to their efforts to fix such 
debts of the father with some 'taint1 which, they might have 
considered, would help them to prove that they were avyavaharika. 
To get themselves exempted from the payment of these debts, 
therefore- they began to rely, it seems, more on more reason­
able considerations such as the father's imprudence, reckless­
ness, or risky or speculative nature of the trade concerned
than the trade as such.
Thus, in the following cases, the father's commercial 
debts w7ere alleged to be avyavaharika either because the trade 
concerned was different from the usual family business, or 
because it was completely new in the sense that before the
father started it, the family avocation was $ot trade but
something else.
2
In Narainrao v. Hanumantram (1930) the father's debts 
to meet losses incurred in the lac-trade were attacked on the 
ground that the trade was not ancestral, and that it was of 
wagering or speculative nature and hence avyavaharika. But
1. Here, it should be noted that in a number of cases such 
as, for example, Nataraja v. Lakshman, A.I.R. 1937 Mad.
195; Budhkaran v. Thakur Prasad, (1941-4 2) 46 C.W.N. 4 25; 
Syed v. Nem Chand, A.I.R. 1945 Lahore 169, (F.B.); Lila
Dhar y , Chunni, A.I.R.1951 All. 574 ; Kulitalai Bank v. 
Nagaman.i. ck a m , A.I.R. 1 955 M a d . 670; Kumbakonam Bank v .
P. S .'Pi] lai , A.I.R. 1 956 Mad. 306; Shivramsa v . Gurunathsa, 
(1956), 58 Bom. L.R.239; Hindustan Idea l v. Perla satteyya
Chettv, A.I.R. 1961 A.P.183; etc. to name a few, the 
father's debts were for commercial ventures, but because 
the sons challenged those debts on the ground that they 
were not incurred for any legal necessity or benefit of 
the family, the doctrine of avyavaharika was not invoked 
directly, and therefore, no useful purpose would be served 
by discussing those cases here. They have dealt mainly 
with the father's power of alienation, and any reference 
to the doctrine of avyavaharika, as found in the case of 
Hindustan Ideal (see p . 189, c.1), for example, was made in 
passing.
In all these cases, debts incurred by the father were 
either for starting a new business or for extention of an 
existing one. Sons were held liable in all but cases of 
highly speculative or hazardous ventures.
2. A.I.R. 1930 Nag. 273.
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the Court found that the transaction was not a solitary 
speculative venture. It was effected in the hope of improving 
the,family finances. In view of this, the Court observed 
that
'"while it cannot be considered prudent for the 
manager of a family to indulge in risky transactions, 
there is no authority for holding that an act is 
avyavaharika merely^because it involves risk to 
the family estate."
One wonders, however, whether the father's motive, however 
good it might be, would justify destruction of the joint 
family property: yet it seems that was not the real question.
2
In Bal Rajaram v. Maneklal Mansukhbhai (1931) the debts 
incurred by the father in the course of his business were 
alleged to be avyavaharika, because the business was allegedly 
run on an unlimited scale in a foolish manner without proper 
circumspection. In the considered opinion of the Court, having 
regard to the facts of the case, the father's alleged reckless 
or imprudent management of his business was not enough to make 
the debts avyavaharika. The contracts concerned were not 
gambling or wagering transactions, and therefore the Court 
said, "There is no element of moral turpitude involved in
3
these transactions." This was a well argued and thoroughly 
discussed case. The son was held liable.
4
In the cases of Ramasingh v. Jalamsingh (1939),
5 6Venkateswara Rao y. Ammayya (1 939) , Sreeramaraju v. Pullam
1. Ibid., at p.277 e.1.
2. (1931) I.L.R. 56 Bom. 36.
3. Per Parker, J . , ibid., at p.54, also see Tyabji, J . , at p.60.
This case vras referred with approval in Jagadishprasad 
Ramlal v.D.B. Ambashankar, A.I.R. 1934 Bom. 324, at p.327; 
which in turn was followed in Gulamkhaja v. Shivlal Hiralal, 
A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 295, at p.296, c.2. The debts challenged 
in these cases were for starting a new business by the father 
The sons were held liable.
4. A.I.R. 1939 Nag.192.
5. (1939) 1 M.L.J. 493. This and above case were followed in
Parmanand Jain v. Firm Babulal, A.I.R. 1976 M.P.187, at 
p. 194, c.1. The facts of the case were similar.
6. A.I.R. 1963 A . P .4o3.
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1
(1963) Rajan v. Kannikonda (1975) the facts ware similar
in that the father's debts were due to trade started by him
when trade was not the family’s normal occupation. None of
the trades involved was speculative. The sons were held
liable in all these cases. It may be deduced from these
decisions that starting a new business by itself cannot
?
generally be held avyavaharika; fot it is not repugnant to
3
good morals. It would appear that the contentions on behalf 
of the sons in these cases seem to represent a pervasive Idea 
that the degree of risk involved in the change of the family's 
usual avocation by itself is so serious as to make the father's 
action avyavaharika. However, the Courts have rejected the 
idea. Does this mean that a Hindu father is free to start any 
business and bind his sons for the debts arising out of such 
business?
' 4In the latest case of Sridharan v. Murthi Brothers (1976)
the father who, though an agriculturist, was also doing 
business in Cotton, incurred debts in the course of his 
business and was sued by his creditors. On behalf of his 
minor sons, it was contended that the business was started 
by the faj^fier and was avyavaharika. While rejecting this 
contention, in view of the facts of this case, the High Court 
observed,
"In a joint family which is a non-trading family, 
it is left to the option of the father-manager ... 
to formulate schemes of expansion in the matter 
of acquisition of property by lawful means and if,
1. (1975) 1 M.L.J. 26.
2. See (1939) 1 M.L.J. 493, at p.498,
"It is too much at this time of the day to ask the Ccur'c to hold 
that all debts borrowed for purposes of trade by a Hindu father 
are avyavaharika debt."
Also see, "Starting a new business like the bus in this case
cannot be called avyavaharika. Vide (1975) 1 M.L.J. 26,
at p .27, c .2.
3 . The father's debt due to new business (a motor to ply for 
hire) was held not being repugnant to good mojrals was not 
avyavaharika. A.I.R. 19 39 Nag. 192, at p . 193, c.1; i.e., 
(Ramsingh v. Jalamsingh).
4. (1976) 1 M.L.J. 1oo. Also see Gollamudi v. Indian Overseas
Bank, A.I.R. 1978 A.P. 37, which is similar.
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in the course of such wishful thinking- the father- 
manager departs from the usual avocation of the 
family and starts a new business as an entrepreneur, 
that by itself cannot be characterised as an 
• ' activity of the father which is not contemplated 
in the personal law or against it. If such 
a business conducted by the f ather-iuanager .is ex 
facie a speculative one or one which no reasonable 
or prudent person would characterise as a business 
undertaken by the father-manager in the interest 
of the other members of the family, then things 
might be different. But, on the only ground that 
the new business has been started by the father- 
manager, as a commercial activity thought of by 
him and for the purpose of prudentialiy conducting 
it for the benefit and welfare of his children and 
other coparceners of the family, that by itself would 
not raise any presumption, much less a reasonable 
presumption, that the debts contracted in the course 
of the working of such a commercial activity are 
by themselves avyavaharika debts ... The term 
vyavahara meij^s 'in the normal course1. The opposite 
of vyavahara therefore should give ah impression to 
a normal person that an abnormal activity was thought 
of by the father-manager or indulged in by him.
For example, if an agricultural family, like the one 
under consideration, suddenly thinks of starting 
a gaming house with the intention of making profits 
thereon, though licensed under the provisions of 
the appropriate legislation, yet the very impression 
gained by a third party who is apprised of such an 
activity on the part of the father-manager, would 
be revolting, in the sense that he would adjudge 
such an activity as an avyavaharika activity or as 
abnormal activity."
It might be correct to say that for the first time the Court 
has attempted to explain the whole circumstance in the context 
of which one should examine the nature of a new business started 
by a Hindu father; and also has pointed out how one might 
adjudge whether or not a particular new business is avyavaharika 
in view of Hindu law. If one goes by the example given by 
the Court, it would appear that a mere change from the usual 
avocation to a new business by itself would not be sufficient 
to constitute such a new business abnormal or avyavaharika.
To be so, besides being new, it has to be tainted, or so it 
seems, by moral turpitude as understood by the modern Hindu 
law. Running a gaming house would not necessarily amount to
A- Ibid., at p . 102 (para 8), c.1 and 2.
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actual gambling by the owner, but the business .itself, being 
associated with gambling could hardly avoid the stigma; for 
Hindu law would not be expected to encourage gambling which, 
undoubtedly, is avyavaharika under Hindu lawn
This brings us to the cases concerning trades involving 
speculative transactions. Apart from the grounds relied on 
by the sons in the above-discussed cases, this was one of 
the common grounds which was put forward to save the son's 
interest from the father's commercial debts.
1
Thus in Khemchand v. Narain Das (1925) the original 
cause of the father's indebtedness was said to be 'satta baz i '
i.e., transactions of speculative character; and on that 
ground the son contended that he was not liable because the 
debts were avyavaharika. Whether the allegations were proved 
or not is not clear, but referring to the allegation the Court 
said that "Speculative transactions cannot be said to be 
immoral, and there is no denying the fact that these were
made in the ordinary course of the business of the firm ...
2
by his father." Following this case, in Mauluk Chand v.
3
Dayakishan (1927), where the father's debts were due to 
Badni transactions the Court said, "Even if this were the 
case, the sons would still be liable, for the father could occur 
debts for the business in speculative transactions as they
1. (1925) I.L.R. 6 Lahore 493.
t
2. Ibid., at p.4 98, cf. Ram Chandra Singh v.Jang Bahadur Singh. 
(192 6) I.L.R. 5 Pat. 198, wherein debts incurred by the 
father for speculative transactions, i.e., for prosecuting 
litigations involving doubtful rights, were held to be not 
binding on the sons. The case was contested, however, on 
the ground of 'benefit of the family'. Also, the case of 
Nand Kishore v. Kunj Behari Lai, A.I.R. 1933 All. 303, is
to the same effect. Therein the father's liability due 
to speculative litigation was held to be not binding on 
the sons (see p. 305).
In Thanesher Pershad v. Ram Chand, A.I.R. 1929 Lahore
468, the father borrowed money to buy a commodity with the 
intention of selling it later when its price was higher.
He was a Government servant and not a trader. The Court 
held in favour of the son saying that a mere random act 
of speculation cannot be treated as a ligitimate business 
necessity.
3. (1927) 106 I.C. 183.
321
cannot be said to be immoral." Apparently, these two decisions
have made it clear that undertaking speculative trade is not
immoral, and debts incurred in the course of such a business
are, therefore; not immoral. In the case of Chotkao Singh 
7
v. Kasan Pagar" (1929), although alleged, it was not proved 
that the debts of the father were for intoxicating drugs.
But as regards the contention of speculative transactions, 
the Court observed, "Speculation is not usually repugnant to 
good morals, It may be foolish but it is not, unless tainted
3
with fraud, immoral." The more decisions we read, the further 
we seem t_o go from the spirit of basic Hindu law. The judges 
would seem to distinguish between speculative transactions 
and gambling properly so-called.
4
In Gulabchand Jethabhai v. Vadilal Sarabhai (1950) the 
sons of the debtor had sued for a declaration that their 
interests in the joint family property were not liable for 
attachment and sale in the execution proceeding against their 
father which was caused due to his losses in speculative 
dealings in shares on the Stock Exchange. They contended 
that the debt was immoral in point of Hindu law and therefore 
they were not liable. In the opinion of the Court, the suit 
was really instituted by the father in the name of his sons. 
While giving the judgement against the sons, the Court said,
"On Stock Exchange, actual deliveries and payments 
are made once a fortnight or so. On all intermediate 
transactions only differences have to be paid.
Simply because the father's buying and selling 
‘might have been intermediate transactions, they
1. Ibid., at p. 184, C.1. This case was followed in Pirthi 
Singh v. Mam Chand, (1935) I.L.R. 16 Lahore 1077. Here 
the liability of the father was comprised of losses in 
Badani transactions and balance of Agent's commission. The 
Court considered the debts as normal commercial liability and 
the sons were held liable, (see pp.1079-80 of the report).
2. A.I.R. 1929 Oudh 458.
3,. Ibid. , c . 2
4. A.I.R. 1950 Kutch 78.
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did not become immoral or against public policy.
Such transactions are recognised as legitimate 
means of earning. The only thing that matters 
in these transactions is whether an actual 
particulai set of shares was there to deal in.
In this cese, there was such a set of shares.
, I hold that the plaintiffs1 father's debt was.
not immoral and that it was perfectly legal."
Not a single authority is cited in this whole judgement. 
However, the judgement would appear to have merit in that 
it has attempted to clarify the distinction which seems to
exist between these speculative transactions and gambling
or wagering contracts. Whether this minute difference, 
though material, between the two would make them vyavaharika 
is another matter.
This brings us to a rather curious decision: curious
2
because in it, it was not the nature of the debt impugned
but something else that was considered material to decide
whether the sons of the debtor were liable. The case is
3
boshi Jayantilal v. Luhar Amritlal (1954). In this case the 
father had incurred debts due to losses in satta in bullion, 
and to meet these losses he had mortgaged joint family property 
The sons had challenged the execution of a decree obtained 
by the mortgagee of their father, on the ground that the debts 
for which the alienation took place were avyavaharika. Accord­
ing to the Court, the father was evidently in collusion wi.th 
the plaintiffs (sons) who supported their claim. In view of 
these facts, the case was decided against the sons on the 
ground of their failure to prove the alienee's knowledge of
1. Ibid., at p. 79, c.2.
2. It should be noted that ever since the famous decision of 
the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud's case, (1856) 6 M.I.A. 
393, it was the nature of the debt impugned which has been 
deciding factor in cases where the son's liability was 
concerned. See above p.262.
3'. A.I.R. 1 954 Saurashtra 36.
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1
the immoral nature of the original debt; for, in the Court's
opinion, that was the material issue to be decided in this
case. At present, we are not coace cned with the propriety of
this'issue. Our.present problem is speculative transactions,
and while refeiring to the argument of the Appellant's Counsel,
that such debts, though speculative, are not repugnant to
good morals, the Court has remarked that, "A distinction must
however be drawn between merely speculative debts and debts
of the nature of gamble or wager which are illegal under the
2
Indian Contract Act;" but the Court left the issue there 
without any further elaboration. An opportunity to explain 
the issue properly presented itself scon, on appeal in Luhar
3
Amritlal v. Doshi Jayantilal (1960), but the Supreme Court, 
too, declined to do so in the light of the texts, saying, 
among other things, that
\
"If we were to decide today what the true position 
under Hindu law texts is on the point with which 
we are concerned, it would be very difficult to 
reconcile the different^texts and to come to 
a definite- conclusion."
1. Relying on the findings of the Lower Courts, the High Court 
seems to have assumed that the debts were 'illegal or 
immoral'; see, "that the antecedent debt which have been 
proved in the present case were illegal or immoral", ibid., 
at p .38, c .1.
2. Ibid.. It may be said that cases involving Kuri or Chit 
funds started by the father, would seem to fall under similar 
category as the liability incurred by the father to subscrib­
ers of such funds was held to be not binding on the son; 
see, Muthusami Servai v .N .K .Mytheen , A.I.R. 1937 Mad.34 4, 
and S.M. Pillai v. Muthusami Servai, I .L .R . 19 39 M a d . 70.
In both these cases the father and sons were sued for recovery 
of subscriptions paid into such funds started by the father, 
but sons were held not liable. But the ground, upon which 
the decisions were based, had reference not to Hindu law 
but to Indian Penal Code, (see, 'Chit fund amounted to a 
lottery, and the promoters of the. kuri ... committed offence 
under S.294-A, I.P.C.;') - per Full Bench in Sesha Ayyar 
v.Krishna Ayyar, A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 225 (F.B.), at p.229.
In this case the claim was against the father only, who was 
held liable. It might be correct to state that these decisions 
would allow the sons to accumulate the so-called 'illegal' 
gains of the father without being liable.
3. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 964.
4. Ibid., at p. 970, c.1.
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Had the Supreme Court come to this conclusion after pursuing 
an enquiry it would have commanded greater respect. The fact 
that the Supreme Court avoided the issue hardly helps us 
in determing the.nature of debts due to speculative transactions
The suggestion that 'merely speculative debts' should 
be treated on a difiierent footing from 'debts of the nature
of gamble or wager' would seem to make some sense in that
it attracts our attention to take into account certain existing
facts of the business life of today as against those which
might have been existed at the time when the smrits were 
written.
So, assuming that no Stock Exchange existed when the 
smrits were written, and therefore the sastrakaras would not 
have included in the exception under consideration debts 
arising out of dealings such as in share market; how could 
one go about reconciling the present situation with the 
sastric precepts of Hindu law? Obviously, one would as the 
Courts seem to have tried to do, apply a principle which 
would be suitable, as the next best thing, for meeting the 
needs of the day. 'Speculation' being the common feature, 
attempts were made, in the cases discussed above, to persuade 
the Courts to consider these debts in accordance with the 
provision concerning 'gambling' debts. Seen in the light of 
the above discussion, therefore, it is quite clear that the 
Courts have held debts due to gambling as avyavaharika; but 
so far as the debts for speculative transactions are concerned, 
they have expressed difference of opinion on the ground that, 
for example, in speculative transactions such as dealing in 
shares, there is always an actual particular set of shares 
to deal in, and their delivery can in fact be effected. 
Admittedly, this is not exactly the same thing as betting on 
horses; but would it make any difference, if the father 
entered, as was the case in Gulabehand Jethabhai (see above 
P'. 321), into such transaction merely to collect profits or 
to pay losses without ever intending to take delivery of the
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shares? It appears that the mere existence of a set of
shares would hardly affect the nature of the debt, if the
r
intention of the dealj_er (father) was nothing but pure 
speculation as in horse-racing. Thus, while determining 
the liability of the son of such a dealer, it would appear 
that the intent ion of the dealer rather than the existence 
of an actual set of shares - or for that matter even gold 
bullion, should be regarded in the context of the facts of 
each case.
Not only the debts for a new or a speculative business,
but also usual Government taxes, such as income tax, in
respect of profits made in such businesses were challenged
on the ground of avyavaharika. Thus, in K.Devadattam v. Union 
1of India (1958), the sons of the assessee had contended 
that they were not liable for payment of income tax assessed 
upon the estimate made by the Incontrtax Officer, as the debts 
were avyavaharika having been incurred by their father in 
a trade which was speculative in nature. Rejecting the 
contention the High Court said,
"There is absolutely no force in the argument 
that the father contracted debts for the business 
which was of a speculative nature and therefore 
the debts were tainted with immorality and 
illegality for which reason the liability of 
the sons by reason of the theory of pious oblig­
ation is excluded. It is in respect of the 
huge profits made by the father that the income 
-tax was imposed and so the family being in 
.enjoyment of these properties is liable to 
'bear the burden of the tax and they cannot escape 
payment^of tax by taking refuse under untenable 
pleas. " "
3
However, in M.R. Radhakrishnan v. Union of India (1959) 
the plea was based on the concealment of true income by the 
father. The facts proved in this case were that income-tax 
was assessed, due to concealment of true income, on the basis 
of estimation. The sons raised a very different plea, 
contending that a tax levied on such basis would be in the
1. A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 131 .
2. Ibid., at p. 138, c.2.
3. A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 71.
nature of an avyavaharika debt because the conduct of the 
father in suppressing the accounts was repugnant to good 
morals. The assessment was not in any sense a penalty o.r 
fine imposed on the father for non-production of accounts 
or f o r 'suppression of material information; nor was it in 
excess of what would have been a proper assessment.
In the opinion of the Court, unless an element of moral 
turpitude is involved in the debt it could not be called 
avyavaharika. 1 While holding the sons liable, the Court 
said that the fatlier
"has not voluntarily incurred any debt. On the income 
earned a tax has been imposed. One method of imposition 
is by levying the tax on an estimated income. The 
matter would of course have been different if a fine 
had been imposed on the second defendant for concealment 
of income and that fine is sought to be recovered from 
the shares of the sons as well. But this is not the 
case here. We agree with the learned Judge that by 
no stretch of imagination can the liability to pay 
the tax~be brought under the category of avyavaharika 
debt."
But it was argued that the sons might escape the liability 
of such debts under another exception, i.e., sulka, which has 
been translated sometimes as 'tax1 and sometimes as 'toll'.
In this connection, after expressing doubt as to the exact 
meaning of the term sulka, the Court stated,
"A son should be relieved of the obligation to pay 
a toll which his father has become liable to pay. 
Problably this is because a toll is payable on 
the spot and as the obligation arises as the result 
of an evasion for which he may be convicted and fined, 
it was an obligation ex delicto. It may be the 
conduct of a father in evading payment of a toll was 
not good conduct."
1. Ibid., at p.73, c.2.
2. per P.V. Rajamannar, C. J., Ibid., c.2. The decision in Chaganti 
Raghava Reddy v. State of Andhra, A.I.R. 1959 A.P.631, would seem to 
agree with this view by implication. The case was between one of the 
creditors (a decree-holder) of the assessee (the father-debtor) and the 
Tax Authorities claiming priority in regard to the share of the sons
in the joint family property, for the purpose of settlement of their 
claims against the father.
3. Ibid.
327
This might have been the case in those days; but could we 
say that the conduct of evading income-tax by concealment of 
accounts or real income is good even today? Perhaps not; 
but the debt could not be tainted, being levied under a 
statute. . However, in the absence of any authority for the 
position that the word sulka would apply to arrears of income- 
tax, the Court held that the sons were liable for the debt 
because it was not avyavaharika.
Although the question referred to the Full Bench in
i
J. Devaraja Rao v. Income-Tax Offleer (1970) concerned the 
sons' liability for the arrears of income-tax, due by the 
father in respect of a separate business prior to a partition 
between him and his sons, they have examined very carefully 
the nature and the scope of the liability arising out of the
father's unpaid income-tax. According to them it was certainly
-  2 not avyavaharika in this case.
As regards the various constructions placed upon the 
terms used in the texts on the subject under consideration,
i.e., the words avyavaharika and sulka; the Court observed 
that,
"it is for the Court to decide in the context of 
the present society whether any particular tax 
liability is of such a nature as could be treated 
as one tainted with illegality or immorality or 
opposed to right conduct as to bring it within the 
exception to the general rule that the son is 
liable to pay the father's debt. We have no 
; hesitation in holding that i he: liability to 
pay arrears of income-tax cannot be regarded as 
one such."
1. A.I.R. 1970 A.P. 426, (F.B.).
2. "There can be no dSoubt that the liability in the present 
case ... cannot be'" said to be avyavaharika." - Ibid. , at p. 4 29
3. Ibid., c.2. Further,
"It has been repeatedly held that the son is liable to pay the 
debts of the father incurred during the course of trade which he 
had lawfully carried on. It does not stand to reason that while 
the son is liable to pay the debts of the father so incurred, he 
is not liable to pay the tax due in respect of the profits of 
that trade, or debts incurred by the father for the purpose 
of the payment of those taxes."
See, ibid.
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Moreover, having regard to comments made by various writers 
and Courts as to the meaning and scope of the term sulka the 
Full Bench said,
"We arc of the opinion that having regard to the 
context in which it occurs, sulka must be confined 
only to such liability, though in nature of tax 
or a duty, which would involve some moral turpitude 
on the part of the father or the incurring of which 
would be tainted with illegality or i m m o r a l i t y ^
Thus, it would appear that unless some moral turpitude is 
involved, all taxes due from the father would have to be 
paid by the sons.
2
The f'jcts in State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lai (1971) 
are not at all clear. It seems that the father of the 
respondent was accused of selling opium, without maintaining 
proper accou(t£)s; and consequently was held liable to pay 
a certain amount as Chori Mehsul. Besides, lie was also fined 
Rs. 5oo which was recovered from him. At another place in
3
the report, it is stated that the Chori Mehsul was imposed 
on him because he was found to have 'exported opium illegally'.
The High Court held that the liability was due to a 
cause repugnant to good morals and therefore the son was not 
liable. Apparently the Court would seem to have considered 
the impugned levy as in the nature of a punitive assessment 
for illegally exporting opium. But, if it were so, why should 
he have been made to pay a fine of R s . 500 in addition to the 
punitive levy? We find no clear answer to this question from 
the facts reported. It may be that the father of the respondent 
might have been found guilty on two counts: firstly, on
account of tirading in contravention of export rules; and 
secondly, for concealment of truth by way of not maintaining 
proper accounts. If the sole basis of the impugned levy 
was these acts of the father, then it would seem to have been 
tainted with illegality and immorality. The description of
Ibid., at p.430, c.1.
2. A.I.R. 1971 Raj. 318.
3. Ibid., at p.319, c.2
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the levy that it was Chori Mehsul would also seem to suggest 
that the whole amount was assessed according to some special 
rules applicable to only those who had broken the law; for 
the term Chori Mehsul would, in this context, mean a levy 
imposed for trading in secret, i.e., in contravention of the 
law concerned. Looked at from this point of view, the 
impugned amount, being a penalty, would seem to be tainted 
with illegajity as well as moral turpitude, so far as the 
son ts l iability is concerned; and therefore, he would not 
be liable. It would come under danda. Although this result 
would manifestly defeat the purpose of the export regulations, 
and consequently the state's right to collect legal taxes 
due from its citizens or subjects, it need not be considered 
alarmingly serious; for the son's immunity is an exception, 
and not the general rule. Had the actual amount of excise 
duty and the penalty been specified clearly, the son would 
have been liable for the excise duty, though not for the 
penalty (see below cases on fines).
Thus, to sum up the discussion in respect of the father's 
commercial debts, it may be correct to say that:
(1) commercial debts as such were neither, it seems, avyava­
harika in ancient times, nor are they so now; that
(2) the debts incurred for a new business, even if the 
business was not the normal family avocation, would not be 
avyavaharika unless they involved some moral turpitude; that
(3) ths debts due to speculative transactions, too, have 
often been held to be binding on the son unless they amounted 
to gamble or wager; though the distinction drawn between 
pure gambling and a speculative transaction which would bind 
the son, would seem to be very thin. One wonders whether a 
Hindu father should be allowed to play with the ancestral 
property with such ease and in such manner, simply because 
the activity is considered to be a legal means of earning 
ojie's living. Even if the sastras had no idea then of such 
commercial dealings as buying and selling shares in the modern
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Stock-Exchanges, they would seem to be quite explicit as to 
what kind of risks a trader may reasonably undertake to 
justify the validity of his liability from the point of view 
of his son's pious obligation to pay it. It is in the light
of such approach, and not merely from the point of view of
the legality or presence or otherwise of actual shares to 
be bought and sold, that the nature of a Hindu father's debts 
of this type should, it seems, be judged. And that
(4) the debts or liability of the father due to taxes imposed 
on profits made would generally bind the son except when (as 
can rarely happen) they are tainted with moral turpitude on 
the part of the father. In short, unless the trade or commerce 
or any ,liability arising in connection with such trade or 
commerce undertaken by the father is in some way connected 
with immorality on the part of the father, the son would be
liable. *
)
(iii) Debts due to Fines.
In the course of the above discussion, we have noticed
the judges making reference to fines or debts due to fines 
imposed upon the father as not binding on the son. It would 
appear from the following discussion that there is no difference 
of opinion between the Courts and the sastric position of 
Hindu law on this subject. We have, however, a very few cases 
directly on the subject.
Thus, in Nhanee v . Hureeram Dhooluba (1814) there is 
a reference to a case decided previously by the Bengal Sudder 
Dewanee'Adawlat, in which on the advice of the Hindu law 
Officer the Court had held "that a son is not liable for a
penalty incurred by his father in expiation of an offence;
2
for neither sins, nor expiation of them, are hereditary."
In this case, the father who had imprisoned and fined a Brahmin 
widow, was himself charged and severely fined, but before its 
recovery he had died.
1. (1814) 1 Bor. 95.
2. Ibid., at p. 101.
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However, in the later case of Luchmun Koour v. Mudaree
1 ----------------------
Lall (1850), despite the son's objection, the Court upheld a
sale of ancestral property on the ground of urgent necessity,
2i.e., to meet, among others, 'the fine of Rs. 100' imposed 
upon the father. I he decision would show that the sastrici 
position relied on in Nhanee1s case was neither expressly 
relied on nor followed in this case. Perhaps, a prevalent 
practice at the tjm^ in that part of the country, rather 
than the precepts of Hindu law, would seem to have influenced 
the decision.
4
In Ramaiergar v. The Secretary of State for India,
(1910) the liability to pay costs, in a false suit brought by 
the father in forma pauperis, was imposed on him. The Court 
held that the debt so incurred was tainted with immorality 
and that the sons were not bound to pay it. Recording to 
the Court, "The reason why the appellants' father was made 
liable for these costs was that he had been guilty of what 
was certainly an immoral act in bringing a suit which he must
5
have known to be false." The liability was treated in this
£
case as in the nature of a fine. It is the dishonesty of the
1. (1850) S.D.A. (N.W.P.) 327.
2. Ibid., at p. 328. Here, while justifying the sale the Court said,
"The circumstances did establish a case of urgent necessity suffsisnt 
to justify the sale, as it was shown that the decrees of creditors 
were in execution « . and that Hurdeo Singh was himself in confinement 
. . and had been fined Rs. 100. "
3. See above p. 227.
4. (1910) 20 M.L.J. 89.
5. Ibid., at p.90.
6. "Again, under Hindu Law, among debts which sons are not bound to pay
are fines, ... and in this case the liability imposed upon the appellants' 
father may also be regarded as in the nature of a fine." - Ibid., at 
pp.90-91.
We have a similar decision in Mohammad Ali v.Jhao Lai, A.I.R. 1928 
• Oudh 10, at p.13, c.1-2; where the father's debts due for payment of 
costs incurred in suits brought by him on false and dishonest grounds.
The sons were held not liable to pay the costs for which decrees were 
.passed againgst the father. Cf. Paryag Sahu v.Kasi Sahu (1910) 14 C.W.N. 
659, at p.661, c.2. In this case, it was contended that the father's debts 
due to costs would cane under the scope of the word danda or fine; but
f.n. continued next page.
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father, the basis of this liability, that saved the sons in 
this case; otherwise costs awarded by the Courts would 
normally, as will be seen presently, be binding on the son.
- 1 
Jn Savnmian v. Narayanan Chettiar (1914) the sons had
claimed exemption from liability to a mortgage debt contracted
by their father to redeem jewels pledged to pay a fine
imposed upon the father when convicted of a criminal offence.
The mortgagee was found to have made no reasonable enquiry.
The sons' contention was upheld because in the opinion of
2
the Court it was not a debt binding on the sons. Thus, 
here, once again, the sastric rule was upheld.
3
In the case of Sunder Lai v. Raghunandan Prasad (1923) 
the debts incurred by the father and the grandfather were 
for damages awarded against .them for malicious prosecution.
The sons contended that the debts were avyavaharika and there­
fore they were not liable. While upholding the sons' contention, 
the Court said,
"The prosecution was held to be false, and
Teju and Goberdhan were liable for criminal
prosecution as well as for civil damages, and
the damages awarded in the Civil Court were
like a fine imposed upon them in a criminal
case ... The debt in question is undoubtedly
not vyavaharika. It would also come under the &
words danda sulkavasesam in Manu and Yajnavalkya."x
f .n. continued from last page) the Court refused to accept the
contention, and his sons were held liable. In this case, a decree for 
costs' was passed against the father who had failed to substantiate 
a claim made to a certain property.
However, in Said Ahmad v.Raja Narain, A.I.R. 1932 Oudh 255, at 
p.253, c.1; though the costs incurred in defending the father in a
criminal case were held to be binding on the son; money borrowed for
the payment of fine imposed on the father in a criminal case was 
considered to be avyavaharika.
1. A.I.R. 1914 Mad. 244.
2. Ibid., at p.245, c.2.
3. (1924) I.L.R. 3 Pat. 250.
4'. Ibid., at p. 253. It may be noted here that of the words danda sulkavasesam
quoted here, only danda and not the sulka, would apply.
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The circumstances which led to incurring the liability were 
apparently illegal, immoral and against the public policy.
But, whether such a liability should be considered to be in 
the nature of a fine as envisaged by the sastras, is a 
different-matter. One would be inclined to think that such 
a view would seem to be ratner superfluous, because in legal 
terms how could it be a fine unless it was, in fact, imposea 
as such in a criminal case? Moreover, unless it is a fine 
properly so-called, application of the sastric rule would 
seem to be improper. However, as the damages -awarded against 
the father in this case were treated as a fine by the Court, 
the sons were absolved of their liability.
Also, we have seen in the case of State of Rajasthan
i
v. Mohan L a i , (1971) that the liability to pay Chori Mehsul 
by the father was considered to be repugnant *to good morals. 
According to the Court it was of the nature of a fine or 
penalty. It was, therefore, held to be avyavaharika, and 
the son was relieved of the liability.
Thus, as far as the father's liability due for a fine
is concerted, there appears to be agreement between the sastras
2
and the modern Courts of law.
Debts on account of Costs: This may be the
appropriate place to examine whether debts of the father due 
to costs awarded by the Courts against him or his expenses in 
respect of litigation of any kind should be regarded as 
avyavaharika. We have already noticed that such debts were
1. A.I.R. 1971 Raj. 318; for the facts and fuller discussion 
of the case, see above p.328.
2. This is the position today. But, seen from the decisions 
in the cases of the Pawar Family (1677) (see above p.227, 
f.n.1) and Luchmun Koour v.Mudaree Lall (1850) (see above 
p.331) it would appear that in practice even the fines 
imposed on the father were recovered from the son. However, 
as the sastric rule was not specifically invoked in these
, cases, one could not be sure as to whether the practice 
came into being due to ignorance of or disregard for the 
sastras. Perhaps, monetary considerations prevailed above 
everything else.
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held to be avyavaharika in the cases of Ramaiengar v. The.
Secretary of State for India (1910) and Mohammad Ali v.Jhao 
2
Lai (1928) as the costs awarded were in the nature of a fine.~ <
3
In Prayag Sahu v . Kast Sahu ,(1910) a decree for costs 
was passed against the father, since deceased, ‘who had failed 
in substantiating his claim to a certain property. His sons 
contended that the liability was of the nature of a fine, so 
it was not vyavahaii.ka in terms of Hindu law, and therefore, 
they were not liable for the debt. They were held liable 
for it, however; because the claim of the father was not 
found to be false or dishonest, though it might have been 
imprudent or ill-advised.
While explaining the basic position at Hindu law on
the subject, Chatterjee, J. said,
"Words used by Hindu law-givers must-be understood 
in the sense in which the authors may be supposed 
to have used them. Hindu Courts of justice did 
not allow costs to successful litigants but imposed 
upon the party who took a false^plea a fine payable 
to the king, equal to the claim .... So that costs
1. See above p. 331.
2. See above p. 331, f.n.6
3. (1910) 14 C.W.N.659. Note that the first name here is spelt
as 1Paryag1, but in 11 C.L.J.599 it is 'Prayag1 which seems
to be correct.
4. Ibid., at p.661, c.1. As regards this, reference may be 
made to the following:
Ninhave bhavito dadyaddhanam rajne ca tatsamam / 
Mithyabhivogi dvigunam abhiyogaddhanam vahet // Yajn.II.11 
vide^ N.Khiste and J.Hosinga, ed., cit.above, p.418.
That is to seiy "If the defendant denies the claim of the 
plaintiff and the latter proves his claim by witnesses then 
the defendant will pay the plaintiff's claim and an equal 
penalty to the King." (see (1910) 14 C.W.N.65 9, at p.661,c.1).
Also, to similar effect is Manu, VIII.59 according to which: 
Yoyavannihnuvitartham mithyayavativa vadet //
Tau nrpen dhyatadharmajnyau dapyau^taddvigunamdamam // 59// 
vide V.N.Mandlika, e d . , Manva-Dharma Sastra, v o l .2, cit.above, 
at p.910; which means "If one falsely denies a debt, or if the 
other falsely demands it, these two, proficient in dishonesty, 
should be made by the King to pay a fine double that sum." 
Manu, VIII.59, vide G.Jha, trans., Manusmrt i , vol.IV, pt.l, 
cit.above, p.8o. - For the views of the other sastrakaras, 
reference may be had to G.Jha, Manusmrti, (Comparative) Notes, 
pt.III, (Cal.1929), pp.565-66; where views of Vyasa, Yama,
f.n. continued next page.
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awarded against a defeated litigant could not be 
danda or fine within the meaning of the text. 
Interpreting che word vyavaharika in the same 
way the costs could not come within the exception 
as the venerable Rishi could not have meant to 
exclude1a thing which had no existence in his 
time."
Seen in the light in which it is presented, one would be 
•inclined to agree with this view because the nature of the 
costs awarded here would seem to differ from ./hat the king 
used to impose upon a defeated dishonest party in those days. 
Nothing like the costs as understood in these days would 
seem to have been awarded to a successful litigant in ancient 
times, and the attempted analogy is not perfect. In the 
present case, moreover, the decree for costs was given in 
favour the successful party, not because the defeated party 
was dishonest but simply because, in the opinion of the Court, 
the successful party deserved to be compensated.
2
In Sumer Singh v. Liladhar (1911) a debt incurred by 
the father to defend himself in a suit for defamation was,
in the opinion of the Court, not immoral and hence binding
3 4on the sons. Similarly, in Chuman Chaudhury v. Ram Sunder
f.n. continued from last page) Narada, and Yajhavalkya are 
given, which would seem to be more or less similar.
Even in the arthasastra there are provisions to similar effect 
see Kant. 11.3 3-4 8; vide R.P. Kangle, cit. above, p.II, 
pp. 26 4-65.
1. (1910) 14 C.V7.N. 659, at p.661, c.1-2.
2. (1911) I.L.R. 33 All. 472.
3. Ibid., at p. 474. This case was followed in Ram Lai v .
Jagdish, A.I.R. 1938 All. 591. In this case a decree for 
costs was awarded against the father, but before its execution 
he died. The son objected its execution on the ground of 
avyavaharika, but the Court held that in defending the suit 
concerned the father's conduct was not opposed to good morals, 
and hence the debt was not avyavaharika. The son was held 
liable.
4. (1917) 39 I.C. 861.
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(1917) the father's liability, which arose out of costs for 
defending himself against a criminal charge upon which he 
was already convicted, was challenged by his son. However, 
in the course of its judgement,’the Court observed that,
"It is the pious duty of the son to pay such a 
debt, especially as in this case the offence 
charged was not one involving any moral turpitude. 
The father was convicted of an assault committed 
by him in asserting his right to a portion of the 
family property."1
Thus, the debt v:as held to be binding on the son.
In the light of this decision, one might consider that 
the son would be liable for such debts only where no moral 
turpitude was involved. It is of interest that the Court 
may find no moral turpitude (from a Hindu standpoint) even 
where the father was convicted under the Penal Code. There 
have been a number of cases, however, in whifch the son was
1. Ibid., at p.862, c.1.
2. Thus, in Beni Ram v. Man Singh (1912) I.L.R.34 All.4, at
p.7. The debt incurred by the father for defending himself 
against a serious criminal charge was held to be binding 
on the son as it was found to be for a legal necessity.
While explaining its view, and after expressing doubt as 
to the correctness of certain previous decisions in which 
alienations of ancestral property made in order to obtain 
release from jail of the father who had been shown to be 
guilty of a criminal offence, were held to be for family 
necessity, and therefore, valid; the Court said,
"There is, however, clear distinction between selling or 
mortgaging property in order to obtain the release from jail ... 
and selling or mortgaging property in order to raise funds for 
the defence of a member who has been accused in a criminal Court .
In the one case the family has been disgraced and the release 
of the offender will not remove that disgrace. It is also 
desirable that an offender should suffer for his misdeeds.
In the other case the family is threatened with disgrace, and 
the intention is to ward it off. According to our system of 
jurisprudence and practice a man is presumed to be innocent until 
his guilt is established. The question, whether in such a case 
as this legal necessity exists for raising money cannot depend 
upon the result of the trial." per Chamier, J., at p. 7.
, (Cf. Nathu Rai v. Dindayal Rai (1917) 39 I.C. 665, which 
appears to be a case of the manager of joint family. It was 
held there that unless other coparceners' consent is obtained, 
the manager could not validly alienate joint family property 
to defend himself against a criminal charge.)
f.n. continued next page.
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held liable for such debts on the ground of 'necessity'; 
but we are not concerned with them here because the doctrine 
of avyavaharika was not invoked in these cases.
As far as the Courts are concerned, however, they would
seem to be free to bring in this doctrine even when it was
1not invoked. Thus, in Maruthappan v. Nlraikulathan (193/) 
the grandfather had mortgaged ancestral property to raise 
money to pay an Advocate who was engaged to assist the police 
in prosecuting a man accused of having murdered his son, i.e., 
the father of the defendants 2 and 3. The mortgagee contended 
that the alienation was binding on the sons on the sole ground
f.n. continued from last page)
However, both the above cases and Sumer Singh v.Liladhar's 
case were followed in Ramalingam Pillai v.Muthayyan (1914)
26 M.L.J. 528; where a sale of ancestral property for the 
purpose of raising funds for the defence of the father in 
a criminal case was held to be for family necessity, and 
therefore, binding on the son. (see p.531 of the report).
Also, in Said Ahmad v. Raja Narain, A.I.R. 19 32 Oudh 
255, where the facts were similar to that of the above case, 
the Court held that the debts were for the family necessity 
and hence binding on the sons, (see p.262, c.2).
So is the decision in the case of Hanumat Mahton v . 
Sonadhari Singh (1919) 52 I.e. 734, at p.735, c.1. The debts 
incurred to defend the father in a criminal case were held 
to be binding on the sons on the ground of family necessity. 
In this case Mr. Justice Jwala Prasad's observation:
"The stigma of criminal charge ... of the family" etc.; which 
would seem to be almost identical to that of Chamier, J . , 
quoted above. One wonders, how many people in these days 
would consider such 'stigma' important enough to make such 
defence a family necessity. Hov:ever, no one would doubt 
that the defence of the father or any family member by 
itself is a family necessity, irrespective of such a consider 
ation as 'stigma'.
1. I.L.R. 1937 Mad. 943.
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of 'necessity'. In the opinion of the Court the debts were
neither for 'necessity' nor for 'family benefit'. In spite
of this finding, however, the Court held the sons liable on
the ground chat the debts were "neither illegal or immoral."
Anyway, this was a case in which the costs had nothing to do
with defending any member of the family, nor protecting the
•family's interest in the material sense. The whole exercise
would seem to have been undertaken either to satisfy feelings
of revenge or prestige or, perhaps, for the vindication of
justice. It could be argued that it was the duty of the
State to find out and bring to book the real offender, and
to that extent the expenses were not necessary. But having
regard to the personal love and affection involved in the
father-son relationship, it would appear that the debt involved
in this case could hardly be described as avyavaharika; for,
it was in no sense tainted with moral turpitude, nor was it
a sheer waste in the normal sense, because though 'necessity'
or 'family benefit' might not be manifest in the conventional
sense of those terms, in the circumstance of the case, both
these factors would, in a peculiar sense, seem to be present.
Achieving a sense of satisfaction may well be construed in
this sort of case as necessary as well as beneficial. This
is the unique case on this subject. The Court had no help
from any previous decision; there seems to be ncne directly
on the point. However, the decision would seem to be correct
in that it would seem to fit into the spirit of Hindu law.
; 2 
In LaKshminarasimhamurti v. Venkata Jogisomayajulu
(193S) the father was ordered to pay personally costs which
he had incurred while defending a suit on behalf on his minor
daughter by setting up a false will. It was for that reason
that the Court ordered him personally to pay the costs of
the plaintiff although he himself was not a party to the suit.
3
The Court held the debt avyavaharika, as it was tainted with 
illegality and immorality, and hence his sons were held not
1. Ibid, at p . 947.
2. (1939) 2 M.L.J. 499.
3. Ibid., at p.500-501.
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to be liable for it.
i
The son in the case of Ananga Bhusan v. Uchhab Sahu
(1955) challenged the debt incurred by his father for defending
himself in a criminal litigation on the ground of avyavaharika.
The contention was overruled for want of any direct authority;
and after discussing the cases of Rent Ram, Hanumat Mahton,
etc.; (see f.n. 2 at p p .336-33?); the Court came to the
2conclusion that the said debt was not avyavaharika ‘ and
therefore it was binding on the son. Although one would not
disagree with the finding of the Court, it may be pointed cut 
that the cases relied on for this decision have hardly said
i
a word as regards avyavaharika debts.
Apart from cases in which the father's liability in
i
respect of costs arose in connection with criminal litigation, 
there have been a number of cases in wh^jh the sons have
contended that the costs impugned were illegal or immoral
because of the father's wrongful conduct in the litigations 
concerned or in incurring the original liability.
3
In Musst. Nanomi Babuasin v. Modun Mohun (1885) where 
the father's debts consisted of a loan, mesne profits, interest 
and costs, and consequently the joint family property was 
sold, it was contended on behalf of the son that the debts 
were tainted becasue of the father's wrongful acts in incurring 
them. It did not impress the Privy Council. They thought 
that the High Court was right in holding that the whole debt 
must be taken as a family debt; and a sale to answer it 
effected by the father or in a suit against him could not be
4
successfully impeached.
Although the costs involved in this case were not the 
significant portion of the total debts, nor the sole basis of 
the decision, and despite the fact that hardly anything was 
said as regards costs in the decision, this case was relied
1. A.I.R. 1955 Orissa 179.
2. Ibid., at p . 184, c.1.
3. (1885) 13 I.A. 1.
4. Ibid., at p . 19.
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on and followed in 3hambu Bhan Sinah v. Chandra Shekkar'
. i ■ **/ ■ .i— i — ^ — ~m,
(1925). In this case, it was contended by the son that the 
debts incurred by his late father for contesting a decree 
for mesne profits were illegal or immoral. However, as regards 
the expenses incurred by the father for prosecuting the suit, 
the Court observed that the father
"was defending his position to the estate of his 
father. No objection can be taken to that act 
of his and if he eventually failed in the litigation 
against his sister on questions of fact on which 
the Court of first instance and the Court of Appeal 
had differed, it is hardly possible2to characterise 
his conduct as immoral or illegal."
The son was, therefore, held liable.
3
In Darbeshwari Singh v. Raghunath (1949) the facts 
4
proved were as alleged by the son, the costs awarded against
V
the father incurred due to his fraudulent and collusive 
transactions. After discussing various authorities both for 
and against (see pp.518-519 of the report), the Court said 
that
"the costs incurred by Sarjung in the present case 
in prosecuting the previous suit was avyavaharika 
debt, for which the son is not liable, and his share, 
cannot be sold for payment of the decretal amount."
1. A.I.R- 1925 Oudh 230.
2. Ibid., at p.23 I, c.2. Cf. Nand Kishore v. Kunj Behari,
A.I.R. 1933 All. 303, at p.305, c.2.
Ip this case the costs impugned were incurred for the 
purpose of delaying execution of certain decrees for mesne 
profits against the father. An agreement made in pursuance
of such purposes was held to be against public policy.
According to the Court, 'the transaction was clearly speculat 
ive and therefore the father was not entitled to employ joint 
family property liable for such action of the father.'
In this case, the question has been tackled from the point 
of view of the father's power of alienation of the joint 
family property.
3. A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 515.
4’. "In my opinion . . . the claim . . . was fraudulent and dis­
honest." per Ramaswami, J . , ibid., atp.5 1 8 ,  c.1.
5. Ibid., at p.519, c.1.
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Thu s f the father's original claim, which was proved to be 
deliberately fraudulent, seems tc have tainted the nature 
of the liability, i.e., costs. The son was absolved of 
his liability, but the father was held liable to pay the 
costs from his share of the property.
However, the same High Court in Kirit Singh v.Chandrakal
1Kuar (1951) came to a different conclusion. There the sons 
had alleged that the costs awarded against their father were 
not binding on them, because their father was guilty of a 
fraudulent act and therefore the debt was of the nature of 
avyavaharika debt. As to the question of fact, the sons had 
failed to prove their father's fraudulent conduct. Both the
Courts below rejected the allegation and the sons were held|
liable; hence this appeal
I
2The High Court observed that v
"The obligation of the son to discharge his 
father's debt depends upon the nature or 
character of the debt when it originated - 
an examination of the circumstances before or 
after the liability is incurred is irrelevant 
to ascertain the nature or character of the 
debt. If there is something illegal or immoral 
in the act of the father when the liability 
is incurred, the son is not bound to discharge 
it. If, however, the father incurs a debt 
(voluntary or involuntary) to make good a loss 
caused by his wrongful act, such a debt cannot 
be said to be illegal or immoral, and the son 
cannot claim exemption merely because the act 
in consequence of which the obligation to make 
; compensation arose was an illegal or immoral act, 
or both illegal and immoral. Suppose, for 
instance, a father steals a property, but later 
on repents, and being unable to restore the stolen 
property makes good the loss by incurring a debt.
Such a debt cannot be said to be immoral or illegal 
in its origin because the purpose of the debr is 
highly moral. A son cannot be absolved from 
liability to pay such debt simply because the 
father was guilty of an immoral act when he 
committed the theft." .....
1. A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 587.
2. Ibid., at p.590, c.1.
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and went on to say that
"We have to examine the nature or character of the 
debt in the case before us at the time when the 
liability was first incurred by Raghunandan. The 
obligation, it may be observed, was unwillingly 
• incurred by him under a lawful compulsion.
S.35, Civil P.C. gives a discretion to the Court 
to award costs and the Court has power to determine 
by whom or out of what property and to what extent 
such ccsrs are to be paid. If by virtue of such 
power the Coart awarded costs to the respondents 
in the exercise of its discretion the origin of 
the liability so created cannot be said to be 
tainted with any illegality or immorality. Even 
if Raghunandan was guilty of a fraudulent act in 
filing a hukumnama which was not genuine, his 
conduct before the date of the decree cannot 
be taken into consideration. The decree for ^
costs, in my view, cannot be said to be Avyavaharika."
It may be noted at the. outset that the example of 'theft1 
cited above by the Court would hardly seem to apply to the 
liability incurred by the father in this case. Moreover, 
despite the Court's opinion that it is by the examination of 
the nature of the father's act in its inception that the nature 
of the debt should be determined, it has in fact examined the 
time not of the father's act but of its own act, that is the 
decree for costs, for the purpose of determining the nature 
of the debt. In other words, it is not the time of the father's 
conduct in instituting the suit, but the end of that conduce, 
which has been taken into account. One hesitates. But for 
the father's conduct how would the Court have given the decree 
for costs? It was not a question of deciding whether a debt 
created by a decree of the Court was immoral or illegal; but: 
it was to determine whether the father's conduct which led to 
the Court's decision was tainted.
Seen in the light of our discussion on the subject so 
far, it may be said that it is the father's act, and not the 
Court's award, that would seem to matter in determination 
of the son's liability. For this reason, the Court's assertion 
(at p. 592) that 'even if Raghunandan was guilty of a fraudulent
1. Ibid., at pp.591-92.
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act ... his conduct before the date of the decree cannot be 
taken into consideration' would seem to be wrong and misleading; 
because a lawful compulsion as such is not enough to make the 
son liable, if in the eyes of Hindu law, it would not bind 
him, e.g., to a fine. In any case, the principle laid down 
here was later severely criticized and overruled by a Full 
Bench of the same High Court, in Sheodher v. Sitaram (A.I.R,
1962 Pat. 308, at p.313, c.2; for further details see p.364 ff«)
Our discussion so far would seem to show that unless 
the costs impugned are proved to be tainted with moral turpitude, 
the sons would be liable to pay them. However, in Perumal
i
Chetty v. The Province of Madras, (1955) the question came 
up in a slightly different form. The importance of discussing 
this case here lies in that it has clearly brought up the 
distinction between a certain aspect of the n\odern concept 
of costs and the charges which were imposed upon the litigating 
parties as envisaged in the sastras.
In the present case, a Hindu father was appointed by the
Court as next friend to continue a suit which was filed in
forma pauperis on behalf of certain minors. The suit was
dismissed for non-prosecution and the plaintiffs were directed
to pay the costs of the defendants, but at the same time the
next friend was also ordered by the Court to pay personally
to Government, the Court-fee payable on the plaint. The
liability was challenged by the son of the next friend on
the grounds of danda and avyavaharik a . The Subordinate Courts
had held that the obligation of the father was in the nature
of a fine or penalty and the son's share could not be proceeded 
2
against. But, on appeal to the High Court, it was held by 
Raghava Rao, J. to be neither in the nature of a fine, nor 
an avyavaharika debt; however, the judge granted leave for 
appeal.
In the appeal, it would appear that the Counsel for 
the appellant sought to equate the liability in the present
1. I.L.R. 1955 Mad. 1179.
2. Ibid., see at pp.1181-82.
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case# relying on certain texts, with what the Kings used
to impose upon litigants in those days. With reference to
this argument, the Court said,
"We have-carefully gone through the texts, and 
we have no hesitation in saying that the conception 
of Court-fees at the present day is radically different 
from the danda which was imposed on parties to a 
litigation in the days of Smritls, Court-fee now 
is levied under the provisions of a statute which 
is primarily fiscal in its nature. Court-fee is
payable at the time of the inst:tution of the suit
by the plaintiff. Under the law at present, the 
primary liability tc pay Court-fee is always on 
the plaintiff. Whatever the theory underlying the 
levy of court-fee may be, one thing appears to us 
I to be quite clear, namely, that it is not in the
I nature of a punishment ... The system of levy of
‘ Court-fee as it now obtains did not certainly prevail 
I in the days of the Smrit.is. No fee was insisted 
I upon at the time of the filing of the plaint. After 
the final disposal of the case, a suqcessful plaintiff 
was liable to pay five per cent on his claim to the 
King as bhriti or compensation. This payment 
does resemble court-fees to a certain extent.
But surely this is not in the nature of danda.
There are numerous other provisions for collection 
of varying amounts from the plaintiff and the 
defendant which are called danda and are undoubtedly 
in the nature of fines or penalties. We shall 
give a few instances. When a debtor denied the 
fact of the debt altogether, and the creditor 
succeeded in establishing .It, the debtor had to 
pay the amount decreed to the creditor, and an 
equal amount to the King as danda fine. If the 
plaintiff turned out to oe a false claimant, he 
had to pay the King a fine, danda twice as much ^
as the amount claimed by him. (Yajnavalkya, 11.11)."
________ i___________________________________ ______________________________
1. Ibid., at p . 1183; for Yajn.II.11, see above f.n.4, p.334.
We may elaborate the point further: According to Manu, VIII
139 _ . ,
' Rne deye pratijnyate panc.akamsatamarhati /
Apahnave taddvigunarhtanmanoranus^sanam // - 
vide V.N.Mandlik, opp.cit., p.956; - that is to say, "On 
the debt being admitted to be due, the debtor deserves 
(a fine of) five percent; and in the case of denial, twice 
as much; such is the ordinace of Manu" - vide G.Jha, opp. 
c i t ., at p .162.
Now, as regards the payment of five per cent to the 
King by the debtor who admits his liability, Medh'atithi 
says, ..."The man deserves this fine on account of his 
having transgressed the law by not satisfying the creditor's 
claims outside the Court and thereby forcing him to come 
up to the King." Ibid., at pp.162-163.
f.n. continued next page.
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Thus the distinction made between the modern concept of 
court-fee and danda, as it appears in the sastric provisions, 
is quite clear; and, provided the plaintiff is made to pay 
it, i.e., the court-fee, no one should have any cause to 
object to its payment. But, in this case the father was 
certainly not the plaintiff; and even if the court-fee as 
such could not be construed as a fine, when its payment is 
imposed on him, would that liability of the father be considered 
as of the same nature as that of a real plaintiff? Obviously 
not; because the nature of the basis upon which the plaintiff 
would normally be held liable for such court-fee, and that 
of the father in this case, was apparently not the same. The 
fact would seem to be that, as the next friend, the father 
was entrusted with certain responsibility; but by allowing the 
minors' suit to be dismissed, for default, apparently he had 
failed to fulfil that responsibility. If that was the basis 
(and one could hardly imagine anything else) for the imposition 
of the payment in question, then, in the absence of any 
reasonable cause to justify his conduct, one would be inclined 
to consider that it might have been in the nature of a penalty 
for his carelessness. Whether his behaviour was wilful or 
casual would depend on the facts; but the Court concluded 
that on this count the son was liable because in its opinion 
the liability was not in the nature of a fine.
f.n. continued from last page)
In fact, the five per cent charge would seem more to 
be ih the nature of a fee than a fine. This view would 
seem to receive support from Visnu, VI. 2o-22,
"If the creditor goes before the King and fully proves his 
demand, the debtor shall pay as fine to the King a tenth 
part of the sum proved. The creditor, on receiving the 
sum, shall pay the twentieth part of it ..." (my emphasis).
To similar effect are: Yajn. 11.44; Narada, I. 132-134; 
Brhaspati, 11, 60-62; Yama (quoted in the Vivada-ratnakara, 
p.78). - Vide, G.Jha, Comparative Notes, cit.above, at 
pp. 595-596.
Certainly the underlined would show that it could not be a fine, but 
. a fee; for, the creditor, in going to the King, has not broken any law. 
Thus, the difference between the present court-fee and fees charged to 
successful litigants in general or the plaintiff in the example, i.e., 
the creditor, would seem to lie in the time of its payment; otherwise the 
nature of the liability in both of them would seem to be similar; because 
in the ultimate analysis, both the charges would appear to be extracted 
for meeting the cost of administration of justice.
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As regards the second contention, i.e., the debt was 
avyavaharika; the Court said,
"The word has reference to the ideal of good 
conduct according to the notions prevailing 
■ at the material time. But we are unable to 
hold that any debt which the father ought not 
to have strictly contracted is necessarily a debt 
which is avyavaharika. There should be an element 
of moral turpitude involved in the debt. It is  ^
only then that it could be called avyavaharika."
In the opinion of the Court, the father's liability to pay 
the court-fee was not an avyavaharika debt and therefore the 
son was held to be liable for it. Unfortunately, as we do
i
not know exactly why the father was made liable for the
court-fee, it would be difficult to assess the nature of
1
his behaviour concerning the case of the minors; and also to 
comment upon the merits of the decision. Otherwise this 
decision would seem to be well argued and comprehensive in 
its treatment of the subject-matter.
2Finally, in M.Veera Raghaviah v. M.China Veeriah 
(1975), where the father had incurred debts for meeting expense 
of civil and criminal litigation against his own son, with 
the object of denying the son's legitimate rights to ancestral 
property and to assert his own exclusive rights to it, these 
were held to be avyavaharika. In the course of its judgement, 
the Court said,
"To make the son liable for the debts incurred by 
’the father for defeating his legitimate rights is 
something opposed to all public morals and decency 
in life. If law is not concerned with public 
morality and decency in life, then it loses all 
moral authority to govern the rights of citizens.
No court of law and justice can be a party to such 
a position. Avarice, unfilial and unnatural anger 
against his only child and son, and immorality are 
writ large on these debt transactions."3
1 . Ibid., at p .1186.
2. A.I.R. 1975 A.P. 350.
3. Ibid., at p.355, c.2.
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Accordingly, the son was held not to be liable for the debts 
of his father. Thus, the. decision would seem to make it 
quite clear that the son's liability to pay costs incurred 
by his father depends on the nature of such liability; and 
the nature of such liability would be d e t e r m i n e d  with 
reference to the nature of the purpose for or out of which 
such liability arose.
In conclusion, it might be correct to say that although 
the modern concept of court-fee as such did not exist during 
the days of the smrtis, certain sastric provisions in this 
respect would, to a certain extent, seem to resemble it.
However, awarding costs to deserving parties would to be 
unknown in those days. In these days, however, the debts 
incurred by the father for defending himself against criminal 
charges of any sort would seem to be legal or vyavaharika,
V
irrespective of their results. So also, if a debt was incurred 
to defend the rights of the family and safeguard its interests, 
it would be binding on the debtor's son. But, where the costs 
were due to the father's fraudulent, dishonest or unjust 
conduct involving moral turpitude, the son would successfully 
claim, or so it seems, immunity from the liability of his father
V I .3.2 DEBTS ARISING OUT OF CERTAIN OBJECTIONABLE 
CONDUCT OR ACTS OF THE FATHER
It may be recalled that in the course of our enquiry 
into the definition of the term avyavaharika , we have already 
brought out the sharp conflict of opinion that exists amongst 
the Courts, particularly in respect of the cases (see above 
pp.218-250) in which the liability incurred by the father had 
arisen from his wrongful acts. Also, we have noticed in the 
last section that even the same Court could not agree as to
1t. See the decisions of the Patna High Court in Darbeshwari 
Singh v. Raghunath ; and Kirit Singh v. Chandrakali Kuar 
at pp. 340-343 above.
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whether the costs awarded against the father due to his
A
fraudulent' and dishonest conduct were avyavaharika .
In order to simplify the discussion of these cases, 
however, we may classify them roughly into two groups. For, 
though in all such cases the liability would seem to have 
arisen due to some personal or material loss or damage caused 
to others by the father's conduct, in some of them the victim's 
loss might have resulted in gains to the father or his family, 
or the fanner might have indulged in such acts simply to 
hurt others.
(!) Cases involving acts of the father simply to hurt 
others:
2
Thus, in Durbar v. Khachar (1908) a decree was obtained 
for damages to the decree-holder's property caused by a dam 
erected by the father, which obstructed the passage of water 
thereto. The son, after the death of his father, raised 
objection on the ground of the avyavaharika nature of the
1. It may be noted that in the middle of the last century there 
was some confusion as regards the son's liability in respect 
of his father's fraudulent debts or alienations. In the
case of Bhuggobutty Dossee v. Kishen Nath Roy (1.865)? (1883) 3 Suth 
W.R. 30, where the father had, in fraud of his creditors, 
made certain alienations of ancestral property. But the 
Court neld that the son was bound by the alienation; 
even if the Court would seem to have been agreed with 
the principle that "A deed may be avoided on the ground 
of fraud." if the claimant was not party or privy to it.
(at p.39, c,2 of the report.) However, in Baboo Beer Kishore 
v. Baboo Hur Bullub (1867): (1884) 7 Suth.W.R.5o2 , where the
facts were similar, the Court, while rejecting the above 
view, said,
"If, therefore, the father, during the minority of the son, 
alienated the properties in fraud of his creditors, such 
fraud would not bind the son, who was neither a party nor 
a privy to such fraud." (at p.505, c.2 of the report) .
Although in both these cases, the doctrine of avyavaharika 
was not invoked, the fact is that the Courts were dealing 
with the father's immoral and illegal acts.
2. (1908) I.L.R. 32 Bom.348.
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liliability. The Court held in favour of the son. In the 
opinion of the Court the scope of the term avyavaharika was 
wide enough to include such liability of the father. It 
said,
"that the son is not to be held liable for debts 
which the father ought not, as a decent and 
respectable man, to have incurred. He is answerable 
for the debts legitimately incurred by his father: 
not for those^attributable to his failings, follies 
or caprices."
Who could be sure that even a decent and respectable man would
not be subject to some ‘failing1 or commit 'follies1? The
view of the Court would seem to be more idealistic than 
2realistic; and its decision would seem to have lost the
spirit,of righteousness. It was not followed in Chhakauri
' 3Mahton v. Ganga Prasad (1911) even though the facts of the
case were almost identical. According to Mr?. Justice
Mookerjee,
"The liability imposed by the Court upon the father 
to indemnify the person, with whose property he had 
improperly interfered, created a debt which might 
justly be recovered from the ancestral property in 
the hands of the son.
The decision would appear to be just, though the ratio relied 
upon would seem to have been derived from the cases, none of 
which could be considered as an authority; for the facts of 
those cases were different from those of this case. Conscious 
of this, perhaps, the learned Judge would seem to be in favour 
of adopting
"the distinction suggested by the Judges of the 
Madras High Court b e t w e e n  a debt which follows 
as the result of an offence under the criminal 
law and a debt for which one is made liable on 
the ground of a breach of civil d u t y . "5
1. Ibid., at p. 351.
2. For a fuller discussion of this case see above pp.218-221.
3. (1911) I.L.R. 39 C a l . 862.
4'. Ibid., at p.874; also, see above p.221.
5. Ibid., also see p. 871 where he mentions the distinction 
in connection with reconciliation of various decisions, 
involving different facts.
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We will say something about this rather strained effort of
reconciliation, and its effects on the son's liability under
Hindu law (see be.Tow pp.390-97).
* 1
The case was followed in Chandrika v. Narain (1924) 
in which ancestral property was sold as a result of certain 
damages awarded against the father for cutting trees and 
demolishing a building not belonging to him. In this case 
the father's action was considered to be a breach of civil
2
duty; and that the family had benefited to a large extent.
Both these findings would appear to be doubtful. For, prima 
facie, the fc^-^er's actions would seem to have made him crimin­
ally liable; and as regards the family's benefit, there is
nothing in the report to support the finding. However, the
3Court held, following Chhakauri Mahton1s case, that the 
debt was neither illegal nor immoral, and therefore the 
sons were bound to discharge it. V
4
However, the case of Deoba v. Babaia (1927) which was 
referred to the Division Bench for answer of the question:
Can a Hindu son be held liable for torts committed by his 
father during the latter's lifetime, even if these torts 
resulted in no benefit to the joint estate? After considering 
certain cases, the Court answered that, "the son can be held 
liable for torts committed by his father .... only to the
5
extent to which the family estate has been benefited."
1 . (1 924) I.L.R. 46 All. 617.
2. IbidJ, see p. 618.
3. Ibid., at p.619. It may be noted that facts of these cases 
are not only dissimilar; but, as regards the question of 
the family's benefit, Mr. Justice Hookerjee has said, (at 
p.874) that "If the liability of the son depends upon the 
nature of the act, the test of benefit to the estate becomes 
immaterial."
4. A.I.R. 1927 Nag. 337.
5. Ibid., at p.338, c.1. cf. Shrawan v. Bhiwa, (1903) 16 C.P.L. 
R.65, at p.68. This was a case for damages against wrongful 
attachment of crops etc. The father obtained no benefit.
Sons were not held liable. However, the case was not
defended on the ground of avyavaharika.
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Apparently, the reference is to "torts' in general, and
in the absence of the actual facts of the case, we could
hardly comment upon this decision, except that it would seem 
1
to have relied more on the judgement of Bowen, L.J. in 
Phillips v. Homfreyz (1383), an English case, than any Hindu 
law precedent to support it. One would net diminish the 
importance of this decision, however; firstly, because it 
would seem to justify why the son should be liable, and to 
what extent; and secondly, it has, by itself, created a 
precedent in modern Hindu law, which would seem to be just 
and reasonable; and therefore, it would appear to fit into
3
the spirit of Hindu law.
i
i  4
In Hemra^ v. Khemchand (1943) the facts proved would
show that the father was held liable for his misconduct,
i.e., he had allowed a promissory note belonging to the other
\
party to become barred by acting fraudulently. The sons were 
held liable by the Privy Council on the ground that the 
liability in its inception was just and true, and their 
father's subsequent dishonest conduct would not affect the 
nature of the debt. As we have thoroughly discussed and 
criticized this case above (see pp.232-247) there is hardly 
anything to add.
5
In B. Naidu v. Kannan (1943) the son had partitioned 
prior to the decree for damages against his father for trespas 
Still, it was held that "The decree can be executed against 
the property in the hands of the son, even though he was 
not a party to the suit and had partitioned from his father 
prior to the decree." The decision would seem to be contro­
versial because the property which came to the son in the
1. Ibid., at p.337, c.2; and 338, c.1.
2. (1883) 24 Ch.D. 439
3. If we refer to actual practice followed by orthodox Hindu 
Courts in the past (see above p.227,f.1) this rule would 
hardly seem foreign.
4’. (1 943) L.R. 70 I.A. 171 .
5. A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 415.
6. Ibid., at p.416, c.2.
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partition could not, afterwards, be considered of the father. 
Moreover, in view of the fact that the son would not be held 
liable ror his father's debt incurred after partition, the 
view, expressed here would seem to be wrong. It could be
argued that the indebtedness related back to the time of the
tort, but this was not argued or discussed m  the judgement.
Also, one would suspect the correctness of applying 
section 53 of Civil P.Code (1908) to this case. For the 
section would seem to apply to the
"property in the hands of a son or other descendant 
which is liable under Hindu law for the payment of
the debt of a deceased ancestor, in respect of
which a decree has been passed, shall be deemed 
to be property of the deceased which has come to 
the hands of the son or^other descendant as his 
legal representative." (My emphasis).
It would appear quite clearly that the section would apply
to the property 'which is liable under Hindu law for the
payment of the debt of a deceased ancestor'. So, the first
question was whether the property in the hands of the son
here was liable. It would hardly seem so; for, as pointed
out above, after partition the son's property could not be
held liable for his father's debt incurred (subject to the
above envisaged 'relation ba c k 1) after the partition. The
property envisaged in the sec. 53 would seem to be the property
2to which Lhe sons succeed after their father's death. For 
these reasons, the decision would seem to be unsatisfactory.
would appear from the cases discussed so far under
this section, that the Courts would seem to be in favour of 
lU'
holding^sons liable for such debts of the father. However,
1. Ibid., at p. 416, c.1.
2. "S.53 Civil P.C., ... speaks of 'a deceased ancestor' and 
'property of the deceased' which has come to the hands
of the sons and it cannot be stretched to apply to the 
property which the sons obtain on partition with their 
' father" - vide Govindram Dwarkadas v. Nathulal, A.I.R. 1937 
Nag. 45, at p.49, c.1. This case was of a creditor obtaining 
decree aginst the father alone after partition. The sons 
were not held liable for the debt. However, in this case 
the father's liability was not concerned with any tort on 
his part. Cf. Krishnrao v.Deorao, A.I.R. 1963 M.P.49, at 
p.51, c.1. (for facts and decision see below p. 369).
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when it came to damages due to malicious prosecution, their 
opinions seem to have been different.
i
Thus, in the case of Sunder Lai v. Raghunandan Prasad 
(1924), the debts of the grandfather and father, due for 
damages awarded against both of them for malicious prosecution, 
were challenged on, among others, the ground of illegality 
and immorality. The case concerned a certain amount borrowed 
by the father on a hand-note, The frets may be stated as 
under:
It was held in the case, whereupon damages were ultimately 
awarded, that the hand-note was genuine and was duly executed 
by the father and that consideration thereon had passed and 
that the defendants knew fully that the hand-note was genuine 
and that they had falsely denied it in the original case for 
recovery of the money due thereunder and subsequently taking 
advantage of the dismissal of the suit had falsely and 
maliciously launched the prosecution against the decree-holder 
etc.; (at page 252 of the report).
Having regard to these fact, and while determining the 
nature of the liability of the father, the Court said that
"It was an illegal and immoral act on the part of 
the defendants to lodge a maliciously false criminal 
case against the decree-holder. It is also opposed 
to public policy. The course adopted by the 
defendants could not possibly be said to be for 
the benefit of the family and was fraught with great 
risk to the family status and reputation. It was 
' a highly tortious act. The prosecution was held 
to be false."
The Court was of the opinion that the debt in question was 
undoubtedly avyavaharika, and therefore the sons were absolved 
from the liability. It would appear from the above view that 
the liability was tainted becalg/^e the act from which it arose 
was avyavaharika. Here, the Court's approach would seem to 
be correct, because, in its view, the act, out of which the 
liability arose, was itself illegal and immoral, and against
1 . (1924) I.L.R. 3 Pat. 25o.
2. Ibid, at p. 253.
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public policy t and therefore, it held that the debt was 
avyavaharika.
This case was relied on in the case of Raghunandan Sahu 
-\
v. Badri Teli (1338). In this case, a part of a certain 
amount, raised on mortgage of ancestral property, was applied 
to pay decreta] debts due to damages awarded against the 
grandfather for malicious prosecution. The sons and grand­
sons contended that the debt was an immoral or an illegal 
debt; and therefore, it was not binding on them. Their 
opponents' argument was that they were liable for all debts 
of their father arising out of a tort or civil wrong committed 
by him; though, they would not be bound by a debt which result 
from a criminal offence. However, the sons' Counsel argued 
that there are debts of a father with a stigma far short of 
criminality attached for which his sons are not liable, that 
a pecuniary liability arising out of a breach of a civil duty 
by the father involving moral turpitude constitutes an avyava­
harika debt, for which the sons were not held liable.
In view of this, the Court observed,
"We are however of the opinion that no hard and 
fast rule can be laid down, and the Courts have 
got to look at each debt and the circumstances 
under which it arises in order to find out 
whether it is a vyavaharika or an avyavaharika 
debt. In the case of a decretal amount, like 
a decree for damages, the act, which is the 
foundation of the suit for damages, has got 
to be scrutinized, and one has got to see whether 
the act was a vyavaharika act or an avyavaharika 
act, that is an act 'repugnant to good morals' r 
or an act which is 'opposed to fair dealings'."
(My emphasis).
These remarks would not only seem to represent the proper 
approach which the Court should adopt while dealing with such 
debts of the father; but also would appear to echo the spirit 
of righteousness and fair play.
1. A.I.R. 1938 All. 263.
2. Ibid., p . 265.
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After explaining what actually precedes the decree 
for damages for malicious prosecution., the Court held that
1. In this case,.from the information on the record all that the 
Court knew was that several persons had obtained decrees for 
damages for malicious prosecution against Khedu Teli. In 
view of this the Court had to rely on certain things that 
normally had to be proved in such suits for damages.
We see no reason to disagree with the decision. However, 
we may be allowed to undertake a speculative exercise. In 
Satdeo Prasad v. Ram Narayan, A.I.R. 1969 Pat.102, though 
the doctrine of Pious Obligation of the son was not invoked, 
and no question as to 'illegal' or 'immoral' debt arose; we 
think that, being a case of damages for malicious prosecution, 
its discussion here might be worthwhile.
Briefly, the facts were that the plaintiffs were prosecuted 
for 'stealing fish, but were acquitted. The defendant was an 
eye-witness. Before the settlement of the fishery right with 
t h e ;defendant, the ditch was open for all the villagers, but 
the,occurrence took place after the settlement. The concurrent 
decisions of the Courts below had found that the plaintiff 
had failed to prove that the criminal case instituted by the 
defendant was maliciously false and without reasonable and 
probable cause. Because the defendant was the Karta of the 
joint family other defendants were impleaded by the plaintiffs
The High Court held in favour of the plaintiffs; but 
the decision would seem to be controversial. In the first 
place the Court presumed that there was no reasonable and 
probable cause for the prosecution in spite of the fact that 
P.W. 3's testimony was in this respect clearly in support 
of the defendant; and that the defendant had the set\lement 
of the fishery right in his favour at the material time.
Also the Court would seem to have relied on the acquittal 
alone for imputing malice to the defendant (at p. 105, c.1). 
The facts of this case differed materially from the cases 
relied upon for the presumption. Thus, seen in this light, 
the findings would seem to be clearly unsupportable and 
unjust.
Now, supposing there were sons in the family and the 
plaintiffs were to rely on their pious obligation for 
payment of the damages; and if the Court were to rule in 
the matter what would be the likely result? If the Court had 
known nothing except the decree for the damages, as in the 
case of Raghunandan Sahu's case, the decision would have 
been given in favour of the sons. But had the facts of 
&<zem i the original criminal prosecution etc.^ known to the Court,
then, having regard to the facts of the case, the plaintiffs 
might have failed and no question of the sons' liability 
would have arisen. However, had the Court found in favour 
of the plaintiffs; then, could, in view of the facts, the 
debt be considered avyavaharika? In this case, one would 
think not. For, there was a genuine reason, i.e., protection 
of fishery right, for commencing the proceedings. Unless, the 
fahter's intention was otherwise than protection of his legal 
rights, the debt could not be avyavahSrika.
"The act of Khedu Teli in bringing a malicious complaint 
without reasonable and probable cause was a tortuous act 
opposed to public policy or decent vyavahara and, as such 
an avyavaharika act;" and the pecuniary liability arising 
therefrom was net binding on his sons.
In conclusion of this section as a whole, it may be
said that whenever the conduct of the father, whether in
2cases involving malicious destruction of other's propercy
or right, or those of malicious prosecution, has resulted in
incurring pecuniary liability the son might successfully
claim exemption from his liability. Moreover, our discussion
would show that while determining the nature of such debts of
the father, the facts, the circumstances and the conduct of
the father antecedent to the incurring of the debts concerned
3
could be looked into; and upon the finding of such enquiry
A
would depend the liability of the sons.
(ii) Cases involving the father's acts leading to some 
benefit to him or the joint family at the cost of others.
At the outset, we may remind ourselves that the son's 
liability to pay his father's debt depends primarily upon the 
nature of the debt, and, as already noted, the test of benefit
1. A.I.R. 1938 All. 263, at p.265, c.1.
2. Although the weight of modern authorities would seem to be 
in favour of holding the son liable (see above pp.349-354), 
the observation made by Mr. Justice Venkatasubba R a o , 
quoted at p. 24 3 above, (i.e. "I would understand Katyayar.a's 
text to mean that the injury inflicted, or damage caused, 
should be the result of the wanton and flagrant violation
of another's right from anger, engendered by malice or revenge, 
for instance, an act of incendiarism. To such and similar 
cases only, the text of Katyavana is applicable."), read 
with decisions involving malicious prosecution, would seem 
to point towards exemption of the son from such debts of 
the father.
3. For a similar view, see Sheodhar v. Sitaram, A.I.R. 1962 
Pat. 308, (F.B.), discussed below, at p.364ff; also see,
M . N .Srinivasan, Principles of Hindu Law, 4th edn., vol.II, 
(Allahabad, 197o), p . 1649. J.D.M. Derrett, C .M . H .L . , cit. 
above, would seem to agree with this view at p. 1o4.
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is immaterial. However, it is the fact of actual benefit 
which arose out of the father's wrongs 01 crimes that seems, 
as will be seen presently, to have influenced certain decisions 
of the modern Courts, while determining the son's liability 
to pay such debts of the father. The cases involving the 
father's liability due to mesne profits, civil or criminal 
misappropriation etc. would generally fall under this category.
(a ) Cases Involving mesne profits
Perhaps the first case directly on the point was that
i
of Musst, Nanomi Babuasin v. Modun Mohun (1835). In this 
case, the father had wrongfully ousted his lessee, who sued 
him to recover possession and for mesne profits, and obtained 
a decree, according to which a large sum of money was awarded 
for mesne profits. On behalf of his minor sons, it was
i
contended that as the liability had arisen in respect of a 
wrongful ouster by the father alone, the sons' shares were 
not liable for such debts of the father. On the other hand, 
the Counsel for the Respondents contended that the joint family 
had benefited by the wrongful ouster effected by the father, 
and "the decree for mesne profits was in effect for restitution 
of what the family had wrongfully received and benefited by". 
(See p. 14 of the report.) The Privy Council, while considering
1. (1885) 13 I.A. 1. Cf. an obiter dicta in Virasvami v ,
Ayyasvumi (186 3), 1 M.H.C.R. 471. This was a suit for damages 
for trespass and non-delivery of possession of certain houses. 
No son vvas involved but the Court observed at p. 477 that 
"There is no evidence of Ayyasvami1s having sons. If he had, 
they would no doubt, be entitled to shares in their father's 
moiety, and so the property available for the plaintiff would, 
to the extent of their shares, be reduced; and except in this 
way the existence of sons would not, we think, affect the 
plaintiff's right."
This view would seem to exclude the son from such liability 
of the father.
In Beni Pershad v. Puranchand, (1896)I.L.R.23 Cal. 262, 
a decree for mesne profits was obtained against the father,
• but it was found later in the appeal that the father was
never really liable for any mesne profits in the first place, 
and therefore, the sons were held not liable (see p.274 
of the report.)
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the nature of this debt agreed with the High Court's finding 
(at p. 19) that "it. must be taken as a joint family debt."
In pther words, it was not immoral or illegal so as not to 
bind' the sons. Although there was no further discussion as 
to the nature of such debts, the decision nay be construed 
as laying down that the decree for mesne profits was in 
effect for restitution of wrongful gains made by the father, 
and by which the family had benefited.
This case was followed in Karan Singh v. Bhup S ingh1
(1904). The sons had challenged the liability incurred by
their father due to mesne profits. In spite of these decisionsr
2
the sons in Peary Lai Sinha v. Chandi Charan Sinha (1906)
contended that such debts of the father were tainted with
immorality and hence they were not liable. The father had
become liable to pay a large sum of money because he had kept
\
the real owner out of possession of his property and had 
reaped profits therefrom. The Court rejected the contention 
of the sons, saying that,
"By unlawful receipt of these profits, the judgement 
debtor enriched his own estate which has now by 
survivorship passed into the hands of the Appellants.
We cannot discover any intelligible principle upon 
which a debt of this character may be described 
as immoral and illegal.
Thus, in the opinion of the Court, the initial unlawful and 
immoral act, which led to the benefit of the joint family 
property, could not render the resulting liability as avyava­
harika.'
1. (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 16, (F.B.) at p.20. Also, reliance
was placed on a previous decision of the High Court, in 
Kishen Lai v. Banarsi D a s , first Appeal No.80 of 1902 
(unreported case), wherein the facts were similar, and 
the sons were held liable.
2. (1906-07) 11 C.W.N. 163. This case is discussed above
at p.238.
3. Ibid., at p . 169, c.2.
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1The case of Ramdeo v. Musst. Gopi Koori (1911) 
involved a question as to whether the grandson was liable . 
for,interest on mesne profits, though the decree for mesne 
profits was given against both the father and grandfather.
The Court, held that he was liable. It may be pointed out 
here that while determining the nature of the father’s liablity 
due to mesne profits, no reference was made to the sastric 
rules in any of the above cases.
However, in Ramasubramania v. Sivakami Ammal  ^ (1925), 
where the father's debts due to mesne profits were challenged 
by his sons on the ground that under Hindu lav/ they were not 
bound to pay such debts, great stress was laid on sastric
i-
texts, particularly that of Katyayana, in order to determine
i
the nature of such debts. On behalf of the sons it was argued 
that due to misunderstanding of Katyayana's t^ext (i.e.,
"Having done an injury to another, or destroyed his things, 
through anger, if anything is promised in satisfaction, it
3
is called a debt for anger.") , by Colebrooke in his Digest, 
lawyers and judges had not correctly appreciated the signific­
ance of the expression ’debt incurred under the influence of 
wrath' occurring in Brhaspati, and that, if that expression 
was properly understood, as explained in Katyayana's text, 
then a decree for mesne profits would come within the scope 
of that explanation and was therefore a debt which fell within 
the category of debts which the sons were not bound to pay.
1. (1911) 16 C.W.N.383. In the case of Yanamandra Papiah v. 
Lanka Subbasastrulu (1914) 27 M.L.J. 276, though the father' 
liability arose out of mesne profits, his sons objected
to it on the ground that the decree was passed against the 
father alone, and therefore they were not liable; but 
they failed. The Court said (at p.277) "that this plea 
is bad"; and held that the debt not being one which the 
sons were not liable to pay under the Hindu law, their
interests also could be proceeded against.
2. A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 841. For further discussion, see above
pp.222-223, and 243.
3. Ibid., at pp.846 and 853. The verse is Katya. 565. Also
see above p.243, for further discussion.
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However, both the judges on the Bench rejected the argument. 
Madhavan Nair, J. rejected it on the ground that the debt 
was-not shown,"jn any sense, to have been incurred in anger"; 
while Venkatasubba Rat;, J. observed,
.■■"I shall now, in the light of this text of 
Katyayana, discuss the son's liability for mesne 
profits. Injury to another, or his property, 
from wrath, is what is contemplated. Is there 
any necessary connection between the awarding 
of mesne profits and destruction of another's 
property by wrath?
"I would understand Katyayana's text to mean 
that the injury inflicted, or damage caused, 
should be the result of wanton and flagrant 
violation of another's right from anger, 
engendered by malice or revenge, for instance, 
and act of incendiarism. To such and similar 
cases only, the text of Katyayana is applicable."
In his opinion, therefore, the text of Katyayana would not 
exempt the sons from their liability to pay in this case.
We feel inclined to agree with the Court on the point; but 
it may be said that if the above construction of Katyayana 
is correct, (for our comment, see above p. 243-44), the father‘*s 
obligation arising out of his acts such as malicious prosecution, 
or destruction of another's property, discussed in the preceding 
section, would seem to fall under the scope of this rule.
However, the Courts would seem to be in favour of holding the 
son liable in such cases (see above p.348 ff.)
Besides the above text, the Court had referred to other 
texts, and had discussed certain cases dealing with another 
general term used in the texts, namely avyavaharika, in order 
to see whether or nor the debts in question would fall under 
that category. It was argued by the son's Counsel, that the 
son should not be held liable7 if there was an element of 
impropriety - however small - in the father's conduct in 
incurring the liability. In the opinion of the Court, however, 
it was an extreme argument which was not warranted by the texts
1. Ibid., at p.853, c.2.
2. Ibid., at p.847, c.1.
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of the Hindu law, nor was the weight of modern authority in 
its favour. In this connections, the Court observed,
If it be borne in mind, that the debts condemned 
. ' by the Smritis in this connection are debts such 
as those due for spirituous liquor, or for lust, 
or for gambling, it will be obvious that the 
. ancient law-givers did not intend the sons to 
enjoy immunity, merely because the father's 
conduct was not above reproach,^judged by the 
highest standards of morality."
Broadly speaking, this observation would seem to be correct;
but could it be considered that an act of wrongful ouster on
the part of the father would amount to a merely reproachable
conduct without taint of immorality so as to bind the son?
The Court held so; for, according to the propositions deduced,
after discussing a number of cases by the Court for the purpose
of determining the son's liability, the debts were not immoral.
These propositions were: " (i) If the debt is in its inception
not immoral, subsequent dishonesty of the father does not
exempt the son. (ii) It is not every impropriety or every
lapse from right conduct that stamps the debt as immoral.
The son can claim immunity only, when the father's conduct
is utterly repugnant to good morals, or is grossly unjust or
2
flagrantly dishonest."
Although we have already criticized these propositions 
(see above p.223 ff), it may be pointed out here that of the 
cases discussed before laying down these propositions not a 
single case concerned the father's liability arising out of 
mesne profits. It was only after stating these rules that 
the Court turned to the cases on mesne profits, (at p.847 
and 854-6), and found that they were all in agreement with 
its own decision. One might debate the correctness as well 
as applicability of these propositions to such cases as this.
For example, it might be argued whether the first rule could 
be applied to the liability due to wrongful ouster. Moreover, 
i,t could not be ruled out that other judges, such as those 
who decided Govindprasad v. Raghunathprasad (see above p . 223 ff)
1. per Venkatasubba Rao, J. Ibid., at p.844, c.2.
2. Ibid., at p.845, c.2.
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might settle for less than the highest degree of immorality 
to exempt the son from his liability. However, in spite of 
the controversy surrounding these propositions, it would 
appear that the decision was just and would find support net 
only among modern authorities but also in the spirit of Hindu 
law. For the intention of the sastrakaras in exempting the 
son from his liability was never, it seems, to enrich him 
by way of such means as wrongful gains of the father at the 
cost of other innocent people. On the contrary, Hindu law 
insists upon payment of all just debts of the father.
In the case of Pashupat Pratap Singh v. Lalat Bahadur
1Singh (1944) the father was sued for recovery of possession 
and mesne profits, because he had remained in possession after 
expiry of a theka (lease) granted to him. After his death, 
his sons were impleaded as his representatives. The Lower 
Court refused to pass decree for mesne profits because in 
its opinion the father's act was wrong and immoral. Hence 
this appeal.
While passing a decree for mesne profits, the High Court 
said of the fajJ^Qer's conduct that
"It does not seem to us that there was anything 
immoral in his conduct. If the transaction had 
been properly a lease he would merely have been 
holding over; if it was a licence he was merely 
holding in continuation of the permission granted 
to him, and, as he died before he could put in 
any written statement, we do not know what excuse 
he had for remaining in possession of the property.
His conduct might have been legally wrong, but 
it does not necessarily follow that he was acting 
in- bad faith or that he had no reason which in 
his view might be sufficient for retaining possession. 
We do not think it can be concluded that every  ^
trespasser in law is guilty of immoral conduct."'
Although no authority is cited, the opinion of the Court would 
seem to reflect the general line adopted by the Courts in 
respect of such liability of the father. Besides, it has the 
merit of explaining how an illegal act might not necessarily 
be immoral. The sons were made to pay the mesne profits.
1. I.L.R. 1945 All. 5
2. Ibid., at p .6
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1
In the case of Laxmipatirao v. Kristrao (1950), the 
son had challenged his father's liability incurred by way 
of mesne profits on the ground ihat it was avyavaharika.
In support, the learned Counsel for the son relied upon the 
decision in Govindorasad v. Raghunathprasa d .  ^ /iccording 
to the headnote of the decision relied upon "A debt contracted 
by a Hindu father for the purpose of depriving the rightful 
owner of his propertv is an avyavaharika debt, which it is
3
not the pious obligation of the son to pay." However, the
1. (1950) 52 Bom.L.R. 342.
2. (1938) 41 Bom. L.R. 589, (F.B.) or I.L.R. 1939 Bom. 533,
(F.B.).
3. This headnote appears to have been based on the judgement 
of Wassoodew, J . , i.e.,
"Consequently I agree that in this case it can reasonably be 
said that the action of the son-in-law in depriving the 
rightful owner of his property cannot be defended upon the 
ordinary standard of honesty, and therefore, I agree with 
order proposed."
Ibid., at p.606. (The son-in-law in this quotation was the father.)
However, Beaumont, C.J., who proposed, it seems, the
order, came to his conclusion in these words,
"The judgement of the trial Court and of the Court of Appeal is 
based on the view that defendant No.3, amongst the other defendants, 
was in possession of the property to which the plaintiff was 
entitled, and it is plain that he never had any sort of right 
to such possession ... According to the judgement of the Court of 
Appeal, most of these moneys had been spent in criminal proceedings 
and in litigation, and in my judgement there could be no sort 
of justification for that conduct on the part of the defendant 
No. 3. I think, therefore, that the claim against him was in respect 
of a liability essentially dishonest in character, and incurred for 
a dishonest purpose. That being so, I think it is a class of debt 
for which the son is not liable under the pious obligation to pay 
his father's debts." ( My emphasis) . Ibid., at p.602. 
According to the third member of the Full Bench (Lokur, 
J.) "Defendant No.3 needlessly intermeddled with another* 
property and made it disappear. His conduct was certainly 
'opposed to good morals' and the respondent cannot be held 
liable for the debt arising out of such conduct of his 
father." Ibid., at p.609.
Seen in the light of the above opinions of the other two 
members of the Full Bench, it is evident that the headnote 
(as well as Wassoodew, J.'s opinion) does not seem to convey the 
important half - i.e., the purpose for which the moneys were 
spent. It is for this reason, the wording of the headnote 
would not seem to represent the correct law laid down by the 
Full Bench. For further details, see above pp.231-32 and 
below pp. 381-82.
364
— tke High Court distinguished that case on the ground 
of the facts, which were different from those of the present, 
case; and relying on the decision in Ramasubramania v. Sivakami 
Ammai, discussed.above (see pp. 359-361), held that the son 
was liable because the debt was not avyavaharika.
The Court was of the opinion that "a Hindu son is bound 
to restore to tnose lawfully entitled money which his father 
has unlawfully retained." As stated, the principle would 
not seem to militate against the principle of Hindu lav-, i.e., 
the son is liable for all just debts of his father.
2
In the case of Sudhansu Kumar Singh v. Mt. Ramqhari Kuer, 
(1957) the father had obtained delivery of possession of 
certain property belonging to an agnate of his upon the 
authority of a decree of the Court, but later the decree was 
set aside and a decree for mesne profits was 'passed against 
him. His son objected on the ground that the debt was avyava­
harika .
However, in the opinion of the Court, the act of the 
father in taking delivery of possession by the authority of 
a valid decree could not be said to be a fraudulent or dishonest 
act. It was therefore held that the decree for mesne profits 
against the father was not in respect of debt tainted with 
immorality, and that the debt incurred was not an a vy av a ha r j.ka 
debt within the meaning of Hindu lav/. Hence, the son was 
liable to pay the decree for mesne profits passed against his 
father.; Apparently, the decision would seem to be correct, 
for there was nothing wrong in the act of the father so as 
to taint the consequent liability.
3
In the case of Sheodhar v. Sitaram (1962) a decree for 
mesne profits was passed against the father, who had forcibly
1. (1950) 52 Bom. L.R. 342, at p.348. This is a part of the 
famous quotation, originally from the decision in Natasayyan
• v.Ponnusami, discussed above pp. 237-239; also see below p.376.
2. A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 115; (for the Court's decision see p . 117, 
c.1.)
3. A.I.R. 1962 Pat. 308 (F.B.).
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dispossessed a rightful person from the Math properties, 
and enjoyed usufruct of the same along with others who sided 
with him in forcibly dispossessing the Mahant. After his death, 
his sons objected to execution of the decree against them on 
the ground that the liability was avyavaharika, and hence they 
were not liable.
The questions to be decided were (a) whether the 
appellants were liable, in the circumstances of this case, 
to satisfy the decree for mesne profits; and (b) whether 
the Court could look into the conduct of the father before 
the passing of the decree, in order to decide whether or not 
the debt was avyavaharika.
As regards question (b), the Full Bench came, after
discussing a number of cases on the point, to the conclusion
that s
"the facts, the circumstances and the conduct of the 
father antecedent to the incurring of the debt in 
question could be looked into to ascertain the 
nature and the character of the debt so as to be^ 
binding on the son as being net Avyavaharika."
On a careful consideration of the authorities discussed in 
this context, one would unhesitatingly agree with this view, 
because it represents the correct legal position.
Regarding question (a), however, the Court answered in
the negative. It was argued on .oehalf of the respondents
that 'a decree for mesne profits can never in law be an
avyavaharika debt. For, whatever may be said with respect to
the forcible possession taken by the trespasser, his receipt
of the usufruct of the land on cultivation of the same cannot
be a dishonest act on his part.1 In support of this contention,
2reliance was placed on the cases of Nanomi Babuasin v. Modun 
Mohun, Karan Singh v. Bhup Singh, Ramasubramania v. Sivakami, 
Peary Lai v. Chandi Charan, Laxmipatirao v. Kiistrao and 
Sudhansu v. Mt. Ramjhari. These were all cases of mesne 
profits in which the sons were held liable.
1. Ibid., at p.313, c.2. Thus, the decision in Kirit Singh v .
M t .Chandrakali Kua r , A.I.R. 1951 Pat.587 (discussed above
pp.341-343) was overruled.
2. We have already discussed all these cases, see above pp.357-364
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After discussing these cases the Court sav'd,
"The decisions in the cases cited above depended 
on the facts and circumstances of each case and*
none of these cases is an authority for the broad
proposition of law, as submitted bv counsel for
.the respondents, that a decree for mesne profits 
can in no case be legally held to be immoral or 
avyavaharika. These are all cases :n which, on 
the evidence, the debts were, vyavaharika, and there­
fore, they have no application to the present 
case, the material facts of which are different 
from the facts of those cases."1
The distinction would seem to have been based upon the fact
that the father in the present case, unlike those cases, had
dispossessed the Mahant by force. The use of force in this
case affected the nature of his act, in that it was the most
unjust and dishonest conduct on the father's part. This was
not, it would appear, the situation in the cases relied on,
though dishonesty was present at least in some of those cases
2
(see for example Ramasubramania1s case. )
Then, turning to the Counsel's argument, the Court said,
"No doubt, the act of trespasser in forcibly 
dispossessing the true owner from the land is most 
unjust, but it is equally unjust and dishonest on 
his part to retain the same forcibly after having 
dispossessed the true owner. The debt incurred 
by such trespasser due to his dishonest act of 
retention of possession is, therefore, tainted 
with immorality and illegality and isnAvyavaharika 
so as not to be binding on his sons."0
(My emphasis).
And, after referring to certain other cases on avyavaharika 
debt, the Court came to the conclusion that the conduct of
1. Ibid., at p.314, c.2.
2. A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 841, at p.848, c.2. Also see above 
p. 360.
3. Ibid., at pp.314-315.
367
the father "in forcibly dispossessing the Mahant and retaining 
possession of the Math properties was undoubtedly grossly 
unjust and flagrantly dishonest." His sons, therefore, were 
not held liable for the same.
If we go by the terminology of the decision, it would 
be quite clear that the Court has followed literally the 
propositions laid down in Ramasubramania's case (see above 
p. 361) - particularly the second proposition - which we
have already criticized. In view of what we have said there 
(at p. 361 a|o/b|ve) , once again, it may not be out of place 
to ask whether even this decisijon would fit into what was 
contemplated by the law-givers while laying down the exception 
which exempts the son from his liability under pious obligation
1. Ibid., at p.316, c.1.
The legal position obtained after this decision has been 
summed up as follows:
"These cases, therefore, were decided on their particular facts, 
and the principle deduclble from them cannot go beyond this 
that where the conduct of the father in doing any act is not 
tainted with immorality, any debt resulting from such a 
conduct, though that may have been incurred even due to subsequent 
dishonesty of the father, is binding on the son. They are, 
however, no authority for the propostion that, even if the 
conduct of the father at its inception is dishonest and 
unjust, the debt resulting frcra such a conduct would be 
binding on his sons; rather, on a consideration of these 
cases, referred to above, the law on the subject seems to 
be that a son is exempted from the liability to pay a debt 
of his father under the rule of pious obligation if the debt 
resulted as a consequence of am act of the father which, 
when that act was done, was tainted with immorality."
M.N. Srinivasan, cit. above, at p . 1652.
It may be pointed out that this summing up would seem 
to be inaccurate in the sense that it does not represent 
the difference in degree of dishonesty etc. in the father's 
conduct while committing an act which would seem to be 
the basis upon which the act of the father might be 
considered vyavaharika or avyavaharika.
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Supposing that the usufruct enjoyed by the father was 
not applied for immoral purposes, the decision in this case 
would seem to moan that the decisions relied on by the 
repondent's Counsel were correct, because the conduct of 
the father in those cases, though unjust and dishonest (in 
some of them at least) to a lesser degree than in the present 
case) was acceptable to the Courts as not being immoral, i.e., 
it was vyavaharika, and therefore, the son must pay. However 
the degree of the father's unjust and dishonest conduct right 
from the start in this case was so high that it could not be 
condoned in view of its seriousness and, therefore, it amounted 
to 'immoral and illegal' conduct; and hence his sons need 
not pay; for the liability arising cut of such conduct 
would be avyavaharika. In other words, if you evict a right­
ful owner from his property in a comparatively civilized 
manner etc. and thereby become liable for mesne profits, your 
sons must pay; but, if you do the same act by (as it were) 
hitting the owner in the face, your sons need not pay. It 
would seem impossible to fit this kind of principle of law 
into the concepts of righteousness and justice, which are 
the basis of vyavahara, and which the sastrakaras as well as 
the Courts of law have professed to uphold. Of course, it 
may well be argued on the other hand that the sastras held 
many debts avyavaharika etc. because they were debts which 
in the eyes of dharma must be paid by the offender or not 
at all. (see above p. 40 and f.n.5 there). However, can we 
consider the liability in question to fall under this category?
(see below p.390 ff for our answer) .
In view of the facts and the circumstances of the case, 
the decision might have been correct, but it might be emphasized 
that as a general rule the test of the nature of the father's 
conduct alone would seem (as shown above at pp.225-228) to 
be inadequate, and therefore might be supplemented, while 
determining its nature, by looking into the purpose of such 
conduct of the father.
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i
In the case of Krishnrao v. Deorao (1963) a decree 
for mesne profits was passed against the father along with 
others. One of them instituted the present suit, after 
the death of the father, against the sons for the recovery 
of the father's share of the mesne profits, which he claimed 
to have been paid to the decree-holder. Although it would 
appear from the report that one of the contentions on behalf 
of the sons in this appeal was based on the doctrine of 
avyavaharika, we could not be sure whether or not it was 
raised in the Lower Courts. Whatever it might have been, 
the Court, without citing any Hindu law authority by name, 
decided the issue in the following terms:
"A liability for a tort does not amount to 
a debt; it is distinct from an obligation 
legally incurred in consequence of a contract 
or quasi-contract. Where a father i,s guilty of 
a civil wrong and a decree is passed against h i m , 
it does not become an Avyavaharika debt. His 
son is bound to pay subject to the condition 
that he has received assets from which the 
liability- can be discharged. ( M y  emphasis).
Only the underlined part of this quotation would seem to be 
on the point. However, the principle of law enunciated here 
is stated in general terms; and though right in principle 
generally as well as in the context of the facts of this 
case as stated, it would seem to go too far. For it does not 
seem to take into account the cases in which the son might 
successfully claim exemption on the ground of the father's 
immoralconduct while committing the tort concerned, as happened 
in the case of Sheodhar v. Sitaram (see above pp.364-368).
1. A.I.R. 1963 M.P. 49.
2. Ibid., at p.51, c.1. It may be noted that the first part of 
this quotation would seem to apply to a case in which the 
father died after committing a tort, and where no decree 
for damages existed against him. See, Deoba v.Babaia, 
A.I.R. 1927 Nag. 337, at p.338, c.1. (discussed above
' at p. 350,JJ
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In the conclusion of this sub-section, it may be 
said that the father's liability due to mesne profits has 
geheral.ly, in view of particular facts and circumstances of 
each case, been considered to be vyavaharika and therefore 
the sons were held liable in most of the decided cases.
However, in a case where the conduct of the father, while 
wrongfully ousting the rightful owner from his property, 
was found to be g r o s s l y  unjust and flagrantly dishonest, the 
resulting liability was held to be avyavaharika and hence 
the sons were not held liable. As the decisions in all 
these cases were based on their particular facts and circum­
stances, no general rule could properly be deduced; but, upon 
a closer examination of these decisions, it wTould appear that 
in most of them the Courts preferred to consider the father's
liability as in the nature of restitution, and hence not
•»
immoral or avyavaharika.
(b) Cases involving misappropriation of other's property
(i) Criminal misappropriation or theft cases:
We have already pointed out that the orthodox Hindu 
Courts had held the son liable not only for the repayment of 
the actual amount stolen by his father but also to pay compens­
ation in respect of the murder committed by the father, to 
the son of the murdered officer (see above p.227, f.n.1).
This trend would seem to have been in existence upto 1872.
For it is stated that "In those days the Government permitted 
wrong-dpers to make restitution and compensation to the wronged,
i
and thus excape trial and punishment."
Perhaps, a similar view might have influenced the decision
2
in Kartar Singh v. Harji Mai (1878). In this case the father
1. Dulleep Singh v. Sree Kishoom Panday, (1872) 4 N.W.P.(H.C.R.)
83, at p. 84 (also see p.85). In fact, this was what exactly 
happened in this case. A Hindu father having been implicated 
in a decoity was imprisoned. He sold ancestral property
to make full restitution to the injured party. The sale 
was impeached on behalf of his minor sons as not for 
necessity. The sale was upheld on the ground that it was 
made for meeting the grave calamity affecting the whole 
family: i.e., death or banishment of the father.
2. (1879) P.R., No.128, p.282; (also, see above p. 229).
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stole and converted to his own use certain property belonging
to the defendant, who sued and obtained a decree against the
father for the value of the property. The debt was challenged
on behalf of his-minor son on the ground of immorality.
However, the Court said,
"It is impossible to hold that the debt created 
by the decree is a debt contracted for an illegal 
or immoral purpose, merely because the act from 
which the obligation to make compensation arose was 
an illegal* o?: immoral act, or both illegal and 
immoral." 1
We have already seen that such a view could be wrong if 
the debt created by a decree may be shown to be falling under 
excepted debts according to Hindu law, e.g., a fine, (also, 
see below Mahablr Prasad 1s case .) it would appear 
that the decision might have^ been based on the precedents of 
the Court; or perhaps inadequate knowledge c3f the sastric 
Hindu law on the part of Counsel for the son, or even the 
judges themselves, might have led the Court to this decision. 
However, the decision would seem to fit into the practice 
followed by the orthodox Hindu Courts.
The question as to whether the share of a son could be
sold in execution of a decree of a Civil Court against his
father on account of the father's criminal embezzlement was
2
considered in Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh (1884). Here, 
the sons had contended that their s^ftVes were not liable, 
because in view of its nature the debt would not be binding 
on them'. The father was sentenced to imprisonment, and whila 
he was serving hit- imprisonment, he was sued in the Civil 
Court.
After referring to certain Privy Council decisions,
Stuart, C.J., said,
"To my mind it is a very serious question whether 
the criminal element in the conduct of the father 
by reason of the embezzlement of which he was
1. Ibid., at pp.282-283.
2. (1884), I.L.R. 6 All. 234.
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convicted did not, so far as the plaintiffs' 
rights were concerned, vitiate the proceedings 
ending in the sale from the beginning, in 
as much as it was an inherent vice which tainted 
the sale, and could not be got rid of, or be 
removed•by the^mere fact of the decree in the 
Civil Court." (My emphasis).
The sale was held to be for an immoral purpose, i.e., for 
raising money to meet the father's liability arising out of 
his immoral and illegal conduct (embezzlement).
Although the above view would show hew a decretal debt 
might not be binding on the son, it would also raise a question: 
should the Court determine the nature of the liability in 
such cases by reference to the nature and purpose of the
father's original act, or, as happened in this case, by
i
reference to that of the resultant decretal remedy (i.e.,
i
sale in execution of a decree for compensation)? Before 
answering the question let us inquire into other decisions 
on the subject.'
2
In Pareman Pass v. Bhattu Mahton (1897) the facts were 
similar. The decision may be summed up thus: that there was
no 'debt antecedent' to the decree in this case; that even 
if the right to obtain damages for the theft or misappropriation 
could be said to have created a 'debt', the debt was tainted
3
with illegality or immorality , and hence the sons were not 
liable. This case was followed in McDowell & Co. v. Ragava
4
Chetty (1904) wherein the father had misappropriated money 
under circumstances which, in the opinion of the Court, constit-
1. Ibid., at p .237.
2. (1897) I.L.R. 24 All. 672. In this case the father was found
guilty of theft, and a decree for damages was obtained
against him. In execution of that decree ancestral property 
was sold. The sons brought suit to recover their shares on 
the ground of immoral nature of the liability of their 
father.
3 . Ibid., at p.676 .
4. (1904) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 71. In this case Natesayyan's case
(see below p.376 ) was distinguished and explained. According
to the Court, the conduct of the father in that case, though 
dishonest, in the circumstances of the case, amounted to 
nothing more than a breach of civil duty.
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uted the taking itself a criminal offence, and therefore, 
his minor sons were held not liable. It may be noted that in 
this case the criminal nature of the initial conduct of the 
father, who was not even charged with a criminal offence, 
was held to be sufficient to relieve the sons.
1In Jagannath Prasad v. Jugal Kishore (1925) the father's 
liability was challenged on the ground of immorality as it 
was found that the same arose out of the father's criminal 
misappropriation. While considering what constitutes 'immoral­
ity' of a debt so as to enable the sons to escape the liability, 
the Court observed,
'■'We think that the test to be applied in a case 
of the kind now before us is whether or not the 
action of the father which resulted in the debt 
was infected with an element of criminality.
Whether such an element is established or not 
and the degree of infection which will support 
a plea of 'immorality' must be a question for 
determination of the facts of each case; and 
though a conviction for misappropriation or 
other cognate offence may be good proof of such 
an element, proof of a previous conviction is 
certainly not essential. The criminality and 
its degree may be inferred from a consideration 
of the whole facts."2
It was held, on the basis of the presence of such criminal 
element here, that the debt was 'immoral' and therefore the 
son was not liable. This case was followed in Bai Mani v.
3
Usafali Ehudar (1931) where it was found that the father
had criminally misappropriated his ward's property. Also to
the same effect is Widya Wanti v. Jai Dayal  ^ (J 932), wherein
the father had embezzled a large amount of money of his
employer. In both these cases, the sons were held not liable.
In the latter case, after referring to certain authorities,
Bhide, J. said,
"I have carefully considered these authorities, 
and although there seems to be some divergence
1. (1926) I.L.R. 48 All. 9. For the facts, see above p.228.
2. Ibid., at pp. 10-11
3. (1931) 33 Bom. L.R. 130.
4. A.I.R. 1932 Lah. 541.
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of opinion as to whether the sons of a Hindu 
father are bound to pay his debts, which are 
the result of mere breach of civil duty, the 
■c authorities seem to be practically agreed that
, they are not so bound if the debts result from
an act amounting to a criminal offence, as in 
this case. "
The above view finds support in Toshanpal Singh v.
9
District Judge of Agra“ (1934). In this case the father was 
secretary of a school committee, authorised to operate its 
bank account for specific purposes. However, he was found 
to have drawn over R s . 30.000 for unauthorised purposes.
In the opinion of the Privy Council the drawings in question 
were a criminal breach of trust, and that under Hindu law 
the sons were not liable; though sc far as authorised 
drawings were concerned (money drawn for authorised purposes 
but not accounted for) the sons were held liable. It may be 
pointed out here that the distinction based on civil and 
criminal liability has not been universally accepted (see 
above p.241, f.n.2).
3
In Surji Sethani v. Ratanlal Chamria (1943) the 
liability arose out of refusal to return certain ornaments 
and cash which were given to the grandfather for safe custody. 
The Court held that a debt which arose out of criminal breach 
of trust was avyavaharika and the ancestral property in the 
hands of his grandsons, after his death, was not liable for 
such debt. One would wonder whether the liability, in view 
of the facts of the case, was, at the time it arose, tainted 
with criminality. For the valuables were voluntarily given 
and accepted, and the alleged breach of trust took place at 
a later date. The decision would prove, apparently, that the 
Courts are not unanimous on the point.
4
In Perumal v. Devarajan (1974) the father had incurred 
liability by way of a theft. After his death his sons contended
1. Ibid., at p.544.
2. (1934) I.L.R. 56 All. 548 (P.C.)
3. (1943) 47 C.W.N. 266.
4. A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 14.
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that they were not liable because the debt was avyavaharika.
The Court agreed that the debt was avyavaharika. However, 
it held that though the sons were not personally liable, 
if they had inherited any property from their father, the 
decree could be executed to the extent of the value of that 
property.^ In order to avoid any confusion that might follow 
•from the wording of this judgement, it may first be pointed 
out that at present the son's liability under pious obligation 
itself is to the extent of any property that has come to his 
hand.. Hence, there would be no question of his being held 
personally liable for any of his father's debt. Further, the 
nature of the property referred to in the decision is not 
clear. However, it may be said in this respect that if it 
were ancestral property, then it would not be liable in the 
hands of the son. For, if the father's debt was avyavaharika, 
then the ancestral property would not be liable at all for 
such debt; but, if it were the self-acquired estate of the 
father, the judgement would seem to be correct.
In view of the fact that there has been difference of 
opinion amongst the Courts as regards the nature of the 
liability arising out of the father's misappropriation, it 
might be appropriate to postpone our conclusion until the 
cases involving so-called 'civil liability' are discussed.
(r1 ) Cases of misappropriation where the father's 
liability nas been treated as a breach of trust or civil duty:
In mcst of the following cases the father would seem 
to have possessed another's property, in the first place, in 
his capacity as a trustee, agent, manager or servant and then 
misappropriated or ruined it.
2
Thus, in Jettyapa v. haximaya (1833) a decree was 
passed against the plaintiff's father, holding him liable 
personally for the sum mentioned in it, for cash and securities
1. Ibid., at p . 16, c.2.
2. Unreported Printed Judgements of the High Court of Bombay, 
v o l .5, (1881-83) p.579. (Originally, B o m .H .C .P .J .1883, p.87)
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in his possession belonging to the family which he failed 
to produce for the purpose of partition between himself and 
the other members of the family. Upon the son's objection, 
the Court declared that in acting as the plaintiff's father 
did, he has offended against the express injunctions of 
Hindu law.
"The pious obligation of the son to pay 
his father's debts is confined to debts 
contracted for moral purposes, and cannot, 
therefore, we think,extend to a pecuniary 
liability arising out of such circumstances 
as the above.
The son's share was, therefore, freed from the liability.
It may respectfully be submitted that the injunctions of 
Hindu law referred to above would seem to have been misunder­
stood; for, according to them, the son would have been liable 
in this case (see above p. 241) . *
3
In Natasayyan v. Ponnusami (1892) a decree was passed 
against the father for money collected on behalf of the 
plaintiff's family but dishonestly retained by him. After 
the death of the father, his sons had objected on the ground 
that the liability was illegal and immoral. However, the Court 
found that the judgement-debt was not an illegal or immoral 
debt, and the sons were liable.
As regards the nature of the debt in this case, without 
going into the exact meaning of the terms 'immoral' or 'illegal 
the Court said,
i
"It seems to us that there can be no question 
that debts of the nature of those found by the 
decree against defendants' father to be justly 
due by him to plaintiff are not of an immoral 
or illegal nature, upon any reasonable view of
1. For a detailed discussion of these rules, see above p. 241.
2. Cit.above, at p.581. Cf. Hemraj v.Khemchand, see above, 
p. 232 ff.
3. (189 3) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 99. It may be noted here that in 
certain cases the name 'Natasayyan' has been spelled as 
1Natesayyan1.
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the meaning of those words as used in the 
rule of Hindu law under consideration. That 
rule, as we understand it, is that sons are 
under a pious obligation to discharge the just 
debts of their fahte'r because otherwise he 
would be liable to be punished in a future 
1 state for non-discharge of these debts. Upon
any intelligible principle of morality a debt
due by the father by reason of his having 
retained for himself money which he was bound 
to pay to another would be a debt of the most 
sacred obligation and for the non-discharge 
of which punishment in future state might be 
expected to be inflicted, if in any. The son 
is not bound to do anything to relieve his 
father from the consequences of his own vicious 
indulgences, but he is surely bound to do that 
which his father himself would do were it possible, 
viz., to restore to those lawfully entitled money 
he has unlawfully retained.11^ (My emphasis) .
The decision would seem to be just; but the statement would 
not seem to interpret the Hindu law correctly, for every debt 
that is justly due would not necessarily be a debt not tainted 
with illegality or immorality. Moreover, it might be correct, 
in the context of the facts of this case, that the sons were 
bound to do that which their father himself would have done;
but as a general principle of law, it would apparently conflict
with Hindu law on the subject. For, even if the father would 
be liable for all his debts and would be bound to repay, his 
sons could not legally be compelled to repay his avyavaha?"! ka 
debts under Hindu law (see above pp. 238-39).
The decision in the above case was followed In Kaneiuar 
v. Krishna Chariya  ^ (1908). In this case, the father had 
misappropriated money received by him for the purpose of being 
paid to others in the course of a transaction entered into 
by him for the benefit of the family. In the opinion of the
3
Court the father's act amounted to a mere breach of civil duty 
and not a criminal act, and therefore, the son's interest in 
the joint family property was held to be liable.
1. Ibid., p . 104. We have already discussed and criticized the 
principle laid down in this decision (see above pp.238-39).
2. (1908) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 161.
3. Ibid., at p .162.
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In Erasala Gurunatham Chetty v. A. Raghavaln Chetty 
(1908) the father, who was administrate!' of a certain estate, 
was made liable in respect of money received by him, as 
the administrator, and not properly accounted for. The sons' 
contention was that their father's act amounted to criminal 
breach of trust, and therefore the debt, being illegal and 
immoral, was not binding on them. However, in the opinion 
of the Court, the evidence in the present case was not sufficie 
to warrant them to hold that the failure by the father to 
account as an administrator amounted to a criminal offence. 
Hence the sons were held liable.
3
In Venugopal Naidu v. A. Ramanadhan Chetty (1914) 
the father incurred liability as the trustee of a temple. 
Certain funds of the temple were improperly expended, and 
therefore, the Court had directed all the trustees to reimburse 
the temple of that amount out of their private funds. The 
debt was not held to be avyavaharika. The Court held, 
"Imprudent and even 'unconscionably' imprudent debts of the 
father are not, in my opinion, immoral, illegal or avyavaharika
4
debts". Hence, the sons were liable. We have already made 
certain observations on imprudent debts (see above.p. 277), 
however, in view of the facts of the case, one would agree 
with the decision. This was a case not of misappropriation 
but misuse of the temple-funds.
5
In Hari Singh v. Sant Prosad Singh (1917) the father 
and the plaintiff bought a property at a revenue sale but, 
the sale having been reversed, the father withdrew the whole 
of the purchase-money from the Collectorate. In a suit by 
the plaintiff to recover his share of the purchase-money 
a decree was passed against the father in execution of which 
ancestral property was sold. The son then brought a suit to
1. (1908) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 472.
2. Ibid., at p.474.
3. A.I.R. 1914 Mad. 654.
4. Ibid., p.655, c.2. Natasayyan v. Ponnusami was followed
in this case.
5. A.I.R. 1917 C a l . 495.
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recover his half share of the property on the ground that 
the debt was an immoral debt for which he was not liable. 
However,- in the opinion of the Court, the father’s act of 
drawing out money from the Collectorate was not immoral,
nor did it amount to criminal misappropriation. The son was,
therefore, held liable.
i
In Caruda Sanyasayya v. Nerella Murthenna (1918) 
the son's liability was in issue for amounts collected by 
his father as trustee and misappropriated by him. It was 
argued jn his behalf that his father must be deemed to have 
criminally misappropriated the funds, which were applied to 
his own use. In the opinion of the Court, however, the son 
was accountable for the debt, because it was not avyavaharika. 
In this connection, the Court said,
"It was the duty of the trustees to collect the 
income and their subsequent misappropriation of 
it does not affect the liability to account which 
they incurred by reason of the collection. The
fact that the misappropriation amounted to a ^
criminal offence appears to be irrelevant."
(My emphasis).
Thus, it would appear that the Court made distinction between 
the time of incurring the liability and that of committing the 
offence. In other words, when the liability arose it was 
civil and not immoral, and subsequent misappropriation would 
not chayige its nature.
3
Ir; Hanmant Kashinath v. Ganesh Annaji (1918) the facts 
were similar to that of the above case in that the father was 
held liable for breach of civil duty as a trustee and his 
sons had objected on the ground that the debt was avyavaharika. 
But the Court rejected the contention on the ground that the 
money not accounted for by the father was not found to have 
been criminally misappropriated. The sons were held liable.
1. (1918) 35 M.L.J. 661 .
2. Ibid., at p. 663 .
3. (1918) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 612
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In Gursarn Das v. Mohan Lal^ (1922) the father had 
misappropriated a large sum of money while acting as the 
manager of the plaintiff's estate, and in consequence a decree 
was subsequently passed against him for such sums of money 
as he was not able to account for. Although it was urged 
that his son was not liable under pious obligation for such 
debts of the father, in the absence of any evidence to show 
that the debt was immoral or illegal, the Court held that the 
son was liable. The Court said,
"Admittedly the father was not criminally prosecuted, 
and the suit was one for accounts which he had 
failed to deliver. Every breach of civil liability 
does not necessarily involve a moral turpitude, 
and in the present case we have no hesitation in 
holding that it has not been shown that the debt 
in question was immoral in law for the discharge 
of which the son was not liable."2 (My emphasis).
It would seem to be a good decision for it has correctly laid 
down why every civil liability could not necessarily be avyava­
harika .
3
The case of N. Venkatakrishnayya v. Kundurthi Byragi 
(1926) was similar to that of Garuda v. Nerella, (discussed 
above p. 379) and was decided in the same manner. The son 
was held liable.
4
In Brijnath Shargha v. Lakshmi Narain (1932) the father 
was entrusted by his brother with certain jewellery and gold 
coins for safe custody. A large number of articles were fcund 
to be missing, for the recovery of which he was sued. The 
father died during pendency of the suit. His son was held 
liable, because in the opinion of the Court the debt was not 
avyavaharika. According to the Court, the father's act was
1 . (1922) I.L.R. 4 Lah. 93.
2. Ibid., at p. 98.
3. (1926) 50 M.L.J. 353.
4. (1933) I.L.R. 8 Luck. 35. Cf. Surji Sethani v. Ratanla] 
Chamria (see above p. 374). It may be noted here that, 
though the facts of these two cases were similar, the 
decisions were altogether different. In Surji's case 
the debts were held to be avyavaharika.
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clearly a breach, of trust, and any loss that resulted to the 
depositor had to be made good by the father. The duty to 
make good the loss being highly moral and lawful, the debt 
was held to be vyavaharika . This principle, though good 
law in view of the facts of this case, could be criticized 
on the same ground as the principle of general, morality laid 
down in the case of Nate say van v . Ponnusainl has been criticized 
above, see pp. 238-39, for it does not correctly interpret 
Hindu lav; in respect of the son' 3 liability.
In Govindprasad v. Raghunathprasad (1938) it was found 
that the father was, along with others, in possession of 
another's property, most of which was spent in criminal
i
proceedings and in litigation in order to deprive the rightful
i
owner of his property. There was, however, no evidence as to
i
whether the father could have been prosecuted criminally in 
respect of his possession of this property. He was neither 
in the capacity of a trustee nor an agent of the rightful owner 
His son contended that the liability incurred by the father 
was avyavaharika, and therefore he was not bound to pay under 
Hindu law.
In view of the facts, the Full Bench held that the
liability was essentially dishonest in character, and incurred
2
for a dishonest purpose and, therefore, it was avyavaharika.
As regards the scope of the term avyavaharika, Wassoodew, J.,
observed,
* "In my opinion there is no warrant for restricting 
its application to criminal acts of the father.
The word,according to my interpretation of the 
text, is used in a comprehensive sense and there 
is nothing to fetter the discretion of the Court 
in applying a proper standard of morality, legality 
or honesty in deciding the question of the son's 
liability. In fact no better or more elastic
formula can be devised in the application of the
rule to the circumstances of each case."
1’. (1938) 41 Bom. L.R. 589 or I.L.R. 1 939 Bom. 533.
2. Ibid., at p. 544, (per Beaumont, C.J.).
3. Ibid., at p.550. "To exempt the son from liability, the
father's act which gave rise to the debt need not be 
necessarily criminal." per Lokur, J., ibid., at p.554.
)
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In the circumstances of this case the decision would 
seem to be correct. For, unlike most of the cases discussed 
in this section, the father's act was in its inception 
dishonest and immoral, and so was the purpose of his act.
Thus, looked at from all angles, the liability would seem 
to be avyavaharika . Also, in view of this decision it might 
be correct to say that while determining the son's liability 
in such cases, the Courts should look into not only the nature 
of the father's civil or criminal act, but also that of the 
purpose for which he committed the act.
2
In Hiradas v. Jagannath (1945) where the father, wno 
was the mortgagor, had rendered himself civilly liable by 
removing certain materials from the mortgaged property, the 
Court said, "It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast 
rule to determine whether a 'particular debt is avyavaharika, 
and the matter must be viewed in a broad and non-technical
3
spirit." The father's act was held to be merely a civil 
wrong, and a decree passed against him was therefore held to 
be binding on the son, because in the opinion of the Court the 
debt was not avyavaharika.
4
In Jakati v. Borkar (1959) the father was the managing 
director of a Co-operative Bank, which went into liquidation. 
He was later charged and a decree was passed against him for 
breach of trust. A certain bungalow belonging to the joint 
family was attached and sold. His sons alleged that the 
debt wa.s avyavaharika and therefore their share in the joint 
family property was not liable for the debt.
After referring to the decision in Toshanpal's case
(see above p. 374) and while giving the judgement against
the sons, the Supreme Court said,
"The managing director of a Bank of the position 
of defendant No.1, who should have been more
1. We have already made this suggestion above at p.231 after 
having discussed the rules concerning civil or criminal 
element in such acts of the father.
2. A.I.R. 1945 Nag. 294.
3. Ibid., at p . 295.
4. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 282.
r
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vigilant in investing the monies of the Bank 
cannot be said to have incurred the liability 
for ra cause repugnant to good morals'. We are 
unable to subscribe to the proposition that 
in the modern age with its complex institutions 
as Banks and Joint Stock Companies governed by 
many technicalities and complex systems of 
laws the liability such as has arisen in the^ 
present case could be called Avyavaharika. "
The debt was therefore binding on the sons.
The liability of the father here, which arose cut of 
his negligence, would seem to have assimilated with that 
which arose from the father's misappropriation in the case 
of Toshanpal . The fathers in both the cases were paid 
employees of the institutions concerned, and their acts 
resulted in loss to those institutions, but there ended the 
similarity- The acts which casued the loss were hardly 
similar in nature, for 'negligence in the discharge of one's 
duty' and 'misappropriation of funds' while in the service 
of an institution could hardly be called similar. The 
construction placed upon the nature of the liability would 
seem, therefore, to be strained. Besides, the reference to 
the modern age with its complexities, though welcome, because 
it took cognisance of the present circumstances, would seem 
to require some explanation as to how such negligence could 
be construed as vyavaharika or avyavaharika in the complex 
circumstances of the modern’institutions.
2
■Cn Sitaram v. Tarachand (1 962) a suit was brought 
against- the father for recovery of certain ornaments, which 
were kept in custody of the father. He failed to return them, 
and, therefore, a money decree was passed against him. His 
sens alleged that the debt was avyavaharika, but the Court 
held that the failure to return the ornaments created a civil
1. Ibid., at p.286, c.2; also see "The liability of a father,
who is a managing director and who draws a salary or a
remuneration, incurred as a result of negligence in the 
discharge of his duties is not an Avyavaharika debt as it
cannot be termed as 'repugnant to good morals." Ibid. ,p.291 ,c.
2. A.I.R. 1962 R a j .136.
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liability because the obligation continued to subsist even 
after the subsequent intention of keeping the ornaments became 
dishonest, and therefore the sons’ objection could not be 
sustained on the ground of avyavaharika or immoral debt. In 
other v;crds, the debt, was held to be vyavaharika and hence 
binding on the sons. The view taken of the father's liability 
in this decision would seem to have been based on a sounder
i
oasis than those in other two cases discussed above.
2
In the case of Venkateswara Temple v . B. Radhakrishna 
(1963) the father, as a trustee of the temple, had lawfully 
collected money belonging to the temple, but subsequently 
he failed to account for the same. For the recovery of the 
amount, he was sued along with his sons. The sons' defence 
was that, as they were not benefited by these amounts and 
as their father might have used the money for his own illegal 
purposes, they were not liable to discharge the debt from 
out of the family properties. However, the sons failed to 
prove that the debt was either immoral or illegal and hence 
they were held liable to pay the debt. In the opinion of
3
the Court, the debt had a lawful origin and the criminality 
consisting in the misappropriation was a subsequent event.
That being so the debt would not be converted into avyavaharika
1. Brijnath Shargha v. Lakshmi Narain, (discussed above at
pp.380-81; and Surji Sethani v. Ratilal Chamria, (discussed 
above at pp. 37 4-375. Also in Sltaram v. Radha B a i , A.I.R. 
1968 S.C. 534, the father was entrusted with valuable 
ornaments for safe custody. After his death, his sons 
denied liability. However, they were held liable. 
Misappropriation on the part of the late father was 
not proved. The contention would seem to have been 
a false plea on the part of the sons.
2. A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 425, (F.B.).
3. For a meaningful criticism of its opinion,see J .D . M . Derrett, 
C.M.H.L., cit. above, pp. 104-105; also see below p. 392.
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d e b t . 1 The Court came to this conclusion after discussing 
a number of decisions of various Courts. In the words of 
the Court,
"A son could claim immunity only where the debt 
i in its origin was immoral by reason of the money
having been obtained by the commission of an offence, 
but not where the father came by the money lawfully 
but subsequently misappropriated it. It is only 
in the former case that the debt answers the 
description of an avyavaharika debt. If originally 
the taking was not immoral, i.e., if it did not 
have a corrupt beginning or founded upon fraud, 
it could not be characterised as an avyavaharika 
debt and the son could not be exempted from 
satisfying that debt. The supervening event 
namely, the m.i sappropriation later on would not 
change the nature of the debt. The vices should 
be inherent in the debt itself."2
In view of the facts and the. circumstances of the case, this 
view would seem to be correct, but as a general rule it might 
come in conflict with the basic principles of Hindu law as 
observed above (see p. 226).
The above decision would seem to have been followed in
3the case of Loganathan v. P. Naicker (1969). Here the material 
facts were that the father had incurred liability due to 
his failure to account for the income and profits from the 
properties, the management of which he had undertaken for the 
benefit of their rightful owners who were his relatives and 
were minors. It was alleged that the father had applied the 
money for improvement of his own family property. In the 
opinion'of the Court, the liability was a civil liability to 
account. The origin of the liability was not repugnant to 
good morals, and therefore, it was not a avyavaharika debt.
The father's later failure to account might be dishonest, 
but that could not alter the original character of the obligation 
and make it criminal even initially. In these circumstances, 
the Court held the son liable for the debt.
1. Ibid., at p. 429, c.1.
2. Ibid., at p. 427, c.2.
3. A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 15; see p. 20, c.2.
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As in the previous case, the decision would seem to 
be just and in keeping with the prevailing trend of the 
decisions of various Courts in respect of such debts of 
the father. However, it may be said that the rather 
excessive emphasis placed upon the rule that the original 
character of the liability could not afterwards be altered 
would seem to be incorrect, for it might be that in the 
context of different facts the original nature of the debt 
would be changed, e.g., supposing that the father in the 
present case had in fact spent the money on liquor or 
prostitutes, according to Hindu law, imputing the purpose, 
which would relate back, the debt would have been immoral, 
and therefore, avyavaharika; and hence, so far as the son's
liability is concerned, the rule would have no application.
i
i
The cases discussed so far were in respect of the 
father's debt which arose out of his breach of trust. But 
now, we will turn to the cases in which the father had incurred 
liability due to his breach of civil duty as a servant or 
an agent. In substance the liability in these cases would 
seem to be similar to the liability arising out of a breach 
of trust, and, as will be seen presently, the Courts have in 
fact treated it in a similar way.
i
Thus, in Shah Wajed Hossein v. Baboo Nanku Singh (187 6) 
the father, as the agent of his principal, leased to a third 
person certain property of his principal without his authority. 
Later, as a result of the principal:s repudiation of the 
transaction, the father incurred .liability and to meet the 
same, he had mortgaged joint family property. The mortgagee 
obtained a decree against the father, but his son challenged 
the sale in execution of the decree, on the ground that the
1. (1876) 25 Suth. W.R. 311. In Jai Kumar v. Gauri N a t h ,
(1906) I.L.R. 28 All. 718, the father, as an assistant
. treasurer of a Bank, incurred certain li a b i l i t y  to his
superior. The son contended that the liability was for
stifling a prosecution and therefore not binding on him, 
but he failed and was held liable.
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debt was immoral. It was argued on behalf of the son that 
the debt might be immoral either in respect of the object 
for-which it was contracted (i.e., to meet the liability 
of the father's own fraud) or in respect of the means by which 
money was obtained. However, under the circumstances of the 
case, the Court held that the debt was not improperly or 
unreasonably incurred, and therefore, the son was liable.
In M.D. Tirumalayappa Moodelliar v. Veerabudra* (1S09)
the father had misappropriated a certain amount of money of 
his principal. His son denied the liability saying that the 
same was immoral and therefore not binding on him. However, 
the Court's decision was to the effect that
"The son of a Hindu father is liable to pay debts 
due by the father as an agent to another. The son’s 
liability arises at: the same time as the father's, 
and the fact that the father subsequently mis­
appropriated the sum or even made himself criminally 
liable does not alter the son's liability." ^
One wonders whether it is true in such cases that the son's
3
liability arises at the same time as the father's and even 
if it is so notionally, if the father spends the money for 
immoral purposes, the liability would cease to exist so far 
as the son is concerned; for it would not bind him. However, 
this was not the circumstance in this case, and therefore, 
the decision would seem to be correct.
1. (1909) 19 M.L.J. 759.
2. Ibid.
3. "The rule that sons, etc., are liable under the Pious 
Obligation as soon as a debt is incurred, ..., has developed 
in order to protect alienees from fraud, and, indirectly,
in order to establish the credit of Hindu fathers."
J.D.M. Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', cit.above, p,57. Cf. "The 
liability of the Hindu son to pay the debt of his father 
arises from the moment the father has failed to discharge 
his obligation" observed the Court in Narsingh Misra v.Lalji 
. Misra (1901), I.L.R. 23 All. 206, at p. 208. In this case, 
the father's certain personal debts, which he had failed 
to repay, were involved. The sons were held liable.
)
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In Niddha Lai y . The Collector of Bulandshahr  ^ (1916)
the sons were held liable for their father's debt which had
arisen, as in the above case, by way of misappropriation
of his master's money, which he was asked to pay to the
master's creditor. The sons had contended that the father's
act amounted to criminal embezzlement, but the Court found
that "this was not exactly the case of criminal misappropriation
of money by a person to whom it had been entrusted. It was
a case of money received by an agent who had not accounted
2
for it and had thus incurred a civil liability."
3
In Mohanta Gadadhar v. Ganga Shy air. Das (1918) , and
4
Venkatacharyulu v. Mohana Panda (1921), the fathers had failed 
to account, as an agent of their respective principals, for 
the amount of rent collected from the principals' tenants.
In both these cases, the sons were held liable on the ground 
that subsequent misappropriation of the money would not affect 
the nature of the liability. In the first case, the Court 
observed,
"It is impossible from the facts of this case 
to say that the circumstances disclose a criminal 
misappropriation on his part or that there was 
any dishonesty which could constitute an immoral 
act within the meaning of the Hindu law. Every 
civil debt does not necessarily involve a moral 
stigma."5
This is a good decision, for it has explained in terms of 
Hindu law, why the liability of the father was not immoral.
It may also be noted that in the latter case the sons were 
held liable not only for the sums actually received by the 
father and for which he failed to account, but also for sums 
which he negligently failed to collect when it was his duty
1. (1916) 14 A.L.J. 610.
2. Ibid., at p. 613 s
3. (1918) 3 P.L.J. 533.
4. (1921 ) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 214.
5. (1918) 3.P.L.J. 533, at pp. 537
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to collect.1
2
In Patna Mudaliar v. Ellammal (1929) the son was 
held.liable for his father's debts which arose cut of money 
collected, as an agent, on behalf of the mahant but not 
remitted to him.
Likewise, in Mahanth Shib Narain Das v. Pandey Jamuna
3
Prasad (1937) the son had to pay for his father's debts.
The father was appointed to collect certain decretal amount 
and rents. The rents were collected but were not paid to 
the principal. In both these cases the Court found no criminal 
intention on the part of the father. The liability was, thus, 
considered to be civil and therefore the sons were held 
liable.
4
In A. Anandarao v. Co-operative Credit Society (1941) 
the father had been employed as Secretary of the Society and 
it was his duty to collect money from its debtors. Out of 
his collections, he misappropriated a large amount of money.
In this connection he was induced to make certain alienations 
of ancestral property. It was contended on behalf of his 
minor sons that these alienations were not binding on them, 
because in as much as their father misappropriated money of 
the Society he committed a crime, and therefore the resultant 
debt was not binding on them.
In view of the long line of decisions of this Court in 
respect of such debts, the sons were held liable. The Court
1. (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 214 at p. 216, (per Spencer, J.). 
Also, see Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. Basunta Kumar, (1913) 
17 C.W.N. 695, which is to the same effect, and where 
the facts were similar to that of this case.
2. A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 792.
3. A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 220.
4. A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 828.
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said,
"Where a father has lawfully received money the 
fact that he misappropriates it later will not 
change the character of the debt and the son 
is liable under the pious obligation rule. Where 
a person receives money on behalf of another 
a civil liability immediately arises and the 
fact that the person who has received it fails 
in his duty to pay it over to the person entitled
to it does not alter the civil character of the
debt."1
In view of the facts of this case, the decision would seem to
be correct, but once again it should be pointed out that the
rule in respect of the nature of the debt would hold only in
such circumstances as in this case.
2The case of Mulchand v. Small Town Committee (1949)
would seem to be similar in that the father here received
money in discharge of his duties as the treasurer of the
Committee and later on he spent it upon himself. His sons
were held liable on the ground that the debt was of civil
character and was not tainted with immorality or illegality
in its origin. In the view of the Court, the fact that the
money was later misappropriated was a wholly irrelevant 
3circumstance.
Conclusion: At orthodox Hindu law, the father's liability
due to theft or misappropriation as such did not make immune, 
it seems, the son from his liability to pay such debts of 
his father. This position would seem to have been in existence, 
even under the British administration of justice, until the 
middle of the last century (see above pp. 369-371). Thus, no 
distinction appeared between a criminal or civil liability 
of the father so far as the pious obligation of the son was 
concerned. Apparently, the modern Courts of law were responsible 
for the introduction of 'criminal element' in the father's act 
as a basis to be considered for the purpose of determining
1. Ibid., at p. 829, c.1 & 2.
2. A.I.R. 1949 E.P. 177.
3. Ibid., at p. 181, c.2.
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whether or not a particular liability of the father was 
'illegal o r 'immoral1, in the context of the son's pious oblig­
ation to pay it (see above pp.371-375).
. The legal position, so obtained, was affirmed by the 
Privy Council in the case of Toshanpal Singh v. District Judge 
of Agra (see above pp. 373-375). Accordingly, even if a 
Hindu father had robbed somebody of his property and enriched 
his own family, his sons could claim immunity on the ground 
that the liability arose out of the father's criminal act and 
as such was tainted with illegality or immorality? therefore 
it would not bind them. Consequently, his family might well 
be left to enjoy the ill-gotten property without any legal 
obligation. We have already shown the anomaly inherent in 
this new concept (see above pp. 228-231). The sastras could 
have hardly contemplated this result when they laid down the 
exception in respect of the son's liability to pay his father's 
debts.
It was not long before the modern Courts realized the 
mischief created by the concept of 'criminality' introduced 
into the Hindu law of debt, but their hands would seem to 
have been tied due to the clear authority of the Privy Council 
referred to above. Perhaps it is out of this situation and 
in order to alleviate the injustice involved, that the present 
dichotomy between the father's criminal acts and civil acts 
would seem to have born. However, in view of the above dis­
cussion, it could hardly be considered to be a satisfactory 
solution.
The present dichotomy between (1) acts for which a crimina 
prosecution has been or could be launched* and (2) acts which
1. See above Mahabir prasad v. Basdeo Singh, at p.371;
Pareman Pass v. Bhattu Mahton, M Dowell & Co. v.Ragava 
Chetty, Jagannath Prasad v. Jugal Kishore, at pp.37 2-73;
Bai Mani v. Usafali, Widya Wanti v. Jai Dayal, Toshanpal
Singh v. District Judge of Agra, at pp.3 73-74; Surji Sethani 
v. Ratanlal Chamria, Perumal v. Devaraja, at p. 3 74-75; 
cf. Garuda Sanyasayya v. Nerella Murthenna, pp. 378-380.
1
gave rise merely co a civil liability - a dichotomy which
2
is evidenced in textbooks - is obviously unrealistic in 
so far as in cases coming under (1) there are wrongful arcs 
which are not prosecuted merely because the plaintiff believes 
he has a better chance of recovering some or even all his 
money by pursuing the civil remedy by an action for unjust, 
enrichment or conversion or the like than by commencing a 
criminal prosecution in the hopes that money will eventually 
be paid to him under sec. 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
1973 (formerly sec. 545 Cr.P.C. 1898, see J.D.M. Derrett,
C .M .H .L ., p. 104), And there are also cases where prosecution 
is at once opted for. It seems completely unrealistic that 
the sons' liability to compensate the victim should depend 
on the victim's option regarding the mode of pursuing his 
opponent.
The dichotomy which gives rise to such anomalies derives 
from the failure on the part of the Privy Council and, e.g., 
the Madras High Court, to grasp that whereas unpaid fines are 
tainted, it is illogical to brand sums owed on account of a 
wrongful act as tainted unless it is accepted philosophy 
amongst Hindus that sons are not to be forced to compensate 
the victims of their fathers' wrongdoing where the act could 
conceivably have been defined as a crime. An illustration 
will clarify the matter. A father, F, being in advanced stages 
of schizophrenic disturbance, turns over the barrow of a 
street-trader causing the trader, T, R s . 500 worth of damage.
F insists that T sells poisoned goods because he is a member 
of a subversive organisation. F's act will not be classified 
as a crime, because F is not responsible for his actions.
Under our dichotomy above the sons of F are liable, because
1. See above all the cases discussed in subsection (ii) at 
pp. 375-390.
2. N.R. Raghavachariar, cit.above, pp.344-345; F.D. Mulla, 
cit.above, pp. 351-353; J.D. Mayne, cit.above, at pp.403-405
G. Sarkar Sastri, cit. above, at p. 238; J.D.M. Derrett,
I.M.H.L ., cit. above, at pp.314-315; P. Diwan, cit.above, 
at p p . 270-271.
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the act is untainted.' If, however, F overturned the barrow 
in the course of a quarrel with T, F being sane, and intending 
to do T malicious damage, the act is tainted and the sons 
are free. But is this accepted Hindu philosophy?
If we go back to our Sanskrit sources and our attempted 
reconstruction of the juridical and philosophical theory on 
which they were based, we reco]lect that the mlmamsa concept 
that a m a n ’s issue, etc., are not tainted with his crimes or
unrighteous behaviour, on the principle that a man's own karma
must be worked out by him, so that it is only his just debts 
which burden his sons, etc., is responsible for the character­
istic dharmasastra position on our subject. We recollect,
however, that the mlmamsa position was not de facto paramount
I 1
in Hindu society. Manu's text gives examples of the other
view, namely that dharma and adharma are, as A t  were, assets
and liabilities which can be shared, and perhaps will be
shared. Inscriptions again and again assure us that those
who divert or confiscate charities will afflict with sin past
and future generations. Hence the Hindu public has not been
faithful to the mlmamsa concept: there was no reason why it
should be. Mlmamsa is one of the intellectual sources of
dharmasastra, but it is only one of many equally valid
philosophies.
Thus, through the ages, the concept that a man's sons 
must share his demerit has found acceptance de facto. And 
these are aspects of Hinduism which cannot be ignored in the 
law-courts. To impose philosophical notions which the public
1. "Dando hi sumahattejo durdharascakrtatmabhih /
Dharmadvicalitam hanti nrpam eva sabandhavam // 28 //. 
Manu, VII.28. Vide, G.Jha, Manusmrti (with Bhasya of 
Madhatithi) , vo. II, (Cal.1939), p ’.9.
"Punishment, ... destroys the king who has swerved from 
duty, along with his relatives." Vide G.Jha, op.cit., trans., 
vol.Ill, pt.II, (Cal.1924), p.289. According to Medhatithi's 
. commentary, i.e.,
"... sarirena kevalena raja nasyati, yavatputrapautra- 
dyanvayena saha // 28 //;
Vide G.Jha, op.cit., at p.9, i.e., "The King is struck down 
not only physically by himself, but along with his whole 
family of sons and grandsons". Vide G.Jha, trans., op.cit. 
at p. 290.
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do not accept in practice is an error, as was recognised 
in the Supreme Court in the great case concerning payment 
of income-tax by idols (Jogendranath Naskar) therein the 
mlmamsa doctrine was fully enunciated, but rejected as 
inconsistent with received practice.
Ori this footingj fines are indeed tainted, because 
they are listed in the texts and not removed by legislative 
act. But in so far as fathers become indebted by way of 
compensation to their victims, whether the act is criminal 
or not, the Hindu public cannot regard it as moral that the 
sons should escape liability merely on the ground that, as 
Hindus, their fathers' souls should be burdened with the 
adharma, and they themselves should be under no obligation 
to compensate the victim and so liquidate the adharma. This,
in the name of a mlmamsa doctrine, would give Hindus a
1 1 '   \
privilege precisely to burden their ancestors with the full 
effects of an adharmic act. Thus, compensation should never 
be held to be tainted, whether it is awarded under sec. 357 or 
in a civil suit.
This brings us to a procedural question which cannot be 
ignored. Much of the ambiguity of avyavaharika arises from 
the fact that the ancient Hindu judicial procedure, whether 
as reflected in the smrti texts and commentaries or in the 
surviving judicial records (e.g., mahajars in Maharashtra or 
inscriptions elsewhere) did not distinguish in principle 
between a civil or a criminal action, and claims which we 
regard as civil claims and complaints which we regard as 
criminal prosecutions were pursued simultaneously. It is 
a commonplace in the sastra that fines, damages, and court- 
fees were dealt with in the same action. Our own approach 
to the subject is conditioned by two factors. We are aware 
that in the common-law system a tort cannot be pursued while
1. Jogendranath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1089, at p. 1091, c.2, and p. 1092, c.1.
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the crime disclosed bv the case has not been prosecuted, ' 
but the prosecution of the crime does not end the victim's 
claim in tort.z In the ancient Roman law it seems to have
1. Reference may be had in this regard to F.Pollock &
F.W.Maitland, The History of English law, 2nd edn. , vol. la., 
(Cambridge, 1911), pp. 572-573; F.W. Maitland, Equity, 
(Cambridge, 1920), p. 258 ff; see particularly, pp.261-262
H.G. Hanbury,, Modern Equity, 8th edn., (London, 1962), 
pp.298-300; A.K.R. Kiralfy, The English Legal System,
3rd edn., (London, 1960) pp. 12-15; Halsbury's Laws of 
England, 3rd edn., vol. 1, (Lodnon, 1952), pp. 11-13, 
para.16.
2. Halsbury's Laws of England, op.cit., pp.11-12, p a r a . 16;
(cf. Halsbury's Lav/s of England, 3rd edn., Cummulative 
Supplement, (1974), vol.10, para. 548); also see, Rose v. 
Ford, (1 937) 3 All. E.R. .359. Here one Mabel A.Rose was 
fatally injured, (and died after four days) in collision
of a Motor Cycle and a Motor Car, driven by the respondent. 
In this case, at p. 371, Lord Wright said, "In any event, 
whatever the old law may have been, the modern law is 
quite clear that, if the act complained of constitutes a 
felony, the civil remedy is not drowned, but merely 
suspended."
For earlier view reference may be made to Midland 
Insurance Co. v. Smith, (1881) Q.B.D. 561, in which a
insured house was feloniously burnt, but the Insurance 
company had refused to pay on the policy. It was held 
that "the true principle of the common law is that there 
is neither a merger of the civil right nor is it a strict 
condition precedent to such right that there shall have 
been a prosecution of the felon, but that there is a duty 
imposed upon the injured person, not to resort to the 
prosecution of his private suit to the neglect and 
exclusion of the vindication of the public law." 
per Watkin Williams, J. at p. 568.
Cf. Smith v. Selwyn, (1914) 3 K.B.D. 98, where it was 
held that an action for damages based upon a felonious 
act committed against the plaintiff by the defendant is not 
maintainable until the latter has been prosecuted or a 
reasonable excuse has been given why a prosecution has 
not taken place, and the duty of the court in such a 
case is to stay the proceedings in the action until 
the defendant has been prosecuted.
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been understood.- as in India, that both aspects of a complaint 
could be pursued concurrently, at least in theory. In later 
Roman law there were several distinctions, turning upon the 
type of action, the chapter (as it were) of law under which 
the claim was brought. The Hindu concept that a debt was 
tainted, irrespective of whether we should define the action 
as a crime or not, is thus intelligible against the earliest 
and not the. developed stages of Roman lav/. Western civil 
laws continued to develop the principle that criminal and 
civil rights could not be pursued in the same action, though 
the choice of first remedy might interfere with the opportunity 
to pursue an alternative. On this subject there were many 
views, and much obscurity, leading eventually to our present 
common-law solution, amongst others. The latest discussion 
of this area of legal history does not concern us in detail 
(H. Chalmers, 'The concurrence of criminal and civil actions 
in mediaeval law', Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris 39, 
1973, 385-424) but it alerts us to the unreality of the 
hypothesis stated above, namely, that if the action from which 
the debt arose is criminal the sons cannot be made to pay, 
whereas if it is civil they may be liable. The sastra was 
developed in an environment in which such distinctions would 
have been unintelligible.
In view of the above, therefore, we may be correct in 
saying that a debt such as, for example, that due to mis­
appropriation, which neither the sastras nor a sastric Court 
would have considered as an avyavaharika debt, should not have 
been considered so, in the first place, by the modern Courts.
However, in order to improve upon the present anomalous legal
1position; the suggestion that sons should not be allowed to
2
plead, under the law of unjust enrichment, that a debt was
1. Per J.D.M. Derrett, C .M .H .L ., cited above, p. 106.
2. Ibid., f.n.7 there. Besides the references given there, see
' also, (1955) 71 Law Quarterly Review, 254: 'In Pari Delicto
Potior Est Conditio Defendentis' by J .K .Grodecki. The
writer's views on 'unjust enrichment' as appeared on pp. 
266-267, would seem, by analogy, to support this proposition. 
Also see, R.Goff and G.Jones, The Law of Restitution,
(London, 1966), pp. 125 ff, particularly pp. 304-305.
397
tainted, when, in fact, it was utilized for meeting legitimate 
purposes of the family, might well be accepted; for it would 
deprive the sons of free enjoyment of such ill-gotten wealth 
by their father, and would make them liable for it. Even 
the sastric point of view on the subject would seem to support 
the propositon.
Now speaking about the section as a whole, the cases 
involving mesne profits, criminal or civil misappropriation 
pose a peculiar problem: in these cases, as we have seen
above, where the father's liability arose out of certain 
objectionable acts of his, if we go by the rule that the 
nature of the act of the father would determine the nature 
of the liability, then, in such cases, the son might stand to 
gain out of his father's certain wrongs or crimes which were 
inherent in the act concerned. This is likely to encourage 
such unlawful and immoral activity - quite contrary to the 
wishes of the law-givers - and the Hindu law would be utilized 
to protect the gains of such illegal and immoral activity 
of a Hindu father.
In view of this apparent anomaly, and in order to avoid 
injustice being done, the above rule may be amended to the 
effect that both the nature of the father's act and his 
intention in doing the act should be looked into for the 
purpose of determining the nature of the ensuing liability, 
and if both or at least the latter was found to be immoral or 
unrighteous, the. son should be exempted, otherwise he should 
be held liable to pay such debts of the father (seen above 
pp. 225-241 ) .
In the present circumstances, therefore, a choice must 
be made by the Supreme Court between two abundantly documented 
viewpoints: (a) where the father becomes a debtor at the
moment of a grossly immoral or illegal act, the sons are 
not liable even where an innocent third party is put to loss - 
and this could happen even in Equity, (for example, see
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Kennedy v. Green, discussed below at pp„413 - 415 )? - and 
the sons may indirectly benefit financiJaiiy by the act; 
and:(b) where the father's illegality, immorality or crime 
succeeds) even momentarily, his civil indebtedness, the 
sons are liable and the third party may be compensated at 
their expense.
The whole problem can only be solved by asking two 
questions: what is the orthodox Hindu scriptural teaching
on sons’ liability to make good their father's debts? and 
(b) does this still apply under modern social, economic and 
legal conditions?
V I .3.3 CASES ON TIME-BARRED DEBTS
In view of the sastric provisions,-* which were based
on spiritual and moral grounds, and according to which, not
only the debtor, but also his sons, grandsons and great-
grandsons were liable to pay a debt, there was hardly any
2scope for prescribing any period of limitation so far as 
recovery of debts was concerned. However, the enactment of
3
the Indian Limitation Act would seem to have led to some odd 
doubts as to (a) whether a time-barred debt of the father 
would bind his sons, and (b) whether a renewal by the father 
of such time-barred debts could be called avyavaharika.
It seems that time-barred debts were considered avyavaharika 
in the sense that their revival was not a family necessity 
in as much as it was against the interest of the family.
1. Mit. on Yajn. 11.50, etc.; see above, p.34; and 31 for 
similar views of the other sastrakaras; P.V.Kane, H .P h . , 
vol.Ill, cit. above, p.408.
2. For an exception, see Kaundinya (or Kuutilya?) quoted in 
Vyavahara-Matryrka; vide P.V.Kane, op.cit., at p.409, f.n. 
656. * ,
3. Since it was first enacted in 1859 (Act XIV of 1859) as 
repealed by Act (XV of 1877) Act (IX of 1908); and the new 
Indian Limitation Act of 1963. For its introduction and 
early development, see T.B. Sapru, ed., Encyclopaedia of 
General Acts and Codes of India, pp. 245-246.
3 99
The answer to both these questions was given in the 
case of Narayanasami v . Samidas Mudali {1883) in the 
following words:
"The fact that the debt was barred by the 
, Act. of Limitation did not affect the existence 
.of the debt, and there was nothing illegal or 
immoral in the action of the father in promising 
to pay it. The new note operated as a renewal 
of the obligation. It was a good debt and the 
son is bound to pay it from any assets of his 
father."2
Thus, the effect of the Act was to debar the creditor's remedy, 
but if the father renewed his barred debt, it was neither 
illegal nor immoral and was binding on the son. The father 
had renewed his barred-debt in this case, but what if the 
father had not renewed such a debt of his and died?
3
In the case of Hiralal Marwari v. Chandfabali Haldarin 
(1908) a surety liability of the father, which was not followed 
within the period of time allowed, was held to be not binding 
on the son, on the ground that the remedy against the personal 
liability of the father was lost, and therefore the creditor 
could not pursue his claim against the son. For the remedy 
which was not available against the father could not avail 
against his son or his family property.
4
In the case of Subramania Alyar v. Gopala Aiyar (1909) 
the liability of the father arose out of his failure to collect 
certain rents (due to a temple of which he was a trustee), 
which were lost to the temple because the father had allowed 
them to become barred. After the father's death his sons were 
sued for the recovery of the amount in question.
In this case the sons were held to be not liable to pay 
the debt of the father which was barred against him. However, 
the debt, the recovery of which was barred by limitation, 
was held to be not extinguished and that the debtor was not,
1. (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 293.
2. Ibid., at p. 294.
3. (1908) 13 C.W.N. 9.
4. (1910) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 308.
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by reason of the bar of limitation, discharged therefrom.
In this regard the Court observed,
* "There is hardly any room for doubt in the
face of the express language of the section 28 
of the Indian Limitation Act, XV of 1877, which 
merely extinguishes the right to property when 
the period is determined for suits for recovery 
of such property. Whenever personal actions 
are barred, the rights themselves are not 
extinguised. That the principal debtor is not 
discharged by lapse of time may also be gathered 
from section 25, clause 3, and section 60 of the 
Indian Contract Act, IV of 1872. A barred debt 
is a good foundation for a written promise to pay 
signed by the party liable to be charged therewith.
It is impossible to regard a debt as discharged 
by limitation when section 60 of the Indian 
Contract Act, speaks of a barred debt as a lawful 
debt, actually due and payable to the creditor.
Unless the law of the limitation operates as well 
as a law of extinctive prescription, omission 
to sue cannot discharge the debtor. ' Limitation 
which merely bars the remedy is never spoken of 
in works of Jurisprudence as a mode of discharging 
an obligation."1
If this were the case then in view of Hindu law how 
could the son be relieved of his liability under the doctrine 
of Pious Obligation? In connection with the Pious Obligation, 
it was observed, obiter, "The Hindu Law makes no difference
2
between a time-barred debt and a debt which is not so barred.'1 
However, the statutary provision would, in effect, amount 
to relieving the son despite the fact that his father's debt 
would still be in existence. In view of this decision, 
therefore, it may be said that
"a further restriction has now been introduced 
by the law of limitation. A son is not liable 
for the payment of a debt due by his father, 
if it was not legally recoverable from him had
1. Ibid., at pp. 310-311.
2. See Sheo Ram Pande v. Sheo Ratan Pande (1921), 63 I.C. 279,
at p. 28o, c.1. In this case a mother succeeded to son's 
property and had alienated it to pay her husband's debts 
which were time-barred, and which were not charged on the 
property. Held that the alienation was not binding.
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he been alive."
Thus, due to the operation of the Act, a situation seems 
to have arisen in which, because the creditor would be barred 
f3om pursuing his remedy, the Hindu father as well as his 
sons might well be encouraged in such a situation to disregard 
their spiritual, moral and legal duty to repay all just debts.
However, as regards the validity and nature of the
revived time-barred debt of the father, there arose certain
differences of opinion even within the same High Court, for
2example, in Indar Singh v. Sarju Singh (1911) and Dalip Sinqh
3
v. Kundan Lai (1913), the Allahabad High Court held that
the father could not legally revive a time-barred debt and
bind tl^ e family property to secure its repayment, for to
revive;a time-barred debt was not a family necessity in-as-much
as it was against the interest of the family'to revive such 
4
debts. Clearly the law contemplated here is Hindu law. 
However, it would seem to have been construed in contravention 
of its spirit. For, to construe a renewal of a just debt, 
even if it was time-barred, as against the interest of the 
family, would seem to go against the most fundamental principle
1. See Gajadhar v. Jagannath (1924), 8o I.C.684 (F.B.), at 
687, c.1. This case raised the question whether a time- 
barred debt can constitute antecedent debt for the purpose 
of supporting an alienation by the father of a joint Hindu 
family. (Also see below p. 4o2).
Also see "The pious obligation of the son does not extend 
to the payment of his father's time-barred debts. If 
the debts could not have been enforced against the father, 
were he alive, the son is not bound." per Dowson Miller,
C.J., see Achutanand Jha v. Surajnarain J h a , (1926) I.L.R.
5 Pat. 746, at pp. 753-754. In this case, elder brother's 
alienation of ancestral property made in connection with 
a mortgage-deed, executed by his father to secure his 
personal debt, was challenged on the ground of lack of 
necessity. The father's personal debt was time-barred at 
the time of the elder brother's alienation. The Court 
upheld the alienation on the basis of the mortgage.
2. (1911) 8 A .L .J . 1099.
3. (1913) 11 A.L.J. 244.
4. Ibid., see pp.246-247. The decision in Naro Gopal v.Paragonda
(1917) 19 Bom. L.R. 69 is on the similar line where an adult
son was not held liable for the father's alienation in 
respect of his time-barred debts.
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of Hindu .law: the father' s just debt must be repaid at the 
cost of the family estate. But these decisions were not
1
followed in Ram KishanRai v. Chhedi Rai ' (1 922), where,
following Narayanasami * s case, such alienation of the father
was considered to be legal and binding on the son after his
death. This conflict of decisions was resolved by the Full
2
•Bench in Gajadhar v. Jagannath (1924). The first two 
decisions were overruled, and the third was approved after 
a thorough discussion of the case-law on the subject. The 
Court held,
"A promise to pay a barred debt is in fact neither 
illegal nor immoral and a son cannot escape 
liability merely because the debt which his father 
had agreed in writing to pay, was one, the payment 
of which he could have legally avoided."3
Moreover, it went on to lay down that "A debt revived by the 
father cannot be regarded as an avyavaharika debt, or a debt 
not recognized by law or usage either under Hindu law or
4
under the law now in force."
This decision has since been followed in Jagdambika
5 6Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh (1930), Parmanand v. Gurprasad
7
(1935) and Gangadhar Patra v. Dolgovinda Sahu (1956) and 
there appears to be hardly any doubt now as regards the nature 
of a revived time-barred debt of the father.
In conclusion it may be said that although a debt of 
the father might become irrecoverable under the law now in 
force by reason of the lapse of the period of limitation, the
1. (1922) 68 I.A. 235.
2. (1924) 80 I.C. 684, (F.B.)
3. Per Kanhaiya Lai, J . , ibid., at p.688, c.1.
4. Ibid., at c .2.
5. (1930) I.L.R. 9 Pat. 843, at p. 849.
6. (1935) I.L.R. 11 Luck. 393, at p. 395.
7. A.I.R. 1956 Or. 193, in c.2. The material facts of these 
three cases were similar, and the debts were held to be 
binding on the sons.
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debt would exist all the same. But; the creditor would not
be able to call upon the son's pious obligation unless the 
-1
fahter revived1 his time-barred debt. Once revived, the 
debt would be binding on the son because mere renewal could 
not make a just debt into an avyavaharika debt.
VI.4 MODERN UNCERTAINTIES-CONCERNING THE CONCEPT
_  K
OF AVYAVAHARIJA DEBTS
The above discussion of the case-law concerning the
definition and scope of the concept of avyavaharika has
abundantly exposed the fact that in spite of their efforts,
the modern Courts have failed to ascertain or arrive at the
law on the subject. This is evident from the fact that,
even after a number of attempts made at defining the term
avyavaharika by the High Courts, the Supreme'Court and the
2Privy Council, the exercise is still on. As regards its 
scope the position appears to be even worse in that, on the 
one hand, they have refused to treat certain debts of the 
father as avyavaharika which according to the sastras would 
seem to have been so treated, (see above p. 308 ff), but on 
the other hand, they have introduced new categories which 
the sastras or orthodox Hindu Courts would not have considered 
avyavaharika debts, i.e., criminal or civil misappropriation 
(see above pp.390-397).
Moreover, as the socio-economic structure of the society 
has undergone a considerable change, the ideas as to what 
constitutes an avyavaharika act or a tainted debt seem to
1. "The exception in favour of debts revived by the father
... are really exceptions proving the rule." J.D.M.Derrett, 
'India Pietas', cit.above, at p. 57; see also f.n. 52 
there, for the reasoning behind the rule.
2. See for example, M.Veera Raghaviah v.M.China Veeriah,
A.I.R. 1975 A.P. 350, at p.355; also see above f.n.1
at p. 254; Sridharan v. Murthi Brothers, ( 1 976) 1 M.L.J.loo 
at p. 102.
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have been affected 1:0 0 . Though welcome, tnese ideas have
a certain unsettling effect upon the law; for, according
to them, 'gambling' debts could not be construed as being
of the same nature as the debts due to 'speculation in stocks 
1and shares', as the latter has become cne of the legitimate
ways of earning one's living; or, the actions of managing
directors of modern institutions such as banks and cooperative
societies could hardly be viewTed without reference to many
technicalities and complex laws which govern the working
2
of such institutions. However, the Courts have not devisee 
•a clear-cut method or laid down any principles by which the 
actions concerned could be properly judged, and therefore 
a certain amount of ambiguity has been injected into or at 
least suffered in the law concerning avyavaharika debts.
In addition, the mental attitude of the'judges in 
dealing with the cases on the subject, the difference between 
the ancient Hindu juridical rules and the modern rules of 
procedure (see above pp.394-396), the difference of opinion 
existing among the Courts as regards the degree of evidence 
required for the purpose of determining whether or not a 
particular debt is 'tainted', may be mentioned as sources 
contributory to modern uncertainty concerning the concept of 
avyavahar ika.
Finally, misapplication or undue extention of judicial 
rules designed to ascertain and stabilise the law, such 
as 'precedents', 'stare decicis' etc., have instead led, 
it seems, to the present confusion. The decision in Luhar
3
Amritlal v. Doshl Jayantilal may be cited as an example or 
this.
1. Doshi Jayantilal v. Luhar Amritlal, A.I.R. 1954, Saurashtra 
36, at p. 38, c.1.; also see above pp.322-23; Gulabchand 
Jethabhai v. Vadilal Sarabhai, A.I.R. 1950 Kutch 78, at
p. 79, c.2; also see above pp.321-22.
2’. Jakati v. Borkar, A.I.R. 1 959 S.C. 282, at p.286, c.2; 
also see above pp.382-83.
3. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 964
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The Supreme Court's decision amounts to this: that
sons are not liable to pay their father's avyavaharika debt,^
but.where ancestral property has been alienated to pay an
antecedent debt of their father, the sons who challenge
the alienation have to prove not only that the antecedent
debt was immoral but also that the alienee had notice that
•)
it was so tainted.^ In this case the debt was found to be 
tainted, but because the sons could not prove the alienee's 
knowledge of the taint, the decision went against them.
Apparently this is contrary to Hindu law, and cannot be 
defended under the doctrine of pious obligation. For, accord­
ing to Hindu law - the sastras - the son is not liable if 
the father's debt is avyavaharika; and not if his creditor 
or alienee knew that it was avyavaharika. Why then should the 
Supreme Court uphold such a -rule and thereby subject the son 
to the additional burden of proof? We shall deal with this 
problem in the following chapter. Suffice it to say here 
that the rule has reference to the doctrine of 'bona fide 
lender or purchaser', and therefore the Supreme Court felt
obliged to hold so, in view of 'precedents' and the rule of
3
'stare decisis'. It should be noted that the doctrine was
4
picked up straight from the English law of trusts and introduced 
to Hindu law by the Privy Council in the case of Hanoomanpersaud
5
Panday; and holding the son liable under this rule alone, 
particularly when the debt was 'tainted', would seem to confuse 
the already unsettled legal position of the doctrine avyavaharika
1. Ibid., at p. 966, c.2.
2. Ibid., at p. 971, c.2.
3. Ibid., at pp. 970-71; also see, J.D.M.Derrett, at (1964)
10 Lucknow Law Journal, cit.above, at p.2.
4. J.D.M. Derrett, C .M . H .L ., cited above, p. 427. Also see 
above, pp.198-99.
5. (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393, at p. 423
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Admittedly a certain amount of flexibility is implicit
in the concept of avyavaharika, because it is intended to
be of general application to various sets of facts. However,
in conclusion, it must be stated that the Supreme Court's
ruling makes still more deplorable the degree of uncertainty
1regarding the limits of 'taint'.
However, before suggesting our remedies, we must invest­
igate in some detail the question of notice of taint, and 
see whether or not the son should be burdened with the onus 
of proving the creditor's, etc., knowledge in order to escape 
his liability under Hindu law.
1. J.D.M. Derrett, I .M .H .L ., cited above, p. 313, sec. 508.
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THE QUESTION OF 'NOTICE OF TAINT:
VII.1 General s
VII.2 The Origin of the doctrine of 'Notice'
VII.3 Its meaning and scope
(i) Actual notice
(ii) Constructive notice
VII.4 Its proper place in Modern Hindu Law
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VII.1 GENERAL
We have already referred above (see p. 200) to the
doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice of
defects in the alienor's powers, and also have noticed that
this doctrine was taken straight from the English law of
2
trusts and introduced to Hindu law by the Privy Council. 
Obviously, with the entry of this doctrine, the doctrine 
of notice entered into Hindu law, for it is part and parcel 
of the former. We might be in better position to ascertain 
its proper place in modern Hindu law if we investigate, in
I
short, its origin, meaning and scope as it was understood
in the!English law of trusts at the time of its entry into
i
Hindu law, that is c. 1856.
VII. 2 THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF NOTICE
It may be said with some accuracy in respect of the 
genesis of the doctrine of notice that the Roman Civil law 
contained germs of the doctrine. For it is there, it is 
stated, that a creditor, who knowingly or dishonestly allowed 
his debtor to sell the property which was mortgaged to him,
3
would be deprived of his pledge. However, this result was 
not possible unless the purchaser proved that there were 
circumstances showing that the creditor knew what was happening 
in respect of his pledge, and acted disingenuously and dis-
4
honestly while the alienation took place.
1. J.D.M. Derrett, C .M .H .L ., cit.above, at p.427.
2. In the case of Hanoomanpersaud Panday, (1856) 6 M.I.A.393,
at p. 423; also see above p. 200, f.n.1.
3. J. Domat, The Civil Law in its natural order, Book III,
tit.1, sec. 1, art. 33; vide W.Strahan, trans.; vol.I, 
(Boston, 1850), pp.661-62.
4'. J. Domat, o p . c i t . ,Bk.III, tit. 1, s. 7, art. 15; and the
translator's note, pp. 704-06; also see, J.Story, cit.above, 
at pp. 254-55.
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Now, IV.S. Holdsworth has, in his History of English law, 
“1
shown how reception of Roman law occurred during the 16t.h 
and ,17th centuries. Concerning the rule that the former 
owner cannot recover at all from the bona fide purchaser, 
he has stated that
"The canonist view of the importance of good 
faith, which did so much for the development 
of commercial contracts, led to the adoption 
of the rule that it was only the bona fide 
purchaser market who could claim this
privilege."
Thus, it would appear that the doctrine was initially 
received on considerations of good conscience, or, as we say, 
'justice, equity and good conscience1. By 1628 the Star 
Chamber, in order to prevent frauds upon creditors and 
purchasers declared,
"that if any man do make conveyances of his land, 
or acknowledge Statutes or Recognizances or suffer 
judgements, whether the same be upon just and 
good consideration or without, and concealing the 
same do afterwards for valuable consideration 
convey the same lands to other persons, as though 
the same were free from any manner of incumbrance; 
such double, and unjust dealing is a notorious 
fraud and deceit against the law of the realm, 
and fit for censure of this court; and albeit 
such former conveyances and incumbrances, if they 
be upon good consideration and bona fide, cannot 
be avoided; yet this court will upon complaint 
punish the offenders and their confederates by 
imprisonment, fine and damages to the party 
grieved, to the full of his loss and hinderances 
; and otherwise, as the cause shall require.
1. W.S.Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol.IV, (London, 1923), 
pp. 228 ff; see particularly pp. 239 and 245.
2. Ibid., vol.V, (London, 1924), p.99; cf. Good faith or
"Bona fides is not identical with the modern ' good faith1... 
although it served as a model for this. Mala fides was in most 
cases present when the acquirer knew the facts which hindered his 
acquiring ownership, e.g., the non-ownership of the transferor." 
Vide M.Kaser's translation, cit.above, at p.107.
31 Ibid., at p.213; cf. Roman law in respect of 'Fraud on creditors', 
vide, M. Kaser, cit.above, at p.52 where transactions made in good 
faith etc. are dealt with in brief.
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In justice, protection from fraud and deceit for 
bona fide creditor or alienee of the debtor was necessary, 
a n d rthe application of the rule to such cases would seem 
to be a just and. logical extension.
In the course of professional development of English 
law, equity would seem to have recognised new forms of
1
property, which led it to treat as property, it is stated, 
not only such things as the rights of the cestui que trust 
to the trust property, and rights to stock and shares, but 
also rights under a contract or covenant. These were compend­
iously called choses in action. Anything which the common 
lawyers refused to treat as assignable property was grouped 
by them under this general description; and thus it included 
many diverse things for which equity was beginning to lay 
down different rules. * v
"In particular, equity was beginning to lay down 
some definite rules for the assignment of rights 
under a contract. It would assist an assignee, 
provided he had given consideration; but he took 
subject to equities; and the debtor could safely 
pay the assignor till he had had notice of the 
assignment. From the first the question whether 
a man had had notice was of vital importance in 
many different branches of equity. And it is 
natural that this should be so. Equity acted 
in personam, and interfered to make the person 
do what he conscientiously ought to do. Hence 
it could not interfere with a person who had got 
a legal title for value and without notice of any 
equitable claim to the property. Naturally the 
question what could be regarded as notice soon 
became important; and by the end of this period, 
equity was elaborating rules as to constructive 
notice. In the particular case of an assignment 
of a right under a contract, it was clearly 
impossible to expect a debtor to pay any other 
than the original creditor, unless he had had notice 
of the assignment. And thus, in this connection, 
notice becomes all important, not as a step in the 
title of the assignee, but as a necessary security 
that the thing he has got will not be destroyed  ^
by a payment made by the debtor to the assignor."
1. W . S .Holdsworth, opp.cit., vol.VI, (London, 1924), p.667.
2. Ibid., pp.667-68.
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Thus it is clear from the above that even if the genesis 
of the doctrine of notice could be traced back to Roman 
Civil Law, the doctrine, as we know it, was developed by 
the English law of Equity, and therefore, so far as we are 
concerned, it originated in equity.
VII,3 ITS MEANING AND SCOPE
As explained above, Equity interfered to make a person 
do what he conscientiously ought to do, and therefore, it 
could not interfere with a person who had got a legal title 
for value and without notice of any equitable claim to the 
property. However, in order to determine whether an alienee 
was bona fide, it was necessary to ascertain what constituted 
notice.
Notice is either actual or constructive, though there
2
is no difference between them in its consequences.
(1) Actual notice is actual knowledge of the facts, 
but to be a binding notice, it must be given by a person
3
interested in the property, during the treaty for the purpose. 
In other words, vague rumours from persons not interested in 
the property will not affect the purchaser's conscience; nor
1. Also, see "The want of notice, too, on the part of the 
purchasers, is a considerable circumstance in their favour." 
Vide, R.Burn, The Ecclesiastical L a w , (8th e d n .; 1824), 
vol.IV, p.330.
2. "There is no difference between personal and constructive 
notice in its consequences," (except as to guilt), per 
Lord Northington, the Chancellor; in Sheldon v. C o x ,
(1764), Amb. 624, at p. 626. (In this case, the barrister 
employed knew the facts of the case, and it was held that 
notice to agent affects his principal.) Also, see
E. Sugden, The Law of Vendors and Purchasers of Estates,
14th edn., (London, 1862), p.755.
3. Ibid., also, see G. Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, vol.2, 
(Lon., 1 849), p. 753.
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will he be bound by notice in a previous transaction which
he may have forgotten. The notice to the purchaser must
therefore be in the same transaction; and a notice, in
order to be binding, must proceed from some person interested
in the property. Thus, by actual notice, knowledge cf the
1facts is brought directly home to the party.
(ii) Constructive notice: It has been said that
'Constructive notice assumes that no proof is 
given that the party had actual notice of the 
fact itself; but that he is affected with 
notice of the fact by construction of lav.7: 
the Court does not proceed upon the principle, 
that the facts proved must be taken as showing 
that the party actually had notice; there 
may be conclusive evidence that he had not; 
yet if his want of knowledge arises from 
negligence he will be equally affected as 
if he had actually had notice."
In this regard, it has also been said that there may be cases 
in which (i) the party is fixed with having himself had notice 
of a particular fact, from the facts of which he is proved 
to have bad knowledge, or (ii) there may be circumstances
in which he is considered as bound by the knowledge which
3 .
his attorney or agent may have acquired. In the context of
these principles the Courts would seem to have construed the 
doctrine of constructive notice.
4
Thus, in Plumb v. Fluitt (1791) title-deeds were 
deposited as security for money with a creditor of the 
mortgagor; the defendant, another creditor of the mortgagor, 
fearing his immediate insolvency, took a conveyance of the 
same premises, without notice of the incumbrance. The mortgagor 
had excused himself for noc bringing title-deeds to the 
defendant on a couple of occasions previous to execution of
1. J.Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, 2nd English 
edn., (London, 1892), p.258.
2. G.Spence, op.cit., p.754; for further details reference 
may be made to E.Sugden, op.cit., pp.755-784.
3. G.Spence, op.cit., p.754.
4. (1791) 2 Anst. 432.
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the mortgage, and only after the execution had told the son 
of the defendant chat the deeds were deposited as a security 
for debts. To succeed, the plaintiff had to prove actual 
or constructive notice of the deposit in the defendant. It 
was in this context that Eyre, C.B., said, "Constructive 
notice X Cake to be in its nature no more than evidence of 
notice, the presumptions of which are so violent that the
i
Court will not allow even of its being controverted."
What he meant by this definition appears to be this: that
where the party has possession or knowledge of a deed under
which he claims his title, and it recites another deed which
shows a title in some other person; there the Court will
presume him to have notice of the contents of the latter
deed, and therefore will not permit him to introduce evidence
2
to disprove it.
We find perhaps a better exposition of this doctrine in
3the judgement of Brougham, L.C., in Kennedy v. Green (1834). 
Here, an attorney upon a fraudulent pretence procured an 
assignment from his client of a mortgage which he had obtained 
for her and subsequently made a mortgage of the property to 
an innocent party, and acted (so it was decided by the Court) 
as solicitor for the mortgagee, who had no other solicitor.
The Master of the Rolls had held that the knowledge of the 
solicitor of the fraud, which he himself had committed, as
1. Ibid., at p. 438. This definition has been quoted with 
approval in E.Sugden, op.cit., at p. 755; J.Story, op.cit., 
at pi 253; G. Spence, op. cit.., at p. 755. In this case the 
decision went in favour of the defendant, for in the opinion 
of the court the facts proved amounted to no more than 
evidence of showing that there was reason for further 
inquiry; but which could not be construed as fraud, or 
gross and voluntary negligance on the part of the defendant 
(see, ibid., pp.439-440).
2. Ibid., at p.438; also see J.Storey, op.cit., pp.258-259.
Also, see, Mertins v.Jolliffe, (1756) Amb.311, at p.314, 
where it was held that "And so it is in all cases where the 
purchaser cannot make out a title but by a deed; which leads
, him to another fact: the purchaser shall not be a purchaser 
without notice of that fact, but shall be presumed cognizant 
of it; for it is crassa negligentia that he sought not after 
it." Hewitt v.Loosemore, (1851) 3 Hare, 339, at pp.455-56, 
was to the same effect. The case is discussed below, see p.419.
3. (1834) 3 M y l . & K e e . 699, at p. 719.
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much affected the mortgagee as if the solicitor had acquired 
that knowledge from a third person, but the Lord Chancellor 
decided otherwise. It was in the course of this judgement 
that his Lordship said,
■ "The doctrine of constructive notice depends 
upon two consi.derations: first, that certain
things existing in the relation or the conduct 
of parties, or in the case between them, beget 
a presumption so strong of actual knowledge that 
the law holds the knowledge to exist; because 
it is highly improbable it should not; and next, 
that policy and safety of the public forbids a 
person to deny knowledge while he is so dealing 
as to keep himself ignorant, or so as that he may 
keep himself ignorant, and yet all the while let 
his agent know, and himself, perhaps, profit by 
that knowledge. In such a case it would be most iniquitious 
and most dangerous, and give shelter and encourage­
ment to all kinds of fraud, were the Law not to 
consider the knowle'dge of one as common to both, 
whether it be so in fact or not. Under one 
or other of these heads, perhaps under both, 
comes the other principle, which is quite undeniable, 
that whatever is notice enough to excite attention, 
and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry, 
is also notice of everything to which it is after­
wards found that such inquiry might have led, 
although^all was unknown for want of the investig­
ation. " (My emphasis).
The term 'whatever1 in this context would seem to mean a 
certain knowledge about the property in dispute, strong 
enough to put the party on inquiry. If so, it has to be 
connected, directly or by inference, with the property in 
dispute, otherwise it could hardly excite attention, or put 
the party on guard so as to make him enquire. In view of the 
facts of the case, and the final decision in this case, this 
construction of the above definition would seem to be justi­
fiable. Thus, it was held that the actual and full knowledge
1. Ibid., at p. 719. Also see "What is sufficent to put the 
party upon an inquiry, is good notice in equity." per Lord 
Chancellor, in Smith v. Low (1739) 1 A t k . 489, at p. 490. 
In this case certain lease, actually proved to be in the 
interest of the infants, was later challenged, but was 
held good.
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possessed by the solicitor of his own fraud must be laid
out of view; and the client, the last mortgagee, was not
to be held cognisant - in law or constructively - of the
fraud merely because the solicitor himself, the contriver
1
and gainer of the transaction, knew it ail w e l l . ' And, as
2
observed by E. Sugden, this seems to be the true rule; 
for, common sense revolts against an assumption that a 
solicitor committing such a fraud would communicate the fact 
to his victim. However, it was further held that the contents 
of the last mortgage and the unusual way in which the receipt 
was endorsed and signed were such as should have led to
3
inquiry and therefore amounted to constructive notice. The 
second mortgagee, as did the first, had completely failed to 
notice the circumstances on the face of the deed. And, though 
both were innocent, one, that is the second mortgagee, was 
made to suffer.
4
It has been observed that according to the definition 
laid down in this case, the doctrine of constructive notice 
appears to be wider than one would have thought from the 
definition given in Plumb v. Fluitt (see above p. 412); for 
in that case though there was evidence to show that there was 
reason for further inquiry, it was held, in view of the facts
5
of the case, that that was insignificant, and hence the 
party was not attached with constructive notice.
1. Kennedy v. Green, op.cit., at p. 720.
2. Op. cit., at pp. 768-769.
3. Kennedy v. Green, op.cit., at p. 721. While commenting upon
this decision, E. Sugden has observed that
"The solicitor committed the fraud upon his first client, and 
she by her negligence in executing the deed without reading it 
or inquiring why her name was to be endorsed by her on the deed, 
enabled him to commit a fraud on the solicitor's second client.
Both were innocent, but one must suffer, and the suffering was 
inflicted on the last mortgagee, who did not notice the circumstances 
on the face of the deed, which had escaped the observation of the 
first mortgagee when she executed the deed in favour of her 
solicitor." 
per E. Sugden, op.cit., at p. 769.
4. J.Story, op.cit., at p. 259.
5. Plumb v. Fluitt, cit.above, at p. 439.
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1
In the case of Jones v. Smith (1841) a restrictive 
construction would seem to have been placed upon this doctrine. 
Here, a party, before advancing money on a mortgage, inquired 
of the mortgager and his wife whether any settlement had been 
made upcn their marriage, and was informed that a settlement 
had been made of the wife's fortune only, and that it did 
•not include the husband's estate which was proposed as the 
security, and he afterwards advanced the mortgage money without 
having seen the settlement or known its contents.
While holding that the mortgagee was not, under the
circumstances, affected with the constructive notice of the
contents of the settlement, or of the fact that the settlement
comprised the husband's estate, Wigram, V.C., said,
"It is, indeed, scarcely possible to declare a priori 
what shall be deemed constructive notice, because, 
unquestionably, that which would not affect one 
man may be abundantly sufficient to affect another.
But I believe I may, with sufficient accuracy 
for my present purpose, and without danger, assert 
that the cases in which constructive notice has 
been established, resolve themselves into two 
classes: First, cases in which the party charged
has had actual notice that the property in dispute 
was, in fact, charged, incumbered or in some way 
affected, and the Court has thereupon bound him 
with constructive notice of facts and instruments, 
to a knowledge of which he would have been led by 
an inquiry after the charge, incumbrance or other 
circumstance affecting the property of which he 
had actual notice; and secondly, cases in which' 
the Court has been satisfied from t h e .evidence 
before it that the party charged had- designedly 
; abstained from inquiry for the very purpose of 
avoiding notice." 2 (My emphasis).
In order to clarify the legal propositions in respect of both
these classes of cases, he further stated that,
"The proposition of law, upon which the former 
class of cases proceeds, is not that the party 
charged had notice of a fact or instrument, which, 
in truth, related to the subject in dispute without
1. (1841) 1 Hare, 43.
2. Ibid., at p. 55.
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his knowing that such was the case, but that he 
had actual notice that it did so relate. The 
proposition of law, upon which the second class 
of cases proceeds, is not that the party charged 
had incautiously neglected to make inquiries, 
but that he had designedly abstained from such 
inquiries, for the purpose of avoiding knowledge 
- a purpose which, if proved, would clearly show 
that he had a suspicion cf the truth, and a 
fraudulent determination not to learn it. If, 
in short, there is not actual notice that the 
property is in some way affected, and no fraudulent 
turning away from a knowledge of facts which the 
res gestae would suggest to a prudent mind; if 
mere want of caution, as distinguished from 
fraudulent and wilful blindness, is all that can 
be imputed to the purchaser - there the doctrine 
j of constructive notice will not apply; there the 
I purchaser will, in equity, be considered, as in ^
■ fact he is, a bona fide purchaser, without notice."
! (My emphasis).
j
This decision was upheld, on appeal, by the Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Lyndhurst. In his opinion, the present case did not 
go beyond this, that a prudent, cautious, and wary person 
would have inquired further. He said that,
"The want of that prudence, caution, and wariness 
is not sufficient, according to the decisions 
and the principles which have hithert02been acted 
on, to affect the party with notice."
The Lord Chancellor was not disposed to extend the doctrine
of constructive notice to such a case as this where it appeared
from the plaintiff's own evidence that the assignee had rea lly
3
believed the representation made to him to be true. However,
it has been observed that, "This doctrine might exclude the
consideration of negligence in the mortgagee in not inquiring
4into the contents of a deed of which he has notice." It may
1. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
2. Jones v. Smith (1843) 1 Phill. 244, at p. 257.
3. Ibid., at pp. 253-254.
4. G.Spence, op.cit., at p. 754, f.n.(b); cf. E.Sugden, op.cit., 
pp.781-784. In fact, Wigram, V.C., has stated that what
he said was 'clearly Sir Edward Sugden's opinion.'
Vide Jones v. Smith, op.cit., at p.56.
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be said that this obsecvation would make sense only if the
1doctrine was intended to be of general application to all 
cases on the subject irrespective of their facts and circum­
stances.
This would net seem to be the case, for, though Knight
Bruce, V.C., - we may note the name, for it was he who had
introduced the doctrine of the bona fide purchaser without
notice into Hindu law - had decided the question of constructive
2notice on similar lines as in Jones v. Smith, his decision 
was overruled by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, in
3
Penny v. Watts ' (1849). Very briefly, the facts were that
one Mr. Watts, who claimed under a marriage settlement as
a purchaser without notice, had notice previous to his marriage 
that a legatee, the wife of the plaintiff, had given up her 
legacy under a will in favour of the intended wife, to whom 
the estate upon which it was charged belonged, and which was 
comprised in the subsequent marriage settlement, and had also 
notice that the intended wife had in consequence devised to 
the legatee a portion of the estate, and that the legatee 
was dead. This was held to be notice, as leading to inquiry, 
of an equitable reversionary title in the husband of the 
legatee under a subsequent agreement with the lady, the devisor, 
before her marriage, to convey the devised estate to him. As 
regards the scope of the doctrine, in the course of his
1. Goinc, by the phrase that 'for my present purpose' used 
by W.1gr:im, V.C., (see above p. 416), this would not seem 
to have been intended.
2. Penny v. Watts, (1848) 2 De G. & Sm. 501. Jones v. Smith 
(1843), Phill. 244, was particularly relied on by the. 
defendant's counsels, who, also said that,
"The tendency of modem decisions is to narrow and not to 
extend the doctrine of constructive notice."
Ibid., at p. 516. How far this influenced the decision is 
not clear. However, the Vice-Chancellor was obviously, 
it seems, unhappy about the reversal of his decision; 
for, he later observed, "that the case, as now decided, 
appeared to him one of the strongest that he remembered 
as to constructive notice." Vide, ibid., (on 19th June,
1850), at p . 525.
3. (1849) 1 Mac. & G. 150, at p. 165.
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judgement the Lord Chancellor said,
"Now, these two facts coming to the knowledge of 
the Defendant, one party giving up a valuable 
pecuniary benefit, and the other in lieu thereof 
devising a certain estate, I think it is not 
! carrying t;he doctrine of the Court further than
it has often been carried to say that, knowing
these facts, he was bound to enquire how these
facts took place, and that, as he knew that the
one party gave up the legacy, and in lieu thereof
the other party had devised the estate, he cannot 
afterwards, if the fact be proved, say that he 
had not that sort of knowledge which will affect 
him with constructive notice of that which, if 
the facts be proved to exist, will show that 
the plaintiff had an equitable title by contract 
to have the devised estates conveyed to him."^
However, in the opinion of E. Sugden, "This seems to carry
2
the principle too far."
However, in Hewitt v. Loosemore  ^ (1851f the Court would 
seem to have reverted back to the view held in Plumb v. Fluitt 
The facts of the case were as follows: A solicitor deposited
a lease with a person as a security with a memorandum, and
four years afterwards assigned the lease to the defendant 
by way of mortgage. The defendant, a farmer, had no notice 
of the previous deposit, and of course he did not obtain 
possession of the lease, but he asked the solicitor, the 
mortgagor, for it, who replied that it should be delivered to 
him, but that as he was rather busy then, he would look for 
it and give it to the defendant when he next came to market.
1. Ibid., at pp. 166-167.
2. Op.cit., at p. 766; cf. G.Spence, op.cit., at p. 754, 
f.n. (b), where he has expressed his hopes to the effect 
that the judgement of Lord Cottenham would have settled 
the point, i.e., if the defendant's want of knowledge 
arises from negligence he will be equally affected as
if he had actually had notice.
3. (1851) 9 Hare, 449.
4 20
In view of the facts, Turner, V.C., held that the 
mortgagee by assignment could not be charged with the money 
secured by the deposit. He further held that as no other 
solicitor was employed, the mortgagor must be considered 
as the solicitor of the mortgagee, but fie did not think 
that the latter was therefore to be considered to have had 
notice of the deposit. For, he said, "Such notice would be 
constructive merely, and constructive notice is knowledge
i
which the Court imputes to a party upon a presumption, so
strong that it cannot be allowed to be rebutted, that the
2knowledge must have been communicated." And he refused to 
act upon such a presumption in the face of the evidence which 
the plaintiff had himself adduced. For, in his view, the 
inquiry made for the lease, and the reasonable excuse given, 
left no ground for imputing suspicion of fraud or gross and 
wilful negligence, and the notice which is consequent upon it.
The controversy as to what degree of negligence would 
constitute constructive notice, or how much negligence would 
be considered enough to impute consequences of a constructive 
notice to the party, as seen from the above decisions, would 
seem to depend upon the significance attached by different 
judges, in the context of the facts of the case concerned, 
to the presumption upon which the doctrine of notice is 
founded.
Thus, as regards the presumption, Wigram, V.C., said,
"A purchaser must be presumed to investigate the title of 
the property he purchases, and may, therefore, be presumed 
to have examined every instrument forming a link, directly 
or by inference, in that title; and that presumption I take to
3
be the foundation of the whole doctrine." What he meant was,
1. As regards what is meant by this presumption see, Wigram's 
observation in West v.Reid (1843) 2 Hare. 249, at pp.260-61 
quoted below.
2. Ibid., at p. 455; also see E. Sugden, op.cit., p. 769.
3. West v. Reid, (1843) 2 Hare, 249, at pp. 260-61. This case 
concerned the benefits arising out of a life insurance 
policy assigned to secure a sum of money owing to the 
assignee etc.
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it seems, that a purchaser might be presumed to have 
investigated every instrument which directly or inferentlally 
formed a link in the title to the property, but not instruments 
which were neither directly nor presumptively connected with 
it, and might only by possibility affect it. This view, 
compared with those of Lord Brougham in Kennedy v. Green 
(see above p. 413), and Lord Cottenham in Penny v. Watts 
(see above p.. 418) . would seem to take a slightly liberal 
view in favour of the purchaser or mortgagee. Both the views 
insist upon presumption of inquiry on the part of the purchaser, 
but when it comes to presumption in respect of pursuing that 
inquiry, one would want it to be pursued so far as it could 
reasonably lead while the other - the liberal view - would 
seem to accommodate some failure in this respect on the part 
of the purchaser, provided, j.n view of the facts of the case 
concerned, there was reasonable excuse to jus'tify such failure 
with respect to further inquiry.
This circumstance would lead, as it obviously has, to 
variation in putting emphasis upon consideration of negligence 
in the process of determining constructive notice or fraud.
Thus, negligence manifested in failure, on the part of 
the second mortgagee in Kenndy v. Green, to notice the unusual 
circumstance cn the face of the deed, was considered to be 
amounting to notice (see above p. 415). However, the other 
school of thought, represented by cases such as Jones v. Smith 
and Plumb v. Flu itt etc. has made distinction on the basis 
of excusable circumstance proved by the plaintiff's own 
evidence coupled with normal behaviour in the context of such 
circumstance of 'a prudent, cautious and wary person' (see 
above pp.415-417). According to the first view such failure 
to inquire would lead to sheltering or even encouraging fraud; 
(see above p. 414) while according to the latter view, such 
insistence upon inquiry would impose unnecessary and impract­
icable conditions in certain cases, leading to unnecessary
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inconvenience 1 in alienations of property; for example,
,:a man, who mortgages a fraction of his estate, 
will thereby throw a cloud upon the title to 
the rest of his estate; and a devise of a single 
acre of land by a will, which does nothing more, 
will throw a cloud upon the title of an heir at 
law to his descended estates; for it is clear 
that neither the mortgagor in the one case nor
the heir in the other can command the production
of the mortgage deed or will: and it is equally
clennr that nothing but the production of the
original itself v.ould be sufficient, if a 
representation such as Smith relied upon be not 
sufficient.
In the context of the facts of the cases concerned both these 
views would seem to be correct, though they could hardly be 
reconciled as general principles on the subject, and therefore 
could only be applicable to appropriate cases.
The Vice-Chancellor Wigram took opportunity in West v.
3
Reid (1843) to discuss the subject at length, and clarify
certain misunderstanding in respect of his own language used
in Jones v. Smith:- "Gross negligence may be evidence of 
mala fides, but it is not the same thing. We have shaken off
4
the last remnant of the contrary doctrine."
He said, "Negligence, as I understand the term, supposes 
a disregard of some fact known to purchaser, which at least 
indicated the existence of that fact, notice of which the
5.
Court imputes to the purchaser." In his view, extreme 
caution may lead a person to inquire after a mere possibility, 
the existence of which he had no ground to surmise; but the 
omission to exercise such caution is not negligence in theg
legal sense of the term, nor, indeed, in any sense. We may
1 . Lord Cranworth, L.C., "believed that the length to which the doctrine
of constructive notice had been extended, had been often productive
of very considerable inconvenience, and had injuriously impeded the 
free transfer of real property." Vide E.Sugden, op.cit., p. 783.
2. Said Wigram,V.C., (while explaining his view in Jones v. Smith,) in 
West v. Reid, op.cit., at p. 260.
3. (1843) 2 Hare, 249; at pp. 257-260.
4. (1841) 1 Hare, 43; at p. 71.
5. West v. Reid, op.cit., at p. 259.
6. Ibid.
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observe that though ordinary diligence or caution has been
expected from the purchaser in other cases such as Kennedy
1 2
v. Green, and Penny v. Watts, none seem to have set the
standard of extreme caution. However, the above definition 
would seem to express the correct view.
As regards the consequences of various degrees of 
negligence, it has been observed,
"There may be a degree of negligence so gross
that a Court of equity will treat it as evidence
of fraud - impute a fraudulent motive to it - 
and visit it with the consequences of fraud, 
although morally speaking the party charged 
may be perfectly innocent;
i
i
but, as observed above, gross negligence is not in all cases 
to be treated as fraud, and these two factors are not to
be treated as the same thing.
Apparently, the Courts were faced with the hardship 
which sometimes arose from the difficulty of drawing the 
nice distinction between cases of fraud and mere cases of 
implied notice.^
1 . (1834) 3 M y l . & K e e . 69 9 .
2. (1849) 1 Mac. & G. 150.
3. G.Spence, op.cit., at p. 755. Also, see Wigram, V.C., 
in West v. Reid, op.cit., pp. 257-258. It may be noted 
that on this point there appears to be no difference of 
opinion among the decisions of Kennedy v. Green and Jones 
v. Smith.
4. Benham v. Keane, (1861) 1 J. & H. 685, at p. 702. This
was a suit by a judgement creditor to establish his
judgement debts as charges upon certain property of his 
debtor, since deceased, and for redemption and foreclosure 
against other incumbrancers. The purchaser from a mortgagee 
of the judgement debtor, taking with notice of a judgement 
which had not been registered as required by law, and 
having the legal estate - held not to be affected by such 
judgement. Also see, West v. Reid, op.cit., p.259:
"I do not deny that difficulty may sometimes arise in 
drawing the line between the degree of negligence," etc.
- per Wigram, V.C.
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However, in these circumstances, it may be noted here 
that by the eighteen fifties opinions were expressed to the 
effect that it was highly inexpedient for Courts of Equity 
to extend the doctrine of constructive notice to cases to 
which it had not hitherto been held applicable. Tn this 
connection the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth, observed,
"Where a person has actual notice of any matter 
of fact, there can be no danger of doing injustice 
if he is held to be bound by all the consequences 
of that which he knows to exist. But where he has 
not actual notice, he ought not to be treated as 
if he had notice, unless the circumstances are such 
as enable the Court to say, not only that he 
might have acquired, but also, that he ought to 
have acquired, the notice with which it is sought 
to affect him that he would have acquired it but 
for his gross negligence in the conduct of the 
business in question. The question, when it is 
sought to affect a purchaser with constructive 
notice, is not whether he had the means of obtaining, 
and might by prudent caution have obtained, the 
knowledge in question, but whether the not obtaining 
it was an act of gross or culpable negligence. It is 
obvious that no definite rule as to what will amount 
to gross or culpable negligence, so as to meet every 
case, can possibly be laid down. 1 ^
The observation concerning limitation on the scope of this
2
doctrine, would seem to have been based on the fear" that
• Ware v. Lord Egmont, (1 854) 4 De G.M. & G. 460, at pp. 4 73-74 .
Also, see, Montefiore v. Browne, (1858) 7 H.L.C. 241, at
p. 269; where Lord Chelmsford, L.C., said, "I do not 
recede at all from what I am reported to have said in the 
case of Ware v. Lord Egmont (4 De G.M. & G. 473), namely, 
that this doctrine of constructive notice ought not to 
be extended. But, at the same time, I said that, in my 
opinion, every purchaser or mortgagee must be considered 
as having notice, not merely if he might have obtained, 
but if he ought to have obtained a knowledge of that 
with which he is to be affected."
2. While commenting on the above case, E. Sugden has said 
"The case shows to what danger a purchaser or mortagee 
is exposed by this doctrine of constructive notice.
, I fear that, if still at the bar, I should have thought
that further inquiry on the part of the mortgagees was
unnecessary."
Op. cit., at p. 779. Also, see f.n.1, at p. 422.
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the insistence upon further inquiry on the part of a purchaser 
or mortgagee, being unnecessary, exposed them to the danger 
of losing their purchase or security. Also, the remarks show 
how little capable the doctrine is of a strict definition.
In conclusion, to sum up the legal position on the 
subject under consideration during the eighteen fifties, 
it may be said that,
"Notice in equity means not only actual notice, 
but also constructive notice. The Court will 
impute to a party knowledge of a fact which he 
would have known had he not avoided the discovery 
of it, or of a fact which he might have known 
had he pursued normal enquiries. When a man is 
in a position to know a fact he is presumed to 
know it and is not allowed to lead evidence to 
the effect that he did not have actual notice 
of it:"1
However, in practice, the Courts would seem to have been 
divided on the question of whether or not a party might be 
fixed with constructive notice in a particular case. It 
all depended, it seems, upon the facts, circumstances and 
intentions of the parties in the dispute before the Court.
Thus, in view of the facts, the Courts would seem to have 
favoured, in certain cases, that the party charged should 
have followed his inquiry so long as the scope for further 
inquiry existed, and was necessary in the eyes of the Courts. 
But, on the other hand, the Courts were reluctant to apply 
that standard in respect of inquiry in those cases, at least, 
where they were satisfied, upon the evidence before them, 
that it was not called for in the interest of justice.
According to the latter view, the question upon constructive 
notice was not whether the purchaser had the means of obtaining, 
and might, by prudent caution, have obtained the knowledge in 
question, but whether not obtaining it was an act of gross 
or culpable negligence: a view, if applied as a general rule,
1. J.D.M. Derrett, at 10 Luck. L .J ., op.cit., at p. 5.
We may note here, that "At common law notice was equated 
with honesty." See, R.Goff & G.Jones, The Law of Restitution, 
(London, 1966), p. 501.
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that would seem to undermine the duty to enquire placed 
upon the alienee who deals with trustees or limited owners 
of property. However, the onus of proving ‘gross or culpable 
negligence' on the part of the defendant, was placed upon 
the plaintiff, as we have seen above (see above p. 421), 
only in those cases where there was evidence, on the one 
hand, to lead the Court to believe that the plaintiff was 
not altogether honest in his dealings with the defendant, 
and that, on the other hand, the defendant made some enquiries 
and either bona fide believed in what the plaintiff told him 
or made enquiries but was completely deceived. It may there­
fore be said that such a rule would apply to only those cases 
which involved, at least, suspected fraud. Of course, the 
party committing fraud or the party who had notice of such 
a fraud was not allowed to t.ake advantage of it. Thus, for
-i
example, in Le Neve v. Le Neve (1748), where the defendant 
had concocted with his attorney a plan for getting rid of 
his marriage settlement, and where his second wife was fixed 
with notice of the same through her solicitor who had acted 
throughout the transaction; Lord Hardwicke, the Lord Chancellor, 
while giving the decree against the defendants, and in order 
to explain the foundation of the doctrine of notice, said,
"The ground of it plainly is this, that the 
taking of a legal estate after notice of 
a prior right, makes a person a mala fide 
purchaser (and not, that he is not a purchaser 
for valuable consideration in every other 
respect); this is a species of fraud, and 
’ dolus malus itself; for he knew the first 
purchaser had the clear right of the estate, 
and after knowing that, he takes away the right^ 
of another person by getting the legal estate."
Thus, fraud or mala fides was, in his opinion, "the true
3
ground on which the Court is governed in the cases of notice."
1. (1748) 3 Atk. 646.
2. Ibid., at pp. 654-655.
3. Ibid.
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hs regards the scope of the doctrine of notice, suffice 
it to say that similar rules existed both in Equity and common
i
law. At common law notice was equated with honesty, and
accordingly, a thing was deemed to be done in good faith
if it was in fact done honestly, irrespective of whether
it was done negligently or not; and therefore, constructive
notice would not prevent the holder of a bill being a holder
2
in due course, provided that he was not in bad faith. This 
apparent distinction between notice at law and in equity would 
seem to have been based on sound principles. As Lindley, L.J., 
observed,
i "The equitable doctrines of constructive notice 
| are common enough when dealing with land and 
! estates, with which the court is familiar;
I but there have been repeated protests against 
I the introduction into commercial transactions
of anything like an extention of these doctrines, 
and the protest is founded on good sense. In 
dealing with estates in land title is everything 
and it can be leisurely investigated; in 
commercial transactions possession is everything, 
and there is no time to investigate title ; and 
if we were to extend the doctrine of constructive 
notice to commercial transactions we should be 
doing infinite mischief and paralysing the trade 
of the country.
As it is not necessary for our present purpose, it may
be sufficient to point out that the doctrine of notice would
4
seem to apply mainly to cases involving proprietary claims; 
and also to transactions involving ’illegal or immoral1
5
contracts, for in such cases, notice of 'taint', due to 
illegality or immorality, plays an important part.
1. "Now, if a person does not stop his hands, but gets the 
legal estate when he knew the right in equity was in 
another, machinatur ad circumveniendum; and it is a maxim 
too in our law, that fraus & dolus nemini patrocinari debent 
Co. 3 Rep. 78 b." Ibid., at p. 655.
2. R.Goff & G.Jones, op.cit., p.501.
3. Manchester Trust v.Furness (1895) 2 Q.B.539, at p. 545.
4. R.Goff & G.Jones, op.cit., pp. 500-502.
5. G.C.Cheshire and C .H .S .Fifoot, The Law of Contract, 4th edn . 
(Lon.,1956), pp.289 ff; Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn. 
(by Lord Simonds) , (Lon., 1 954), vol.8, pt.4, sec . 4 , cl.259, 
at p. 152.
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VJ1 . 4 ITS PROPER PLACE IN MODERN HINDU LAW
Before we begin to assess the proper place of the 
doctrine of notice in modern Hindu law, it is necessary 
to note the basic difference between Equity and Hindu law 
in respect of the nature of the property and the proprietary 
•rights involved concerning the property. In equity, the 
Courts have treated the assets as the debtor, or as a trust 
fund in the sense of an ordinary trust, to be administered 
by the executor for the benefit of all persons wTho are inter­
ested in it, such as legatees, creditors, distributees, etc., 
according to their relative priorities, privileges and equities 
But in Hindu law the ancestral property is, as explained 
above (see chapter I), vested in coparceners, and if the 
family consisted of the father and his sons, for example, they 
all own it equally, and the father's power of alienation of 
such a property is restricted to 'just' purposes as understood 
in Hindu law. Although certain members of the family might 
be entitled to maintenance etc., the question of legatees 
hardly ever arises in Hindu law. And even if the doctrine 
of pious obligation allows the father to encumber his sons' 
interests, that power, too, is subjected to 'his just debts'.
In these circumstances the validity of any encumbrance upon 
such joint family property in general would depend upon the 
nature of the purpose of the father's alienation. There was 
no provision in s'astric Hindu lav; for entertaining equitable 
claims such as understood in the English law of trusts, if 
such claims were outside vyavahara.
Then again, the Courts of Equity do not supersede the 
principles of law upon the same subject; and hence,
"a sale made bona fide by the executor, for a 
valuable consideration, even with notice of 
there being assets, will be held valid, so 
that they cannot be followed by creditors or 
others, into the hands of the purchaser. In
1. J.Story, op.cit., at p. 578.
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this respect, there is a manifest difference 
between the case of an ordinary trust, where 
notice takes away the protection of a bona fide 
purchaser from the party, and this peculiar 
sort of trust, mixed up in some measure with 
general ownership. To affect a sale or other 
transaction of an executor, attempting to bind 
the assets, so as to let in the claim of 
creditors and others, who are principally 
interested,- there must be some fraud, or ^
collusion, or misconduct between the parties."
Perhaps it was this latter kind of trust which might have 
seemed, in the eyes of the Privy Council, to resemble the 
ownership of joint family property in Hindu law. For, as v/ill 
be shown presently, they were dealing with the alienations 
made by a manager - a limited owner - of an infant, and at 
the same time their attention was drawn to a dictum, relied 
on for the purpose of placing onus of proof on the infant 
plaintiff, which was taken from the case in which collusion 
between the father and his sons was alleged. If this is 
correct, then it may be said that the scope of the doctrine 
of notice in the Hindu law of debts, if any, would not go 
beyond the cases involving outright collusion or fraud.
Let us first explain how the Privy Council brought this
/
doctrine into Hindu law. Thus, in Brown v. Ram Kunaee Putt"
(1848) the alienee, who alleged that he had advanced a certain
loan to the guardian of the minors, lost his claim because
in view of the Court he had failed to prove that the m o n e y
was borrowed on account of the minors, and that the same was
appropriated to the payment of alleged decrees to save the
ancestral property of the minors. But in Oomed Rai v. Heera 
3
Lall (1851) the sons appeared to have failed because they 
could not discharge the onus of disproving the charge created
1. Ibid.
2. (1848) 4 S.D.A.R. 791. This was a case in which the 
plaintiff promised to the guardian that he will pay the 
amount to save the ancestral property of the minors, but
in fact he did not do so. Also, he had fraudulently obtained 
the guardian's signature on the bond.
3. (1851) 6 S.D.A. (N.W.P.) 218.
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by their father, once the father's creditor had established
the charge by proving the fact of advance of money to the
1
father. This was a case of suspected collusion between 
the father and his sons.
Relying on the dictum, however, it was argued in
2Hunoomanpersaud Pandy v. Musst. Babooee Munraj Koonweree 
(1856) that if the factum of a deed of charge by a manager 
for an infant was established, and the fact of the advance 
was proved, the presumption of law would be prima facie to 
support the charge, and the onus of disproving it would rest 
on the heir.
After referring to the facts of that case, that is 
Oomed Rai's case, Knight Bruce, L.J., said,
I "Now, it is to be observed that a lender of 
money may reasonably be expected to'prove the 
circumstances connected with his own particular 
loan, but cannot reasonably be expected to know 
or to come prepared with proof of the antecedent 
economy and good conduct of the owner of an 
ancestral estate; whilst the antecedents of 
their father's career would be more likely to 
be in the knowledge of the sons, members of the 
same family, than of a stranger; consequently, 
this dictum may perhaps be supported on the 
general principle that the allegation and proof 
of facts, presumably in his better knowledge, 
is to be looked for from the party who possesses 
that better knowledge, as well as on the obvious 
ground in suits of the danger of collusion 
between father and the sons in fraud of the 
creditor of the former. But this case is of 
; a description wholly different, and the dictum 
does not profess to be a general one, nor is it 
so to be regarded. Their Lordships think that 
the question on whom does the onus of proof lie in 
such suits as the present, is one not capable 
of a general and inflexible answer. The 
presumption proper to be made will vary with 
circumstances, and must be regulated by and 
depend on them. Thus, where the mortgagee
1. For further details, see above pp. 261-62.
2. (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393, at p. 418. For further details, 
see above p.262, f.n.2.
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himself with whom the transaction took place 
is setting up a charge in his favour made by 
one whose title to alienate he necessarily 
, knew to be limited and qualified, he may be
reasonably expected to allege and prove facts 
presumably better known to him than to the 
Infant heir, namely, those facts which embody 
the representations made to him of the alleged 
needs of the estate,^and the motives influencing 
his immediate loan."
This vas not a case of avyavaharika debts, but the 
rule laid down here by the Privy Council later became the 
foundation in respect of the doctrine of onus of proof in 
cases where alienations made by a limited owner were involved. 
According to the Privy Council the rule in respect of fixing 
the onus of proof in such cases was necessarily a flexible 
one, which would vary with circumstances and should be regulated 
by and depend on them. In its view, generally the party 
possessing better knowledge of the facts should be made to 
allege and prove the facts; or in cases of collusion and 
fraud, the burden .of proof should be placed on the fraudulent 
party.
The dictum which led to these propositions came, as we
2
have seen above, from the case in which collusion between 
the father and his sons in fraud of the creditor was suspected. 
The phrase ’in fraud of the creditor’ may be noted here for 
it too comes from the English law of trusts.
Afterwards, while dealing with the powers of the manager 
for an infant heir, the Vice Chancellor, Knight Bruce, observed,
"The power of the Manager for an infant heir to 
charge an estate not his own, is, under the Hindoo 
law, a limited and qualified power. It can only 
be exercised rightly in case of need, or for 
the benefit of the estate. But where, in the 
particular instance, the charge is one that a 
prudent owner would make, in order to benefit the 
estate, the bona fide lender is not affected by 
the precedent mismanagement of the estate. The
1. Ibid., pp. 418-419.
2. Oomed Rai v. Heera Lall, discussed above p.429 ff.
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actual pressure on the estate, the danger to 
be averted, or the benefit to be conferred 
upon it, in the particular instance, is the 
thing to be regarded. But of course, if that 
danger arises or has arisen from any misconduct 
to which the lender is or has been a party, he 
■ cannot take advantage of his own wrong, to 
support a charge in his own favour against the 
heir, grounded on a necessity which his wrong 
has helped to cause. Therefore, the lender 
in this case, unless he is shown to have acted 
mala fide, will not be affected, though it be 
shown that* with better management, the estate 
might have been kept free from debt. Their 
Lordships think that the lender is bound to 
inquire into the necessities for the loan, and 
to satisfy himself as well as he can, with 
reference to the parties with whom he is dealing, 
that the Manager is acting in the particular 
instance for the benefit of the estate. But they 
think that if he does so inquire, and acts 
honestly, the real existence of an alleged 
sufficient and reasonably credited necessity 
is not a condition precedent to the validity 
of his charge, and they do not think that, 
under such circumstances, he is bound to see to 
the application of the money. It is obvious that 
money to be secured on any estate is likely to 
be obtained on easier terms than a loan which 
rests on mere personal security, and that, there­
fore, the mere creation of a charge securing a 
proper debt cannot be viewed as improvident 
management; the purposes for which a loan is 
wanted are often future, as respects the actual 
application, and a lender can rarely have, unless 
he enters on the management, the means of 
controlling and rightly directing the actual 
application. Their Lordships do not think that 
a bona fide creditor should suffer when he has 
;acted honestly and with due caution, but is 
himself deceived."
Now, before going any further, we must note that the 
Privy Council was dealing with the manager's power, and not 
with the avyavaharika debts. Moreover, for these propositions
1. Hunoomanpersau d 's case, op.cit., at pp. 423-424.
i
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1
no authority - Hindu law or otherwise - was cited by 
his Lordship. Had the Privy Council been alerted in respect 
of the Hindu law rule concerning avyavaharika debts, perhaps, 
it would not have laid down these propositions in this 
fashion. .But we cannot blame the Privy Council on this 
account because it was not dealing with such debts.
1. Though one suspects if the Privy Council were thinking 
of similar disputes involving alienations by limited 
owners of the property in English law of trust and equity. 
Speaking particularly of the Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce 
one feels almost sure that he might have been thinking 
of the cases, it seems, such as Stroughill v. Anstey
(1852) 1 De G.M. & G. 635, (see the head note in the 
report); and Firmin v. Pulham (1848) 2 De G. & Sm. 99, 
at p. 101. The former was an appeal from his decision 
and the latter was decided by him. These two cases 
approve of the view that a purchaser or mortgagee is 
not bound to see to the application of the money raised. 
Also, for the similar view see M 1Queen v. Farquhar (1805)
11 Ves. Jun. 467, at p. 479, Eldon, L.C., has said "how 
they (that is vendors)gLls posed of it afterwards as to 
their respective interest was not of any importance to 
him," (i.e., a bona fide purchaser). Also see, E.Sugden, 
op.cit., pp. 779-780.
Concerning the distinction in reference to raising of 
money not apparently for a payment of a charge, between 
the case of a man who is owner as well as trustee, and
that of a man who holds the property merely as a trustee
subject to a charge; and as regards to purchaser's 
conduct while dealing with such parties, see Sbroughill 
v. Anstey, above, pp. 654-6 55. There, the Lord Chancellor, 
Lord St. Leonard, (formerly Sir E, Sugden), has said 
that;people dealing with trustees 'must be considered 
as under some obligation to inquire and to look fai rly 
at what they are," i.e., to see that no breach of trust 
is committed. And also, it may be noted, that the Lord 
Chancellor, while stating the above, was, in his own 
words, "endeavouring to lay down a rule to make them 
(i.e., purchasers and mortgagees) more secure than
perhaps they have hitherto been."
Ibid., at p . 655.
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However, the fact is this, that in the above context
- the powers ot a manager for an infant heir - it introduced
the doctrine of bona fide lender, and said that 'unless
he is shown to have acted mala fide, he will not be affected.1
And it is this terminology which was later relied upon, as
will be shown presently, for the purpose of placing the
additional burden of proof upon Hindu sons to show the
creditor's knowledge of the immoral nature of their father's
debt. The first case which relied extensively on the above
propositions was, it seems, the case of Musst. Junnuk Kishoree
2
Koonwur v. Baboo Rughoonundun Sing (1861). It was alleged 
that the minor son was not bound by his father's various 
alienations of tine joint family property because they were 
avyavaharika. The Court found that all the debts of the 
father were incurred for extravagant spending caused by 
dissipation, but it refused to hold them avyavaharika. In 
spite of this finding, however, all the sales, except those 
which were made under court-auctions, were reversed in favour 
of the son, on the. ground that the purchaser was not a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice. In the opinion of 
the Court,
"The property sold being of a value far beyond 
the amount of decrees; that granting even if
1. For, whatever is said there was in the context of a manager 
only, and nowhere in the whole quotation is there any 
mention, expressly or by implication, of the term 'father' 
or 'father-manager'.
Besides, it is difficult to believe that the Privy Council 
would affirm, first, the rule of Hindu law that the son's 
pious obligation to pay his father's debt depends upon the 
nature of the debt (see above p. 59 or p. 421 of the report); 
and immediately afterwards would lay down, in the same case, 
another rule which would virtually nullify the first one.
In view of the above, it may be said that the proposition 
concerning 1 bona fide lender' was intended to be applied 
only to the alienations made in the capacity of an 'ordinary 
manager' as such, and not by a 'father-manager'. The former 
could bind others only to the extent of the family necessity, 
while the latter, in addition, would bind his sons' inter­
ests for his own vyavaharika debts under the doctrine of 
pious obligation, (see above chapter I).
2. (1861) 1 S.D.A. (L.B.) 213; for further details see above
pp. 262-264.
I
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plaintiff is unable to displace the sales which 
have taken place in execution of judicial 
decrees on the only ground on which a displace­
ment would be legitimate, viz., the immoral 
purpose of the loan patent on the face of the
decrees, still the other sales are liable to
reversal as being made v/ithout any necessity, 
and not only were they made on the part of the 
vendor without any legal necessity under Hindoo 
law, but they have been purchased on the part ' 
of the purchaser without any enquiry and caution 
with a view to seeing that no breach of trust 
was committed, which a party, dealing with a 
person in the position of the plaintiff, a party 
a trustee with a restricted right of sale, should 
have u s ed,1 that considering the position of 
the father and that of the person purchasing, 
j relations in most instances to each other, the
I latter, therefore, cognizant of all the circum­
stances of the family, it was incumbent on them,
I (as laid down in Hunoomanpersaud1s case), to
I prove the facts presumably better known to him
than the infant heir. ... That consequently, 
with exception of the sale made in execution 
of decrees, all the sales should be reversed ^
. as having been without authority under Hindoo law."
(My emphasis).
Apparently, the Court dealt with these sales in view 
of the father's limited power as a manager. Prima facie the
judgement appears to be sound and just, but it - at least the
material portion of it - was not based on any known principle 
of Hindu law. If the debts were not avyavaharika, then, 
according to Hindu law, the son was clearly liable. True, 
the alienations seemed apparently unjust. Without realising, 
hov^ever, the significance of the distinction between powers 
of an ordinary manager and those of a father-manager (see above 
f.n.1 at p. 434), the Court applied the proposition laid down 
by the Privy Council in order to do justice so far as it was 
possible under the English law of trusts and equity, the 
consequences of which, as we shall see, proved to be not 
entirely satisfactory from the point of view of Hindu law.
1’. For this, besides Hunoomanpersaud1 s case, above, the Court 
relied on Stroughill v. Anstey, see above, f.n.1, p.433.
2. Musst. Junnuk Kishoree's case, op.cit., p.221.
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In short, the decision would seem to mean this: that as
he was dealing with a limited owner, the purchaser ought 
to have made enquiry; that he was proved to be 'cognizant 
of all the circumstances', that is, he was proved to have 
notice of. the facts that there was no just cause for the 
sale, hence he was not a bona fide but mala f_ide purchaser, 
and mala fides being a species of fraudJ (see above, p.426), 
a Court of justice would not allow him to take advantage 
of his own fraud.
Regarding the sales made in execution of judicial 
decrees, the Court held,
"Freedom on part of the son as far as regards 
ancestral property from the obligation to 
discharge the father's debts under Hindoo law, 
can be successfully pleaded only by a consideration 
of the invalid nature of the debts incurred.
Now we are clearly of opinion, that 'the plaintiff 
has been unable to show that the expenses for 
which those decrees were passed, were, looking 
to the decrees themselves, and we cannot now 
look beyond these, immoral, and such as under 
Hindoo law, the son would not be liable for; 
we must therefore decline to interfere with 
the 5 sales, ..., which have taken place by 
the intervention of the Courts for debts, which, 
though caused by extravagance, were such as a son 
would be liable for;"^ (My emphasis).
However, were the immoral purpose of the expenses, for which 
the decrees were passed, patent on the face of decrees 
themselves, the Court would seem to have been prepared to 
interfere with even these sales (see the previous quotation 
on p. 4 35 above).
In view of our present concern, it may be observed that 
in fact the issue of purchaser's notice was neither raised
1 . That "the transaction seems to have been part of a system entered 
into by certain parties, including the principal defendant, 
to ease plaintiff's father of his ancestral property by 
supplying his extravagances."
This finding - (see, ibid., at p.223 ) - of the Court would 
prove beyond any doubt that it was all a big fraud.
2. Ibid., at p . 222.
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nor even commented upon as such; though, were the immoral
purpose present on the face of the decrees, it is possible
to argue, such evidence would have been sufficient to impute
actual or constructive notice of the invalid nature of the
original debts to the purchaser concerned. But the fact
that all this was said only after the Court had already
decided that the debts were not avyavaharika would hardly
support an inference 1 to the effect that it meant proving,
on the part of the son, the purchaser's knowledge of the
'immoral' nature of the debts. The doctrine of bona fide
purchaser was relied upon only while considering the validity
of the alienations made by the father in his capacity as
a manager, i.e., on the ground of legal necessity. It would
seem to be the Court's view, that in the absence of immoral
nature of the debts, the existence of decree debts was
%
sufficient necessity justifying the judicial sales.
2
The case of Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (1874) 
involved two appeals, but the questions raised in the appeals 
had nothing to do with avyavaharika debts. Certain sales, 
one private and another through the intervention of the Court 
were challenged on the ground of lack of legal necessity. 
Collusion between the fathers and their sons was suspected. 
Relying on the principles laid down in the case of Hunooman­
persaud (see above pp. 4 30-4 32), and having regard to the
1. After referring to this case, the Privy Council concluded 
that' in this decision, "it was held that it was necessary 
for the son, in order to set aside the sale of property 
for the purpose of paying the father's debts, to show that 
the debt was illegal or contracted for an immoral purpose;" 
and in support, it has quoted the above passage. - 
G irdharee Lall's case, (1874) 1 I.A. 321, at pp. 332-333. 
However, the P.C., in Suraj Bunsi's case (1879) 6 I.A. 88, 
at p. 105, construed the same passage thus, "that the son 
was under an obligation to pay the debts of the father
if not contracted for immoral purposes, and that he had 
failed in this case to prove as against the purchasers under 
the decrees, that they were so contracted". (My emphasis). 
The underlined phrase was not mentioned, nor could it be 
properly inferred from the passage concerned.
2. (1874) 1 I.A. 321. For facts see above, p.265..
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decision ju Musst. Junnuk Kishoreefs case, above, the Privy 
Council held in favour of the purchasers. In course of 
its judgement in respect of the auction-sale, the Court 
restated the principle of bona fide purchaser, and observed 
that a purchaser under an execution need not enquire beyond
i
the decree itself. In. this context the role of the doctrine 
of notice would not be ignored, but nothing was said about 
it in this judgement.
However, the Privy Council, in Suraj Eunsi Koer v. Sheo 
2Proshad Singh ' (1879) drew two propositions from the two
cases discussed above (see pp. 434-437) :
"1st, that where joint ancestral property has 
passed out of a joint family, either under
a conveyance executed by a father in consideration
of an antecedent debt, or in order to raise money 
to pay off an antecedent debt, or under a sale in 
execution of a decree for the father's debt, 
his sons, by reason of their duty to pay their 
father's debts, cannot recover that property, 
unless they shew that the debts were contracted 
for immoral purposes, and that the purchasers 
had notice that they were so contracted; and 
2ndly, that the purchasers at an execution sale, 
being strangers to the suit, if they have not 
notice that the debts were so contracted, are 
not bound to make inquiry beyond^what appears 
on the face of the proceedings." (My emphasis).
With respect, the underlined deductions of the Privy Council 
would seem to be wrong (see above p. 437, f.n.1). For the 
principle of bona fide purchaser was not applied in either 
of the above cases while determing the son's liability 
in respect of proved avyavaharika debts of the father, but 
only after the sons were found to have failed to prove the 
immoral nature of the debts concerned. These two cases have
4
clearly affirmed the rule that the son would not be liable
1. Ibid., at pp. 333-334.
2. Op.cit., see f.n.1 at p. 437 above. For facts, see above
’ p. 266.
3. Ibid., at p. 1o6.
4. Musst. Junnuk Kishoree's case, op.cit., at pp. 221-222, 
and Girdharee Lall's case, op.cit., at p. 331, (para.2).
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for his father's debts contracted for immoral purposes.
The sons' liability for their father's debts was therefore 
considered in the context of 'legal necessity', i.e., in 
view of the father's capacity as a manager of the joint 
Hindu family. Any observations made in these cases in 
respect of avyavaharika debts of the father were pi a .! n iy 
obiter dicta.
In the present appeal, the debts were proved to be 
avyavaharIk a and the sons had, bv their objections, made 
it clear before the auction took place, that the decree was 
passed for those debts of the father which were not binding 
on them. On the other hand the Counsel for the respondents, 
Leith, Q.C., argued, among other things, that "the purchaser 
here was under a decree without notice actual or constructive 
that the sons had adverse claims." One suspects whether 
this argument led the Privy Council to formulate those 
propositions based on different facts and circumstances and 
decide the case upon such basis.
However, as J.D.M.Derrett has observed,
"If we examine the facts we find that firstly 
there was taint, and secondly that the 
purchasers had actual or constructive notice 
of it, wherefrom it follows that it would be 
wrong to contend that the case laid down that 
if the debt were tainted and the sons could 
not show that the lender had notice of the 
taint, then the sons could not escape liability.
Here is a simple case where, on the facts,
; the purchasers were bound to take subject to 
the sons' right to withdraw their interests.
The further proposition, that the sons must 
prove both taint and knowledge thereof before 
they can escape, by no means followed - though 
it might appear to follow to someone not
1. Suraj Bunsi's case, op.cit., at p. 94. However, under 
Hindu law, such plea as this particularly when there are 
sons in the family, is useless. See J.D.M.Derrett, at 
10 Luck. L .J ., op.cit., at p. 5.
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thoroughly familiar with Hindu law."
Thus, it would appear that the proposition in respect of 
notice would seem to have been misconceived (see above, p.4 37, 
f.n.1), and applied as if in order to meet the argument 
advanced which could have been easily countered as being 
without foundation in view of Hindu law. For, until this 
decision, the son was not required under Hindu law to prove 
either a lender's or purchaser's knowledge of the avyavaharika 
nature of the father's debt. We may respectfully observe
2
that the Privy Council had failed in the first place to grasp 
the significance of the provisions of Hindu law on the subject 
before laying down the propositions, and therefore it was 
not aware, it seems, of their consequences. In any case what 
the Privy Council meant by the notice in this case was a clear 
hint to the purchasers that ‘the debts were of the tainted 
nature. It would at the most amount to constructive notice 
sufficient to put them on their guard. For, in view of the 
facts of the case, the utmost that could be said against them 
is that they had notice that the sons impeached the debts as 
being tainted with immorality. Thus, it would appear that 
in view of the Privy Council it was notice enough if the sons 
made it known to the Court before the sale takes place, that 
they impeached the debts on the ground of avyavaharika.
1. Ibid., at pp. 9-10. Also see,
"Nov; in this case it will be observed that it was never suggested that 
the' minor plaintiffs were bound to show, not merely that the money 
was borrowed for immoral purposes, but that the lender, Bokali, had 
notice of the purpose for which it was borrowed. ..., but there was 
no such issue, nor was it suggested, nor could it well be suggested 
that the purchasers had knowledge of the immoral nature of the debt." 
observed the Court in Maharaj Singh v. Balwant Singh, op.cit., 
at pp. 533-534; also see below p.4 4 4 .
2. "The draft judgements of the Privy Council often have small 
amendments made in them by members of the Board who are not 
experts in the topics under consideration." - per J.D.M. 
Derrett, cit.above, 10 Luck. L .J ., at p. 9.
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In Hanuman Singh y. Nanak Chand (1884), although the
defence was not based upon the proposition laid down by the
Privy Council discussed above, the son's appeal was dismissed
on the ground of his failure to prove the avya >/anar.ika nature
of the debt and the creditor's knowledge thereof; for, in
the opinion of the Court, there was collusion on the part
of the son and his father (as regards collusion, see above
f.n. 6 at p.268 ). As we have already observed above (see
P«270)> this decision is of doubtful authority. No issue
was raised as regards the lender's notice, and therefore,
the remarks to that effect would seem to be obiter. However,
2
in Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh (1884) the sons contended
against the defence of bona fide purchaser without notice
that, having regard to the invalid nature of the debt, they
were entitled to recover their shares in the property. While
\
awarding the decree to the sons, and rejecting the question 
of notice, the Court observed,
"And it is further to be considered whether, under 
such circumstances, any notice to the purchaser 
was necessary. The maxim, in jure, non remota 
causa, sed proxima spectatur, does not, however, 
apply to any transaction originally founded in 
fraud, and much less in proved crime, 'for the 
law will look to the corrupt beginning and consider 
it as one entire act'; and again, on the same 
page - 'neither does the above rule hold in
criminal cases, because in them the intention
is matter of substance, and, therefore, the first 
motive, as showing the intention, must be 
principally regarded (Broom's Legal Maxims, 2nd ed.
; 1858, p. 170).' The principle of the law so stated
appears to me^to render the question of notice 
immaterial."
One wonders whether the Court is talking here about Hindu law! 
However, the learned Chief Justice went on to hold that the
1. (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 193. For facts etc. see above pp.268-7o.
2. (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 234: for facts and further discussion, 
see above p.37iff. The facts of the case clearly disclosed 
at least reasonable constructive notice; (see ibid., at
p. 239 ) .
3. Ibid., at p. 237, (per Stuart, C.J.).
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purchaser had reasonable constructive notice. Apparently, 
the question of the onus of proving the purchaser's notice 
by the son would seem, supposing that it has place in Hindu 
law, to depend upon the facts and circumstances of each 
case.
2
In Krishnaji v. Vithal Ravji (1887), although the son 
had proved the immoral nature of his father's debts, the
3
High Court held' that to succeed against the auction-purchasers
1. However, the same High Court would seem to have treated 
the above rule as if it was an universal rule applicable 
to each and every case. For, in Lai Singh v. Deo Narain 
Singh (1886) I.L.R. 8 All. 279, the sons had challenged 
"their father's sale of ancestral property on the ground 
of lack of necessity and immorality. The District Court 
had placed onus of proof upon defendants who in appeal 
contended that the sons should prove that %the debts were 
immoral. However, while remanding the issues for determin­
ation, the High Court, raised the first issue at p.282
as: "Have the plaintiffs established that those debts 
were contracted for immoral purposes, and that at the 
time of the sale was impeached the defendants had notice 
they were so contracted?" (My emphasis). This shows that 
the Courts in India were not yet sure as regards the
applicability of the rule.
2. (1887) I.L.R. 12 Bom. 625, for facts and further discussion,
see above pp. 27o-271.
3. Ibid., at p. 631. This rule was merely referred in Bhagbut 
Pershad v. Musst. Girja Koer (1888) 15 I.A.99, at p . 104.
This case is discussed above pp.271-272 . In Bhavanl Bakbsh 
v. Ram Dai (1891) I.L.R. 13 All. 216, at p. 223, the 
question of notice of taint to the creditor was considered, 
in the absence of any contention to that effect, and also 
perhaps wrongly; and in view of the facts (see above
pp. 274-276 the Court's observation on the question was 
obiter. Also see Beni Pershad v. Puran Chand (1895)
I.L.R. 23 Cal. 262, at p. 275 the rule has been referred 
to in passing. A similar dictum is found in Kishan Lai v. 
Garuruddhwa j a (1899) I.L.R.21 All.238, at p.240. Also, 
see above p. 278 for facts and further discussion 
of the case.
Also, in Devi Pitta v. Saudagar Singh, (1900) 35 P.R.No.65, 
p.291, at pp. 296-297 it has been stated that an alienee 
who is himself the antecedent creditor by his position 
is prima facie fixed with knowledge of the nature of the 
debts and of the purposes on which the money borrowed has 
been spent.
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he must also prove that the alienees knew that the debts
were contracted for immoral purposes. The Court would seem
to have felt compelled to follow the propositions laid down
in Suraj Bunsi’s case simply because they were "still, in
1force unqualified by any decision." Nothing more is said 
there about this case. The manner in which it was followed 
would seem to show that the Court was not altogether happy. 
However, this decision was perhaps the first one in which 
the son’s pious obligation was applied in the name of the 
Hindu law to pay his father’s immoral debts, from the payment 
of which he is expressly immune under the same law. And 
all this would not have been possible but for the distinction 
made between the judicial and other sales. However, as 
observed by Melvill, J . ,
"If relief is to be given upon the ground in 
this country, it must be given, not on account 
of any distinction between a legal and equitable 
estate (see Phear, J.'s observation at p.408, 
volume VII, Calcutta Weekly Reporter), but 
because the innocent purchaser is supposed to 
have been the victim of fraud on the part of 
the vendor, and of^laches on the part of the prior 
incumbrancer11, (My emphasis).
This would seem to mean that unless the father and perhaps 
his sons were guilty of some fraudulent conduct as against 
the purchaser, such relief should not be granted merely 
because the purchaser had no notice. For, as the same Judge 
has explained,
i
"A purchaser at a Court sale takes the estate 
subject to all existing liens, whether he has 
had notice of them or not. A Court sale is 
only a process by which a Court does for a debtor 
what he is bound to do for himself, i.e., to sell
1. Krishnaji1s case, cit.above, at p. 631, per Parsons, J.. 
Perhaps this was an example of following precedents without 
much regard for provisions of Hindu law on the subject,
or, even if the facts and circumstances of the case were 
dissimilar from the case which was followed.
2. Sobhagchand v. Bhaichand, (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom.193, p.206.
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his property in order to pay his debts.
If he did for himself he would be bound to 
protect the rights of prior incumbrances; and 
the Court, which^acts for him, is equally bound 
to do the same."
Seen in the light of these observations, the protection 
given by the Court to the auction-purchasers in this case,- 
irrespective of whether they were strangers or not, could 
hardly be justified under Hindu law, in the absence of any 
fraudulent conduct on the part of the father and his son.
2
In Maharaj Singh v. Balwant Singh (1906) the doctrine 
of notice was invoked in these terms: *the son is liable to
pay the debts of his father unless he can show that these 
debts were incurred for immoral purposes, and that the
j
creditors who made the advances did so with the knowledge 
of the object of the loan.' However, while rejecting it, 
the Court observed that,
"Experience tells us that his licentious mode 
of life was not and could not have been concealed 
from his neighbours. It was no doubt the common 
talk of the bazar. No intending lender could 
fail to have learnt of it if he had made any 
inquiry whatever. We know of no express 
authority for the proposition advanced by 
Mr. Sundar Lai that a son who disputes his 
liability to pay his father's debt contracted 
for immoral purposes must ordinarily prove that the 
lender was aware of the object for which the 
money was borrowed, though there is the highest 
authority that he must do so if he is attempting 
to recover ancestral property which has already 
passed out of the family. If the onus of proving 
such knowledge lies on a son, it would be, we ^
think, next to impossible for him to discharge it."
1. Ibid., at pp.206-207. Though this was not a case of 
avyavaharika debt, reliance on it for the present purpose 
would seem to be justifiable in view of apparent improper 
use to which the doctrine of bona fide purchaser would seem 
to have put by the (incidently) same Court.
2. (1906) I.L.R. 28 All. 508; for facts and further discussion, 
see above pp. 281-284.
3 . Ibid., at p . 521.
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(It may be noted here that Burkitt, J. , who referred to 
the doctrine in passing in Kishan Lai v. Garuruddhwaja (1892),
see above f.n.3 at p.442, was one of the judges who decided
the present case.)
After a thorough discussion of leading authorities on 
the subject, the Court came to the conclusion that,
"It is common experience that money-lenders 
readily advance loans on any class of landed 
security, taking considerable risks, but 
charging high if not exorbitant rates of
interest. It is no easy matter for sons to
satisfy the heavy onus which lies upon them 
in impeaching loans obtained for immoral 
purposes, but it would, we think, be the 
death-blow to the rule of Hindu law which 
gives immunity to sons when defending their 
title to ancestral property from liability 
to their father's ifnmoral debts, if it were 
the law that in order to absolve themselves 
from liability the sons must prove, not 
merely the purpose for which such loans were 
contracted, but also that the lenders knew of 
the immoral purpose of the loan."1
Although obiter, these views seem to fit perfectly into the
2
terms and spirit of Hindu law. The Madras High Court came
3
to similar conclusion in Savumian v. Narayanan (1914). It
held that while claiming exemption from the liability on ground of
1. Ibid., at pp. 544-545.
2. In this regard, we may cite J.D.M.Derrett, cit.above,
10 Liick. L . J . , p. 12, where he has said,
"It is of great importance to note that in Uttar Pradesh, where 
so many cases in the Pious Obligation have arisen since 1906, 
the dictum in Maharaj Singh stands uncorrected (particularly 
from 1906 to 1925 when the case of Sat Narain was published): 
therefore the presumption that it is correct has more than 
half a century's authority in a leading High Court."
Also see Babu Singh v. Behari Lai (1908) I.L.R.30 All.156, 
at p. 159 the Court has expressed similar view. For facts, 
see above p. 284.
3. A.I.R. 1914 Mad. 244, at p. 245, c.2; for facts, see above 
p. 332 . This decision was later regarded as the conclusive 
authority on this point in Lakshmanaswami v. Raghavacharulu, 
£ee below, f.n.3 at p. 446), at p. 295, c.1.
446
illegality of the debt, the sons were not required to prove 
that the creditor had notice that the antecedent debt of their 
father was immoral.
i '
The case of Sat Narain v. Behari Lai (1925) involved 
no question of tainted debt nor that of notice. The question 
was whether the joint family property became vested in the 
Official Assignee when the father was adjudicated insolvent; 
and also, a question of preemption rights was involved.
However, while dealing with these questions the Privy Council 
observed in passing that,
"When the decree which was executed was made in 
a suit to which the sons were not parties and 
the property sold was the joint property of 
the father and the son the sale was good on the 
principle of Hindu law that it is the pious duty 
of a Hindu son to pay his father's debts unless 
it is shown that the debt in respect of which 
the decree was made was contracted by the father 
to the knowledge20f the lender for the purposes 
of immorality." (My emphasis).
This observation was irrelevant in view of the issues involved; 
besides, as pointed out by Patanjali Sastri, J., (as he then 
was) ,
"The reference in this passage to the lender is 
perhaps an inadvertent slip as it is difficult 
to see how the lender's knowledge of the immoral 
purpose can render the sale bad if the execution 
purchaser had no knowledge of such purpose and 
purchased the property bona fide for valuable 
consideraton." 3
However, once again the doctrine was invoked, relying upon
4
the above dictum, in Lakshmanswami's case in 1943. Here 
the debts were proved to be avyavaharika, and the High Court
1. A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 18.
2. Ibid., at p. 22, c.1
3'. Lakshmanaswami v. Raghavacharulu, A.I.R. 1 943 Mad. 292, 
at p . 296, c .1.
4. Ibid.
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rejected the contention saying rhat,
"The Hindu law no doubt casts a pious obligation 
on the son to discharge his father's debts 
except those falling within certain categories 
which are usually referred to as illegal or 
. immoral. But this obligation, it is well to 
remember, was based on the religious duty of 
the son to relieve the father from the evil 
consequences arising from the non-payment, of 
his debts and was not designed for benefit or 
the protection of his creditors; and similarly 
an examination of the Smrithi texts relating 
to the excepted categories show that they are 
based solely on the impropriety of the father's 
conduct in contracting the debt, and have no 
relevance to the propriety or otherwise of the 
I creditor's conduct in advancing the loan. The 
I position therefore is that if the father's debt 
I is free from taint, a pious duty is laid on the 
I son to rescue the father from the penalties of 
i indebtedness the resulting advantage to the 
creditor being purely incidental; if, on the 
other hand, the debt originates in the father's 
misconduct the pious duty ceases to operate, 
and the son is not bound to pay off the debt 
however bona fide the creditor may have been in 
advancing the loan. It follows that all that 
the son has to prove to establish his immunity 
from the pious obligation in a suit by the 
creditor is the immoral character of the debt, 
and it is not incumbent on him to show further 
that the creditor lent with the knowledge that  ^
the debt was contracted for an immoral purpose;"'
(My emphasis).
Perhaps this is the most accurate exposition of the legal 
position, in view of Hindu law on the point under consideration, 
that we have come across so far, and. one feels inclined to 
agree with this view; for, if there is no pious duty, the 
son should not be made to pay in the name of the pious oblig­
ation. Moreover, in view of the creditor's knowledge of
1. Ibid., at pp.295-96; cf. the remarks to the effect that the 
son has also to satisfy the Court that the creditor was aware 
of the immoral nature of the debts before advancing the loan. 
See Shankar Rao v. Kamtaprasad Agrawal, A.I.R. 1947 Nag.129, 
at p . 141, c.1; for facts and further discussion, see above 
pp.298-3oo . It should be noted that in this case the debts 
were not proved to be avyavaharika; and also there was proof 
showing collusion on the part of the father and his sons.
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Hindu law on the subject - for it is the money-lenders in- 
India who generally know it better than the debtors - can 
one imagine that he would advance money knowing that it is 
required for an immoral purpose? Or would any intending 
debtor tell his would-be cireditor in so many words that he 
wanted the loan for paying his liquor bills or gambling 
debts? The question of proving the creditor's knowledge 
of taint as a general rule would seem to go beyond the 
suggestion that onus of proof should depend on the facts 
and circumstances of each case, and also it would seem to 
defeat the purpose of the doctrine of tainted debts in Hindu 
law if the son is made to prove the creditor's knowledge in 
all cases irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the 
cases concerned. One would think employment of such rules 
should be in the direction of upholding rather than defeating 
good laws. v
However, in Doshi Jayantilal v. Luhar Amritlal (1954) 
the Court itself raised the issue of alienee's (creditor- 
mortgagee's) notice of 'taint', and held that, the sons must 
prove both the immoral character of the debt and notice of 
it to the alienee. Both the Lower Courts had held that the 
debt was illegal or immoral, and the High Court assumed that 
it was so tainted; but in its view the father was 'evidently
in collusion with the plaintiffs and he supported their case.'
3
However, the Supreme Court has said that the plaintiffs' 
claim "was resisted" by both the alienee and the alienor,
i.e., the father. It is therefore difficult to understand 
the High Court's assertion of collusion.
1. A.I.R. 1954 Sau. 36, at p.39, c.2; for facts see above 
pp.322-323 . As in this case, the propositions laid down 
in Suraj Bunsi's case were upheld in Udmiram v. Bal Ramdas, 
A.I.R. 1956 Nag.76, at pp.79-80. For facts and further 
discussion, see above pp.3o1-3o3.
2. Ibid., at p. 37, c.1.
3. See, Luhar Amritlal v. Doshi Jayantilal, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 
964, at p. 965, c.2, para. 4. The Supreme Court seems to 
have said nothing on this point, for, nothing is reported.
iI
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Later this decision was challenged1 in the Supreme 
Court on the ground that the principles of Hindu law do not 
justify the viewT taken by the High Court that the sons had 
to prove the alienee's knowledge about the immoral nature 
of the antecedent debt. However, the Supreme Court upheld 
the above decision, saying that as the said propositions 
laid down in Suraj Bunsi's case were followed without a doubt 
or dissent, they should be considered as correctly representing 
the true position under Hindu law on that behalf; and there­
fore, the Court was of the opinion that it was inexpedient 
to reopen the question after such a long lapse of time.
The Court said, "First and foremost in cases of this character 
the principle of stare decisis must inevitably come into 
operation."^
! 3
As regards the Supreme Court's assertion, that the
said propositions were followTed without a doubt or dissent,
it may respectfully be stated that their Lordships would
seem to have been misled in coming to this conclusion. The
facts would seem to present a different picture. For, since
the case of Suraj Bunsi Koer to the present case of Luhar
Amritlal about sixteen cases (see above pp.440-448) would
seem to have dealt directly or indirectly with the proposition
under consideration. In eleven of the sixteen cases, it was
either referred to in passing or the views expressed by the
Courts were obiter dicta; and it is important here to note
that in most of these cases, it was the Court, and not the
parties’concerned or their advocates, that had raised the
issue of proving the creditor's or purchaser's knowledge of
1. Ibid.. For facts and further discussion see above pp.323-324.
2. Ibid., at p. 970, c.1.
3. For a considered rejection of this assertion, see J.D.M.
Derrett, cit. above, 10 Luck.L .J ., p. 2 and pp. 9-13.
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the taint.. This shows, by the way, what little importance 
was attached to the doctrine of notice as a defence against 
the ,doctrine of avyavaharika debts in the legal profession 
itself. If it were an accepted rule of Hindu law on the 
subject, every Counsel for the lender or purchaser would 
have fought with chis weapon in the interest of his client.
The lawyers' non-reliance upon it, therefore, would seem to 
be indicative of the fact that it was not commonly so regarded 
as the Supreme Court has asserted it to be. Then again, 
of the five remaining cases in which the doctrine of notice 
was relied on, in one case, i.e., Krishnaji 1s case (1887),
(see above p. 442) the Bombay High Court had merely referred 
to the proposition with approval without any comment or 
discussion, (see also Udmiram's case, f.n.1 at p.448, above), 
but in three others, i.e., Maharaj Singh's case (1906) (see 
above p. 445), Savumian's case (1914) (see above p. 445) and 
Lakshmanaswami's (1943), the Courts of Allahabad and Madras 
had declined to follow it after their considered opinion on 
the subject. We have already quoted these opinions above 
while discussing those cases. In view of the above, therefore, 
the Supreme Court's assertion would seem to be incorrect, 
and hence it follows that the propositions laid down in Suraj 
Bansi's case did not correctly represent the true position 
under Hindu law on the subject. Consequently, the application 
of the rule of stare decisis,in such an unsettled circumstance 
would seem to be erroneous; for, "It is only well established 
positions which are not to be upset, and not situations 
uneasily balanced upon precarious and possibly mistaken dicta." 
Obviously the Supreme Court would seem to have had some doubts 
about the law they were laying down, for otherwise they would 
not have pointed towards the legislature for the correction
1. J.D.M.Derrett, ibid., at p.2. We have also shown above 
at p. 440 the Privy Council's misunderstanding of the 
principles of Hindu law on the subject. Also see above 
f.n. 1 at p. 251 , where we have extensively dealt with 
the question of stare decisis.
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of anomalies, if any, in the administration of this branch 
1
of Hindu law.
The other main justification for upholding the
propositions was that it was intended to protect bona fide
alienees against frivolous and collusive claims made by the 
2debtor's sons.
Now looking to the facts as noted by the Supreme Court 
it is difficult to understand how the High Court found that 
the father and his sons were in collusion in this case. Not 
only has the Supreme Court not even mentioned any collusion
3
in this case, but also it has positively stated that the 
sons' claim was resisted by both respondent 1 (the mortgagee) 
and respondent 2 (the father-mortgagor-debtor) , who pleaded 
that the mortgage had been executed for the payment of debts 
which were binding on the family. Thus both 'the Courts were, 
it would seem, directly in conflict with each other on this 
point.
4
Besides, the Supreme Court has noted the fact that 
both the District Court and the High Court were unanimous 
in holding that the alienee had made no attempt to prove any 
enquiry on his part and we must note that even a stranger 
is under obligation to make enquiries, as regards the existence 
of any antecedent debts payable by the debtor before he enters 
into any transaction. One wonders how could an alienee, who 
did not even bother to step into the witness box to prove 
that he'made any enquiry whatever, be regarded as a bona fide 
alienee?
In view of the above, it would seem that this was not 
a case of collusion on the part of the sons and their father 
nor was it a case of bona fide alienee. And, if this were so, 
the question of proving the alienee's knowledge would not
1’. Luhar Amritlal' s case, cit.above, at p. 970, c.2.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., at p. 965, c.2.; also see above p. 448.
4. Ibid., at pp. 965-966.
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arise at all; for such a deliberate disregard in respect 
of his duty to enquire would, in view of the above discussion 
of English cases, as well as that of Hunoomanpersaud1s case, 
amount to mala fides on his part. Moreover the alienee's 
bad faith and his debtor joining him in rejecting the debtor's 
sons' claim would seem to amount to nothing else than collusion 
on their part against the sons, to rid them of their shares 
in the joint family property. If these findings are correct, 
then the Supreme Court's affirmation of the rule in these 
circumstances must be regarded as incorrect, for it seems to 
go too far. The cases involving collusion on the part of 
the debtor and his sons in the past alone is not a sufficient 
justification for upholding such a rule in a case where the 
facts and circumstances differ completely from them. It 
should be remembered that even in English law the application 
of the doctrine of notice has been subjected sto the facts and 
circumstances of each case (see above pp. 425-426); and 
therefore, it may respectfully be stated that the Supreme 
Court should have looked into the problem more carefully 
particularly in view of its own position. After all, as 
observed by J.D.M. Derrett, "The additional burden placed on 
the sons does not have the effect of preventing collusion 
between father and son so much as facilitate collusion between 
the father and the creditor, if it can be said to achieve 
anything at all."^
3
In Thoga v. Suresh Chander (1975), although the Chief
4
Justice;had not raised the issue of notice while remanding 
the case for retrial, both the Lower Courts differed, after 
finding that the debt was avyavaharika, on the question of
1. J . D . M. Derrett, cit. above , 'indica Pietas#, p.62; (also, we 
find at pp.61-62 a succin<fc explanation of the working of 
the propositions).
2. At (1964) 10 Luck. L.J., at p . 13.
3. A.I.R. 1975 J. & K. 16; for facts and further discussion
of the case see above pp. 3o6-3o8.
4. Ibid., see pp.16-17; incidently, this appears to show that 
the issue of notice as such was not considered important
enough by the Chief Justice even after the Supreme Court's
ruling in Luhar v. Doshi, above.
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the vendee's knowledge of taint. In the end, the High Court 
upheld the Trial Court's finding that the vendee had no 
notice of the taint, and therefore the son must pay the 
debt even if it was tainted with immorality. Collusion 
between the father and his son was alleged. Leaving aside 
the correctness of this judgement, it may be noted that in 
this case the Court has at least endeavoured to lay the on_us 
of proving the vendee’s knowledge of the taint on the person 
who, in its opinion, could have possessed better knowledge^ 
of the facts concerned. Moreover, it has, unlike the Supreme 
Court (Luhar v. Doshi, above), tried to take into account 
other relevant circumstances of the case before applying the. 
law. Unfortunately, however, nothing is said about the 
vendee's duty of bona fide enquiry. This was a suit by the 
son, and he had proved that .the debt was avyavaharika. Upon 
this, one would have expected that the vendee should have 
proved that he was bona fide purchaser. However, application 
of the rule that the son must prove alienee's knowledge of 
taint, even before- his bona fides are established, in cases 
of mere allegation of collusion, would seem to offer blanket 
protection to the alienee, irrespective of whether, in justice 
he deserves it or not. True, if there was a reasonable basis 
for the Court to suspect collusion on the part of the debtor 
and his son, then, placing upon the son the onus of proving 
the alienee's knowledge of taint might well be justified on 
the ground of his fraudulent conduct, but otherwise there 
seems to be hardly any justification for upholding the doctrin 
of notice of taint in Hindu law.
2
However as proved in M.V. Raghaviah v. M.C. Veeriah 
(1975), fraud or collusion may take place between a debtor 
and his creditor against the debtor's own son. Here, the 
father had sold joint family property to his brother's son
1. Ibid., at p . 17, c.2, see para. 5; also see p. 3o7. 
above. For further explanation, see Hunoomanpersaud's 
case at pp. 430-431, above; and J.D.M.Derrett, 'Indica 
Pietas', cit.above, p.60.
2. A.I.R. 1975 A.P. 350; for facts and further discussion 
see pp. 346-347.
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under false pretences in order to defeat his own son's 
legitimate rights. The Court said,
t "We have already found that majority of the
debts were not true and that even the true debts 
were Avyavaharika and not binding on the second 
■ defendant (the son) and that in any case the 
first defendant (the father) himself had 
independent means for discharging those debts.
So, there was really no necessity for selling 
the property. The recital itself is false.
The plaintiff who is no other than the first 
defendant's elder brother's son, must have been 
in the know of things. He had been a policeman 
and was purchasing and selling properties. So, 
it can be safely assumed that he is a worldlywise 
person. It was well known that right from 1964 
the first defendant altogether abandoned the 
second defendant after the death of Venkataramamimma 
It is preposterous to say that the plaintiff did 
not know of the civil and criminal proceedings 
which were going on’ between the father and the 
son. What is more, those proceedings were in 
respect of these very lands. The second defendant 
in his evidence alleged that the plaintiff was 
actively supporting the first defendant in all 
these unholy activities. Be that as it may, 
could it be imagined even for a minute that the 
plaintiff did not know the serious troubles 
between his own paternal uncle and his son? It 
is impossible to give credence to the plaintiff's 
alleged innocence and ignorance of these matters.
All this demonstrates beyond any doubt that the 
plaintiff actively colluded with the first defendant 
in bringing about Ex. A-1 in order to defeat the 
rights of the second defendant.
And this need not be considered, it is suggested, as an
2
isolated example. If this is so, then the rule that
1. Ibid., at pp. 356-357, per A.Sambasiva Rao, J., who
delivered the judgement of the Court.
2. For, the characteristics of money-lenders and their
{ accomplices have more than once/described or found to be
fraudulent and crafty. See for example, Hunoomanpersaud1s 
case, p. 418; Musst. Junnuk Kishoree’s case, at pp.222-223 
Bhawani Bakhsh's case, at p. 223; Maharaj Singh's case, 
at pp.544-545; even the facts in Udmiram's case, would 
seem to be of this nature; see, A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 76, at
pp.77-78; all these cases have been discussed above.
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to succeed, a Hindu son must prove not only the tainted 
nature of his father's debt but also the lender's or alienee's 
knowledge of the taint, irrespective of whether or not the 
defendant was a bona fide lender or alienee, would seem to 
go not only far beyond its intended purpose, but also would 
apparently lead to effectively nullifying the express 
provisions of Hindu law - the purpose of which is undoubtedly, 
morally or otherwise, not only reasonable but necessary for 
orderly living and development of the society as a whole.
For, the doctrine of avyavaharika debts is basically meant 
to benefit society and not only the sons of a Hindu father.
Then again, have the principles of equity such an 
overriding authority even in English law as to interfere with 
legal provisions? In view of their role in English law (see 
above p. 4 28), one would not think so; and if the same were 
to be applied in Hindu law too, equitable principles should, 
it seems, do the same. It would appear, therefore, that so 
long as both the sastras and modern courts of law hold that 
a Hindu son is not bound under Hindu law to pay his father's 
tainted debts, neither the doctrine of bona fide lender or 
purchaser, nor the doctrine of notice should be allowed, as 
a general rule, to alter the legal position except, perhaps, 
where the son was party to a deliberate fraud against his 
father's creditor etc.. Hindu law does not protect such 
fraudulent gains, and, therefore, it would seem appropriate 
even in view of Hindu law, if the application of the doctrine 
of notice is strictly confined to cases of proved (or strongly 
suspected on reasonable evidence) collusion between the 
father and his son in fraud of his creditors or alienees.
Conclusion: Not only sastras but also the Supreme Court
of India, and of course all other Courts in India, state even 
today that 'tainted' debts of the father do not bind his 
sons under Hindu law. On the other hand, as we have seen 
above, the effect of the doctrines cf bona fide purchaser
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and notice of "taint1 has been, in the ultimate analysis, 
to nullify this position. Looked at from this angle, the 
Privy Council would seem to have erred in Suraj Bunsi1s 
case in drawing the said propositions: that in order to
escape liability the son must prove both the tainted nature 
of the debt of his father and the purchaser's notice thereof 
(see above p. 438); for, as shown above (at p.440), it failed 
to realise the consequences of the propositions upon Hindu 
law. The rule in respect of precedents has further complic­
ated the legal position. Neither the Courts, nor the legal
profession, appear to be sure as to the exact place of the
1doctrine of notice in Hindu law. The Supreme Court itself 
would seem to have been uneasy while affirming this doctrine; 
for, on the one hand, its reasoning would hardly seem to 
convince (see above pp. 448-452); and on the other hand, 
it has almost nervously pointed towards the legislature 
for correction of anomalies, if any. The anomaly referred 
to is apparently this: that though under the doctrine of
pious obligation the son is not bound to pay his father's 
'tainted' debts, by application of the doctrine of notice he 
would nevertheless be forced to pay such debts if he failed 
to prove that the lender or purchaser knew that the debts 
were incurred for tainted porposes. No doubt, this is 
contrary to Hindu law. The situation, therefore, raises the 
question: Is there any scope for the doctrine of notice of
taint in modern Hindu law?
Thk Privy Council has referred (see above p. 432) to 
the fact that the lender would have hardly any control in 
most cases over actual spending of the money advanced to 
his debtor. In addition to this^ the Hindu law position 
that the concept of tainted debts has reference only to 
improprieties of the father's conduct, would apparently 
leave some scope for fraud and cheating against creditors 
etc.. In the interests of justice, one is bound to feel
1. For a similar view see J.D.M. Derrett, cit.above, 'Indica 
Pietas', pp. 63-64.
i
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sympathetic towards victims of cheating or fraud by the 
father (debtor) . However, so long as the doctrine of 
avyavaharika debts remains a part of modern Hindu law, in 
cases where it is proved that the father incurred debts for 
an immoral purpose, his son would have to be freed, it seems, 
from his liability under the doctrine of Pious Obligation 
in spite of the suffering of an innocent party.'1' This may 
seem 'legally' just, but the fact that an innocent party 
such as, for example, a stranger auction-purchaser, would 
suffer under the circumstances is appavrently far from 
'righteous'„ In order to mitigate such suffering, therefore, 
we may agree with J.D.M.Derrett when he says,
"Where the purchaser of joint family property 
is the creditor he is fully apprised of the 
circumstances and is able to bring facts within
1. For similar views, see J.D.M. Derrett, cit.above, at
10 Luck. L.J., p.4; also see "If the debt was incurred 
by the father clearly for an immoral purpose, there can, 
of course, be nO pious duty on the part of the son to 
discharge it, that is, no pious duty legally recognisable." 
per Stuart, C.J., in Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh, cit. 
above, (see p . 371 ) at p. 241. Also see observations of 
Patanjali Sastri, J . , (quoted above at p. 447) according 
to which excepted debts are solely based on impropriety 
of the father's conduct and have no reference to propriety 
or otherwise of the creditor's conduct in advancing the 
loan.
It may also be pointed out here that even in English law 
of equity and trusts the doctrine of bona fide purchaser 
was not considered as an absolutely universal rule. For, 
exceptions were made in respect of claims of a judgement- 
creditor, who had no notice of the plaintiff's equity; 
and in cases where claims were made against the claims 
of a dowress. - See J.Story, cit.above, at p. 266, f.n.3 
and cases cited there.
2. Such suffering of an innocent party was not unknown even 
in English law, from where the doctrine of notice has 
been imported: see, for example, Kennedy v. Green,
discussed above at pp. 413-415, at p. 415 ; also see 
f.n. 3 at p. 415.
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his knowledge to the notice of the court.
Therefore proof of taint alone is 
sufficient to release the sons' interests 
from the effects of the court, sale. But 
< when the purchaser is a stranger to the
suit, his equities are at least as good 
as the sons', and unless they prove that 
, he knew of the taint, or could have known 
of it, i.e., that he knew all along that 
they were not really liable, or rather 
that he was not a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice of the father's
defective power to bind his sons, and
therefore of the court's defective power 
to sell the sons' interests, they must 
suffer him to retain the whole property, 
including their interests."
If the son could prove that the auctjon-purchaser was in 
collusion with the father, he would save his interest in 
the joint family property. On the other hand, however, if 
it is proved that the son was in collusion With his father 
in fraud of his lender or a subsequent alienee of the father, 
then - and in such circumstances only - the son might justly 
be made to prove not only the tainted nature of the debt, 
but also the lender's or purchaser's knowledge of the taint
for escaping his own liability. For such an exception to
the doctrine of avyavaharika debts might be justified in 
view of the practice followed by the Orthodox Hindu Courts 
(see above p.227, f.n.1) according to which not merely the 
terms of the law but also its spirit must be looked into, 
in the context of the facts and the circumstances of the case 
concerned, so as to serve the interest of justice. In other 
words, the Court was prepared to make an exception to general 
rules if justice demanded it in an appropriate case. Moreover,
1. J.D.M. Derrett, C.M.H.L., cit.above, p . 107. Also see,
"A security which is given in respect of a debt arising out of 
an illegal transaction is tainted with illegality, and cannot 
be enforced, whether it is under seal or not, if it was 
taken by a person who knew, or ought to have known, of illegality." 
Halsbury's Laws of England, vol8, p . 152, sec. 259; 
see also above, p. 427, f.n. 5.
459
fraudulent gains from innocent people have nowhere been 
condoned by Hindu law, and if such an exception is made 
in order to prevent frauds or cheating on the part of the 
father and his son it would seem to fit into the spirit 
of Hindu .law, because the purpose of the doctrine of 
avyavaharika is certainly not to facilitate defrauding 
or cheating of others either by the father or by him and 
his son. However, the exception must not be allowed to 
become the rule while the doctrine of avyavaharika debts 
exists in Hindu law.
i
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CHAPTER VIII
C O N C L U S I O N S
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It emerges from this study that the sastric inform­
ation on the Pious Obligation and the doctrine of 'tainted1 
debts was not law in the modern Western sense. It is 
not possible however to argue that both these s'astric 
rules were invariably enforced; nor can one argue that 
they were never enforced - still less that they were 
unenforceable <
Trie main concern of the sastric precepts was 
upholding and preserving dharma, i.e. righteousness as 
conceived by the sastras. The sastras dealt with life 
as a whole, and therefore, in order to grasp properly 
the significance of the sastric precepts it was necessary 
to view them in a wider context. It seems that the sastric 
approach was properly understood by the orthodox Hindu 
Courts, for they appear to have dealt with siich precepts 
in a flexible way having regard to the facts and circum­
stances of the case concerned. However, the system lacked 
uniformity and certainty.
On the other hand, due to the circumstances then 
prevailing, the British scholars and judges mistakenly 
took these precepts for legal principles because of their 
similarity to certain concepts of Canon law already known 
to them; and later on whenever they were faced with 
problems of construction or application of the precepts, 
they were obliged to rely on those concepts from their own 
laws due to their inadequate knowledge of the sastras. 
Obviously, those concepts, as we have seen in chapters 5-7 
above, have affected both the meaning and scope of the 
precepts concerned. Moreover, in order to achieve uniformity 
and certainty, the flexible approach of the orthodox Hindu 
Courts while dealing with such precepts (as found in the 
mahajaras etc.) was replaced by a more refined but 
comparatively rigid system of piece-meal application under 
which, speaking generally, the modern courts of law not
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only construed such precepts in a narrow context, but
also applied them more rigidly under the doctrines of
'precedents' and 'stare decisis1.
These changes would seem to have occurred in spite
1
of the Privy Council's warning, as far back as 1856, 
that the rules of construction developed for the purpose 
should be applied in the context of the facts and circum­
stances of each case, as the rules were not rigid but 
?
only basic.~ Consequently, we find that in a number of
cases discussed above the form or procedure rather than
the substance of the case concerned has dictated the course
of the decision. Apparently, this tendency has led to
3
certain anomalies, and the rules of 'precedents' and 
'stare decisis', though introduced with good intentions, 
have helped to perpetuate such anomalies. The Supreme
4
Court's decision in Luhar v. Doshi has undoubtedly put 
in jeopardy the future of the doctrine of 'tainted' debts 
and that of the Pious Obligation.
Consequently, as we have clearly demonstrated above 
(see chapters 6-7), the law relating to these doctrines 
is hardly settled. In fact it is ambiguous and enmeshed 
with anomalies even to this day. This kind of legal 
situation can hardly be described as conducive for proper 
administration of justice in respect of the doctrines under 
consideration, particularly in view of their close connection.
1. Hunoomanpersaud's case, see above p. 431.
2. Hemraj v. Khemchand, see above p. 233.
3. See above p. 391 ff.
4. A.I.R. 196o S.C. 964, see above pp. 4o5-4o6.
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In the end, if the legal situation persists as it presently 
is, the public is bound ro suffer. So, in order to 
alleviate the situation, can we, having regard to the 
present social and legal conditions, offer any practical 
solutions in the light of our investigation?
We have stated above (see p. 397) that the whole 
problem can only be solved by asking two questions:
(i) what is the orthodox Hindu scriptural teaching on the 
son's liability to make good his father's debts? and
(ii) does this still apply under modern social, economic 
and legal conditions?
According to the scriptures the son is expected to 
make good his father's just debts in order to save his 
father, after his death, from punishment in a future state 
for non-payment of such debts. Also, they sa'y that both 
merit and demerit were transferable from one person to 
another (see above pp. 37-4o); and yet the sastras have 
excluded the father's 'tainted' debts from his son's 
liability.
In this connection, we have observed (see above 
p. 393) that the mimamsa concept, that a man's issue etc. 
are not tainted with his crimes or unrighteous acts, on 
the principle that a man's own karma must be worked out 
by him so that it is only his just debts which burden his 
sons, etc., is responsible for the characteristic dharma- 
sastra position on our subject.
However, we also recollect that the mimamsa position 
was not de facto paramount in Hindu society. M a n u 1s text 
gives examples of other views, namely that dharma and 
adharma are, as it were, assets and liabilities which can 
be shared. Inscriptions again and again assure us that
1, Manu VII.28, see above p. 393, f.n. 1. For further 
information, see above pp. 4o-41.
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those who divest or confiscate charities will afflict 
with sin past and future generations. Hence the Hindu 
public has not been faithful to the mimamsa concept: 
there was no reason why it should be. MLnimsa is. one of 
the intellectual sources of dharmasastra, but it is only 
one of many equally valid philosophies.
Thus, through the ages, the concept that a man's 
sons must share his demerits has found acceptance de facto. 
And these are aspects of Hinduism which cannot be ignored 
in the law-courts. To impose philosophical notions which 
the public do not accept in practice is an error, as was 
recognised in the Supreme Court in the great case concerning 
payment of income-tax by idols wherein the mimamsa doctrine 
was fully enunciated, but rejected as inconsistent with 
received practice. '
In view of the above and having regard to a number 
of instances taking place in actual practice wherein, 
without any intervention of the law-courts, Hindu sons 
do in fact pay not only just debts but also 'tainted1 
debts of their father, we might be correct in saying that 
if it is an accepted Hindu philosophy that a man's sons 
must share his demerits, and if in fact they do share them, 
then, it is only logical that they may legally be held 
liable to share his 'tainted' debts, too.
On the contrary, one might, argue that the scriptural 
teaching or. our subject also reflects the society's 
disapproval of immoral or unrighteous acts on the part of 
the father, and that this kind of drastic change in the law 
on the subject would undermine the sastric teaching and 
also encourage immorality and unrighteousness in the society. 
Now, in view of our discussion of so many cases of the 
fahter's immorality, etc. one wonders how many fathers
1. Jogendranath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, 
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1o89, at 1o91.
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were deterred by the presence of the doctrines under 
consideration. It is difficult to completely disagree 
with such an argument, for the deterrance envisaged in 
such cases is always an unknown quantity. But the fact 
that many fathers, in spite of the presence of these 
doctrines, still go on leading immoral, etc. lives in the 
society and incur debts for the purpose shows quite clearly 
that the doctrines have had little effect, if any.
Perhaps the sastras were right in those days, and
the judicial system under orthodox Hindu Courts may have
been more effective in administering the law on our subject,-
but India has changed since then, and is undergoing change
even today so far as its social, economic and legal structure
is concerned. In view of this change (see below), it may
be observed that the failure to achieve what 'the sastrakaras
- and we may add even modern courts - seem to have hoped
for from the doctrines of 'tainted debts' and the Pious
Obligation appears to lie in the fact that the enforcement
of morals through modern civil law is rarely effective,
and sometimes it can be counterproductive, for, instead
of promoting morality, as we have seen above in cases
particularly on criminal misappropriation (see pp. 37o-375),
2
it may frequently encourage roguery.
The change that is taking place in modern society in 
India may have been unimaginable in the days of the sastrei-
1 . For details regarding the changes in socio-religious and 
legal framework in India, see J.D.M. Derrett, R . L . S . I ., 
cit.above, chapters 12-13, pp. 4oo-481. Also, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the changing situation 
in the case of Jakati v. Borkar, see above, p. 383.
2. For a similar assertion see P. Devlin, The Enforcement 
of Morals, (Oxford, 1965), pp. 52-55. The author has 
discussed the problem of the enforcement of morals through 
the civil law, and has come to a conclusion in these 
. words, "These legal attitudes promote neither morality 
nor obedience to the law. On the contrary they shock 
the conscience and reward knavery." (at p. 55).
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karas. Although traces of the caste-systom etc. are still 
very much alive, it cannot be denied that the forces of 
change are at work. In these days, if we visit a factory, 
an office, a school or college, a restaurant, or travel 
by Indian railways, for example, we will sea people not 
only of various castes but also of different religions 
working, learning, dining and travelling together. In 
fact, even intercaste or inter-religious marriages have 
become, though not common, tolerable in the modern society. 
And, in order to encourage this trend, it seems that the 
Constitution of India has, unlike the sastras, laid down 
a legal framework in that all the people are generally 
assured of equal treatment before the law and any discrimin­
ation on grounds of religion, race, caste, etc. is prohibited. 
'Untouchability' is abolished and its practice in any form 
is forbidden. Moreover, by Article 44, the Constitution 
has directed that "The state shall endeavour to secure for 
the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory 
of India." (My emphasis).
The need for a uniform civil code is all the more 
enhanced by the rapid development in the economic life of 
the country, for, huge modern industrial, commerical and 
financial institutions involve people of various faiths and 
races. In such circumstances, it would seem to be unjust 
and discriminatory to have one law for Hindus and others 
for Muslims or Christians or Parsis. All things being 
equal, can a bank be sure presently of recovery of its 
loan from a Hindu father as compared to a father of any 
other faith? In view of the doctrine of 'tainted' debts 
in Hindu law, it cannot be absolutely sure for obvious
1. Apart from Preamble of the Constitution, Articles 14-17 
• may be referred to in this connection.
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1
reasons. As J.D.M. Derrett has pointed out, the situation
is more likely to lead to distrust in a Hindu father's
credit-worthiness. In the wider sense, therefore, the
situation is a handicap not only to Hindus but also to
the economic development of the country as a whole.
Thus, having regard to the scriptural teaching on
sharing of the merits as well as the demerits of one person
by another, the failure on the part of the civil law in
enforcing morals, the provision of the Constitution of India
in respect of a uniform civil code for all Indians, and the
2appropriate social, economic and legal needs of the country, 
we may respectfully suggest that
(1) The Parliament should abolish the doctrine of 
'tainted' debts and detach the doctrine of Pious Obligation 
from its spiritual and sociological foundations, so that 
all the debts of the father would be recoverable from the 
joint family property, whether or not 'tainted' in the
3
traditional or any other sense.
However, in the meantime, it may be recommended that
1. "The question of 'taint1, especially as misconstrued 
recently in the Indian Supreme Court, leaves u n c e r t a i n t y
in the mind as to which debts, subject to which conditions, 
will be binding upon the sons." See 1Indica Pietas', 
cited above, p. 63.
2. As ah example, we may cite The Untouchability (Offences) 
Amendment and Miscellaneous Provision Act, 197 6 (Act
1o6 of 1976). By sec. 13 the State Government is empowered 
to impose collective fines on inhabitants of an area 
concerned (including a Hindu undivided family).
Apparently, the enactment is in pursuance of the 
Art. 17 of the Constitution, which has abolished 'untouch­
ability'. The objective of the Act could hardly be 
achieved if, for example, Hindu sons would be allowed 
to avoid the liability under the doctrine of 'tainted' 
debts, which includes 'fines'. Thus, it is clear that 
in order to meet present legal needs personal laws may 
have to give way in the wider interest of the country.
3. For a similar view, see J.D.M. Derrett, 'Indica Pietas', 
cit. above, p. 64.
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(2) The Supreme Court should, at the first available 
opportunity, rectify its own error as regards the application 
of the doctrine of notice along the lines suggested in the 
conclusion of the chapter VII (see pp. 455-459), i.e. in 
order to escape his liability under the Pious Obligation,
it is necessary for the son to prove the tainted nature 
of his father's debt; but he would be required to prove not 
only the tainted nature of the debt but also the lender's 
or purchaser's knowledge of the taint only if there was 
collusion on the part of the father and his son, or where 
the purchaser was a bona fide stranger.
(3) In the light of our discussion of the anomalous
legal position in respect of the present dichotomy between
the father's criminal acts and civil acts (see above pp.
391-397), we may respectfully submit that the Supreme Court
2
should, as it has done in the past, reconsider the whole
1. In Luhar v. Doshi, A.I.R. 196o S.C. 964,
"The Supreme Court's slip was per incuriam, and there­
fore is not really binding upon any inferior court, 
still less upon the Supreme Court itself. The error 
must be rectified because sons' interests must be 
protected against a sale to pay for liabilities which 
actually are avyavaharika, notice or no notice."
J.D.M. Derrett, C.M.H.L., cit. above, p. 1o8.
2. In this connection see Guramma v. Mailappa, A.I.R. 196 4
S.C. 51o. In this case, a gift of land to a daughter 
was involved. Here
"Features of sastric law not to be found in the 
Mitaksara were resurrected, and it was held that 
gifts to daughters in performance of the duty to see 
to their welfare even after thej r marriages were valid 
and binding on coparceners (their brothers and ethers) 
on the footing that in ancient times the daughters 
might have demanded (according to some authorities) 
an actual share if they were not married by the time 
a partition took place, a right virtually obsolete and 
almost unknown to the Anglo-Hindu law."
Ibid, p. 91.
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legal position in the light of sastric theory and actual 
practice, having regard to accepted philosophical notions 
amongst Hindus on the one hand, and the circumstances 
prevailing today on the other.
(4) Alternatively, a choice must be made by the 
Supreme Court between the abundantly documented viewpoints:
(a) Where the father becomes a debtor at the moment 
of a grossly immoral or illegal act, the son is not liable 
even if an innocent third party is put to loss (see above 
p. 397), and
(b) Where the father's illegality, immorality or 
crime succeeds, even momentarily, his civil indebtedness, 
the son is liable and the third party may be compensated 
at his expense.
(5) For the purpose of proper administration of 
justice, the courts in general may be reminded by the 
Supreme Court that the rules of construction etc., 
applicable to cases involving the doctrines under consider­
ation, should be applied with reference to the facts and 
circumstances of the case concerned. The flexibility 
inherent in this warning is essential in view of the 
indefinite nature of the doctrine of 'tainted' debts. If 
the judges would use their discretion appropriately, at 
least some ill-effects of the anomalies referred to above 
could be avoided in the future.
Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that the theme 
of this research, namely, the doctrine of 'tainted' debts 
in the context of the son's liability under the doctrine 
of Pious Obligation, has been examined in the light of the 
Dharmasastra and Arthasastra, as expounded by their 
commentators and digest-writers, as well as modern scholars 
and the judgments of the modern courts of law.
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In addition to the scope of this investigation, we 
remain aware of the existence of other avenues of research 
which would fruitfully be explored. Noteworthy among 
these are,the mahaiaras and inscriptions, which, although 
rich in relevant material, lie outside the brief of the 
•present study. These would repay close legal analysis in 
the future.
* * *
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SURETYSHIP DEBTS
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SURETYSHIP DEBTS
A.I.1 INTRODUCTION
Suretyship in general has been discussed by various 
1
writers. However, our purpose is different from theirs.
We are concerned, here, only with the Hindu son's liability
1. P.V.Kane, cit.above, H .D h ♦, III., pp.435-438 and pp.446- 
448. Kane discusses here main points in outline, including 
the sons' liability;
L.S.Joshi, Dharmakosa, vol.I, pt.2, (Wai, 1938), pp.661- 
667 which contains the smrtis and extracts from commentaries 
upon them on the subject at length; and at pp.667-715, 
we get informiaton, among others, on sons' liability to 
pay his father's suretyship debts;
H.T. Colebrooke, cit.above, Digest, vol^I, pp.226-262.
The discussion on the subject here is ample and sufficient.
J.Jolly, Recht und Sitte, (Strassburg, 1896), translated 
into English by B.Ghosh, Hindu Law and Custom, (Calcutta, 
1928), pp.221-223; K .P .Jayaswal, Manu and Yajhavalkya, 
(Calcutta, 1930), 200-202; Balkrishna, Sir Asutosh Memorial 
Volume, (Patna , 1926-28), pp.286-287; P.N.Sen, The General 
Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, (Calcutta, 1918), 320- 
323; N .C .Sen-Gupta, cit. above, Evolution of Ancient Indian 
L a w , 238-239; all these have mentioned the subject very 
briefly.
L.Sternbach, Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian L a w , I, 
(Delhi, 1 965) , pp. 153-1 98. We have here a long and 
detailed discussion on the topic. The responsibility of 
sons for sureties' obligation is discussed at pp. 186-195?
H.N. Chatterjee, Law of debi: in Ancient India (Thesis, 
D.Phil., Oxford, 1 969), pp. 'l6q-256. The subject is 
treated here quite at length and in a systematic manner.
J.D.M.Derrett, 'Suretyship in India: The classical
law and its aftermath'; (Recueils de la Societe Jean Bodin, 
XXVIII, 1974, 389-421, or see J.D.M.Derrett, E ssays in 
Classical and Modern Hindu Law, vol. 1, (Leiden, 1976), 
227-259. This contains not only a critical discussion 
on the subject, but also its evaluation in comparison 
with certain other contemporary legal systems.
473
to pay his father's suretyship debts. This question is 
mentioned in almost all the smrtis, but there appears
to be a difference of opinion among them. For
2 3"some of the sources, as G., Vas. and K.,
were of the opinion that the son was not
liable to pay the surety-money; Mn., Y.
and Vi. declared that the son had to pay the
surety-money in the case of surety for payment
only; Brh. and Katy. also in the case of
sureties for delivery of assets; Vyasa's
opinion was that the son was always liable
to pay the surety-money."
We have to examine, therefore, these various views in the 
light of the commentaries upon them, and try to ascertain,
1. Gautamadharmasutra, XII.38, q. in Dharmakosa, op.cit.,
p. 677; or see G.Biihler's Trans., Gautamap X I I .41, S.B.E., 
II, (Oxford, 1879), p. 241; Vasistha, 16.26, Dharmakos'a, 
op.cit., p.678; or Vasistha, XVI.31, G.Biihler, Trans.,
S.B.E., 14, (Oxford, 1882), p. 82. Also see Manu, VIII. 
159,160 and 162; Yajnavalkya, 11.53-54; Kautilya,
3.11.18, 3,16.9; Narada, 4.10. It may be noted here 
that Sternbach, op.cit., appears to suggest at p . 186, 
f.n.55 and at p . 190, f.n.61, that Narada did not mention 
this subject, i.e., son's liability, which seems to be 
incorrect (see Apararka on Yajnavalkya, 11.47, A.S.S.46, 
pt. II, (Poona, 1904), p. 648; and Dharmakos'a, op.cit., 
p.695); Brhaspati, XI.41, 51, according to J.Jolly's 
trans.. S.B.E.33, (Oxford, 1889), pp.327 & 329 respectively; 
or Brhaspati, X.118, as q. by Sternbach, op.cit., p. 187; 
also q. in Dharmakos'a, op.cit. , p. 671; Katyayana, 534, 
r . V . Kane, e d .& trans., cit.above, Ka ty ay a na smr t i , 
pp. 67, 22 3; Vyasa, Dharmakos a , op.cit., p. 676; q. in 
the Vivada-ratnakara, cit.above, p.44; the Smrticandrika, 
cit.above, p. 354; Apararka (on Yajh. 1 1 .53), op.cit., 
p. 656; Visnu, V I .41, vide, J.Jolly, trans., cit.above,
S.B.E.7, p . *46.
2. G. - Gautama; Vas. - Vasis+jha; K. - Kautilya; Mn. - Manu; 
Y. - Yajnavalkya; Vi. - Visnu; Brh. - Brhaspati; Katy. - 
Katyayana; see Sternbach, op.cit., Abbreviations, pp.1-23.
3. Cf. Kaut. 3.11.18, wherein he states, "Sons and grandsons 
shall bear liability for suretyship concerning life, 
marriage or land to which no restriction as to place or 
time applies"; vide R.P.Kangle, cit.above, trans., p.263.
4. L.Sternbach, op.cit., p . 186.
474
as far as possible;, the nature of suretyship debt so as to 
determine whether its inclusion into the category of 'tainted 
debts' is justifiable f(o^m the sastric point of view.
Definition of suretyship; Before we ascertain the 
nature of suretyship debts, it is essential that we should 
know its meaning and very briefly investigate the various 
kinds of sureties which existed according to the sast.raka.ras.
Vijnanesvara (c. 1125) defines suretyship thus:
f 1pratibhavyam nama visvasartham purusantarena saha samayah / 
That is to say that, "Pratibhavyam, suretyship, is a contract 
with another person with the object of creating confidence.5' 
Although this translation appears to give the gist of the
3
definition, it is literal and hence unclear. H , N .Chatterjee 
puts it, "Suretyship stands* for a contract or agreement with 
a person (other than the debtor) for creating confidence 
(in respect of the safety and security of the capital invested 
as a loan)." This translation seems to confine itself to 
suretyship in respect of debts only. But, in view of 
Vijnanesvara's treatment of the term, particularly in the 
context of his explaining the three main kinds of suretyships, 
it appears to be a narrow one. Moreover, the second party 
in respect of suretyship, need not necessarily be 'the debtor'. 
J.D.M. Derrett seems to have overcome this deficiency when 
he translates this definition as, "the word suretyship means 
the contract or agreement with a third party which has as 
its object (or 'for the purpose of') confidence (in the
4
second party)". According to Sternbach, however,
1. The Mitaksara on Yaj n .I I .53, B.S.Moghe, trans., Yajnavalkya- 
smrti Mitaksara Vyavaharadhyaya, (Bom., 1879), p . 116. Also, 
see P.V.Kane, cit.above, H.Dh., Ill, p.436, f.n.726.
J.H.Dave, e d . , Prthvichandra's Vyavaharaprakasa, (Bom., 1962), 
p.225; V . P .Bhandari, e d . , the VIramitrodaya-Vyavahara­
prakasa , (Benares, 1929), p.247.
2. J .R.Gharapure, trans., cit.above, Yajhavalkya-Smrti, vol.II,
1 pt.III, p.808.
3. cit.above, p. 175.
4. J.D.M.Derrett, 'Essays', cit.above, pp. (231-32).
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"this definition (of Vijnanesvara) is not 
detailed enough. From the point, of view of 
ancient Indian law, the contract of suretyship 
should be defined in' the following manner: 
contract of suretyship is a contract whereby 
a man binds himself to be personally answerable 
for obligation of another as an accessory 
debtor, in addition to the person principally 
liable." ^
But he himself (at p. 163) appears to contradict his own
definition when he denies that the surety is an accessory
debtor, saying that he (the surety) is liable only if the
2
principal debtor does not repay the debt.
With regard to the above criticism of the definition 
given by Vi jrianes'vara, J.D.M. Derrett observes,
"... jurists like Vijnanes'vara were highly 
trained minds, and versed in logic, 'whence 
it follows that the definition is deliberate. Now, 
it follows that the classical definition 
insists upon aspects which Sternbach would 
not necessarily see as uppermost: Firstly,
pratibhavyam is the actual contract itself, 
and not an abstract notion. There is a 
suretyship when an agreement to answer, if 
necessary, for another man's obligation is 
still valid and binding. Secondly, Sternbach's 
intrusion of the word 'personally' could give 
rise to misunderstandings. If anything is 
clear it is that the surety's obligation does 
not necessarily die with him (as Sternbach 
fully explains in his article) , and, moreover, 
the obligation attaches to the surety's 
property - indeed, without the liability of 
' the surety's property (the surety, as we
shall see, should be an independent, rich man) 
the institution of suretyship is a mockery.
Next, the classical definition insists that 
the institution exists for the purpose of
1. L.Sternbach, cit.above, p.23; also see, J.D.M.Derrett, ibid.
2. Also see, J.D.M.Derrett, ibid., f.n.7; here, J.D.M.Derrett 
observes, "the document Lekhapaddhati (ed. C.D.Dalai and
G .K .Shrigondekar, Gaekwad Or. ser., 19, Baroda, 1925), 
at pp.19-21 in our Appendix would make the sureties liable 
along with, or rather indistinguishably from the principal 
debtor. The general law would seem to have been that the 
liability of a surety was conditional upon the principal's 
default". See p. (232).
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inducing confidence: and there can, 
therefore, be a suretyship in the eyes of 
the Hindu jurists though no definite or even 
envisaged obligation is in question at the 
time of the agreement. As we shall see, 
the Hindu jurist was interested in the 
confidence aspect rather more than in the 
debt aspect: though this is not to suggest
that there was any defect in the agreement - 
evidently there was no suretyship without an 
explicit undertaking to indemnify the third 
party in case the confidence should turn out 
to be unjustified. And this would apply 
with equal force and with equal validity 
whether the confidence turned out to be 
unjustified by chance, misfortune or fraud: 
j what is in view may as well be speculation 
j as a normal business undertaking. The 
I institution of suretyship existed to enable 
j risks to be taken, and not only risks in 
j respect of the second party's honesty and 
integrity."1 %
Thus, it appears from the above discussion that suretyship, 
as envisaged by the sastra, may mean an agreement between 
the surety and a third party mainly for the purpose of 
inducing confidence in respect of the second party, who 
might be, among other things, an intending debtor. We may 
turn, now, to the kinds of sureties available according to 
the sastras.
The classification of sureties: A person may stand
as a surety for another in several ways, and hence the
sastrakaras mention several kinds of sureties. Thus, Manu
2
speaks of only two kinds of sureties: 1. for appearance,
1. Ibid., pp. (232-33).
2. Yo yasya pratibhus tisthed darsanayeha manavah / 
adarsayan sa tarn tasya prayaccet sva-dhanadrnam //
Manu, VIII.158, vide Dharmakos'a, op.cit., p. 662; G.Jha, 
cit.above, trans., Manusmrti, vol.IV, pt.1, p.201; and 
his H .L .S ., p . 180; H .T .Colebrooke, cited above, p.243.
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and 2. for payment;** whereas Yajnavalkya,^ Narada, Visnu^
5and Medhatlthi on Manu, VIII.158 refer to three kinds of
sureties, adding one more to the above list of Manu, namely
the surety for confidence; Brhaspati^ adds a fourth one:
surety for delivering the assets. It is said that "there
is not much difference between payment and delivery of assets
7
which are separately mentioned by Brihaspati." This is,
1. Darsanapratibhavye --- / dana pratibhuvi prete dayadanapi
dapayeta // Manu, VIII.160; vide Dharmakosa, op.cit.,
p. 6 64; G.Jha, Manusmrt i , op.cit., p.203; G.Jha, H .L .S ., 
pp. 185-186.
2. Darsane pratyaye dane pratibhavyam vidhlyate /Yajn.II.53, 
cit.above, see f.n.6; also see Dharmakos'a, op.cit., p.665;
G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cit., p . 177; V .P .Bhandari, ed., the 
VIramitrodaya, Vyavahara-prakasa, (Benares, 1932), p.248;
H.T.Colebrooke, op.cit., p.239.
3. Upasthanaya danaya pratyayaya tathaiva ca / trlvidhah 
pratibhurdrstastrisve varthesu suribhih // Narada, 4/118;
Dharmakosa, op.cit., p. 669; H.T.Colebrooke, op.cit., 
p. 237 .
4. Darsane pratyaye dane pratibhavyam vidhlyate / Visnu, 4.41; 
Dharmakos'a, op.cit. , p. 662; J.Jolly's trans., cit.above,
S.B.E.7, p.46.
5. Medhatlthi on Manu, VIII.158, vide G.Jha, Manusmrt i , 
o p .cj t ., p . 201.
6. Darsane pratyaye dane rnidravyarpane tatha / 
catusprakarah pratibhuh sastredrsto manlsibhih // Br.XI.41;
Dharmakos'a, op.cit., p. 671; Br. q. in the VIramitroday a , 
op.cit..- p. 24 7; J.Jolly, trans., cit.above, S.B.E.33, 
p. 327; G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cit., p . 173; H.T. Colebrooke, 
op.cit., p.233; P.V.Kane, cit.above, H .D h ., III, p.436, 
f.n.-727; Br. q. by Apararka on Yajn.II.53, cit.above,
A.S.S.46, pt. II, p.6 55; Br. q. in the Smrticandrika,
V v a .-kanda, II., p . 148; vide J .R .Gharpure, trans., (Bombay, 
1950), p.276; P.N.Sen, The General Principles of Hindu 
Jurisprudence, (Calcutta, 1918), p.320; R.K.Ranade, (1950), 
Bom.L.R., J., p.81; G.Jha, Trans., the Vivada-cintaman i , 
(Baroda, 1942), p.22; P .D .Vidyalankara, ed., The Vivada- 
ratnakara, (Calcutta, 1887), p. 40.
7. R.K. Ranade, op.cit., p. 82.
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1 -  7 however, a debatable point. To these four kinds, Harita
3adds a fifth: a surety for fearlessness; Katyayana increases
the list by two more terms: a surety for carrying out
4 5proceedings and a surety for swearing. Vyasa and Pitamaha'
add the eighth type of surety called a surety for presentation
of the delivered pledge. Kautilya, like Gautama and Vasistha,
does not directly give us any list, but, by implication, he
seems to refer to the surety for payment, that for safety
of life, surety in respect of return of land by tenants and
7that concerning marriage. Also, according to the Vivada-
1. According to the Vivada-cintaman i , op.cit., p.22, these 
seem to differ in that the payment is giving from one's 
own, while restoring means returning a thing to him from 
whom it was borrowed.
2. Abhaye pratyaye dane upasthane 1rthadarsane / 
pancasvesu prakaresu grahyohi pratirbudhaih //
Harita q. in G.Jha, cit.above, H .L .S ., p . 178; Dharmakosa, 
cit.above, p.661; also, q. in the Smrticandrika, op.cit., 
p. 148.
3. Danopasthanavadesu visvasa-sapathaya ca /
lagnakam karayed evam yathayogam viparyaye // Katy..530.
P.V.Kane, ed.& trans., cit.above, Katyayanasmrt i , pp.66,
222; q.by Apararka on Yajn.II.53, op.cit., p. 655;
H.T.Colebrooke, cited above, p.239; G.Jha, cit.above,
H .L .S ., p . 178; quoted also in the Smrticandrika, op.cit., 
p. 148; The Vivada-ratn'akara , op. cit., at p. 41 seems ho read 
'dapayet' for 1karayet1; The Vivada-cintamani, op.cit., 
pp.22-23; Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.673.
4. Lekhye 1krte ca divye va danapratyayadarsane / 
grhitabandhopasthane rnidravyarpai;e tatha // Vyasa;
q. in Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.676; The Smrticandrika, op.cit., 
p. 148; G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cit., p . 185.
5. Adhipalakrtastvadhirmitakalopalaksitah / na cetsa 
dhanine dattastasyadhestaih samrpanam*// Pitamaha
Dharmakosa, op.cit., p.675; The Smrticandrika, op.cit., 
p . 150; G.Jha, H .L .S ., op.cit., p . 182.
6. Kautilya, 3.11.14 reads 'pretasya putrah  pratibhuvo v a 1 /
vide R.P.Kangle, cit.above, e d . , Kautiliya Arthasastra, I, 
p . 113; and trans., II, p. 262.
7. Jlvita-vivaha-bhumi-pratibhavyam --- vaheyuh / Kaut.3.11.18
ibid., I., p . 113; and ibid., II., p.263, f.n.18;
For various interpretations of the above see Sternbach, 
cit. above, pp.189-90, f.n.60, and Derrett, cited above, 
f.n.7 .
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ratn'akara of Candesvara, a surety should be demanded in 
cases where there is a possibility of breach of faith.
Thus, the number of sureties is likely to increase with the 
increase in the number of situations involving a possibility 
of breach of faith. We should note, however, that this 
classification appears defective in that it seems, at 
least in some cases, more artificial than real: take, for
example, the case of the surety for delivery of assets
(Brhaspati) and that for presentation of the delivered pledge 
(Vyasa and Pitamaha). If we look at the basic nature of the 
surety (guarantee) required in both these cases, there seems 
hardly any difference. In these cases, it is not the owner­
ship of assets nor the pledge that matters, but the purpose 
for which the surety is sought and given. Thus it is the 
delivery of goods (assets or pledge) involved which is
assured, and from this point of view there need not be any
distinction between the two. Looked at from this angle all 
those sureties which assure doing of an act (such as swearing 
or carrying out proceedings or performing an ordeal etc.) 
or otherwise, on the part of the second-party, may be placed 
in one class.
It may also be noted that there seems no uniformity
of opinion among the sastrakaras as regards the classification
of sureties. The number of sureties mentioned by them seems
2to vary. Thus, Vyasa names seven sureties, Katyayana
mentions numbers 1,2,3,6, and 7, i.e., five sureties, while
3Harita has enumerated all, 1 to 5;' but Pitamaha mentions
1 . Vastutastu yatra yatr'avisvasasambhavastatra tatra 
vis'vasaya rajna pratibhurdapya ityevanugatam / 
the Vivada-ratnakara, op.cit., p. 43.
2. See above f.n.4 at p. 478, also J.R. Gharpure, trans., 
S m r .candrika, p . 148; first edn., (Bom., 1950), p.277.
3. See above, p. 478, f.n. 3 and 2 respectively; also 
R.K.Ranade, op.cit., pp.82-83. According to him Vyasa 
mentions only five sureties which seems incorrect.
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only the last one. But those which are perhaps the earliest 
ones, such as Gautama and Vasistha, mention none by name 
tn spite of the fact that they were aware of the existence 
of 'suretyship1. Otherwise, how could they lay down the 
rule thac sons are not liable to pay their father's surety­
ship debts? Whatever they might have thought of the term, 
it is fairly clear that, in the context here, it refers 
to the surety for payment. If this is sc, it may be correct 
to say that the conception of suretyship originated, perhaps, 
in respect of debt-liability. Why? Probably because of 
mistrust, either real or imaginary, on the part of money­
lenders, in respect of the ability and/or intentions of the 
would-be debtors to repay their dues; or as suggested by 
CandesVara, due to a possibility of breach of faith (see 
„ above p.479); or perhaps due to the lack of ^initiative 
on the part of the money-lenders to take risks. And, 
as we all know, in the world of 'shortages' and 'needs', 
unless credit-facility is available life would be almost 
unbearable. It may be to help solve this problem, due to 
the inherent human reaction to the distressed condition 
of fellow human beings, that in most c a s e s /  at least by
1 . Pratibhavyavaniks'ulkamadyadyutadanda na putran
adhyabhaveyuh / Gaut.XII.41, cit.above, see f.n.1 at p.473
Pratibhavyam vrthadanamakshikam ... na putro 
daturmahati // Vas.XVI.31, cit.above, see f.n.1 at p.473
2. For the exception see,
'Grhitva bandhakam yatra darsanesya stnito bhavet / 
vina pitra dhanam tasmad dapyah syat tadrnam sutah // 
Katy. 534 ;
vide P.V.Kane, cit.above, p.67, (cf. Medha. on Manu,
VIII. 162) .
Kane translates (at p.223, ibid) "where a person becomes 
a surety for the appearence of a man after receiving a 
pledge from him, the son of the surety should be made to 
pay the money from that pledge in the absence of the father 
(i.e., in the case of his death or of his having gone 
■ abroad). The Mita. on Yajn.II.54, seems to extend this 
concept and applies to a surety for assurance. Vide 
J .R.Gharpure, trans., cit.above, pp.810-811. With reference 
to Katyayana's use of surety for appearance in this context, 
Gharpure, at p.811, f.n.2, says "the mention of the surety 
for appearance includes the surety by assurance."
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implication, * the person who undertakes suretyship does
it out of a feeling of kindness towards the plight of the
would-be debtor. The act of helping the debtor on the
part of the surety undoubtedly carries with it the risk
of himself paying the amount involved (see Proverbs 6:1,
11:15, 20:16), in the case of failure on the part of the
debtor^ to pay his debts. This attitude of taking risks
for no visible returns - except, perhaps, a kind of self-
satisfaction one gets out of one's own good deeds - on the
part of sureties in general, might have encouraged even the
money-lenders to take risks themselves (see J,D.M.Derrett's
observation above at p.476). Now, even if the above discussion
3
in respect of the number of sureties is very sketchy, it
1. Trayah pararthe klisyanti saksinah pratibhuh kulam /
Manu/VIII.169; vide G.Jha, ed., cit.above, Manusmrt i , 
vol.II, p . 157; "Three persons suffer for the sake of 
others: witness, surety and the judge"; vide G.Jha,
trans., cit.above, vol.IV, pt.I, p.221. It may be noted
here that one of the two interpretations given to this 
part of the verse by Medhatlthi runs,
"Athava parasyartham kurvantah klesmapnuvanti, 
na hyesam svarthagandho 1 styato balanna karayitavyah'';
i.e., 'or ... these persons undergo suffering for doing 
the work of other persons, —  ' and they have not the
slightest selfish motive, ..." (ibid.). We need not go
into the controversy regarding the meaning of the word 
kulam in the verse (reference may be made to G.Biihlor, 
trans., Laws of Manu, S.E.B.25, (Oxford, 1886), p.284, 
f .n .169. In The law relating to the joint Hindu family 
(Cal., 1885), K . K . Bhattacharya , at p. 26, after a briel: 
discussion, concludes that 'family' seems to be appropriate 
meaning of the word kulam here, rather than 'judge'; and 
shows by analogy, the similarities between surety and joint 
Hindu family, so far as their sacrifices for others are 
concerned. This view in the context appears more convincing 
though it may be noted that Kula is well known as (inferior) 
court.
2. See above, f.n.2 at p.475; also, see 'na pratibhavyam anyat', 
Kaut.3.11.15 (vide, R.P.Kangle, p . 113); J.D.M.Derrett,
cit.above, f.n. 2 at p.475, translated the above verse, 
'suretyship operates in this way only (i.e., in the absence 
‘ of the debtor, his heirs, or co-obligors)'.
3. For fuller discussion see H .N .Chatterjee, cit.above, 
pp. 177-187.
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seems sufficient, from our point of view, in conjunction 
with the discussion on the definition of suretyship (see 
above pp. 474-476 ) to reveal the significance of suretyship 
debts. Accordingly, it would appear that the suretyship 
came into being, unspontaneously, to instil confidence 
whenever there seemed a possibility of a breach of faith.
The earliest such circumstance seems to refer to the payment 
of debts (though one cannot be positively sure of this).
And, though in most cases a suretyship seems to have been 
undertaken out of sympathy and generosity, it carried risks 
all the same.
Having this information in the background, we may 
proceed, now, to enquire into the opinions of the sastrakaras 
in respect of the nature of the suretyship debts of Hindu 
fathers and their sons' liability therefor.
A .I .2 SURETYSHIP DEBTS AND THE LIABILITY OF 
THE SURETY'S SONS
(a) The Dharmas'astra Vi e w : According to the sastrakaras
speaking generally, sons are not liable to pay the surety
2 3debts. Thus both Gautama and Vasistha declared that the
surety-money shall not involve the son. Their statement,
however, is in general terms and as observed above
there is no direct reference to any particular surety as such.
1. Medhatlthi on Manu,VIII.169.
"It is only on being requested by another person that the witness, 
the surety and the judge should appear as a witness, stand 
surety or investigate cases - and not forcibly (thrusting 
themselves); hence if these persons should volunteer to do 
it, their action has no validity."
Vide G.Jha, trans., cit. above, p. 221.
2. Gaut. XII.41, (for the text, see f.n.1 at p.480 above)
3. Vasistha, XVI.26, (for text, see f.n.1 at p.480 above)
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Manu states, Pratibhavyam vrtha-danam aksikam saurikam
A
ca yat danda-s'ulkavasesam ca na putro-datumarhati //
which means, among other things, that where there is money
due by a surety, his son shall not be obliged to pay. But
immediately afterwards he explains that this rule shall apply
to the case of 'surety for appearance'; "in the case of the
death of the surety for payment, however, the king shall
2
make the heirs also to pay up." (An exceptional rule laid
down by Manu will be discussed below at p.486). According 
— 3
to Yajnavalkya, however, sureties for appearance and sureties
for assurance are themselves liable, and in the case of
sureties for payment, even their sons are liable. He further
states that where a surety for appearance or for assurance
dies, the sons of such surety need not pay the debt, but the
sons are liable in the case of surety for payment. Brhaspati,
' 4too, agrees with others so far as the general rule is
concerned, but further declares that in case the surety
defaults in respect of a suretyship for payment or for
delivery of assets (of the debtor), his sons are liable to
5 6pay the debt. Visnu remains in favour of exempting the sons
1. Manu? VIII.159; vide V.N.Mandlik, e d . , Manavadharmasastra , 
(Bombay, 1886), p.975.
2. Manu, VIII.160; vide G.Jha, trans., cit.above, p.203.
3. Durs'arie pratyaye dane pratibhavyam vidhiyate/adhyau 
tu vitathe dapyavitarasya suta api // Yajn. 11.53,
vide Dharmakos'a, cit.above, p. 665.
Darsfana pratibhuryatva mrtah pratyayiko1 pi va / 
na tat putrarnam dadhyurdadhyurdanaya yah sthitah //
Yajn. 11.54, vide Dharmakos'a, ibid., p.666.
4. Sauraksikam Vrthadanam Kamakrodhapratisrutam / Pratibhavyam 
dandasulkase^am putranna dapayet // Br.x 118, vide
Dharmakos'a, cit. above, p. 708.
5. "... both the two last (sureties), and in default of them 
their sons (are liable for the debt), when the debtors break 
their promises (to pay the debt)". Brhaspati, XI.41,
vide J.Jolly, trans., cit.above, p.327.
6. "Darsane pratyaye dane pratibhavyam vidhlyate /
adyau tu vitathe dapyavitarasya suta api // Visnu, vl.41, 
Dharmakos'a, op.cit., p.662 .
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from the payment of surety-debt except in case cf the surety
for payment on the part of their father. Narada is in
agreement on this subject with others so far as the general
rule is concerned. Katyayana does not positively lay down
any general rule excluding the sons from the liability of
suretyship-debts of their father as has been done by Gautama,
Vasistha, and Manu or Brhaspati; though he appears so
(when he says, "but a debt which is ‘tainted1 (sadosam)
2
need never be paid (by the sons etc.")) to convey this 
sense. Bur, perhaps following somewhat thoughtlessly the 
latter part of the statement made by Brhaspati (see above) 
he declares that the surety's sons are liable to pay the 
debts in respect of a surety for payment or a surety for
3
delivery of assets (of the debtor).
1. "... dadyatputrastu paitrakam / ... pratibhavyakrtam
vina // Nar.IV.10, Dharmakos’a , op.cit., p.695.
2. Katya. 554, vide P.V.Kane, cit.above, p.228, and for the 
word sadosam see p. 69.
3. " ... But the latter two and in their absence their sons 
also (are liable to pay) if the debtor fails in his 
promise." Katya., 536, ibid., pp.223-24. Kane, in the 
f.n. 536, comments,
"This is the same as Br. p.327, V.41. This verse 
obviously refers to the four kinds of sureties 
mentioned by Brhaspati. Vide note on 530. 1 The
laiter t w o ' - mean the surety for dana (repayment 
of debt) and for rnidravyarpana (delivery of the 
goods of the debtor to the creditor). The son 
of the surety for appearance and honesty is not 
liable to pay his father's suretyship debt, but 
the sons of the other two kinds of sureties are 
liable to pay (but not the grandsons)."
Also, K.N.Chatterjee, op.cit., at p . 199, f.n.5, observes,
"The contradiction may be accounted for when we 
consider that the text of Brhaspati reconstructed 
in the light of the quotation appearing in 
different sources, does not claim to be genuine 
Brhaspatismrti in its original form. There are 
cases where the commentators and digest-writers 
ascribe wrongly verses to the author to whom 
they do not properly belong."
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"Katyayana shares the verse 53 6 with Brhaspati 
x.78 and it may be stated here that this 
provision does not fit at all with his other 
statement regarding the number of sureties 
(in the verse 530, where the sureties are 
stated to be five in number). In that 
' list the first two are surety for payment 
and that for appearance and in these two 
cases, as we shall see subsequently the obligation 
of the sons are different. In the case of 
the surety for payment the sons are bound 
to pay, while in the case of the surety for 
appearance they are exempted. Under the 
circumstances it is quite reasonable to 
ascribe the verse to Brhaspati only, where 
it fits properly in the context of the four 
types of sureties (x.77). This is strengthened 
by the fact that in the Smrticandrika, 
Madanaratnapradipa, Sarasvativilasa, and 
Vyavaharaprakasa, this verse has been 
attributed to Brhaspati only."^
s
Also, Vyasa says,
"Upon a failure of assurance, or the non­
performance of a writing, ordeal, or appearance, 
the sureties shall be made to pay the debt; 
one should not compel their sons to pay. The 
sureties for payment and dispute s h a l ^ b e  
compelled to pay and their sons also."
From this it appears that evdn Vyasa was conscious of the 
general rule, though in details he seems to differ from others.
In regard to the subject of payment of surety-debt 
by the surety's descendants (sons and grandsons), we come
1. H.N.Chatterjee, op.cit., pp. 199-200.
2. q. in the Smrticandrika, (p. 151), vide J.R.Gharpure, 
trans., cit.above, p. 281.
Vipratyaye lekhyadivyadarsane cakrte sati / 
rnam dapyah pratibhuvah putram tesam na dapayet / 
ddnava-dapratibhuvau dapyau tatputrakau tatha // 
Vyasa, Dharmakosa, op.cit., p. 676.
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across a special rule. Thus, Katyayana declares that,
"The debt (of the grandfather) arising 
from suretyship need never be paid by the 
grandson; even the son need pay only the 
principal.(of the suretyship) debt of his 
father."
Vyasa1s contribution in this respect appears identical to 
that of Katyayana, when he says, "the son only shall pay
2the debt of his father incurred by his becoming a surety, ‘ 
to the extent of capital only (and not the interest). He 
clearly absolves the grandsons of the surety from this 
liability.
Lastly, we have from the sastrakaras what appears to
be an exception to the general rule. Thus, according to
3 4Manu and Katyayana, it seems that in cases where the surety\
accepts security from the second party in return for his 
accepting suretyship, even the sons are liable to pay the 
surety-money, to the extent of the value of the security.
The text of Manu does not mention the liability of the son 
of the surety as such, but the context is so clear (i.e.,
1 in the event of the death of the surety other than that 
for payment' see Manu, VIII.161-162) that by implication he
1. Pratibhavyagatam pautrairdatavyam na tu tatkvacit / 
putrenapi samam deyamrnam sar vatra pa i tricam // Katy. 561;
vide P.V.Kane, ibid., pp.70, 232-233. This verse appears 
also in Sulapani's Dlpakalika, vide here Gharpure, op.cit., 
(2nd;edn.) at p. 811. It may be pointed out here that 
according to Colebrooke's trans., (cit.above, p.255) of 
this verse, the word sarvatra in the original, is translated 
as 'in every instance', which Kane seems to have ignored.
2. H.T.Colebrooke, ibid., p.254.
Rnam paitamaham pautrah pratibhavyagatam sutah / 
samam dadyat tatsutau tu na dapyaviti niscayah // Vyasa. 
Vide, Dharmakos'a, op.cit., p.676 . It may be pointed out 
here that the translation made by J.R.Gharpure, (trans., 
the Smrticandrika, (p.152), op.cit., at p.283) is so literal
as to render it almost impossible to understand.
3'. Manu, VIII. 161 read with 162; for a detail observation, 
see H .N .Chatterjee, cit.above, pp.194-195.
4. See above f.n.2 at p. 480.
1
almost certainly refers to the son of the surety.' Katyayana 
is quite clear on this point.
The above discussion in respect of the sastrakaras' 
views on the subject may be summed up before we turn to the 
opinions of commentators upon them and digest-writers.
Thus, it may be noted here that (1) most of the s'astrakaras 
agree on the general rule that the sons of the surety need 
not pay a surety-debt; (2) however, again the majority of
them except certain surety-debts from the general rule;
(3) then, by a special rule, they restrict the liability, 
in respect of these excepted surety-debts, to sons and to 
the extent of the capital only; and (4) lastly, an exception 
to the general rule is laid down (by Katyayana and Manu) 
whereby the liability of the. sons is extended even to the 
other cases of suretyship, provided the father-surety has 
received security (in form of money or pledge etc.) for his 
becoming surety.
The commentators and digest-writers: According to
2 ' the Maskarlbhasya on Gautama XII.38 (vide Dharmakos'a, p.677),
the term pratibhavyam signifies, as mentioned by Vyagra (ibid.)
three sureties: for appearance, trust and payment. And
relying on the rule of Manu, concerning the surety for payment
Maskarl seems to interpret this verse so as to hold heirs
of the surety for payment liable to pay the surety-money,
after the surety's death. Haradatta, also, taking into
account the parallel passages of Manu and Yajnavalkya,
restricts the application of this general rule of Gautama
1 . "Hence the words should be construed to mean 'son of the surety 
to whom money had been made over' as it is the son that 
forms the subject of the context; as for the surety himself 
his liability would follow from the mere fact of his being 
a Ksurety!"
Medha. on Manu,VIII.162, vide, G.Jha, op.cit., p.206.
2. Pratibhuvastrayah / --- 'Danapratibhuvi prete dayadan-
api dapayet' iti Manuvacanat / Maskarlbhasya, 
vide Dharmakosa, cit.above, pp. 677-78.
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1
to the sureties for personal appearance of an offender.
The Vivada-cintamani renders surety-money here as 'money
2due 'on account of standing surety for appearance and trust 
-- shall not be paid by sons.' The VIramitrodaya and the 
Vivada-ratnakara hold similar vievvs. According to them 
sons are liable to pay surety-money in respect of the surety 
for payment. Thus, it appears from these comments that both 
the commentators and the digest-writers have expounded the 
meaning of 'surety-money' (in Gaut.XII.41) in the light of 
what Manu and Yajnavalkya have stated on the subject.
_ 5
Medhatlthi Qn Manu^ VIII.159, explains the denial of 
the son's liability by way of a question and answer: "How
could there be any idea of the son's liability to pay the
I
surety-money, etc., when there were not debts incurred by 
his father?" What is implied here is quite clear. Where 
(i.e., in cases of surety for appearance and guarantee) no 
debt is incurred by the father, there is no question of 
son's liability. Put he goes on and points out a situation 
in which even if the father has incurred no debt, his mere 
undertaking to pay for others would bring about the same 
result as if he has, in fact, taken a loan. Thus he seems 
to explain what Manu states in the following verse: the
1. Haradatta on Gautama, XII.41, vide G.Buhler, cit.above, 
trans., S.B.E.,2, p.241, f.n.41; also, Gaut.XII.38, 
v i d e >Gokhale's e d . , (Poona, 1910), p.97.
2. Vide G.Jha, trans., cit.above, pp.28-29; H.T.Colebrooke, 
cit.above, p.306.
3. VIramitrodaya on Yajn.,II.47, vide J.R.Gharpure, trans., 
cit.above, p.787.
4. "If the father were surety for payment --- must be paid
by his son; as is ordained in the system of jurisprudence." 
Vide, H.T.Colebrooke, op.cit., p.306.
5. Kathampunah putrasya pratibhavyadipraptistarhi tadrnasya 
pitra'grhTtatvat naisadosah yadyen datavyatayangikrtamtad- 
grhitaphalatvadgrhltameva.../
Vide V.N.Mandlik, cit.above, p.975; also, see G .J h a ,trans., 
op.cit., p . 202.
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heirs of fhe surety for payment should pay the surety-money
after the death of the surety. Moreover, after referring
1 ?to another smrti (Yajn.II.54), he explains" that this rule 
does not apply to the sureties for appearance or confidence 
(for the surety for appearance includes, here, the surety
3
for trust also). It may be noted that the use of the word
4dayada in the text of Manu, here, though it includes sons, 
has the wider meaning. It may include others'"' in absence 
of the sons (for further discussion see below pp.493-494 ).
Thus, it signifies that the liability in the case of surety 
has reference to the property of the surety. Indeed, without 
the liability of the surety's property, the institution ofg
suretyship is a mockery (see above pp.475-476).
_7 ~
The Mitaksara (on Yajn.53) explains, by giving examples, 
what is meant by the three kinds of sureties 'and states that
1. Ibid., also Raghavananda on Manu,VIII.160, vide V.N.Mandlik, 
op. cit. , p. 976’.
2. Medha. on Manu,VIII.160, G.Jha, ibid., p.204.
3. Pratibhavyamityatra darsanapratyayapratibhuvau. The 
Vivada-ratnakara, vide P .V.Vidyalankara, e d . , cited above, 
p. 57; also, see G.Jha, Manusmrti-notes, pt.II, (Calcutta, 
1924), p.545; Sarvajnanarayana on Manu,VIII.160, agrees,
'Dardaneti pratyayasyapyupalaksnam /' Vide, V.N.Mandlik, 
op.cit., p .976.
4. 'dayadah putrah1 / The Vivada-ratnakara, op.cit., 
at p.43. "The word dayada is confined to sons only."
The Smrticandrika, (p.152), vide J .R .Gharpure, op.cited,
p. 283 ,
5. Yo 'yam pratibhavyam na putro datumarhatiti purvoktavidhih 
sa dars'anapratibhukarmani/ pitrkrte/vijneyah/aanartham 
punaryah pratibhuh sthitah tasminmrte rikthabhajah
api dapayet kimuta putran / Govindaraja on Man u ,VII I .160, 
Dharmakos'a, o p . c i t . , p . 664 ;
Dayadanrkthagrahinonatu putraneva / Sarvajnanarayana, 
on Manu,VIII.160, Mandlik, cit.above, p. 976;
Danapratibhuvi --- mrte sati dayadan putranapi
dayayet putrebhyah dapayedityarthah / Ramachandra on 
, Manu,VIII.160, ibid.
6. J.D.M.Derrett, cited above, Essays , at p. (232).
7. Vide J .R .Gharpure, cit.above, p.809.
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in the case of the last (surety for payment) sons should
be made to pay, which according to him means (by implication)
that the sons of the first two (i.e., surety for appearance
1
and surety for assurance) should not be made to pay.
Vijnanesvara makes an important point when he says, "By
mentioning 'the sons' it has been indicated that grandsons
2
should not bo made to pay." While commenting on the 
following verse, he even restricts the son's liability to 
the principal amount only; and in support cites Vyasa. 
Katyayana (see above p.486) seems to agree with this rule of 
Vyasa. The Vivada-cintamani (on Yajn.II.54), however, appears 
to extend the son's liability to pay even in respect of the
4
surety for deliverance of assets. We have already referred 
to Brhaspati's view in respect of the son's liability to pay 
in case his father was surety 'for the delive'ry of the
property by the debtor' (see above p. 4 83 ). In this kind
of surety, says Devanna-bhatta,
"This is what comes to be stated: 'whether
it be debt or any other thing, such as money
etc., I shall pay to you' in this way where
a surety has given an undertaking, there the 
surety shall be made to pay; or in his absence 
his son shall be made to pay."^
Moreover, Vyasa (see above p.485) may be cited in support, 
who states that in case of suretyship for payment and dispute.
/ _ _  _
1. Sulapani on Yajn.II.53, ibid.
2. See f.n.1 und 2 above at p.486.
3. Rnam paitamabam pautrah pratibhavyagatam sutah / 
samam dadyattatsutau tu na dapyaviti niscayah //
Vyasa quoted in the Mitaksara on Yajn.II.54, vide, 
Dharmakosa, cited aobve, p.666.
4. Vide G.Jha, trans., cited above, p.23.
5'. The Smrticandrika, (p. 151), vide J. R. Gharpure , trans., 
op.cit., p .281.
491
the sureties and their sons are to be made to pay. Regarding 
the latter, the explanation runs,
"In the .case of a surety in a dispute, 
he having undertaken to pay the proved  ^
amount as well as the amount of penalty, 
like the surety for payment, when he 
is available, he himself shall be made 
to pay; otherwise his son."2
Thus, .besides the surety for payment, the son's liability 
seems to have extended to cover these two cases. But on 
what basis? The basis seams to lie in the express undertaking 
given by the father in these cases (as explained in the 
Smrticandrik a , see above p.490). Goods, whether property or 
a deposit or a pledge, do represent value in money. And in 
this sense an agreement or a promise to pay money (debt) may 
be equated with that of delivery of assets or a promise to 
pay whatever a court would decide in respect of the liability 
of the debtor. This might well fit into the explanation 
offered by Medhatlthi on Manu,VIII.159 (see above pp.488-489). 
We may conclude, therefore, that the whole basis for the son's 
liability to pay surety-money lies in the promise or an 
express undertaking on his father's part to pay in the case 
of default made by the debtor.
On the point of the son's liability in respect of
suretyship, involving acceptance of security (by way of pledge
or a deposit) for becoming surety by the father, we have a
3few comments to consider. The gloss of Medhatlthi on Manu, 
VIII.162, may be stated in brief as follows; Before becoming
1. H .N .Chatterjee renders it 'fine'; it may be noted here 
that if this is to be taken as correct meaning, then, 
the liability incurred by the father, though by way of
a surety-undertaking, does include 'tainted debt' in the 
form of fine, and as such it might be contrary to the 
rule that sons are not liable to pay the tainted debt 
of their father. In fact the reference is to the court 
fee payable by the defeated debtor.
2. Ibid.
3. Vide G.Jha, trans., cit. above, pp.205-206.
surety, other than for payment, the father accepts security 
from the debtor, who instructs him to pay his debt in case he 
is unable to pay, out of the security. The father-surety dies, 
His son succeeds him and inherits, or takes into his 
possession, among other things, the security. The liability of 
the father follows from his being surety. But the son's liabilit 
lies in his inheriting or getting possession of the debtor’s 
security.^ In both cases, however, the liability is limited 
to the extent of the value of the security and no more. Thus, 
Medhatlthi's interpretation appears to mean that the son's
liability in such cases, as the surety for appearance or
2 . . . .assurance, " is attached to the security in his hands, and that.
it extends to the value of the security. The Vivada-ratnakara
( q. by Jagannatha ) seems to hold similar view. However,
4
according to Halayudha this kind of arrangement must not only 
be known but also has to be proved, otherwise the case would 
come under the general rule.
5The Smrticandrika renders Katyayana (534) thus,
" When after taking a pledge, one has stood surety for
appearance, there, after proving the claim, he shall be
0
compelled to pay the debt, and his son also." The rule as 
stated, contrary to Manu's, seems to apply during the surety's 
life-time as well as after his.death. But one might be right 
in interpreting this to mean, as Kane has rendered, i.e., in 
case of his death or his having gone abroad (see f.n.2 at 
p . 480 above). Moreover, having known the fact that the pledge
1. "Only on account of the fact that he had received money"; 
The Smrticandrika, on Manu,VIII.162, vide J.R.Gharpure, 
trans., op.cit., p.283.
2. See above f.n.2 at p . 4 80.
3. H.T.Colebrooke, op.cit., p.250.
4. q. by Jagannatha, ibid.
5. See f.n. 2 at p . 4 80 above for the text and its translation.
6. Vide J.R.Gharpure, trans., op.cit., p.282.
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was received by the surety (as, also, Medhatlthi on Manu,
VIII.161), the claim must be proved before compelling j
compliance thereto from his son. Jagannatha'1' agrees to this view, 
but appears to visualise the circumstance arising only after 
the surety is dead.
In short it may be said of this exception that in a
case of the surety for appearance or assurance, if the
father-surety accepts security against the liability to pay,
2after his death or in his absence abroad his son would be 
liable to pay the security-money to the extent of the value 
of the security in his hands, provided the claim as to the 
existence of this arrangement is proved.
We have found nothing more from the commentators than 
what the sastrakaras have already told us regarding the 
special rule (see p. 486), and thus, why the liability in 
connection with the suretyship-debts mentioned therein should 
be inherited only by the sons (of the surety), remains some­
thing of a puzzle. But how could it be inherited in the first 
place? Let us try to find an answer.
We have already noted above in connection with the 
interpretation of the term dayada in the text of Manu (see 
p*489 )f as explained by Govindaraja (see above p.489,f •n.5), 
that the liability, in the case of a deceased surety for 
payment, has reference to the property of the surety. Also, we 
have come across (see f.n.4 at p. 489) the different view of 
Devanna'-bhatta, on the subject, for he thought that the term 
dayada should be confined to sons only: because, in the above 
sense (i.e., as rendered by Govindaraja) it becomes contrary 
to the statement of ~---— - -----------------
1. H.T.Colebrooke, trans., cited above, 248.
2. Dravyagrahane (na) pratibhavyangikare tu
putrapautrabhyam api savrddhikam deyam. Tatha ca 
Katyayanah --- ;
The Vyavahara-mayukha, cited above, p.177.
This seems to be an exceptional rule. See also 
V.N. Mandalika, cit.above, p. 68.
_  1 V
Vyasa and Brhaspati." Moreover, we have discussed with
appreciation (see above p.490), his principle making 'the
terms of agreement' as the basis (with which he wants) to 
determine all the suretyship cases.
H.N.Chatterjee remarks,
"This interpretation of Devanna-bhatta, if 
taken up in the light of the question raised 
• by Medhatlthi (for which see p. 201), may 
be explained in the way that the undertaking 
by the surety himself, to pay the debt on 
behalf of the debtor, brings on him the 
liability to pay it himself. This undertaking, 
as Medhatlthi explains, is equivalent to 
a debt (incurred by him). The similarity 
is on the point of payment of both the types 
of money (the normal debt and the surety- 
debt) under all circumstances (avasVa-deyatvam) . 
Once this concept is applied to the ^case of 
the surety, the position of the son becomes 
quite convincing. As in the case of a normal 
debt, the obligation of the son arises 
because of his status as a son (putratvena, 
as explained by Vi jnanes'vara), independent 
of the question whether he inherits his 
estate or not, similarly that liability 
is extended in this case also because of 
the special position of the father-son 
relationship as conceived of in the sastras.
In the case of the surety for payment, the 
question of payment of the surety-debt by 
the son may be explained in the situation 
where the father leaves behind him an estate.
In such a case his obligation arises in 
twofold ways, both as a son and as the 
; inheritor of the estate. Where however such 
a surety does not leave behind any property, 
the liability of the son should be explained 
as spiritual in the sense that because the 
agreement of his father is regarded as 
equivalent to a debt and because the 
inability to discharge a debt is supposed 
to lead a man to hell, and because a father 
craves for the birth of a male issue for 
getting himself free from the possibility 
of falling into hell, the son has been 
directed to regard it as his principal duty
1. See above p. 4 85 , f.n. 2.
2. "A debt liability devolved as a surety, must never be paid by the son's 
son." Br. q. in the Smrticandrika (p. 152), See J.R. Gharpure, trans., 
p.283.
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to save M s  father from such unholy situation.
So far as the position of the son of the 
surety for the debtor's property is concerned, 
where the son also is made liable for the 
surety-debt of the father (as mentioned by 
Brhaspati, for which see p.226), no suitable 
explaination in support can be given except 
that the nature of the agreement provides 
for giving of something (arpana) ."*1
What is contained in this passage is, however, an explanation 
justifying the passage over to the son of the liability 
arising out of the suretyship contract of his father, not 
the contract itself. Although, in the end, the result may 
be, for all practical purposes, the same as one would have 
expected in respect of the father-surety, yet we may be 
wrong in treating this as inheriting the suretyship. For 
this lacks the main requirement of a valid suretyship agree­
ment. What we see is the product of Hindu law and not a
suretyship proper. The liability itself, however, passes
, . 2
over to the son by way of inheritance or survivorship.
Before we conclude, we have to examine the arthasastra 
provisions in respect of the surety-debt and the son's 
liability therefor. Once we have done that, we may draw 
our conclusions about the main point of our inquiry: whether
or not the suretyship debt be placed under the category 
of 'tainted debts'.
Arthasastra view: The Kautiliya arthasastra also
, ^
has, like the dharmasastra, a provision according to which 
the surety-debt of the father need not be paid by the son
1. H.N;Chatterjee, cited aobve, pp.218-219.
2. We shall not enter here into the question of the origin
of the son's title, which both the major schools recognise 
as deriving at least in significant part from the fact of 
the son's birth.
3. Pratibhavyam --- kamadanam ca nakamah putro dayado va
rikthaharo dadyat / Kaut.3.16.9, vide, R.P.Kangle, 
ed., pt.I, cited above, p. 122; for the trans., see 
pt. II, cited above, p.281.
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if he is unwilling to pay it. The same applies tc the
heir inheriting his property. On the contrary, by another
rule, not only the sons but also the grandsons are placed
under obligation to pay the surety-debts. As to the exact
meaning of this verse, however, there appears to be no one
opinion among the scholars - especially regarding the term
2
jivita-vivaha-bbumi. 7\ccording to Kangle, the meaning 
of this verse is, ''Sons or grandsons shall bear liability 
for suretyship concerning life, marriage or land to which
3
no restriction as to place or time applies;" while 
R.Shamasastry renders it, "Any debt, the payment of which 
is not limited by time or place or both for which life, 
marriage or land is pledged, shall be borne by sons or
4
grandsons." In the opinion of L.Sternbach this translation 
is probably wrong and hence he states that it should be like 
this, "The debt, the payment of which is not limited as 
to time or place, and in which (1) a person, (2) that which 
can be carried away, or (3) land form surety (i.e., security),
5
should be taken over by sons or grandsons. " But he himself does 
not feel sure of his own rendering. We have no convincing 
commentary nor does there appear any parallel rule in the 
dharmasastra which might have thrown some light on this 
problem. No convincing explanation has been offered, either,
1. Jivitavivahabhumipratibhavyamasarikhyatadesakalam tu 
putrah pautra v'a vaheyuh / Kaut. 3 .11 . 1 8 , ibid., pt.I,
p . 113.
2. On this controversy reference may be made to the following: 
L.Sternbach, cit.above, pp.189-90, f.n.60;
J .D .M.Derrett, cited above, f.n.30;
H .N.Chatterjee, cit.above, p . 198, f.n.1.
3. R.P.Kangle, pt.II, cited above, p.263.
4. R.Shamasastry, trans., Kautilya's Arthasastra,(Bangalore, 
1915), p.222.
5. L.Sternbach, op.cit., p . 190, f.n.60.
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on this problem by the scholars and we are left still in
i
a state of confusion.
t
Conclusion: Both the arthas'astra and dharmasastra
seem to agree on the issue that the sons should not be held
liable, generally, for the surety-debts of their father.
.But they appear to differ in that the first, appears to
place both debts (in general) as well as the surety-debt
2
on the same rooting in connection with son's liability 
to pay them (according to Kaut.3.11.18), while the latter 
has distinguished even between those surety-debts which 
are subject of son's liability and those which are not. 
Secondly, in 1 he view of the dharmasastra the nature of the 
suretyship-debt appears to signify that the liability is 
basically attached, depending on the kind or purpose of the 
suretyship, either to the person (in cases of the surety 
for honesty or appearance, for example) or to the property 
of the surety. Also, in most cases of suretyship an element 
of 'risk' is present, though the nature of the risk itself 
may not necessarily be 'sinister or immoral' as is generally 
the case with risks taken in connection with 'speculative 
business’ or 'robbery' etc.. From this point of view, it 
may be said that the denial of the sons' liability concerning 
surety-debt, generally, seems to be due to the 'personal' 
nature of the liability on the one hand, and the 'risky' 
nature on the other: especially, perhaps, to put some brakes
1. J.D.M. Derrett, op.cit., f.n.30, at p. (242) suggests that
"if one makes the small alteration of reading - pratibhavyam 
saiakhyata - the sense.is exact: - they are liable for limited 
suretyship (in point of country and time) provided it be surety­
ship for a livelihood (i.e. honesty) , a marriage (or betrothal) 
or landed property (to be mortgaged or sold etc.)"
In a sense, (when he says, in f.n.60, that "Probably we 
must understand that the sentence related to the problem 
of the limits to which the surety guaranteed for the 
principal debtor.") Sternbach, (cit.above, p . 190), 
appears to agree with the proposition limiting the scope 
of the liability in respect of this rule.
2. R.K.Ranade, cited above, p. 84.
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on fathers' generosity, so as to protect their families 
from losing their joint properties; for, during those 
days, there appear few traces of personal property known 
to us. In this sense the inclusion of certain categories 
of surety-debts, under the category of 'tainted debts', 
seems reasonable.
(b) Cases concerning surety debts: The father's
liability arising out of suretyship has, in certain cases, 
traditionally been looked at from the standpoint of his 
'illegal or immoral' debts, for the purpose of determining 
the son's liability to pay such debts. In this connection, 
Mr. Justice Ranade has said,
I
"Occuring in the context where it stands, 
it simply suggests that surety obligations 
recklessly incurred stand in the same 
category with other extravagant or immoral 
acts of the father which entail no liability 
on the sons."^
The father's liability arising out of his act of suretyship 
is therefore discussed here.
2
In Moolchand v. Krishna (1844) the Court of Sadar 
Divani Adalat had, on the advice of the Sastri, held that 
by Hindu law a son is always liable to fulfil the surety 
engagement of his deceased father to repay money as regards 
the amount of principal, and if a special agreement be made 
for interest, then he is also liable for interest. The
1. Tukarambhat v.G.Mulchand Guiar, (1899) I.L.R. 23 Bom.454, 
at p.458, discussed below at p. 500.
2. (1844) 2 Bellasis' Reports, 54.
It may be noted here that previously it was held that 
under Hindu law a creditor is required to establish his 
demand against the original debtor before he can come 
upon the security to that debtor to pay the debt. Also, 
it was held there that a widow is not liable for her 
husband's surety debts. Vide B.S.Keshoor v .Rajkoonwur, 
(1812) 1 Bor. 93.
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reporting of the case is so sketchy that hardly any comment 
could be made except: that the use of word ’always* would 
seem to be misleading. For, in appropriate cases, the 
son might not be held liable if such payment of money would 
be found to be for an immoral purpose.
i
In Nuthoo Lall v. Chedee Sahee (1369) the father had
incurred liability by way of suretyship in respect of payment
of certain tells at a ferry due from another person. Ancestral
property of the surety was sold. It was contended on behalf
of his sons that the sale was not binding on them because
2
the father's surety did not amount to a legal necessity.
The Court held that as the purpose to which the purchase- 
money was applied was to meet an obligation purely personal 
to the father, and as the sale in no way benefited the estate, 
the sale was illegal, and the purchaser had no right to refund 
of purchase-money. It would appear that in this case the 
Hindu law of surety debts was completely left out as if it 
did not exist. The suretyship debt of the father did not 
depend, for its validity, upon 'necessity* as understood 
in Hunoomanpershaud's case, and therefore its application 
here would seem to be out of context. However, the sons 
could have avoided their liability, it seems, on the ground 
of avyavaharika debt, had they based their defence accordingly. 
For, if the father's liability due to tells would not bind 
the sons generally, then his suretyship debt for the same 
purpose could hardly be binding on them.
3
In the case of Sitaramayya v. Venkatramanna (1888) 
the son was held liable, in a suit brought to recover money
1. (1884) 12 Suth. W.R. 446.
2. It may be noted here that although necessity and reckless­
ness on the part of the father was pleaded in Hiralal 
Marwari v. Chandrabali Haldarin, (1908) 13 C.W.N. 9, the
case was decided on the ground of the law of Limitation.
The father's surety was in respect of confidence and partly
in respect of payment, not of immoral or illegal nature.
3. (1888) I.L.R. 11 Mad. 373.
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from the anccstra.l property, on a surety bond executed by 
the father, since deceased. In support of the decision 
t h e :names of Manu, Yajnavalkya etc., were mentioned, but 
no discussion of .any particular smrti text is reported.
* n
In Tukarambhat v. G.Mulchand Gujar  ^ (1898) the facts 
were similar and the son was held liable for the father’s 
debt incurred as a surety. The Court had examined the 
sastric position on the subject in the case. According to 
its considered opinion, the obligation in respect of sureties 
for appearance and honesty was limited to the sureties 
themselves personally, and did not bind their sons? but 
the obligation in respect of sureties for payment of money 
lent and sureties for delivery of goods was binding on them,
3
and their sons also, after their death. Even as regards 
the first two classes of sureties, Justice Ranade said,
"If they have derived any advantage or received a pledge,
4
their heirs may be compelled to pay the debt." The use 
of the term 'heirs' would seem to be misleading in that it 
did not specify to whom exactly it applied. Moreover, he 
went on to say that
"The more general texts which class suretyship 
obligation with reckless and immoral debts 
must, therefore, be qualified by the particular 
texts quoted above, and when so explained, it 
becomes clear that they refer to particular 
classes of sureties which do not include 
sureties for payment of debts, in respect 
of which last class, unless the debt can 
• be shown to have been incurred for immoral 
or illegal purpose, the sons are^. liable to 
discharge their father's debts."
Apparently, the decision makes it clear that even in respect 
of those sureties for which the son would normally be held 
liable (i.e., payment of debts and delivery of goods etc.),
1. Ibid., at p. 374.
2. (1899) I.L.R. 23 Bom. 454.
3. Ibid., at p. 459.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., at p. 460.
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he might escape liability if he could show that the debt was 
incurred for immoral or illegal purposes.
The above two cases were followed in the case of The 
Maharaja of Benares v. Ramkumar Misir  ^ (1904). Here the 
father was surety for payment of rent by a lessee to his 
landlord. The surety's sons were held liable in spite of 
their contention that the rule applied cnly to transactions 
purely of a ready money character, and not to sureties for 
payment of rent etc..
In Narayan v. Venkatacharya  ^ (1904) a suit for execution 
of a decree against the grandfather for his suretyship was 
challenged by his grandson. It was held that the grandson 
was not liable, in view of the Mitaksara, for his grandfather's 
surety, "unless the latter in accepting the liability of the
3
surety received some consideration for it." This view 
would seem to be erroneous, for in Mitaksara there appears 
to be no such reference to this effect in respect of surety 
for payment of grandfather, (see above pp. 489-490).
In C.V.Reddiar v. C.K.V.Reddiar  ^ (1905), following
Sitaramayya and Tukarambhat's cases above, sons were held
liable for their father's security for payment of a grand-
5
mother's maintenance-money. Also, in Rasik Lai v. S.Rai 
(1912) the son was held liable for his father's surety for 
payment of debts. The case of Reddiar above was followed 
in D.Kameswaramma v. V.Venkatasubba Rao° (1915) where the 
facts were similar.
1. (1904) I.L.R. 26 All. 611, at p.615.
2. (1904) 6 Bom. L.R. 434.
3. Per Ranade, J., ibid.. Also, see Gour's Hindu Code,
4th edn., cit.above, at p. 545; S.V.Gupte, Hindu Law,
(1947 edn.), at p.738. It may be said that even Gupte's
view is not correct because the Privy Council's case, 
relied on there, was not of a surety.
4. (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 377.
5. (1912) I.L.R. 39 C a l . 843.
6. (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120, at p. 1122.
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i
In the case of Raghunandan Frasad v. Chem Ram (1915)
the son was held liable to discharge the liability created
by his father by way of indemnity clause. The Court observed
that "It cannot be said that the debt incurred by Murli
2Manohar (the father) was tainted with immorality." However, 
whether or not this was a case of surety is not clear from 
the facts of the case. Though the decision would seem to 
be correct in view of the facts of the case, whether such 
an indemnity clause would be binding upon a vendor’s sons, 
where the father alone was the vendor, would seem to depend 
on the nature of the liability. In such a case the liability
3
would not be one under suretyship properly so called.
4
In Thangathammal v. Arunachalam Chettiar (1918) a 
Hindu father executed a surety-bond stating that he would 
make the debtor pay within two months the amount due on 
a promissory note already executed by the latter and that, 
in default of the payment by the debtor, he would pay. The 
contention that the surety was for assurance and not for
1. (1915) 27 I.C. 895.
2. Ibid., at p. 896, c.1.
3. The essentials of a proper contract of surety:
"There must be a creditor, a principal debtor, and a 
quarantor or surety, who makes himself liable for the 
liability of the principal debtor. .. But where the contract 
between the surety and the creditor i s not a collateral 
undertaking but creates an original liability as between 
these two parties then the contract is not one of surety 
but one of indemnity." 
per Mullick, J., in Mahabir Prasad v.Siri Narayan, (1918)
3 Pat. L.J. 396, at pp. 399-400. ?.?his was a case of the 
father's liability due to indemnity, and because it was 
found not to be usual or customary, i.e., vyavaharika, 
the sons were held to be free from any liability.
Also, see Bharatpur State v. Sri Kishan Das, (1935),
I.L.R. 58 All. 804, (F.B.). The facts and decision in this
case would seem to be, in effect, similar to that of 
Mahabir Prasad's case. See particularly the judgement of 
Sulaiman, C.J., at p. 810.
Also, see Alla Venkataramanna v. P.Mangamma, I.L.R. 1944 
Mad. 86 7, where Bharatpur State's case was followed at p.888.
4. (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 1071.
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payment, and that the fact that the money had already been 
lent to the debtor before execution of the surety-bond was 
an indication of that, was overruled by the Court on the 
ground of express promise to pay by the father. The sons 
were held"liable.
i
In the case of Satya Charan Chandra v. Satpir Mahanty 
(1918) the father's liability arose out of his surety given 
for good behaviour of a stranger as Tahsildar to the decree- 
holders. The actual terms of the surety-bond showed that 
he stood surety in respect of any misappropriation of funds 
etc.. The Court held that the action of the father in 
standing surety for good behaviour of a stranger and pledging 
joint family property for that would be unlawful under Hindu 
law as affecting the son. After discussing certain points 
regarding illegal or immoral debts, the Court: said, "If a 
father's debt, incurred by his own breach of the law, is 
an illegal debt, then the father's debt, incurred by a
2
stranger's breach of criminal law, is also an illegal debt."
3
In the case of Balkrishna Sahai v. Sham Sundar Sahai 
(1920) the son was sued to recover from him his father's 
surety debt. Following the decision in Mahabir Prasad v.
Sri Narayan (1918) 3 Pat. L.J. 396 (see f.n.3 at p.502 above), 
the Court held that
"A Hindu son or grandson governed by the 
Mitaksara Law is liable for the debt of his 
, father or grandfather due on account of 
a contract of suretyship for the payment 
of money and which comes within the meaning 
of vvavahara, ... unless the^transaction is 
either illegal or immoral."
Although the decision in respect of the son's liability was 
correct, the remarks concerning the grandson's liability were
1. (1919) 4 Pat. L.J. 309; cf. Choudhari Govinda Charan Das 
v.Hayagriba Upadhaya, (1931) I.L.R.10 Pat.94, (see p505 below)
2. Per Roe, J . , ibid., at p.311.
3. (1920) 56 I.C. 962.
4. Ibid., c .2 .
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incorrect. Fcr the case relied on for the purpose was, 
in the first place, not a case of a 'surety' proper, but 
of an 'indemnity'; and secondly, its view on the point 
was 'obiter1, and therefore, it could hardly be taken as 
an authority.
I
In Brij Nath Prasad v. Bindeshwari Prasad Singh (1925) 
the grandfather had undertaken liability as surety in case 
a guardian was found liable but failed to pay to his ward.
His grandson contended that neither he nor his joint family 
property was liable for the debt under Hindu law. However, 
the property in his hand was held liable. Apparently, the 
decision would seem to go against the decisions on the 
subject, (see above Narayan v. Venkatacharya's case at p.501 
or Lyallpur Bank's case at.p.506 below); for^there was • 
nothing to show that the grandfather had received any 
consideration in return for his suretyship.
2
In the case of Chakhan Lai v. Kanhaiya Lai (1929) the 
father assured his brother's creditor that in default of 
payment by his brother, he would pay the debts. Following 
the cases of Maharaja of Benares, and Rasik Lai (see above 
P-501)/ the Court held that undoubtedly the liability of the
3
father in this case was binding on his sons. Also, the
4
decision in Mata Din Kandu v . Ram Lakhan (1930) was the 
same as in the above case. Here the father had assured 
payment.of a decretal debt of another person.
i
5
In the case of Tulshi Prasad v. Dip Frakash (1931)
the son was held liable for his father's suretyship debts.
In this connection, the Court said, "So far this Court is
concerned, it is settled law that ordinarily a son is liable
for the surety debt of his father unless it is shown that
£
the debt is tainted with immorality."
1. A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 609.
2. A.I.R. 1929 All. 72.
3. Ibid., at p . 74.
4. (1930) I.L.R. 52 All. 153.
5. (1931) I.L.R. 53 All. 695.
6. Ibid., at p. 697.
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The father in Choudhari Govinda Charan Das v. Hayagriba
Upadhaya * (1S31) stood surety in the matter of appointing
a guardian for damage, waste, misappropriation etc. of the
ward's property by the guardian. Following Satya Charan
Chandra's case (see p,503 above), it was held that the security
.bond was for the honesty of the guardian, and under Hindu
law, the liability of the surety could not be enforced against
the ancestral property in the hands of the son and grandsons.
Further, it was held that "such a plea can be successfully
taken by the son even after the property has been sold in
2
execution of a decree against the father." However, going 
by the facts of Satya Charan Chandra's case, it may be said 
that it would depend upon actual terms of the surety-bond, 
and also the nature of the acts of the person in respect 
of whom the surety was given in each case. '
3
In the case of Hanumantha Rao v. Venkatakrishnayya 
(1933) what appears to be a surety for appearance and confid­
ence in that the father had undertaken liability in case 
a judgement-debtor did not file his insolvency petition 
within the time allowed, was construed to be for payment 
on the ground that a decree was passed against the father 
in respect of the said liability and hence it was a decretal 
debt. As regards the liability of his sons, after his death, 
the Court said that
. "It appears to me that a surety debt which is 
not either immoral or illegal is one which the 
sons are bound to pay unless it is one for 
honesty or appearance, and in my opinion the 
obligation undertaken that the judgement- 
debtor would file an insolvency petition 
being outside any of four undertakings 
enumerated in the texts should be held as 
one binding on the sons.
1,. (1931) I.L.R. 10 Pat. 94.
2. Ibid., at p. 104.
3. (1933) 65 M.L.J. 609.
4. Ibid., at p. 616, per Pakenham Walsh, J . ; cf.
K .Lakshminarayana1s case, below at p. 507.
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The distinction made on the ground of undertakings mentioned 
in the texts would seem to be too literal and therefore 
unconvincing. One would think that the Court should have 
determined the nature of the father's surety in the context 
of the undertakings enumerated in the texts.
1In Dwarka Das v. Kishan Das (1933) the father had 
executed a surety-bond for payment of a certain amount in 
a family compromise. However, after his death, his son 
refused to recognise the liability in a suit by the bond­
holder to execute the bond. After upholding the legal 
position that the son is liable for the father's liability 
in respect of the surety for payment, the Court said, "But 
if the,surety for appearance or for confidence had bound 
himself after taking some property in pledge, then his son
must also pay the suretyship debt, from the property taken 
2
in pledge." The son's liability in such a case would 
therefore clearly depend upon and to the extent of the 
property taken in pledge; otherwise he would not be liable 
for this kind of surety. It was also held, obiter, that 
"the liability of the grandson for the payment of the debt
3
incurred as surety does not exist."
Following the decision in Narayan v. Venkatacharya,
^ 4
(see above p.501) in Lyallpur Bank Ltd. v. Mehr Chand (1934)
the grandson was not held to be liable for his grandfather's
liability due to suretyship for payment unless the grand-
; 5
father had received consideration for the debts. In this 
case there was no evidence to the effect that the grandfather 
had received any consideration, and therefore, the grandson 
was free from any liability. However, this decision and 
that of Narayan v. Venkatacharya were rightly criticized
1 . (1933) I.L.R. 55 All. 675.
2. Ibid., at p. 681.
3. Ibid.
4. A.I.R. 1934 Peshawar 132.
5. Ibid., at p. 133, c.2.
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on this point of the grandson's liability for his grand­
father's such debts in Sarwan v. Kunjilal's case, A.I.R.
1951 M.E. 49, discussed below at p. 510.
'I
In K. Lakshminarayana v. Hanumantha Rao (1935) the 
father had executed a surety-bond, undertaking that a 
judgement-debtor would file an insolvency petition within 
a specifled period. The petition was not filed and in the 
meantime the father died. The surety w~as held to be 'for 
confidence' or 'for honesty' and therefore the sons were 
not liable. The decision would seem to be correct, for it
has followed the law correctly.
The decision in Dhir Narain Chand v. Shiva Sahay 
2
Chaudhary (1935) was to a similar effect in that the sons 
were not held liable for their father's liability due to 
surety for appearance. The person for whose appearance 
the surety was given died before the date concerned.
In Satrohan Singh v. Uma Dutt  ^ (1935), due to the Court's 
order, but without personal responsibility, the father had 
executed a security bond hypothecating family property to 
pay costs that might be awarded against a third party to the 
decree-holder. In the suit of the decree-holder to execute 
the bond against the family property, the Court, after 
distinguishing Maharaja of Benares and Sitaramayya's cases 
(discussed above pp.501 and 499 respectively), said that,
' "In our opinion a debt incurred personally
by the father in a joint Hindu family for 
being surety for payment of money, as 
distinguished from a debt for being a 
surety for appearance or for honesty for 
another, is binding under Hindu law upon sons, 
but a mere hypothecation of the joint family 
property for the purpose of securing a debt 
cannot be enforced against the joint family 
property, unless it can be shown, in some
1 . (1 935) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 375.
2. A.I.R. 1935 Pat. 127.
3. A.I.R. 1935 Oudh 455.
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manner that the hypothecation was for  ^
legal necessity or for antecedent debt."'
In the present case it was not alleged that any such 
circumstances were present.
In the cases of Malak Chand v. Hira Lal“ (1935) .,
3
Shamrao Keshav v. Sbantaram Naik, (193 5), Pandurang v.Abdul
Hussain^ (1 939), Daljit Singh v. Harkishan Lai Sah~* (1940),g
Kanjeshwar Nath v. Benares Bank L t d . (1940) the sons were 
held liable for their fathers' sureties for payment. The 
facts and the circumstances of these cases involved hardly 
any scope for criticism, for the decisions were straight­
forward in accordance with Hindu law.
7
In the case of Kesar Chand v. Uttam Chand (1945) the 
father's surety-bond was construed in the light of an order 
of the Court below, and actual terms of the bond. Accordingly, 
their Lordships of the Privy Council held on the construction 
of the surety bond that the scope of the liability of the 
surety was limited to proceedings against the properties 
specified only, thus creating a charge on them excluding
g
all personal liability. Thus, due to lack of personal 
liability on the part of the surety, the bond ultimately 
proved to be no value because, in the absence of any debts 
due from the father, the Privy Council avoided the liability 
in respect of both secured and unsecured properties by reason 
of the pious obligation on the sons to pay the father's debt 
and passed the decree accordingly in favour of the sons and 
the grandson.^
1. Ibid., at p. 456, c.2.
2. A.I.R. 1935 O u d h . 510.
3. A.I.R. 19 35 Bom. 174.
4. I.L.R. 1939 Nag. 536.
5. A.I.R. 1940 All. 116.
6. A.I.R. 1940 All. 196.
7. A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 91.
8. Ibid., see p. 93, c.2.
9. Ibid., see p. 94, c.1 & 2.
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However, one would have thought that the terms that 
"I stand surety for ..., and I agree that my movable and 
immovable properties detailed thereunder shall be liable" 
etc. (my emphasis) seemed clear enough to impute personal 
liability to the father, at least to the extent of property 
comprised in the bond; and if so, the sons', but not the 
grandson's, shares would seem to have been liable.
1
In Lingbhat v. Parappa (1951) the question raised, 
in view of the above Privy Council decision, was whether 
the sons were liable by reason of their pious obligation 
to pay the father's debt incurred as a surety for payment 
of money, out of their joint family properties.
After explaining at length the decision in Kesar 
Chand' s case (above), the High Court held tha>t
"The whole question, in our opinion, turns 
on the terms of the surety bond. If under 
the terms of the surety bond the father 
has rendered himself personally liable, 
be it an ordinary personal bond or even 
a mortgage or a pledge importing personal 
liability for the deficit if any on the 
realisation of the security, the sons 
are certainly liable to pay the father's 
personal debt incurred in this manner to 
the extent of their right, title and ^
interest in the joint family properties."
Thus, the father's personal liability would have to be
established for the purpose of attracting the son's liability
\
to pay such debts of the father. In view of the facts of
the case, the sons' appeal was dismissed. In the opinion
of the Court, the law on the subject remained unchanged,
for the decision in Kesar Chand v. Uttam Chand did not make
any departure from the true position as it obtained before 
3
1945; i.e., as explained above, the surety debts of the
father would be binding on the sons.
1. A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 1.
2. Ibid., at p.2, c.2.
3. Ibid., see p.4, c.1.
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In the case of Sarwan v. Kun^i L a i * (1951) the question
to be decided was whether the grandson is liable for his
grandfather's suretyship for payment. It was contended
that he was not liable, unless it is proved that consideration
was received by the grandfather for accepting the suretyship.
After carefully reviewing the case-law and the sastric
position on the point - which we have already discussed above
(f.n.1 - 2 at p. 486 & f.n. 2 at p. 489) - Mr. Justice
Chaturvedi held that under Hindu law, a grandson is not
liable for a debt contracted by his grandfather as surety,
and the question whether any consideration was received by
2
the grandfather does not arise. In view of the fact that
I
this was a well considered judgement, though of a single 
judge, it. may be said that the law laid down here would seem 
to be correct; for the texts have expressly .confined the 
obligation to pay only to the surety's sons.
3
The cases of Kalappa v. Venkatesh (1962), Hindustan
4
Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Sohanlal Gagumal (1970) and Kanisetti----------------------
A. Rao v. A .R. Reddi (1970) concerned the son's liability 
to pay his father's surety for payment, and in all these cases 
the sons were held liable. In the last mentioned case, the 
Court said, "It made no difference to their liability that 
the money had already been lent to the debtor before the 
surety-bond was executed."^ In rhe Hindustan Commercial Bank 
case, the sons' contention was based on the want of any 
family need or benefit. But the Court held that
"the surety-bond in question created a personal 
liability on the father to pay the third person's 
debt; and that debt being neither illegal nor
1. A.I.R. 1951 M.B. 49.
2. Ibid., at p. 51, c.1.
3. A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 260.
4. A.I.R. 1970 P.&H. 67 (F.B.).
5. A.I.R. 1970 A.P. 158 (F.B.).
6. Ibid., at p. 162, c.2.
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immoral, the joint family estate in the hands 
of the sons was liable for the payment of the 
same in view of the pious obligation of the 
sons to pay their father's debts."
There was hardly anything to comment upon in the above 
cases, which has already not been covered in the above 
discussion.
A .1 .3 CONCLUSION
Thus, to sum up the present position, it may be said 
that (i) in respect of surety for payment or performance 
of a contract to deliver goods, etc., the son is generally 
liable.under the pious obligation if the principal debtor 
defaults after the father's death, provided the terms of 
the surety-bond disclosed personal liability 'of the father 
and the purpose of the debt was not illegal or immoral.
The grandson is not at all liable for such debts, both in 
the eyes of the sastras and the modern Courts of law; perhaps 
in order to restrain indefinite liability under a contract 
of which the party pursued (i.e., grandson) has no personal 
notice and as a check on fraud. However, identity of father 
and son appears to be useful here, especially where joint 
family is needed (as in partnership law) to secure the lender,
(ii) As regards surety for honesty or appearance, no financial 
liability may ever arise, but if At does after surety's life­
time, the receiver of the surety is to lose his right against 
the male issue generally, simply because no debt of the father 
occurred in his lifetime. When a pledge or other security
was taken by the surety himself, i.e., the father, at dharma- 
* 2sastra the sons and heirs would be liable , but this rule
3
also would seem to have been abandoned in modern Hindu law
1. A.I.R. 1970 P.& H. 67, (F.B.), at p.74.
2. See above, p. 491 ff.
3. For a similar view, see J.D,M.Derrett, Suretyship in India, 
etc., cit.above, pp.
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(see above the case of Sarwan v. Kunjilal, at p. 510.)
(iii) Looked at from the dharma concept, it may be said
that as a surety for payment is likely to become a creditor
(after meeting his surety liability) of the debtor, chere 
seems to be hardly any dharma in agreeing to be surety. 
.However, a surety for honesty or appearance seems to agree 
to do so out of dharma. Whether he alone can claim the
merit of this, under the mimamsa doctrine on the subject
of vicarious merit, or whether it can be shared by his 
sons, etc., seems to depend upon the choice of philosophy; 
for mimamsa is, as seen above (see pp. 393-394), only 
one of many equally valid philosophies.
■v
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A P P E N D I X  II
Pavara, Visvasarava, Gharanyaca Aitihasika Kagada-Samgraha
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Pavara, Visvasaraya , Gharanyaca Aitihasika Kagada-Samgraha 
Transliteration LEKHANKA - J_ . 10.12.1677
Mahajaranama ba tarikha 2 4 malie savala roja dusabe 
su samana sana 1087 Surata majalcsi kasabe Paranera sababa 
amki rajasrl Bubajl raje valada KrsnajI raje Pavara mokadama 
mauje Supe pa Paranera yasi Vithoji valada Dasapatlla Vadekara 
mokadama ka Vade ta ma sa Junara lehona didhale yaise je 
apala ganva tumhasa sana 1085 va sana 1086 madhe jagira 
hota. tyasa ugavanlbadala apala bapa Dasapatlla va Ramaji 
valada Vithoji Desapadiya ta ma he doghe anaunu kasabe 
Paraneri jagira mhanaunu adabakh'ana ghaluna bulakhi Copadara 
cakara hajuri mahasala thevila hota tyasa Dasapatlla majakure 
va Ramaji Desapadiyanen bulakhi Copadara adabakhaniyata 
ratri adaracya adara kothadimadhen phasi ghaluna bulakhi 
pura karuna khuna kela ani bulakhi majakuraci mata mohara 
90 navada hotya tya gheuna adabakh'ana phoduna Dasapatlla va 
Ramaji Desapadiya palona gele. tyavarl Copadaraca varisa 
darabarin jaunu phiryada jala. kunabaha va tyaci mata je 
geli hot! te yaise sadarahu pai darabari tumhasa padile te 
tumhi deuna Copadaraca mamila pharikha kela. tyavarl sahebi 
Vadekarasa talaba pathavili kim hajura yeuna khunaca va mateca 
javaba karane. tyavarl apala bapa Dasapatlla va Ramaji 
Desapadiya hatlm lagale nahimta. pajona gele. maga apanasa 
Dasapatilaca pharjada mhanaunu talabe gheunu ale. tyasa 
maharaje pharmavile kim apala khuna kela ahe va tyaci mata. 
neli ahe tyaca javaba karanen. apanasa darabari mavalaga 
paike padile aheta mhanaunu pharmavile. tyasa khunabaha 
pahata rajaputa mela tyaca khunabaha sone mana sade tlna 
hote. tyace paike mabalaga hotati. javaba karavale. nava 
jati mhanaunu radabadala jaliyavari khunabaha rupaye 1240 
barase calisa va mata mohara 90 nau (da) dara moharesi 
rupaye 14 pra rupaye 1260 barase sathl mokara rupaye hajara
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2500 adica he apana barajaye rakabata khuda kabula kele. 
he paike Dasapatlla va Ramaji Desapadiye ya hara dojana 
mudatl mahine tina mokarara keli ahe. te mudatisa jhada 
karitila. jari mudatisa jhada na k&ritlia tari Vadaci 
mckadami va desapadepana tumhasa mirasa karunu didhali 
ase tim donahi vatanen lekarace lekarl arjanl karanen. 
ha mahajara sahl.
da Govida Jaganatha a Desapadiye ka Paranera. 
da Giramaji Govida a Desasadive pa Paranera. 
da Abadula Karima va Gayaji Desarnukha pa Paranera. 
da Raghoji Bab.aji a Desarnukha pa Paranera. 
da Mokadama va Setiye va Mahajana kasabe Paranera. 
da Raghoji NTlakatha Kulakarni ka ma. 
di ApajI Krsna Citinisa pu Paranera.
Ni Nagara Vithoji Patila.
T r a n s l a t i o n
The Historical Records of the Pavar, Visvasarao Family
The document No. 1, dated 10.12.1677
The statement dated 24th of the tenth month (i.e.) 
second day of the eighth (month) of the Arabic year 1087 
(10.12.1677 A .D .) in connection with the decision of the 
Surata Court in the case concerning the chief town Paraner 
is hereby given in writing by Vithoji, the son of Dasapatil 
Vadekar, the head of the chief village Vade, taluka Junar, 
to Bubaji Raje, the son of Krsn'&ji Raje Pavar, the head of 
the village Supe, district Paraner (which is) as follows:
"My village was assigned to you for the collection 
of revenue during the years 1085 and 1086. (However) in 
connection with realization of the revenue concerned, my 
father Dasapatil and Vithoji Desapadiya1s son Ramaji went 
to the (district) treasury at the chief town Paraner where
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public revenue was deposited. (It) was in the custody of 
the Copadara (attendant) - a Government servant. Both 
Dasapatil and Ramaji Desapadiya grudgingly (or vengefully) 
claimed their right to the amount realized. They personally 
overpowered the attendant and forced him into one of the 
rooms where in the darkness of the night, they murdered 
him by strangulation; and then, they broke open his safe, 
stole his property - 90 mohuras (gold coins) and ran away. 
Thereupon the heir (son) of the Copadara lodged a complaint 
to the (Xing’s) Council. You had settled the litigation 
regarding the right of collection of revenue by paying the 
whole amount (both) in respect of compensation for the murder 
and his property in accordance with the order of the Council 
(Court). Your Lordship, then, lodged a demand for the payment 
from the Vadekaras (i.e. Dasapatil and Ramaji, Desapadiya).
In this connection the King summoned the Vadekaras to 
personally attend and answer the charges regarding the murder 
and the property concerned. However, my father Dasapatil 
and Ramaji Desapadiya could not be found. (They) ran away. 
Hence I was taken to answer the demand because of my being 
Dasapatil's son. There, the King said that the murder of 
his (servant) is committed and his property is stolen, (so) 
answer the charges. He (also) mentioned that his treasury 
was full of money. Regarding the compensation for murder 
(I was told that) the dead man being Rajaputa, the compensation 
for his murder would usually be three and a half mana of gold. 
Its cost in terms of money amounted to a very large sum. The 
witnesses were called (and cross-examined). (I) prayed for
mercy, and in the presence of (respected people of) nine 
castes, (humbly) requested to fix the amount to be charged 
to the extent of what was paid by his Lordship (Raje Pavar) 
into the Court. After long discussion, compensation for the 
murder was fixed at Rupees 1240 twelve hundred forty, and 
fpr the property - mohuras 90 nine(ty), Rupees 1260 twelve 
hundred sixty, at the rate of R s . 14 per mohur, making a grand
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total of Rupees 2 500 tv,o and a half thousand as original 
sum due; (and) to the payment of which (I) personally 
agreed, (lit. I accepted it to be placed on my own neck).
The amount due was to be paid by each of the two - Dasapatil 
and Ramaji Desapadiya, (or on their behalf) within the 
fixed period of three months. They were (ordered) to pay 
in the time. If (they) failed to pay within the time, the 
authority to manage the village Vade (i.e. MokadamI) and 
powers of Desapade would belong to you as Mirasa (an heredita 
right to land-tax). You may enjoy these two rights (or title 
from generation to generation. This statement is given in 
writing;" signature.
Comments: The word khunabaha is important. It means
compensation for a murder. Usually, it was paid to the 
victim's heirs or relations. That such payments were 
extracted from the criminal's sons is quite clear from the 
mahajara.
There is no mention of fine in the case. However, in 
view of the king's utterance that his treasury is full of 
money, it seems that he may have uttered those words to 
assure the son (of Dasapatil) that he need not extract any 
money by way of a fine from the son, and therefore perhap‘3, 
the son was not made to pay any fine in this case. We cannot 
be sure, however, as to whether a fine was included in the 
original payment (made by Raje Pavar). However, it is quite 
clear that the son was made to pay his father's debts arising 
both by way of compensation for a murder committed by him 
of another person, and reimbursement of the property stolen 
by his father.
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